JUDGMENT S.K. Tiwari, J. This revisional petition is directed against the order dated 19th July, 1996, passed by ld. 12th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, in G.R. Case No. 2888B of 1992. 2. The Special Police Establishment (popularly known as C.B.I.) filed a charge-sheet against the opposite party under Ss. 420, 460, 468 and 471 IPC in the court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. The same was made over by him to ld. 12th. Metropolitan Magistrate, for disposal according to law. The ld. Magistrate framed charges and examined as one witness. 3. On 3.6.96, the accused filed an application praying for his discharge on the grounds: (1) That the documents contemplated in sub-so (5) of s.173 Cr. PC had not been annexed to the challan by the prosecution; and (2) That the Special Public Prosecutor conducting the case was not competent to conduct the case on behalf of prosecution because he was working under the direct administrative and disciplinary control of the Director of C.B.L who happens to be a Police Officer. 4. The ld. Magistrate upheld the defence contentions allowed the application, dropped the case and discharge the accused persons. Hence this petition. 5. The ld. Senior counsel for the opposite party, Sri Pramodranjan Roy, has argued that vide judicial department notification dated 30th July, 1991, issued in exercise of powers under sub-so (1) of S. 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court of 12th Metropolitan Magistrate was designated as Special Court of Judicial Magistrate. First Class, for trial of cases investigated under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. Hence the chargesheet initially submitted in the court of Chief metropolitan Magistrate and cognizance taken by him was bad in law. Consequently the subsequent trial of the case by 12th Metropolitan Magistrate was illegal and the trial was vitiated on this count also. 6. The apex court in case of Purusattam vs. State of Kutch ( AIR 1954 SC 700 ) has laid down that if a Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence in good faith though not empowered to do so, the defect was curable under S. 529 Cr.PC (i.e. S. 460(e) of the New Code). Hence the ld. court committed only a curable irregularity and the trial is not vitiated. 7. The ld. Hence the ld. court committed only a curable irregularity and the trial is not vitiated. 7. The ld. counsel for the opposite party then contended that this revisional petition is not competent because Inspector of C.B.I., who has filed the revisional application has not produced any authority to file this application. In case of Nadir Khan vs. State (AIR 1975(2) SCC 406 ) it has been laid down thus :- "The High Court is not required to act in revision merely through a conduit application at the instance of an aggrieved party. The High Court, as effective instrument of administration of criminal justice, keeps a constant vigil and whenever it finds that justice had suffered, it taken upon itself as it's bounden duty to suo-motu act where there is a flagrant abuse of law." I find no substance in this contention. Once the revisional jurisdiction has been invoked, the question whether it has been filed by a person duly authorised or not becomes immaterial. 8. Now, I shall consider whether the non-filing of documents provided in sub-so (5) of s. 173 Cr.PC was fatal? 9. The ld. Magistrate held that cognizance had been taken only on the basis of challan filed under s. 173(2) Cr.PC. Since challan did not accompany all documents on which the prosecution relies, including the statements recorded under s. 161 Cr.PC, the entire proceeding is vitiated. The ld. Magistrate relied on the following cases:- (1) Smt. Kalpana Ghosh vs. State (1996 Cr. LJ 1406); (2) Raghubir Saran Jain vs. State (1995 Cr. LJ 1447)., in support of his conclusions. 10. The ld. counsel for the opposite party has supported the trial court's order and has relied on the following cases:- (1) Satya Ranjan Paul vs. State of WE. (1996 CWN 606); (2) R.G. Brealey vs. State of WB. ( 1996(2) CHN 362 ); (3) Pradip Kumar vs. State of W.B. ( 1996(2) CHN 147 ); and (4) Jagganath China vs. M/s. Hockings Cookers Ltd. (1996 Cal Cr.LR (Ca]) 1114). 11. It has been held in the aforesaid cases that if the police fails to annex all the documents contemplated in s. 173(5) Cr.PC with the challan, a Magistrate would not be competent to take cognizance of offence. The reliance has been placed on Satya Narayan Musadi vs. State of Bihar ( AIR 1980 SC 506 ). 12. 11. It has been held in the aforesaid cases that if the police fails to annex all the documents contemplated in s. 173(5) Cr.PC with the challan, a Magistrate would not be competent to take cognizance of offence. The reliance has been placed on Satya Narayan Musadi vs. State of Bihar ( AIR 1980 SC 506 ). 12. A contrary view has been taken in the case of Anisha Dutta vs. State of W.B. (1996(2) Cal. LT 346). With great respect, I submit that the entire misconception appears to have arisen from the misinterpretation of ratio of Musadi's case (supra). The apex court defined the scope of precedent thus: "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides, what is of essence in a decision is it's ratio and not every observation if found therein nor what logically follows from various observations made in it. