K. Rajendran v. Charirman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Anna Salai, Madras
1997-09-24
RENGASAMY
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER: 1. This writ of certiorari is to quash the order of the first respondent, the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, confirming the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner has narrated the following facts. The petitioner was working as a First Grade Foreman in the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board at Peravoorani in Thanjavur District. On 22 9.1986, he applied for one day causal leave and in continuation of his casual leave, he extended one month earned leave due to his ill-health as his one leg and one hand did not function properly and he was taking treatment at that time. But, his leave was refused by the Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Peravoorani, who returned his leave application. But as he was not in his house at that time, the letter sent to him was re-directed to the Assistant Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Peravoorani. After he became normal, he informed the Electricity Board that he wanted to join the duty but before that, a show cause notice dated 12.3.1987 was issued to him by the Assistant Divisional Engineer (Operation & Maintenance), Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Pattukkottai alleging that he continuously absented himself for more than ten days, that he did not attend the office without valid reasons and he gave a wrong address in the earned leave application. Thereafter, disciplinary enquiry was initiated against the petitioner for charges that he absented himself for more than ten days without prior permission and that he gave wrong residential address in his earned leave application. After the completion of the enquiry, on the report of the fourth respondent, the enquiry officer, the third respondent issued a show cause notice on 4.1.1988 as to why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner requested the third respondent to furnish him with a copy of the enquiry proceedings as per his letter dated 13.1.1988 but the third respondent rejected his request. Though he gave his explanation on 29.1.1988 denying the charges against him, the third respondent passed the orders on 4.2.1988 removing him from service permanently. His appeal before the second respondent, the Regional Chief Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Trichy, was dismissed and finally his appeal before the first respondent, the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, also met with the same fate. 3.
His appeal before the second respondent, the Regional Chief Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Trichy, was dismissed and finally his appeal before the first respondent, the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, also met with the same fate. 3. Due to his ill-health, he was undergoing treatment and therefore, he could not attend the office. He also sent the earned leave application but the same has been returned without sanctioning the leave and he was residing in the same address which was given in the leave application. Therefore, the dismissal order is illegal. As there was no other remedy for him, the petitioner has filed this petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order of the first respondent. 4. Mr.A.R.Nagarajan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the petitioner was suffering due to paralytic stroke for which he was undergoing treatment, both under allopathy doctor and thereafter under a native doctor, for which medical certificates were produced at the time of the enquiry but they were not received by the enquiry officer, the fourth respondent, that the earned leave also was subsequently applied, which was not accepted by the Assistant Executive Engineer without applying his mind and for the absence of the petitioner for ten days, the punishment of removal from service is very serious and therefore, the order of the first respondent has to be quashed. 5. As held in Rai Bareilly Kshetria Gramin Bank v. Bholanath J.T. ?1997?3 S.C. 717, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the High Court, while exercising the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution, is not the appellate court going into the facts with regard to the disciplinary proceedings. However, the patent errors of law in the procedure leading to manifest injustice alone has to be gone into and only if the petitioner is able to satisfy the court that there is manifest injustice due to the errors of law or violation of principles of natural justice, this Court can interfere with the order of the first respondent. 6. Mr.A.N.Sivaprakasam, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that though the petitioner applied for casual leave on 22.9.1986 for one day, he did not come for duty from 23.9.1986 onwards continuously that however on 29.9.1986, he sent an application for earned leave for 30 days from 22.9.1986 onwards but it was.
