Judgement DAS, J. :- This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16-5-1991 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Title Suit No. 16 of 1987 decreing the suit of the plaintiffs for partition. The plaintiffs who are the respondents here filed the suit for declaration of their right, title and interest in the lands described in the schedules to the plaint (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) and for partition of the same. 2. We have heard Mr. D.K. Biswas, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. M. Nath, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 3. The case of the plaintiffs may, briefly, be stated as under :- The plaintiff No. 1 Smt. Kiran Bala Bhowmik is the wife of Late Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik and plaintiff Nos. 2-5 are the daughters of Late Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik and plaintiff No. 6 is the grand son of Late Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik. The defendant No. 2 who is appellant No. 1 herein is the son of Late Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik, the appellant No. 2 (defendant No. 4) is the wife of appellant No. 1 and appellant No. 3 (defendant No. 1) is the son of Late Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik and appellate No. 4 is the wife of appellant No. 3. 4. The case of the plaintiffs is that Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik, their predecessor was a resident of Chittagong (now in Bangladesh) and he had a business of manufacturing of steel trunk under the name and style Binapani Steel Trunk Factory and he had also wholesale business of molasses and ghee at Chitagong. It is stated that while Kshetra Mohah was running the aforesaid business in Chittagong his eldest son, namely, Chinta Haran Bhowmik (appellant No. 3) used to help him in running the business. But after the partition of India Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik along with other members of the family came to Tripura and settled at Bhatta Pukar (Badharghat) after purchasing land described under Schedule A of the plaint. It is stated that after purchasing the aforesaid land measuring 346 acres Kshetra Mohan constructed residential huts, excavated ponds, set up some orchard and let out huts to tenants and thus from all sources he used to earn a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per mensem. It is stated that after purchasing the aforesaid land measuring 346 acres Kshetra Mohan constructed residential huts, excavated ponds, set up some orchard and let out huts to tenants and thus from all sources he used to earn a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per mensem. But although Kshetra Mohan came to Tripura, he sent his eldest son Chinta Haran to Chittagong to look after the business and Chinta Haran used to remit money to his father from the income of the business at Chittgong. A portion of that money used to be deposited in the Savings Bank Account No. 2399 in the United Bank of India, Agartala Branch, Kshetra Mohan was thus running the family with the income he used to get from the aforesaid sources. 5. Kshetra Mohan died on 28-12-1956 and after his death his eldest son Chinta Haran and second son Subhas Chandra used to look after the family who were living jointly but out of the income of the joint family properties and business, it was alleged, some properties, movable and immovable described under Schedules B(a), B(b), B(c), B(d) and C (i) were acquired collusively. 6. It was further alleged that not only those properties were acquired by the defendants out of the income of the joint family property but taking advantage of the minority of the plaintiff Nos 3 to 5 and illiteracy of plaintiff No. 1 the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 got a sale deed executed by plaintiff No. 1 and Kanak Prava in their names and in the name of Sibabrata Bhowmik, the other son of Kshetra Mohan for land measuring 3 kanis 17 gandas 1 kara 1 kranta. It was alleged that they got this sale deed executed exercising undue influence and pressure from plaintiff No. 1. 7. It was further alleged that some time in the year 1985 it came to the notice of the plaintiffs that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 created the false documents and tried to get these documents registered. But due to their timely objection those could not be registered and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 could not create separate holding in their names. It was further alleged that as the plaintiffs raised objection it revealed that defendants collusively made a partition of the suit land amongst themselves depriving the plaintiffs of their legal right to the property. But due to their timely objection those could not be registered and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 could not create separate holding in their names. It was further alleged that as the plaintiffs raised objection it revealed that defendants collusively made a partition of the suit land amongst themselves depriving the plaintiffs of their legal right to the property. The plaintiffs, therefore, approached the defendants for amicable partition of the suit property but their all attempts were frustrated and the defendants did not agree for partition of the suit land. The cause of action of this partition suit arose in the month of Sept. 1986 and also on 3-3-1987 when the defendants finally denied to settle up the disputes by amicable settlement. The plaintiffs, therefore, filed the suit for partition of the suit land. 8. The defendants Nos. 2 and 4 resisted the suit by filing a joint written statement. They denied all the material averments of the plaint and contended further that the actual income of the properties of the joint family was not more than Rs. 500/- which was subsequently increased to Rs. 1000/- only until amicable partition. It was contended that out of the suit property two plots of land measuring .035 acres and .015 acres were acquired by the Government and wife of Kshetra Mohan and his sons only got the compensation money. No daughter was made party to the land acquisition cases. It was further pleaded that actually amicable partition was held on 28-4-1978 and prior to this amicable partition the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and plaintiff No. 1 were separate in mess from January, 1972. It was denied that any sort of threat was exercised on plaintiff No. 1 and Kanakprava for transferring the shares of the plaintiffs by executing sale deed. It was stated that due to the death of Shibabrata his share devolved upon the plaintiff No. 1. So, amicable partition was made on 28-4-1978. 9. The answering defendants also contended that the properties described under Schedules B and C were not the joint family properties. It was also denied that the answering defendants collusively got the mutation in their names. 10. So, amicable partition was made on 28-4-1978. 9. The answering defendants also contended that the properties described under Schedules B and C were not the joint family properties. It was also denied that the answering defendants collusively got the mutation in their names. 10. The defendant No. 1 who also contested the suit by filing a written statement virtually adopted the written statement filed by the defendant No. 3 and stated further that he gifted his entire property by a deed of gift in favour of his wife and as such he has no interest in the suit property. It was further contended that the homestead, that is, dwelling house occupied by both male and female members cannot be partitioned in view of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act. He also denied all other materials averments of the plaint. 