ORDER This petition is filed by the daughter of the detenu challenging the order of detention made by the District Collector and District Magistrate, Coimbatore District under Sec.3 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982). 2. By the said Order in Cr.M.P.No.18 of 1996 dated 10.10.1996, the District Collector and District Magistrate, the 2nd respondent herein, has declared one Tmt.Saroja alias Rosa, aged 38 years, as a ‘Bootlegger’ within the meaning of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, as there was compelling necessity to detain her in order to prevent her from indulging in any such activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under the said Act. 3. The Detaining Authority has shown the following cases to vouch the activities of the detenu which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public Order: (1) In Perumanallur Police Station, Crime No.68 of 1995, a case was registered for an offence under Sec.4(1)(i), T.N.P. Act, she was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate-I, Tiruppur, in S.T.C. No.526 of 1995 for sale of arrack. (2) In Perumanallur Police Station, Crime No.141 of 1995, a case was registered for an offence under Sec.4(1)(i), T.N.P. Act, she was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate-I, Tiruppur, in S.T.C. No.2837 of 1995 for sale of arrack. (3) In Perumanallur Police Station, Crime No.168 of 1995, a case was registered for an offence under Sec.4(1)(i), T.N.P. Act, and the same is pending trial before the Special Magistrate, Tiruppur in C.C.No.7 of 1996 for sale of I.D. arrack. (4) In Perumanallur Police Station, Crime No.380 of 1995 a case was registered for an offence under Sec.4(1)(a), T.N.P. Act, for transporting the I.D. arrack, and she was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate-I, Tiruppur in S.T.C. No.2836 of 1995. (5) In Perumanallur Police Station, Crime No.l 19 of 1996, a case was registered for an offence under Sec.4(1)(a), T.N.P. Act, for transporting the illicit arrack and she was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate-I, Tiruppur in S.T.C. No.2118 of 1996. (6) In Perumanallur Police Station, Crime No.246 of 1996, a case was registered for an offence under Sec.4(q)(a), T.N.P. Act, for transporting the illicit arrack, a case has bene filed before the Judicial Magistrate-I, Tiruppur and the trial is pending. 4. (6) In Perumanallur Police Station, Crime No.246 of 1996, a case was registered for an offence under Sec.4(q)(a), T.N.P. Act, for transporting the illicit arrack, a case has bene filed before the Judicial Magistrate-I, Tiruppur and the trial is pending. 4. Apart from these six cases, the Detaining Authority has stated one more case registered against her as the ground case wherein on 18.9.1996 at about 5.00 P.M. the accused (detenu) sold I.D. arrack to one Ponnudurai for Rs.10 saying that it was a special kind of arrack which would give effective intoxication. By believing the words of the detenu, Ponnudurai consumed the arrack and he felt giddiness and irritation in his chest, throat and abdomen and vomitted twice before reaching Pandian Nagar bus stop. On 19.9.1996 at about 10.00 hrs. Thiru Ponnudurai went to Perumanallur Police Station and gave a complaint to the Inspector of Police, who registered a case against the detenu in Crime No.311 of 1996 under Sec.4(1)(i), T.N.P. Act read with 328, I..P.C. went to Pandian Nagar, where the detenu was selling arrack, arrested the detenu and seized the various properties used for sale of arrack including a cash of Rs.10, which was the sale amount of arrack, in the presence of witness under a cover of mahazar. The Inspector of Police has also taken two 750 ml. samples from the arrack and sent it for chemical examination. The chemical examiner issued a certificate to the effect that the sample contained Ethyl Alchohol, Acid, Easters, Higher Alchohol, Aldheydes and Atropine, which is a poisonous substance. The Medical Officer in the Government Hospital, Avinashi, examined the said Ponnudurai and issued a Certificate. The accused (detenu), who was arrested by the Inspector of Police, produced before the competent Court of Law and remanded to custody. On the reports submitted by the Inspector of Police, the sponsoring authority herein, the Collector and the District Magistrate, Coimbatore District, has passed the, Order of detention. The petitioner has challenged the said Order on many grounds. The respondents have filed their counter refuting the various grounds raised in the petition. 5. The main contentions on the side of the petitioner are that- (a) the various acts alleged against the detenu will not fall under the definition of ‘bootlegger’ under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. (b) the Detaining Authority has not applied his mind before passing the order of detention. 5. The main contentions on the side of the petitioner are that- (a) the various acts alleged against the detenu will not fall under the definition of ‘bootlegger’ under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. (b) the Detaining Authority has not applied his mind before passing the order of detention. Sec.2 (b) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 which defines ‘Bootlegger’ means a person, who distils, manufactures, stores, transports, imports exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in contravention of any of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 (Tamil Nadu Act X of 1937) and the rules, notifications and orders made thereunder, or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance of support of the doing of any of the above mentioned things by or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing.” 6. It was vehemently argued on the side of the petitioner that on the solitary incident of the ground case, the other of detention has been passed by the Detaining Authority which is totally not in accordance with law. Learned Additional public Prosecutor appearing for the State has argued that the detenu has four convictions under Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937, two cases for sale of I.D. arrack and two cases for transporting I.D. arrack, that one case for sale of arrack is pending trial before the Special Magistrate, Tiruppur in C.C.No.7 of 1996 and another case in Perumanallur Police Station in Crime No.246 of 1996 for transporting arrack before the Judicial Magistrate-I, Tiruppur and all these cases have been registered in the years 1995 and 1996 and therefore the detenu is a ‘bootlegger’ within the meaning of the Act. A perusal of the records show that she had four convictions to her credit by a competent court of law and two cases are pending trial under the said Act apart from that another case has bene registered against here which is shown as ground case, in the order of detention. From the records, it is shown that the transporting and selling I.D. arrack, a kind of liquor, which are offences punishable under Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937. From the records, it is shown that the transporting and selling I.D. arrack, a kind of liquor, which are offences punishable under Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937. The detenu had continued the said activities in the year 1995 and 1996 till her arrest by the Inspector of Police on 19.9.1996 in the ground case. Transporting and selling I.D. arrack, which is a prohibited variety of liquor to public said to be acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Detaining Authority in para-4 of the grounds of detention has clearly stated that she has acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 7. It was further contended on the side of the petitioner that the entire detention order has been based on the ground case and one single incident cannot be taken as ‘habitual’. In Vijaynarain Singh v. State of Bihar Vijaynarain Singh v. State of Bihar, 1984 3 S.C.C. 14 the Supreme Court held: “The word habitually’ means repeatedly’ or ‘persistently’. