Judgment :- The Second Appeal No. 1242 of 1993 has been preferred by the unsuccessful plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 23,100/- on a promissory note dated 5-2-1982 for a sum of Rs. 13,750/-. 2. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant executed promissory note on 5-2-1982 after receipt of Rs. 13,750/- and agreeing to pay interest at 24% per annum. A sum of Rs. 23,100/- was claimed for interest and principal. 3. The defendant denied the execution of the promissory note. According to the defendant on 5-2-1980 the plaintiff approached him to purchase buffalo for Rs. 3000/-. The defendant refused to purchase the same as the buffalo was not healthy and not in good condition. The plaintiff promised to substitute it with a new one in case of the death of the buffalo or in case it falls seriously ill. Further the plaintiff also promised to desist from claiming a sum of Rs. 3000/- in such case. Further he took the signature of the defendant in blank papers as security. Believing the plaintiff, the defendant signed the blank paper and took the buffalo. But the buffalo died shortly. When the defendant demanded return of the sum, the plaintiff filled up the blank papers and created promissory note for Rs. 13750/-. The said promissory note is time barred and the defendant is not liable to pay any amount. 4. The trial Court framed four issues. On consideration of the facts and circumstances and on scrutiny of the promissory note itself, the trial Court found that there was serious material alteration in the promissory note and hence the plaintiff was not entitled to the claim. But the appellate Court disbelieving the evidences of defendant had reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the second appeal has been preferred by the defendant. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the promissory note in question Ex. A1 dated 5-2-1982 has been materially altered and hence it is not valid. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no plea on material alteration. The respondent has proved the execution of the promissory note. Therefore, Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act applies. Hence the presumption on consideration etc. should be in favour of the plaintiff. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no plea on material alteration. The respondent has proved the execution of the promissory note. Therefore, Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act applies. Hence the presumption on consideration etc. should be in favour of the plaintiff. 6. When we look at the promissory note, the following facts are found. At the top of the promissory note, the figure of Rs. 13750/- is found in thick ink, while the body of the promissory note, which is a printed one is written in different ink. There are two revenue stamps. In only one revenue stamp the wordings V. Arumuga is found but on the other revenue stamp there is no signature or any wording. Only a small line is found in the second revenue stamp. The second revenue stamp appears to be a new one when compared to the other one. The first stamp is in dark colour and the second one is not so. While the first stamp is whitish brown the second is pure white. 7. Further as the trial Court has mentioned, that if we look behind the second stamp holding it before a bright light, the letter (M), is available. Therefore, the letter (M) has been put on the unfilled promissory note while the letters 'N' is written on the revenue stamp. That act evidences that the stamp is of the value of Rs. 0.20/-. From the scrutiny, it is seen that the defendant has signed the (note) when there was only one 20 paise revenue stamp. Subsequently another revenue stamp is affixed over the letter '(M)'. This is clearly a material alternation. Probably for the purpose of claiming higher amount than what could have been claimed with the signature on a single 20 paise stamp, the devise has been adopted. Whatever it is the alternation done to the promissory note is material one. Therefore, Section 87 is attracted. 8. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the said alteration was done with the knowledge and consent of the defendant. It is obvious from the fact that the letter '(M)' would have been put by the defendant on the second stamp if had he really consented for the alteration. Therefore, Section 87 is attracted. 8. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the said alteration was done with the knowledge and consent of the defendant. It is obvious from the fact that the letter '(M)' would have been put by the defendant on the second stamp if had he really consented for the alteration. When the trial Court has carefully and rightly found the alteration, the lower Court has failed to carefully scrutinise and find the material alteration. The appellate Court has not considered this vital alteration. On the other hand, it states, it is not able to see that the second stamp has been affixed on the letter '(M)'. This is not only incorrect but also misleading. Probably, the appellate Court Judge has not cared to look into the promissory note properly. Because, when we look at it as indicated above, the word '(M)', is there and above that new stamp has been affixed on the letter '(M)'. Thus letter '(M)' has been deliberately concealed. There is material alteration and on that account, the suit promissory note is hit by provisions of Section 87 of Negotiable Instruments Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that there was no plea of material alteration is unsustainable. When there is intrinsic evidence available and from the facts, the presumption can be easily drawn without any further evidences, the Courts have to look into the evidence and arrive at a finding. Simply because there is no plea with reference to the material alteration it cannot be ignored when the evidence is available. The trial Court has rightly relied upon the decision reported in Verco Pvt. Ltd. Padi v. Newandram Naraindas, 1974 AIR(Mad) 4. The principle laid down in the said case is applicable to this case. Therefore, the judgment of the lower appellate Court deserves to be set aside. The second appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment of the lower appellate Court is set aside. No costs. Appeal allowed.