6. Mr.A.N.Sivaprakasam, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that though the petitioner applied for casual leave on 22.9.1986 for one day, he did not come for duty from 23.9.1986 onwards continuously that however on 29.9.1986, he sent an application for earned leave for 30 days from 22.9.1986 onwards but it was. refused on certain grounds and was returned back to the petitioner, that this leave application was redirected to the office of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board with an endorsement ‘no such addressee’, that the petitioner also did not turn up even after the expiry of 30 days, which he sought for in his earned leave application and therefore, on 10.11.1986, a memo was issued for his unauthorised absence for more than ten days. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, no explanation was submitted by the petitioner and therefore, charges were framed for his continuous absence for more than ten days without leave application under Standing Order 30(vii) and also for giving false residential address purposely, which also would amount to misconduct under Standing Order 30(iv) that at the time of the enquiry, the petitioner herein has admitted both the charges and therefore, he was found guilty and when the disciplinary authority viz., the third respondent, sent the show cause notice for the proposed punishment, then only he stated that he was unwell and could not attend the office. 7. In the enquiry report dated 3.11.1987, the fourth respondent has stated that on 5.10.1987, the petitioner, who appeared before him, admitted that he did not turn up to the office for more than ten days without permission and he also admitted that he was not residing for a long time in the address given in his earned leave application as he was away and was not residing in that address. 8. When the petitioner himself has admitted before the enquiry officer that he absented himself without prior permission and that he was not residing in the address given in the earned leave application, this Court is not exercising the functions of the appellate court now to go into the question whether the petitioner was suffering due to any illness for his inability to attend the office or actually the address given by him was the correct address.
Even though now it is argued before me that the petitioner would say that he produced certain medical certificates before the enquiry officer but he refused to receive them, he has not made any such allegation in the explanation submitted by him in his reply dated 13.1.1988 for the show cause notice issued by the third respondent. In this letter, he would simply say that for the explanation called for from him, for his removal from service, he felt that certain matters mentioned at the time of the enquiry were not considered by the enquiry officer and therefore unless the entire proceeding copy was given to him, he could not give explanation and he wanted a copy for the entire enquiry proceedings. If really the medical certificates produced by the petitioner before the enquiry officer were rejected by him, certainly the petitioner would have mentioned in this letter that the medical certificates produced before the enquiry officer were rejected by him. If really anything had happened at that time, the petitioner would not have submitted for the enquiry by the fourth respondent. Therefore, there is nothing to accept the contention of the petitioner that he was suffering from any illness for his inability to attend the office for more than ten days without prior permission. As the disciplinary authorities have accepted this fact, the High Court cannot go into the question of evidence. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner advanced two arguments relating to the alleged violation of natural justice. The first is the failure to give the proceedings copy and the second is the proposed punishment even in the second show cause notice. The learned counsel would submit that in the letter dated 13.1.1988, the petitioner has asked for the copy of the enquiry proceedings for submitting his explanation for the show cause notice issued by the third respondent but the copy was denied and this will amount to denial of natural justice. Even in this letter of the petitioner, he has stated that he went through the findings of the enquiry officer and he felt that some of the matters, mentioned by him to the enquiry officer have not been considered. Therefore this letter would clearly show that the copy of the findings of the enquiry officer was furnished to the petitioner along with the show cause notice issued by the third respondent.
Therefore this letter would clearly show that the copy of the findings of the enquiry officer was furnished to the petitioner along with the show cause notice issued by the third respondent. But not satisfied with the findings of the enquiry officer, the petitioner in his letter dated 13.1.1988 wanted the minutes for the proceedings. He is entitled to peruse the minutes if at all he wanted. There is no rule compelling the disciplinary authority to furnish the copy of the minutes of the proceedings. No doubt, the copy of the findings against the delinquent has to be necessarily furnished and in this case, the copy of the findings has been furnished to the petitioner. The findings also is not elaborate because the enquiry officer would say that for both the charges, the delinquent had pleaded guilty. Hence, it is futile to argue that for the reason that the copy of the minutes was not furnished to the petitioner, though the copy of the findings has been given to the petitioner, it will amount to violation of natural justice. Hence, this ground is rejected. 10. The next ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the show cause notice issued by the third respondent, the proposed punishment for the removal of the petitioner is mentioned. In his proceedings dared 4.1.1988, the third respondent has mentioned that in view of the findings of the enquiry officer, he has to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the charges and therefore, he proposed to remove him from service, for which his explanation was called for within seven days.
