D. K. SETH, J. Mr. A. K. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioners, as sails the impugned orders dated 29-8-1997 contained in Annexures-7 and 8 respec tively to the Writ Petition, by which the petitioners were sought to be reverted from the post of Revenue Inspector to the post of Lekhpal. 2. The impugned orders of reversion are being challenged by the learned Coun sel on the ground, firstly that before issu ing the order of reversion, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners; secondly, the petitioners having been al lowed to work for more than four years on the promotional post, the petitioners could not be reverted at all even if the appointment was illegal and thirdly, that the order of promotion does not indicate that the promotion was on ad hoc basis or by way of a local arrangement, therefore, reversion on the ground that promotion was made by way of a local arrangement, cannot be sustained. 3. Relying on various decisions which shall be referred to later on at the ap propriate stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioners by reason of their long period of work as Revenue Inspector, have acquired a right to continue on the said post and as such the orders impugned reverting them to the post of Lekhpal should be quashed. 4. Mr. D. R. Choudhery, learned Ad ditional Chief Standing Counsel, on the other hand, contends that the petitioners having been appointed by way of local ar rangement, they have not acquired any right to continue on the promotional post since their lien was confined to the post of Lekhpal, therefore, there is no infirmity in the order of reversion. He also relies on certain decisions for the sake of support ing his contention. 5. Mr. Choudhery secondly contends that for appointment to the post of Revenue Inspector, qualification of train ing is necessary, which the petitioner do not possess and therefore no such promo tion could be made. It is further submitted that by virtue of their promotion which is wholly contrary to the rules, the petitioners cannot acquire any right to continue on the said promotional post. It is further submitted that by virtue of their promotion which is wholly contrary to the rules, the petitioners cannot acquire any right to continue on the said promotional post. It is next submitted that by virtue of Rule 6 of U. P. Subordinate (Revenue Service Super visor Kanoongo) Service Rules, 1977 (herein-after referred to as the Rules), the promotion in question is non-est and there is no necessity of affording any kind of opportunity of hearing before reversion. 6. The orders of promotion which are Annexures 1 and 5 respectively to the Writ Petition, do not indicate that the said promotion was either made on ad hoc basis or by way of local arrangement. It simply grants promotion to the petitioners to the post of Revenue Inspector. The petitioners were also transferred from one place to another as Revenue Inspector and the order of transfer is contained in An- nexure-4. According to him, the transfer was not by way of local arrangement. From the order dated 27th August, 1997 (An-nexure-6), it appears that as many as 11 persons who were promoted as Revenue Inspector, were reverted to the post of Lekhpal on the ground of promotion having been made by way of local arrange ment of untrained persons as well as their lien continuing on the said post of Lekhpal. The said order dated 27th August, 1997 (Annexure-6) was passed on the basis of an order dated 22-8- 1997 passed by the District Magistrate, Budaun and in terms thereof the same was given effect to by the impugned orders con tained in Annexures 7 and 8 respectively to the Writ Petition. Thus, it appears that the principal order is the order dated 22rid August, 1997 which however has not been challenged in the present petition. The order dated 27th August, 1997 and order dated 29th August, 1997 contained in An nexures 6, 7 and 8 have been challenged. However, it would be too technical a point which I am not inclined to give much im portance to. 7. But the fact remains that the petitioners are untrained persons promoted to the post cf Revenue Inspec tor which fact is also not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Nowhere it is claimed in the Writ Petition that petitioners were trained Revenue In spectors. 7. But the fact remains that the petitioners are untrained persons promoted to the post cf Revenue Inspec tor which fact is also not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Nowhere it is claimed in the Writ Petition that petitioners were trained Revenue In spectors. Rule 6 of the Rules provides that for the purpose of recruitment to the ser vice (Revenue Inspector) training of sur vey and land records from the Training Institute, Hardoi and passing of the prescribed syllabus shall be essential. The expression essential (Awashyak) used in the rule indicates that the qualification mentioned is neither optional nor addi tional or preferential. In the context of the framing of the rule the expression essen tial means mandatory/compulsory. Such qualification whether even can be ac quired after promotion or it is pre-requisite, is a question to be looked into. 8. Rule 5 of the Rules, provides for recruitment in the post of Revenue In spector by direct recruitment or by promo tion of confirmed Lekhpals. The source