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit.” When we apply the said dictum to the instant case, it is clear that the accused (detenu) had four previous convictions and two cases pending trial against her apart from the ground case, which are all cases filed by Perumanallur Police either for transporting or selling I.D. arrack. The contention of the petitioner, that solely on the basis of the ground case the Detaining Authority has passed the order of detention is baseless, when the detenue had number of cases under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937, to her credit. The various convictions to the credit of the detenue under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act will clearly embrace the definition of ‘bootlegger’ under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. Therefore the first contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 8. The various convictions to the credit of the detenue under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act will clearly embrace the definition of ‘bootlegger’ under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. Therefore the first contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 8. It was argued on the side of the petitioner that the Detaining Authority has not applied his mind while passing the order of detention as the activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order and Public health and pointed out that the certificate of the chemical analyst based on the sample seized from the arrack which was in the possession of the detenue would not reveal that the arrack sold by her was containing poisonous substance as to affect human health. It was further contended that the complainant Ponnudurai and on whose complaint, the ground case was registered was hale and healthy when he gave the complaint before the Inspector of Police, Perunmanallur, on 19.9.1996 and therefore the I.D. arrack alleged to have been sold by the detenu was not containing atropine substance to that extent of spoiling the health of human beings. We need not go deep into the merits of the case on the basis of the Chemical Analyst report and on other substance available on record, the Detaining Authority has come to a subjective satisfaction. There is no valid reason to interfere with the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority. 9. It was contended on the side of the petitioner that there was no valid reason for the Detaining Authority to detain her under Act. 14 of 1982, on the ground that she was likely to be enlarged on bail and in the event of her release on bail she would indulge in such activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. To substantiate this point, the learned counsel for petitioner has pointed out the dismissal of bail application filed by her before the learned Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, and also before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. It is clear from the documents that she had applied for bail before the Sessions Judge, Coimbatore in C.M.P. No.2935 of 1996 and the same was dismissed by the said court. She applied for bail before the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl.O.P. No.7725 of 1996 and the same was also dismissed by the High Court. It is clear from the documents that she had applied for bail before the Sessions Judge, Coimbatore in C.M.P. No.2935 of 1996 and the same was dismissed by the said court. She applied for bail before the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl.O.P. No.7725 of 1996 and the same was also dismissed by the High Court. Showing the dismissal of the bail applications, it was further argued that there was no opportunity for the accused to come out of Judicial Custody. This argument of the learned counsel for petitioner cannot be accepted, as the Apex Court of India, uniformly held that a valid detention order can be passed against a person in jail. In Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Bhadwan and another4 Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Bhadwan and another4, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 33 the Apex Court held: “As an abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Sec.3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in Jail. Take for instance a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the Detaining Authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from Jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, against the considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority, is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely to be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. Therefore, We are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in Jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case. The question which still remains to be considered is: Can a person in Jail custody, like the petitioner, be served with an order of detention whilst he is in such custodye In dealing with this point, it is necessary to state the relevant facts which are not in dispute. The petitioners was arrested on the 25th January, 1963. He has been custody ever since. On the 15th February, 1963 when the order of detention was served on him, he was in jail custody. On these facts, what we have to decide is: was it open to the Detaining Authority to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent her from acting in a prejudicial manner when the petitioner was locked up in jaile We have already seen the logical process which must be followed by the authority in taking action under Sec.3(1)(a). The first stage in the process is to examine the material adduced against a person to show either from his conduct or his antecedent history that he has been acting in a prejudicial manner. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in prejudicial manner manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in prejudicial manner manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If this question is answered against the petitioner, then the detention order can be properly made.” In Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 482 the Supreme Court held: “From the catena of decisions of this Court it is clear that even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can validly be passed if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; if he has reason to believe on the basis of the reliable material that there is a possibility of his being released on bail and that on being so released, the detenu would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities and if the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction the same cannot be struck down.” From the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that if the Detaining Authority has reason to believe on the basis of the reliable material that there is a possibility in the event of here release, that she in all probability would indulge in prejudicial activities, such a subjective satisfaction of the authority cannot be struck down. The Detaining Authority herein has shown six previous cases and also the ground case filed against the detenu under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act and had come to the subjective satisfaction for the necessity to keep her under detention. When the subjective satisfaction is well based on the case which either ended in conviction or which the accused in facing trial at the time of passing the order, the said satisfaction arrived at by the authority cannot be termed as wrong. In such circumstances, when there are sufficient materials to detain the accused on well based grounds. The order of the Detaining Authority has to be upheld. From the foregoing reasons, it is clear that the detention order passed against the detenue has to be upheld to and the petition be dismissed. 9. In the result, habeas corpus petition is dismissed. B.S.-----Petition dismissed.