In his proceedings dared 4.1.1988, the third respondent has mentioned that in view of the findings of the enquiry officer, he has to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the charges and therefore, he proposed to remove him from service, for which his explanation was called for within seven days. The learned counsel for the, petitioner would submit that for the findings of the enquiry officer, the petitioner is entitled to submit his explanation to convince the disciplinary authority that he was not guilty of the charges but even before that stage was over, the third respondent, disciplinary authority, in the show cause notice mentioned above, has mentioned that the findings of the enquiry officer would prove that the petitioner was guilty of the charges and therefore, he was giving the proposed punishment of removal from service, that this kind of notice to the petitioner by the third respondent would show that even before he considered the explanation offered by the petitioner he had decided to impose the punishment of removal of the petitioner from service that as there was a preconceived decision for the third respondent to remove the petitioner from service even before an opportu- nity was given to the petitioner to explain his innocence, the conduct of the disciplinary authority informing the proposed punishment is against the natural justice. In support of his argument, he relied upon the decision of this court in Victor v. General Manager, Rani Mangammal Transport Corporation 1997 T.L.N. J. 163. No doubt, the learned Judge would observe that the show cause notice as to the finding of the enquiry officer and also informing the proposed punishment is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, E.C.1.L., Hyderabad v. Karunakar Managing Director, E.C.1.L., Hyderabad v. Karunakar Managing Director, E.C.1.L., Hyderabad v. Karunakar J.T. ?1993?6 S.C. 1. According to the learned Judge, after the receipt of the report from the enquiry officer, before taking any decision, the management has to send the entire copy of the report including the enquiry proceedings to the delinquent employee and after receipt of reply or explanation from the delinquent employee, it is open to the respondent to arrive at a decision regarding punishment as per the provisions of the Standing Orders. For arriving at this conclusion, the learned Judge relied upon the above-mentioned decision viz.
For arriving at this conclusion, the learned Judge relied upon the above-mentioned decision viz. Managing Director, E.C.I.L., Hyderabad v. B.Karunakar and also the decision in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan ?1991?1 S. C. C. 588 of the Apex Court. But on a careful and thorough reading of these two decisions of the Apex Court, it is nowhere laid down that the proposed punishment should not be mentioned in the show cause notice as to the findings of the enquiry officer. In the first decision, Managing Director, E.C.I.L., Hyderabad v. Karunakar no doubt, the Apex Court would mention two stages, the first stage for the delinquent to represent against the findings in the report before the disciplinary authority taking into consideration of the findings in the report and according to their Lordships, that is the stage in which the delinquent has the right to prove his innocense and the second stage is the right to plead either no penalty or a lesser penalty when the guilt is accepted. The Supreme court, in Managing Director, E.C.I.L., v.B.Karunakar would observe as follows: “7… while the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during, the first, stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposed to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage, which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment…” It is pertinent to mention at this stage that under the 42nd Amendment to Art.311 of the Constitution, issuing a separate notice as to the proposed punishment has been taken away.
It is the second right exercisable at the second stage, which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment…” It is pertinent to mention at this stage that under the 42nd Amendment to Art.311 of the Constitution, issuing a separate notice as to the proposed punishment has been taken away. In the decision in several paragraphs, the Apex Court would refer to the show cause notice to the employee as to the findings and also to the proposed punishment, and the employee's right to represent that he was not guilty of the charge and also to plead with regard to the punishment. Their Lordships would observe as follows: ”4…After the report is received by the Government, the Government is entitled to consider the report and the evidence laid against the delinquent public servant. The Government may agree with the report or may differ either wholly or partially, from the conclusions recorded in the report. If the report makes a finding in favour of the public servant and the Government agree with the said finding, nothing more remains to be done, and the public servant, who may have been suspended is entitled to be reinstated with consequential reliefs. If the report makes findings in favour of the public servant and the Government disagrees with the said findings and holds that the charges framed against the public servant are in its opinion, prima facie established against him, then also the Government has to decide provisionally what punishment should be “imposed on the public servant and give him notice accordingly. The court then proceeded to observe, that ”it would thus be seen that the object of the second notice is to enable the public servant to satisfy the Government on both the counts, one that he is innocent of the charges framed against him and the other that even if the charges are held proved against him, the punishment proposed to be inflicted upon is unduly severe. This position under Art.311 of the Constitution is substantially similar to the position which governed the public servant under Sec.240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. “ [Italics supplied] The second notice mentioned above refers to the notice after the enquiry report is received as the first show cause notice must have been given for explana- tion before the enquiry had started. 11.