of recruitment has been specified in Rule 5 by different modes whereas Rule 6 does not make any distinction in respect of such recruitment either byway of direct recruit ment or by promotion. In respect of such recruitment, the qualification of training having been made essential i. e. man datory/compulsory, the same is applicable to both the direct recruits as well as promotees. The expression used therein "for the purpose of recruitment" indicates that it is a requisite qualification and at the end the same having been expressed as "shall be essential" (Awashyak), which ex pression has rightly been sought to be in terpreted by learned Standing Counsel as compulsory as held earlier. This clearly indicates that for the purpose of recruit ment, the qualification laid down in Rule 6 is essential. It does not provide therein that after such recruitment or promotion, the promotee person would be sent for training. On the other hand in Rule 17 of the Rules, it has been provided that per manent Lekhpals should be sent for train ing, therefore, the training being a pre requisite for which permanent Lekhpals are sent, the said condition laid down in Rule 6 appears to be a pre-requisite. On the other hand in Rule 17 of the Rules, it has been provided that per manent Lekhpals should be sent for train ing, therefore, the training being a pre requisite for which permanent Lekhpals are sent, the said condition laid down in Rule 6 appears to be a pre-requisite. Had it been intended by the legislature while framing the rule that such qualification of training can be acquired after recruitment or promotion, in that event Rule 6 would not have been couched in the manner it has been. An overall reading of the whole rule indicates that there is no provision for sending promotees or direct appointees to the post of Revenue Inspector, to training. If the legislature had so intended, then it would surely have made provision alike Rule 17 for sending Revenue Inspectors to training after recruitment or promotion as the case may be. Thus, it is intended to be a pre- requisite. 9. Admittedly, in the present case, the petitioners are not trained and in this view of the matter, they cannot claim any right on the post of Revenue Inspector on the basis of such promotion which appears to have been granted by the Tehsildar, Budaun by way of local arrangement. 10. Now it may be examined as to whether such essential qualification can be waived. 11. While considering whether a provision is a mandatory or directory, it is to be borne in mind that language alone most often is not decisive and regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in ques tion, in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. However, no universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments could be considered directory or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. The court has to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. The question is dependent upon the intention of the legislature and not upon the language by which it is clothed. In order to decipher the legislative intent, the Court has to ascertain not only from the phraseology used but also from the nature, design and the consequences that might follow from construing it one way or the other. A mandatory enactment is re quired to be obeyed or fulfilled exactly. In order to decipher the legislative intent, the Court has to ascertain not only from the phraseology used but also from the nature, design and the consequences that might follow from construing it one way or the other. A mandatory enactment is re quired to be obeyed or fulfilled exactly. But a directory enactment may be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. Even in some cases complete non- compliance of direc tory provisions has been held as not affect ing the validity of the Act done in breach thereof. Directory requirements can be categorised as (a) those if specifically com plied with, make the Act valid; and (b) those if not complied with at all, the Act will remain unaffected. But in case of man datory requirements substantial com pliance does not help. Mandatory provisions does not leave any scope of description and it is intended to be obeyed and failure to do so render the Act done in disobedience a nullity. The question is to be tested on the anvil of public interest involved. If mandatory condition is waived whether public interest should suffer is a question to be looked into. 12. In the present case, if untrained people are appointed as Revenue Inspec tor, their performance cannot be expected to be as efficient as those with training. The job of the Revenue Inspector require specific technical knowledge in various matters for which survey and land records training in necessary. Due to such reason, the training has been provided as a pre requisite condition. The Revenue Inspec tors have to deal with the public. They are required to decide issues relating to inter est in land involving rights of the people at large having ownership or other interest in land. If untrained persons are engaged, it would not be in the public interest. It is to be remembered that principle of waiver is applied when a requirement of statute do not involve any question of public interest or public policy because the conditions prescribed are meant for protection of public on the ground of public policy. The purpose of such conditions cannot be waived. 