Judgment :- 1. The tenant who suffered eviction before the authorities below filed the above revision. 2. The landlord respondent filed a petition under Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act 18 of 1960 and Act 23 of 1973 to evict the respondent from the premises bearing Door No. 45 (Ground floor), Kattur Sadayappan Street, Periamet, Madras 600 003. According to the landlord, he was carrying on his business under the name and style of M/s. Anwar & Co. at No. 23, E.K. Guru Street, Periamet, Madras-600 003 which is a rented premises. Since the landlord of that building wanted him to vacate, the petitioner wanted the building in question for his own occupation for carrying on the said business. 3. The petitioner/tenant filed a counter contesting the petition. In the counter, it is denied that the petitioner is carrying on business under the name and style of Anwar and Co. at No. 23, E.K. Guru Street, Periamet, Madras-3. It is also the specific case of the tenant that the landlord is having non-residential premises of his own in the city. Referring to earlier proceedings in R.C. O.P. No. 100/80 and 505/85, the tenant has stated that the object of the landlord is only for eviction and not for any bona fide reason as stated by the landlord. The Rent Controller and Appellate Authority found that the landlord wants the premises for his own occupation and his claim is a bona fide one. Aggrieved against the same, the tenant has filed the above revision. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that though the petitioner was carrying on business on the date of filing of the petition at No. 23, E.K. Guru Street, Periamet, Madras-3 and his landlord wants him to vacate the said premises, admittedly from March 1989 onwards, the petitioner has shifted his business to No. 118, Vepery High Road, Madras-7. In the absence of any evidence as to why he wants to shift the present business from No. 118, Vepery High Road, Madras-7, to the premises in question the landlord is not entitled an order of eviction. The learned counsel further submitted that having admitted that the petitioner is a Wealth Tax assessee and he is in possession of Wealth Tax Assessment which shows the number of properties owned by the petitioner in the city. The learned counsel further submitted that having admitted that the petitioner is a Wealth Tax assessee and he is in possession of Wealth Tax Assessment which shows the number of properties owned by the petitioner in the city. Admittedly, the said document was not filed before the court and so adverse inference could be arrived at against the landlord. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further submitted that Ex.R-1 shows that the petitioner owned some property in the town and so the petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. It is his further case that the landlord has constructed the third floor and to prove that, the tenant filed an application for appointment of Commissioner which was erroneously dismissed by the Appellate Authority. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has submitted that before the authorities below, the respondent established that he is running a business in a rented premises and he has no other non-residential premises of his own in the town and so, the landlord is entitled to get the tenant vacated for his possession of the premises to do his own business as requested in the petition. The learned counsel has further submitted that since both the authorities have concurrently fond that the premises is required for bona fide requirement of the respondents business, this Court may not interfere with the factual finding sitting at revision. 6. We have to proceed on the basis of the established facts before the authorities. As found by the authorities below, the petitioner had been carrying on business under the name and style of M/s. Anwar and Co. at No. 23, E.K. Guru Street, Periamet, Madras-3 on the date of the petition. In the evidence, it is admitted by the landlord that in March 1989, he had shifted the premises to the premises bearing Door No. 118, Vepery High Road, Madras-7. The landlord filed the petition for his own occupation on the ground that he was under threat of eviction from the premises at Door No. 23, E.K. Guru Street, Madras-3. But, immediately after filing the petition, he had shifted the business to 118, Vepery High Road, and he has been carrying on business from March 1989 at the above address. The landlord filed the petition for his own occupation on the ground that he was under threat of eviction from the premises at Door No. 23, E.K. Guru Street, Madras-3. But, immediately after filing the petition, he had shifted the business to 118, Vepery High Road, and he has been carrying on business from March 1989 at the above address. In the evidence, the landlord has not stated anything as to why he wants to shift the business from the premises bearing Door No. 118, Vepery High Road. The authorities below proceeded on the basis that since the landlord has proved that he was doing businesses in a rented premises and he is not having any other premises of his own in the town, he is entitled an order of eviction to have his business in the premises in question. The authorities below did not apply Their mind to the question that in spite of shifting the premises from Door No. 23, E.K. Guru Street to No. 118, Vepery High Road, whether the landlord still requires the premises for his business. Even earlier, the landlord has filed R.C.O.P. No. 100/80 on the same ground against the petitioner. As deposed by R.W.1, the said petition was withdrawn on the basis that the tenant agreed to pay enhanced rent. Further, the landlord has filed the petition in R.CO.P. No. 505/85 on the ground of wilful default against the petitioner herein. Though it was allowed at the instance at the tenant, in the appeal and the eviction order was set aside and the landlord filed C.R.P. which is pending in this Court. The above facts show that the intention of the landlord is to evict the tenant from the premises in question and not have his business in the said premises. It is not the case of the landlord that he is also under threat of eviction from Door No. 118, Vepery High Road, Madras-7. 