“ [Italics supplied] The second notice mentioned above refers to the notice after the enquiry report is received as the first show cause notice must have been given for explana- tion before the enquiry had started. 11. By issuance of the second notice to the delinquent, with regard to the findings and also the proposed punishment, the Apex Court would refer the twin rights to the delinquent arising thereunder and thereafter in two stages, that is the first stage to prove the innocence before the disciplinary authority if it has decided to accept the, findings and the next is the right to plead for lesser penalty, which is said to be the second stage for the show cause notice as to the proposed penalty. While expressing this right of me delinquent, the Supreme Court has not anywhere said that there shall be two separate show cause notices when especially under 42nd Amendment to Art.311, there need not be a separate notice with regard to the proposed punishment. But there shall be a show cause notice for the proposed punishment giving opportunity to the delinquent to represent either for no punishment or lesser punishment. When such a show cause notice as to the findings and also the proposed punishment is issued, the Apex Court mentions that it is only on the basis of the prima facie proof on the findings and the proposed punishment is only a provisional decision. At one stage, the Apex Court observes: “Till that time the conclusions that the Disciplinary Authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative.” Therefore, for the reason that the proposed punishment is mentioned in the showcause notice, it will not amount to the pre-conceived decision to impose the penalty on the delinquent. As reportedly observed in the decision, it is only a provisional conclusion arrived from the prima facie proof and the show cause notice is issued only tentatively giving opportunity to the delinquent to represent his case as to his innocence and also for the” lesser punishment. 12. In the impugned notice, what is mentioned is the provisional conclusion and the tentative penalty.
12. In the impugned notice, what is mentioned is the provisional conclusion and the tentative penalty. If it is accepted that already the disciplinary authority had taken a definite decision to impose the penalty, then there was no necessity to issue a show cause notice as to the findings of the enquiry officer. As a separate show cause notice for the proposed punishment is now dispensed with under the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution the showcause notice was issued for the findings as well as the proposed punishment provisionally giving opportunity to the delinquent to represent on both aspects. As a matter of fact, even in the other decision of the Supreme Court, referred by the learned Judge, viz., Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan viz., Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan viz., Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 471, the Apex Court would hold that even after the 42nd Amendment, the right to represent as to the punishment is not affected and the Apex Court would observe as follows: “15…We, therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The 42nd Amendment has “not brought about any change in this position.” So, it is made very clear that the show cause notice mentioning the recommendation of the enquiry officer regarding the guilt of the delinquent and the proposed punishment to be inflicted on him are within the rules of natural justice. In view of the clear views taken by the Apex Court in the above two decisions, I am unable to follow the decision in Victor v. General Manager, Rani Mangammal Transport Corporation 1997 T.L.N.J. 163. 13. Then coming to the question of punishment, it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was suffering from paralysis on account of which he could not attend the office and therefore, leniency might be shown in the matter of punishment. Though, the petitioner applied for casual leave on 22.9.1986, thereafter he did not turn up continuously for months together without prior permission, though he sent a letter dated 29.9.1986 for earned leave for 30 days, which was refused.
Though, the petitioner applied for casual leave on 22.9.1986, thereafter he did not turn up continuously for months together without prior permission, though he sent a letter dated 29.9.1986 for earned leave for 30 days, which was refused. But the petitioner did not ascertain whether leave was sanctioned to him or not and he did not turn up for duty even after the expiry of 30 days. As he had absented continuously for more than 10 days, the standing orders contemplate the punishment and before the enquiry officer, the petitioner has accepted giving false address where he was not actually residing. Therefore, when the disciplinary authority has decided to enforce a penalty within its power, the High Court cannot interfere under Art.226 of the Constitution of India when it is not exercising the appellate powers. Therefore, the petitioner is riot entitled to any remedy in this writ petition. 14. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.