13. Non-compliance of mandatory requirements results in nullification of the act, is a general rule. It is subject to only one exception viz. such requirement can be waived if no public interest is involved. The purpose of such conditions cannot be waived. 13. Non-compliance of mandatory requirements results in nullification of the act, is a general rule. It is subject to only one exception viz. such requirement can be waived if no public interest is involved. This principle is being regarded as the established principle of law right from the case of Wilson v. Malutosh, 1894 C. A. 129 (EC.) at page 133, followed in Dhirendra Afar/i Ghorai v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1964 SC 1300 at page 1304 and series of subsequent cases and again in Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore, AIR 1991 SC 1055 at page 1058. As stated above, public interest having been involved, the present case does not come within such exception. 14. The use of the word "shall be essential" raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative, as has been held in the case of State of U. P. v. Man Bodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 (917) and Govind Lal Chaggan Lal Fatel v. Agriculture Produces Marketing, AIR 1976 SC 263 (267 ). The word shall is ordinarily mandatory unless it is so interpreted in the context or the intention otherwise demand. It has been so held in the case of Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan. AIR 1961 SC 1480 (1485 ). When a statute uses the word shall prima facie it is mandatory but the Court may ascertain the real inten tion of the legislature by carefully examining the whole scope of the statute, is the ratio laid down in the case of State of U. P. v. Baburam Upadhyuya. AIR 1961 S. C. 751 (765 ). 15. In the present case, the word shall is followed by the expression be essential. Therefore^ the expression shall be essential, having regard to the ratio decided in the above cited cases and the scope of the statute discussed above, can not but be held mandatory permitting no exception or waiver. 16. Mr. Srivastava, learned Counsel for petitioner, relied on an order dated 23rd August, 1996 passed in Writ Petition No. 26024 of 1996 in support of his con tention that in a similar case this Court has granted an interim order. 17. The order referred to by the learned Counsel being interim in nature, is not a precedent. 16. Mr. Srivastava, learned Counsel for petitioner, relied on an order dated 23rd August, 1996 passed in Writ Petition No. 26024 of 1996 in support of his con tention that in a similar case this Court has granted an interim order. 17. The order referred to by the learned Counsel being interim in nature, is not a precedent. In the said ease, the order of promotion was also confirmed which is a distinguishing feature conspicuously ab sent in the present case. Admittedly, in the present case, the appointments were never confirmed. Transfer from one place to another made by way of local arrange ment, cannot be treated to be the order of confirmation. There is no bar in transfer ring an ad hoc or temporary employee. Confirmation is a positive Act deciding to confirm an appointment after proper ap plication of mind. In the absence of any such order of confirmation simply on the fact that petitioners were transferred, it cannot be held that the same was an Act indicative of confirmation in as much as transfer is not an incidence of service ap plicable to confirmed employee alone ex cluding ad hoc or temporary one. Thus, the said order referred to by the learned Counsel for petitioner, does not help in his contention. 18. Mr. Srivastava also relied on the decision in the case of Smt. V. Makeshwari v. Union of India and others, 1993 (2) U. P. LBEC 898, in support of his contention that the petitioner having worked for a quite long time, could not be reverted as has been held in the said case. But in the said case, the question of qualification which is a pre-requisite condition in the case in hand, was not a factor. On the other hand, it was not the promotional avenue. It was not a case of absence of requisite qualification. Therefore, it was held that the person was not eligible to be promoted to the post of clerk and the said promotion was granted by mistake. But in the present case, the promotion is not granted by mis take but was made by way of a local arran gement. Therefore, the decision cited by Mr. Srivastava, cannot be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. Mr. But in the present case, the promotion is not granted by mis take but was made by way of a local arran gement. Therefore, the decision cited by Mr. Srivastava, cannot be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. Mr. Srivastava then relied on the decision in the case of S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , for the purpose of supporting his contention that while passing an order, reasons are to be recorded. 20. In the present case, the order has been issued by an administrative authority. Two reasons have been given in the said order. One reason is that the promotion was granted by way of local arrangement and the other is that the per sons were not trained. Therefore, it ap pears that the order impugned contains certain reasons for reversion. One more reason is indicated therein that the petitioners had their lien on the post of Lekhpal. This being so, it cannot be said that there was no reason given in the order. 