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and build upon it." 13. Let us now examine the ratio of Musadi's case. The prosecution filed a charge-sheet in the trial court under the E.C. Act. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and subsequently issued process against two other accused persons not sent up for trial by the police. The accused persons contended that for the purposes of taking cognizance of offence, the Magistrate can only look into the challan or police report filed under s. 173(2) Cr.PC and no other document should be looked into for the purpose. The apex court was required to decide: "Whether in view of the provision contained in s. 11 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, (Act for short), a Court taking cognizance of any offence punishable thereunder, upon a police report is precluded from looking into the complaint or first information report filed before the court or that it must keep itself exclusively confined to the report submitted by the police, is a question raised in this appeal by special leave from a decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court." 14. The court, while discussing the scope of s. 173 Cr.PC, observed thus :- "While submitting this report in connection with the offence of which s. 170 of the Code applies, meaning thereby that a case in which such investigating officer has found sufficient evidence for trial to be held by the court, it is incumbent upon such officer to forward to the Magistrate along with his report; (a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to Magistrate during investigation; (b) the statements recorded under s. 176 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses." 15. The court further held thus:- "The report as envisaged by s. 173(2) has to be accompanied as required by sub-so (5) by all the documents and statements of the witnesses therein mentioned. One cannot divorce the details which the report must contain as required by sub-so (2) from its accompaniments which are required to be submitted under sub-so (5). The whole of it is submitted as a report to the Court." Thus the apex court held that the court while taking cognizance of the offence the court shall not only look into the challan filed by the police but can also look into the documents annexed therewith. It does not follow from the judgment that if no documents under sub-so (5) have been annexed, but complete facts have been narrated in the body of the challan, the court would not be competent to take cognizance. It is only for this reason, the court proceeded to add:- "But even if a narrow construction is adopted that the police report can only be what is prescribed in s. 173(2) there would be sufficient compliance if what is required to be mentioned by the statute has been set down in the report. To say that all the details of the offence must be set out in the report under s. 173(2) submitted by the police officer would be expecting him to do something more than what the Parliament has not expected him to set out therein. If the report with sufficient particularity and clarity specifies the contravention of the law which is the alleged offence, it would be sufficient compliance." 16. If the report with sufficient particularity and clarity specifies the contravention of the law which is the alleged offence, it would be sufficient compliance." 16. I, therefore, with great respect took a contrary view in case of Anisha Dutta (supra), holding that the view taken by earlier Single Benches on the point was per-in-curium. The ld. counsel for the opposite party criticized my observations made in Anisha Dutta's case (supra) and cited AIR 1960 SC 936 and wanted me to refer this matter to a larger Bench for the sake of judicial discipline and also in the interest of stare decisis. I do not think it necessary to do so in the light of what has been discussed above. 17. The ld. counsel then relied on Darshan Singh vs. State of Maharastra ( 1972(1) SCR 571 ) in support of his contention that the charge-sheet must accompany documents. The case is not an authority for the proposition that where no documents are filed, cognizance cannot be taken. Even assuming for the sake of agreement that cognizance could not be taken without compliance of the provisions of s. 173(5) Cr.PC, it has to be borne in mind that the requirements of procedure are generally intended to sub serve the ends of justice. So, undue emphasis should not be placed on the technical requirements. The breach of technical rule shall not vitiate the trial unless it is shown that the contravention has caused prejudice to the accused (see AIR 1963 SC 1696 ). 18. Sri Roy next contended that the impugned order amounts to acquittal. Hence no revision lies. Even if the argument is taken to be correct, an acquittal can be set aside in a revisional proceeding, if the circumstances so warrant. Hence this contention also fails. 19. Now I shall consider question of validity of appointment of the public prosecutor? 20. The ld. counsel for the opposite party has taken me through Ss. 24 and 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code and has also invited attention towards 14th report of the law commission. The Code as well as the report provide that the prosecuting agency should be separated from the subordination of the police. 