7. Apart from the fact that the petitioner is carrying on business in a rented premises and that there is no other premises of his own, the landlord has to prove his requirement was bona fide one, and the need of the landlord should be genuine. Otherwise, the landlord will evict the tenant to satisfy his whim by merely proving the ingredients mentioned in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Otherwise, the landlord will evict the tenant to satisfy his whim by merely proving the ingredients mentioned in Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. While dealing with the scope of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, the Apex Court in a decision reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1060 = 1988 2 L.W. 1 (Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar) has held as follows: — “We are of the view that by merely proving that the premises in question is a non-residential building and that the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for the purpose of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on any residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own, the landlord cannot in the context in which Section 10(3) (a) (iii) appears get a tenant evicted. He must show in view of clause (e) of Section 10 (3) that his claim is bona fide. The word “claim” means “a demand for something as due” or “to seek or ask for on the ground of right” etc. In the context of Rent Control law which is enacted for the purpose of giving protection to tenants against unreasonable evictions and for the purpose of making equitable distribution of buildings amongst persons who are in need of them in order to prove that his claim is bona fide a landlord should establish that he deserves to be put in possession of the premises which is in the occupation of a tenant. Any decision on the question whether a landlord deserves to be put in possession of a premises in the occupation of a tenant should naturally depend upon the bona fides of the landlords requirement or need. The word ‘claim’ in clause (a) of Section 10(3) of the Act should, therefore, be construed as ‘the requirement’ of the landlord or his deservedness. ‘Deserve’ means’ to have a rightful claim’ or’ a just claim’. Since clause (e) of Section 10(3) of the Act is also applicable to a petition filed under sub-clause (iii) of Section 10(3) (a) of the Act it becomes necessary to examine whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. Otherwise the landlord will be able to evict a tenant to satisfy his whim by merely proving the ingredients mentioned in Section 10(3)(a)(iii), of the Act. Otherwise the landlord will be able to evict a tenant to satisfy his whim by merely proving the ingredients mentioned in Section 10(3)(a)(iii), of the Act. Take a case where a landlord for some oblique reason wishes to get rid of his tenant from a non-residential building of the category mentioned in Section 10(3) (a) (iii) and to achieve his aim fakes to start money-lending business (for which indeed no specified separate portion in a building may be needed) in a building not belonging to him and to create evidence even actually lends money to some of his friends or relatives and a week thereafter applies for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he is carrying on business and has no non-residential building of his own in his occupation in the city, town on village concerned. Apparently, the conditions prescribed in the aforesaid sub-clause (iii) are fulfilled. If the requirement of “claim” being “bona fide” as contained in Section 10(3) (e) is construed to mean that the genuineness of the need of the landlord for the non-residential building is not to be considered and the circumstance that the landlord on the date of making the application is factually carrying on business of his own in his occupation in the city, town or village concerned is to be construed sufficient to make his claim bona fide , the tenancy of no non-residential building will be secure. It will be preposterous to attribute such an intention to the legislature. Such a contingency should be avoided as it would be against the very object of the Act itself. The need of the landlord should be genuine. That is the object of enacting clause (e) of Section 10(3) of the Act. When once we reach the above conclusion it is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use or occupy the premises. What is necessary is that he should bona fide need them for his own use and occupation or for occupation by any of the members of his family as held by this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel, (1974) 3 SCR 267 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1059 ) and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, 1975) 1 SCR 127 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1596 ). The learned Judge who decided the case out of which this appeal arises was, therefore, in error in holding that the landlord need not prove that his requirement was bona fide but that his claim was bona fide as provided in clause (e) of Section 10(3) of the Act. The learned Judge has made a distinction between ‘requirement’ and ‘claim’ in the present case without there being a difference.” In this case, the above said discussion will show that the landlord has not proved that his requirement of the building in question is a bona fide one. The reasons stated in the petition were not in existence on the date of passing the order of eviction. 8. As submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the landlord deposed in his evidence that the Wealth Tax assessment was available and if it is produced, it will show the number of properties owned by him. Admittedly, he has not produced the same. In view of the specific objection raised by the tenant that the landlord is having other buildings of his own in the town, it is for the landlord to establish that there is no such premises. Having admitted that he is having the Wealth tax assessment, he should have filed it before the Court to prove that he is not having any other premises in the town. The Apex Court, while dealing with such a situation held in a decision reported in 1985 (1) S.C.C. 251 = 98 L.W. 26 (Variety Emporium v. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina) that if the relevant document is not produced, the court should draw an adverse inference against the person who has not produced. In view of the above, I find that the petitioner has not proved that his requirement is a bona fide one. In view of the above finding, the order of the authorities below are set aside and the revision is allowed. No costs.