21. Mr. Srivastva further relied on an unreported decision in the case of Gulab Chandra and others v. State of U. P. and others, Writ Petition No. 41663 of 1992, disposed of vide order dated 18-2-1993 and contends that an opportunity is to be given before passing the order of rever sion. In the said case, it was an order of termination of service of temporary employee. However, learned Counsel sub mits that the same principle would be applicable even if an order of reversion is issued. 22. In the present case, admittedly the order of reversion has been passed without affording any opportunity of hear ing to the petitioners. But at the same time, it appears that the petitioners did not have any right to continue with the promotional post by reason of their dis qualification of not having training which is a pre-requisite and the promotion having been made by way of local arrange ment. Therefore, no useful purpose would be served even if hearing is given to the petitioners on admitted facts of the case, However, it may be open to the respon dents to grant a post decisional hearing to the petitioners within a period of one month from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. 23. Mr. Therefore, no useful purpose would be served even if hearing is given to the petitioners on admitted facts of the case, However, it may be open to the respon dents to grant a post decisional hearing to the petitioners within a period of one month from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. 23. Mr. Srivastava next relied on the decision in the case of Sri Krishna Agrawal v. State of U. P. and others, 1993 (3) UPLBEC 1903. In the said case, the ques tion involved was that of ad hoc promotion in the post of Senior Inspector of Ac counts which required five years ex perience as qualification, but the promo tion was given with ten months of such experience. But in the said case before the order of reversion was issued, the incum bent had acquired five years experience though in a higher post and on that ground the reversion order was set aside. In the present case, the requisite qualifica tion of training has not been acquired ad mittedly during this period of promotion. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the ratio laid down in Sri Krishna Agrawal (supra) cannot be at tracted. The said case proceeded on the basis of a decision in the case of Ram Swarup v. State of Haryana and others, 1978 (2) SLR 836. The relevant extract of the said judgment as would be necessary for the present purpose, is quoted below: "14. Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner lacked the initial qualification at the time of his ad hoc promotion to the post of Senior Inspector of Accounts, even then it has to be examined as to whether he could be trans ferred/reverted to the post of Stenographer, if he had acquired the qualification and gained experience in accounts subsequently. " A similar question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Swamp v. State of Haryana and others, 1978 (2) SLR 836, wherein the appellant having worked as Chief Inspec tor of shops for about ten months where he gained experience in the working of Labour Laws was appointed as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer on 1-1-1968. " A similar question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Swamp v. State of Haryana and others, 1978 (2) SLR 836, wherein the appellant having worked as Chief Inspec tor of shops for about ten months where he gained experience in the working of Labour Laws was appointed as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer on 1-1-1968. He continued working as such till April, 1977, when he was sought to be reverted on the ground that at the time of his appointment as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, he did not possess the requisite experience of five years, in the working of Labour Laws, which was one of the minimum qualifica tions required under Rule 4 (1) of the Pun jab Labour Services (Class I and II) Rules 1955 governing his service. The Writ Peti tion filed by him, against his order of rever sion, was dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court on the ground that Writ Petitioner having only about ten months experience in regard to the working of Labour Laws, as Chief Inspector of Shops was ineligible to be appointed as Labour-cum- Conciliation Officer under Rule 4 (1) of those Rules. The Division Bench took the same view and dismissed his appeal in limine. After granting special leave their Lordships of the Supreme Court reversed the orders of this Court and observed as under: ". . . . . . . . The appointment of the appellant to the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer was, therefore, clearly in breach of Rule 4, Clause (1) of the Rules. The question then arises as to what was the effect of breach of clause (1) of Rule 4 of the Rules. Did it have the effect of rendering the appointment wholly void, so as to be completely ineffective or merely irregularity so that it could be regularised as and when the appellant acquired the necessary