21. The ld. 20. The ld. counsel for the opposite party has taken me through Ss. 24 and 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code and has also invited attention towards 14th report of the law commission. The Code as well as the report provide that the prosecuting agency should be separated from the subordination of the police. 21. The ld. trial court has placed reliance on the case reported in AIR 1995 SC at page 1628, wherein the Assistant Public Prosecutor working in the State of Maharastra had successfully challenged the State Governments' order regarding their subordination. The apex court allowed the petition and directed the State Government not to permit the Assistant Public Prosecutor to work under the subordination of police officers. However, s. 25 of the Cr.PC does not altogether debar police officers from conducting cases on behalf of prosecution. Sub-section (3) of s. 25 Cr.PC provides that where no Assistant Public Prosecutor is available for conducting particular case, the District Magistrate may appoint any other person to work as Assistant Public Prosecutor. Even a police officer not below the rank of Inspector can discharge the functions of Assistant Public Prosecutor, if he has not taken part in the investigation of the case. 22. Even if the Public Prosecutor is working under the direct supervision of the Director of C.B.I., whether the, legality of his acting as Public Prosecutor can be questioned in a collateral proceeding like the present one in which he was personally not a party? The apex court in case of Golla Raju Ranga Raju vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1981 SC 1473 ) laid down :- "The defacto-appointment of a defacto judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is no concern or consequence to the Judge, except as a Judge. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bring in issue and litigate upon the title of Judge to his office........ Hence the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments." The same doctrine equally applies to all persons holding public office and discharging public duties, including the public prosecutor. 23. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bring in issue and litigate upon the title of Judge to his office........ Hence the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments." The same doctrine equally applies to all persons holding public office and discharging public duties, including the public prosecutor. 23. In case of Puspa Deui vs. M.L. Wadhaun ( AIR 1987 SC 1748 ) it has also been laid down that "where an office exists under the law, matters not how the appointment of incumbent is made, so far as the validity of its acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions. The official acts of such persons are recognized as valid under the defacto doctrine born of necessity and public policy to prevent endless confusion and endless mischief." The apex court quoted with approval the observations of Sir Asutosh Mukherjee (In: Pulin Behari vs. King Emperor, 15 CLJ 517) wherein it was observed : "The substance of the matter is that defacto doctrine was introduced into law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of public and the individual where this interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising duties or an office without being lawful officers. The doctrine, in fact, is necessary to maintain the supremacy of law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large." 24. Thus even if it is assumed that the ld. Public Prosecutor being subordinate to a police officer, was not eligible to conduct the case, the trial was not rendered illegal and he cannot be prevented from conducting cases in the court below without effectively obtaining a writ of quowarranto against him. 25. In the present case, the charges were framed on the basis of documents produced in the case. The accused persons never challenged the framing of charges. The prosecution case proceeded and one witness was examined. The dropping of prosecution by the ld. Magistrate was unprecedented and shocking. The ld. Magistrate had no powers to discharge the accused at this stage. He had no powers to question the legality of the order relating to taking cognizance by the ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. If the points were raised before him, he ought to have directed the party concerned to approach higher court. The ld. Magistrate was unprecedented and shocking. The ld. Magistrate had no powers to discharge the accused at this stage. He had no powers to question the legality of the order relating to taking cognizance by the ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. If the points were raised before him, he ought to have directed the party concerned to approach higher court. The ld. Magistrate acted in a most irresponsible manner and in utter ignorance of law. 26. The petition is allowed. The impugned order is hereby quashed. The ld. Magistrate is directed to proceed with the trial from the stage of which the proceeding had been dropped. The petitioner is directed to appear in the trial court on 14th March, 1997. 27. A copy of this order be forwarded to Registrar (A.S) for directing the Inspecting Officer to inspect the court of Id. Magistrate and report to this court the cases in which such orders of discharge have been passed. The matter be also brought to the notice of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for such action as he may deem fit. Revisional application allowed.