JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition is pending since 1987. As agreed, the case is finally heard. 2. It is alleged that the petitioner was appointed as Lecturer in Chemistry in Government of Rajasthan in 1959. He joined as Lecturer in Chemistry in University of Rajasthan-respondent in 1962. He was promoted as Associate Professor in January 1981. 3. It is also stated that the petitioner, with due permission, on or from 11.9.1984 left India to join as Assistant Professor in Bio-Chemistry, Medical Faculty, University of Garyounis, Benghazi for one year which was extended on 11.9.1985 for another one year, but he could not resume his duties on expiry of the extended period of his leave i.e. 10.9.1986. His services were ceased from the University vide order dated 11.12.86(Ex.9) Hence, he has filed this writ petition challenging the said order with a prayer to quash the same, and also challenged vires of rule 29(ii) of Ordinance 358 to declare it ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution on the grouped that the deeming provision of ceasing the service is bad as it does not provide for any enquiry and the punishment cannot be imposed without affording reasonable opportunity of hearing. 4. Reply has been filed. The learned counsel for the respondent-University submits that the Ordinance is perfectly valid. He further submits that it is neither arbitrary nor ultra vires to Article 14 of the Constitution of India rather it is in confirmity with rule 18 and accordingly it is not necessary to give opportunity of hearing in case an incumbent does not resume his duties after expiry of his sanctioned leave as such action amounts to wilful absence from duty. It is also submitted that once the petitioner had availed the benefit of Ordinance he cannot challenge the same on any ground. That apart, the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to join, but, deliberately, he did not resume his duties on expiry of his sanctioned leave. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the material on record. 6. That apart, the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to join, but, deliberately, he did not resume his duties on expiry of his sanctioned leave. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the material on record. 6. The Rule 29 of Ordinance 358, which is material for deciding the controversy, reads as under:- "LEAVE WITHOUT PAY TO TAKE UP EMPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE: 29.(i) When a teacher is permitted to take up employment outside the University, the pay of which is not debited to the University, he may, at the discretion of the Syndicate, be granted leave without pay for one year and be also allowed to retain his lien on the post held by him in the University for a corresponding period provided that the person concerned has completed atleast 5 years of permanent service in the University. Provided further that in the case of a teacher who has rendered 10 years of permanent service in the University, may be sanctioned 2 years leave without pay at the discretion of the Syndicate and be allowed to retain lien for the corresponding period on the post held by him in the University. (ii) A teacher seeking leave under the above provision must return to the University service on the expiry of the leave, failing which he will be deemed to have ceased to be in the university employment." 7. Bare perusal of the above provision reveals that a teacher who had rendered five years of permanent service may be granted leave for one year at the discretion of the Syndicate to join outside employment and if he had completed 10 years of permanent service, may be granted two years leave for this purpose, it retains lien for the corresponding period. It is further provided that if a teacher does not return to the University after expiry of leave, his services will be deemed to have been ceased to be in the University. 8. In the instant case, the petitioner was granted leave without pay for one year, and at his request, the period of his leave was extended for another one year upto 10.9.1986, but, as stated, after expiry of the extended period of leave, the petitioner did not return and resume his duty in the University of Rajasthan. Now he has challenged validity of rule 29(ii). Now he has challenged validity of rule 29(ii). A perusal of the above rule makes it dear that only due to this rule the petitioner was allowed to have other employment while in the service of the University with certain conditions otherwise he was not entitled to get the employment outside and, therefore, once he had availed the benefit of that rule the same cannot be challenged if not complied with on the pretext that enquiry is necessary to find out wilful absence. So, in my view, the argument of Shri Joshi is not sustainable. 9. No doubt, it is a cardinal principle that before taking any action one should be heard, but at the same time, if excluded by necessary implication, it is not necessary. The rule of natural justice is not embodied rule. As already stated, an employee is entitled for two years leave and if after expiry of maximum period of leave he does not join, then it will mean that he is not interested for any reason whatsoever and has abandoned his employment. It was not necessary to hold an enquiry under rule 29(ii) and to follow principle of natural justice. Therefore, the argument of Shri Joshi is not tenable. A reference can also be made to S.L. Kapoor's case reported as AIR 1981 SC 136 , wherein, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as under:- "Where on the admitted and indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs." 10. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner was also issued notices. In view of rule 18 wilful absence after expiry of leave sanctioned shall be liable to punishment including dismissal but the petitioner has not bothered even after expiry of the period given in the notice to resume duty and, therefore, cessation of service under rule 29(ii), which is neither dismissal/removal from service, cannot be said to be illegal. So any reply given afterwards is of no consequence. So any reply given afterwards is of no consequence. Nothing has been shown by the petitioner, by placing any material that at that point of time he was detained due to some unavoidable circumstances or reasons beyond his control rather he came to India in July/August'86 and left after submitting an application for further 10 months extension of his leave and, as stated, under the circumstances and looking to the conduct of the petitioner, cessation of his service is not bad or illegal calling for any interference. 11. Now, if the case is considered from other aspect that assuming, for the sake of argument, but not admitting, that observance of principle of natural justice is necessary in this case, then also, petitioner has no case as he was given sufficient opportunity of resuming his duty in the University. It has come on record that admittedly petitioner's two years term of leave was to expire on 10.9.1986. It was well within his knowledge that period of his leave cannot be extended beyond this date. Petitioner came to India in July/August, 1986 and applied for extension of his leave for another 10 months in July, 1986 and left India in anticipation of sanction of leave beyond 10.9.1986. It has also come on record that vide order dated 14.8.1986, Dy. Registrar (Establishment) informed the petitioner that extension of his leave is not permissible under the rules. The respondent also sent a Cablegram on 24.9.1986, which was received by the petitioner in September and October, 1986 respectively. Again on 21.10.1986, another Cablegram and a letter was sent to the petitioner to resume his duties upto 4.11.1986 i.e. beyond 10.9.1986-the date of expiry of his extended period of leave. Again, the Registrar sent a letter dated 8-10.11.1986(Ex.7) giving last opportunity to the petitioner to join his duties upto 24.11.1986, but the petitioner did not turn up. Vide order dated 11.12.1986, the service of the petitioner were treated to be ceased. So, sending letter on 18.11.1986 i.e. after expiry of his period of leave, is of no consequence and no interference is called for. 12. No other point has been raised before me in this case. 13. In view of what I have discussed above, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. Consequently, this writ petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******