qualifications to hold the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer. We are of the view, that the appoint ment of the appellant was irregular since he did not possess one of the three requisite qualifica tions, but as soon as he acquired the necessary qualifications of five years experience of the working of labour laws in any one of three capacities mentioned in clause (1) of Rule 4or in any higher capacity, his appointment must be regarded as having been regularised. The appel lant worked as Labour-cum-Conciliation Of ficer from 1st January, 1968 and that being a post higher than that of Labour Inspector or Deputy Chief Inspector of Shops of Wage In spector, the experience gained by him in the working of Labour Laws, in the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer must be regarded as sufficient to constitute fulfilment of the require ment of five yeas experience provided in clause (1) of Rule (4 ). The appointment of the appel lant on the post of Labour- cum-Conciliation Officer, therefore, became regular from the date when he completed five years after taking into account the period of about ten months during which he worked as Chief Inspector of Shops. Once his appointment became regular on the expiry of this period of five years on his fulfilling the requirements for appointment as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer and becom ing eligible for that purpose, he could not there after be reverted to the post of Statistical Of ficer. The order of reversion passed against the appellant was, therefore, clearly illegal and must be set aside. " 24. The Supreme Court in the case of Ram Swamp (supra) has proceeded on the same proposition that initially at the time of appointment, the incumbent did not possess qualification, but had acquired the qualification before the order of reversion was passed and therefore the order of reversion was interfered with. Such is not the position in the present case, therefore, the ratio laid down in the case of 5r/ Krish na Agrawal (supra) has no manner of ap plication to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 25. On the other hand, learned Addi tional Chief Standing Counsel has relied on the decision in the case of Suman Kumar Srivastava v. District Magistrate, Lucknow, 1989 (1) UPLBEC 481, wherein it has been held that by reason of promo tion byway of local arrangement, a person does not acquire any legal right to hold the said post and therefore, the order of reversion to his substantive post cannot be said to be illegal. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, the petitioners having not acquired the requisite qualification to hold the post and the promotion having been made by way of local arrangement, the petitioners cannot claim the have ac quired any right to continue on the said post. 26. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, the petitioners having not acquired the requisite qualification to hold the post and the promotion having been made by way of local arrangement, the petitioners cannot claim the have ac quired any right to continue on the said post. 26. Learned Additional Chief Stand ing Counsel also relied on the decision in the case of Shri Pal Singh v. District Magistrate, Mainpuri and others, 1996 A. W. C. 850. In the said case, it was held as follows: "17. In the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, AIR 1994 S. C. 1558, the Honble Supreme Court has very clearly laid down that "a breach of procedure whether called a failure of natural justice or an. essential administrative fault, cannot give aggrieved person a remedy in the Courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The court does not Act in vain. " 18. Therefore, mere breach of any prin ciple of natural justice is of no consequence and cannot nullify the order if such order does not affect any vested right of the aggrieved person. Non-observance of any principle of natural jus tice must result in loss of something of substance in order to entitle the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. " 27. As it appears from the decision aforesaid that breach of procedure is to be considered as to whether it amounts to failure of justice as an essential part or not, for the purpose of giving the aggrieved person remedy in courts unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by failure and the Court does not act in vain. 28. In the present case as it appears that the promotion having been made by way of local arrangement and the incum bent not possessing the requisite qualifica tion even by the reason of failure to give opportunity of hearing, nothing of sub stance has been lost in as much as even after hearing, the same decision may be taken. However, it is not necessary to go into the said question as I have preferred to keep the said point open to the respon dents in view of the observation made above that the respondents may provide a post decisional hearing. 29. However, it is not necessary to go into the said question as I have preferred to keep the said point open to the respon dents in view of the observation made above that the respondents may provide a post decisional hearing. 29. For all these reason, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders of reversion. The Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. .