Honble NAOLEKAR, J.–The petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of Panchayat Samiti, Mandle. A criminal complaint is being filed by Smt. Laxmi Roshan Lal Harijan u/s. 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act before the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, Mandle. Admittedly, although cognizance is being taken, no charge has been framedagainst the petitioner till 22.5.97 and the order of suspension has been issued against the petitioner in exercise of the powers conferred u/S. 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act). The order of suspension was issued on the ground that on the complaint made against the petitioner Sarpanch of Panchayat Samiti, Mandle by Smt. Laxmi w/o Roshan Lal, aCase No. 582/96 was registered and the petitioner was sent to jail on 24.2.97 where he remained upto 26.2.97 as there are serious charges against the Sarpanch after consideration of the report submitted by the Chief Executive Officer and Secretary, Zila Parishad, the State Govt. is of the view and find it proper to suspend the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch, Panchayat Samiti, Mandle till the decision isrendered by a competent court. (2). Section 38(4) of the Act under which the powers have been exercised for suspension of the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch, reads as under:- ``Section 38.–Removal and suspension: (4) The State Government may suspend any member including a chairperson or a deputy chair person of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under sub- section (1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involvingmoral turpitude is pending trial in a court of law and such person shall stand debarred from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayat Raj Institution concerned while being under such suspension. From the entire reading, it is clear that the powers of suspension are to be exercised if (i) an enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) against the Sar-panch or (ii) if criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a court of law. Admittedly, no enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) of Sec. 38 of the Act against the petitioner for his removal. The ground for suspension of the petitioner is only that criminal proceedings are pending trial against the petitioner. Admittedly, no enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) of Sec. 38 of the Act against the petitioner for his removal. The ground for suspension of the petitioner is only that criminal proceedings are pending trial against the petitioner. The question is when it can be said that thematter is pending trial in the criminal court. A Division Bench of this Court in Banshidhar Saini vs. State of Rajasthan (1), had an occasion to consider Sec. 17(4A) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 which is a akin to the provisions of Sec. 38(4) of the Act and has held that unless a charge is framed, it cannot be said that any case is pending trial as in warrant cases before a Magistrate, the proceedings areonly enquiries upto the time when the charge is drawn up, read over and explained to the accused. It is only thereafter that the trial begins. (3). In Ratilal Bhanji Mithani vs. State of Maharashtra (2), it has been held by the Supreme Court that the trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge; prior to it, the proceedings are only as enquiry. (4). In ``Common Cause, A Registered Society Through its Director vs. Union of India (3) while explaining the phrase ``pendency of trials and the phrase ``non-commencement of trial, the Supreme Court has said as under:- (i) In case of trials before Sessions Court the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the concerned cases. (ii) In cases of trial of warrant cases by Magistrate if the cases are instituted upon police reports the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant cases by Magi- strate when cases are instituted otherwise than on police report such trial shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the concerned accused under Section 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (iii) In cases of trials of summons cases by Magistrate the trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appear or are brought before the Magistrate are asked under Section 251 whether they plead guilty or have any defence to make. (5). (iii) In cases of trials of summons cases by Magistrate the trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appear or are brought before the Magistrate are asked under Section 251 whether they plead guilty or have any defence to make. (5). ``Pendency of trial in the court of law in the case in hand would be from the framing of the charge and not before that. In the present case, no charge hasbeen framed against the petitioner and the order of suspension was issued. Thus, it cannot be said that criminal proceedings in regard to any offence involving moral turpitude was pending trial in the court of law when the order of suspension was issued. Section 38(4) of the Act authorities the State Government to pass an order of suspension only when the matter is pending trial in the court. The order passedby the State Government in suspending the petitioner, was without authority of law and is liable to be set aside. (6). Writ petition is allowed. The order dated 22.5.97 (Annex. 4) is set aside. It will be open to the State respondent to take up the proceedings against the petitioner in exercise of the powers u/S. 38(4) of the Act if criminal proceedings are pending trial in the court of law in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude against the petitioner and the decision in this case would not be treated as an impediment in exercise of that power.