11. The defendant No. 3 also contested the suit by filing a separate written statement and denied the material averments of the plaint. It was contended that the plaintiff No. 6 did not inherit any property through her mother Kanak Prava as the latter transferred her share in the suit land on 29-9-1962 by executing a kabla in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and their other brother Sibabrata Bhowmik. It was further contended that the plaintiff already transferred their shares by executing registered sale deed and as such they are not entitled to get any further land by way of partition. It was also contended by her that the properties described under Schedules B and C were neither joint family property nor were they acquired by the income of the joint family. 12. Upon the pleadings, learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issues :- 1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 2. Have the plaintiffs any cause of action for this suit? 3. Has the proper court fee been paid in this suit ? 4. Is the suit barred by Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956? 5. Did the plaintiff No. 1 for herself and four other minor daughters along with them a major daughter executed a deed of sale on 29-9-1962 in favour of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and another son (now dead) Shibabrata Bhowmik ? 6. Are the plaintiffs legally entitled to demand any partition of alleged joint property after being sold their shares ? 7. 1 and 2 and another son (now dead) Shibabrata Bhowmik ? 6. Are the plaintiffs legally entitled to demand any partition of alleged joint property after being sold their shares ? 7. Are the properties mentioned from para 11(a) to 11(d) and from para 12(a) to 12(c) of the plaint the joint property or properties of the plaintiffs and defendants? 8. Are the plaintiffs entitled to get the suit land partitioned as a preliminary decree? 9. Any other relief/reliefs parties are entitled in the suit? 13. The plaintiffs examined one witness and defendants also examined one witness. They also exhibited a number of documents. 14. On consideration of the evidence on record learned Subordinate Judge has found that the plaintiffs had cause of action for the suit and that no amicable partition at all took place. Shibabrata, the third son of Kshetra Mohan died unmarried and thereafter plaintiff No. 1 Kiranbala died. Learned trial Court, therefore, found that the plaintiffs were entitled to get a decree and accordingly he decreed the suit holding that the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 will be entitled to get 1/7th share of the suit property. 15. Before entering into the rival contentions it may be advantageous at this stage to describe the lineage of Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik which is as follows :- 16. The first question that requires consideration in this case is whether the land described under Schedule A was the self acquired property of Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik. It is, however, an admitted fact that the land described under Schedule-A was purchased by Kshetra Mohan but the contention of the defendants was that the plaintiffs sold their shares of the aforesaid land to the sons of Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik, namely Chinta Haran Bhowmik, Subhas Chandra Bhowmik and Shibabrata Bhowmik at a consideration price of Rs. 1000/- only by executing a sale deed marked as Ext. Y Mr. 1000/- only by executing a sale deed marked as Ext. Y Mr. Nath, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has quite vehemently argued that this document is a collusive one and it was obtained from the plaintiff No. 1 by exercising undue influence and pressure and that no reliance can be placed upon this document as there is no evidence on record to show that the wife of Kshetra Mohan who is the natural guardian of the minor plaintiffs obtained necessary permission from the District Judge before selling their shares of the aforesaid land described under Schedule A. The law regarding the power of the widow or disposal of the immovable properties as laid down in decided cases has been summarised in clause 178 of Mullas Hindu Law as follows :- "To uphold an alienation, by a widow or other limited heir, of the corpus of immovable property inherited by her, it should be shown- (1) that there was legal necessity, or (2) that the alienee, after reasonable inquiry as to the necessity acted honestly in the belief that the necessity existed; or (3) that there was such consent of the next reversioners to the alienation as would raise a presumption that the transaction was a proper one; or (4) that it was a surrender by her of her whole interest in the whole estate in favour of the nearest reversioners at the time of alienation. Where any one of the first three positions is established, the alienation may be of the whole or any part of the estate, but where the fourth alone is proved then the alienation must be of the whole estate." 17. Mr. Biswas, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted that mother i.e. the wife of Late Kshetra Mohan was the karta of the family and as such she was quite competent to sell the properties of the minors to defray their expenses. It is stated by him that such a sale is a valid one as it was done due to legal necessity. 18. The settled law is that the burden of proof of legal necessity is on the alienee. It is stated by him that such a sale is a valid one as it was done due to legal necessity. 18. The settled law is that the burden of proof of legal necessity is on the alienee. The Supreme Court in Smt. Rani v. Smt. Santa Bala, (1970) 3 SCC 722 : AIR 1971 SC 1028 has observed as follows at page 1031 (of AIR) :- "Legal necessity to support the sale must however be established by the alienees ....... Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion, it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. Recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove legal necessity. The recitals are, however, admissible in evidence, their value varying according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. The recitals may be used to corroborate other evidence of the existence of legal necessity. The weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances." 19. In the instant case on perusal of the evidence on record we find that none of the alienees on whom the burden of proving legal necessity lies has given any effective evidence in this regard. D.W. 1 Subhas Chandra Bhowmik who is the second son of Kshetra Mohan Bhowmik simply stated that his mother and elder sister Kanak Prava executed a sale deed in their favour in respect of their shares and the shares of the minors, namely, plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 5. He did not say even casually what was the necessity for sale of the shares of the minors. 20. We may, therefore, turn to the recitals of Ext. Y by dint of which the three sons of deceased Kshetra Mohan purchased the land. On going through the Ext. Y sale deed we find the ground for sale was some urgent need. It is interesting to note here that urgent need arose only in respect of the plaintiffs and not in respect of the defendants, namely, three sons. Y by dint of which the three sons of deceased Kshetra Mohan purchased the land. On going through the Ext. Y sale deed we find the ground for sale was some urgent need. It is interesting to note here that urgent need arose only in respect of the plaintiffs and not in respect of the defendants, namely, three sons. Admittedly the family was in joint mess at the time when this Ext. Y kabala was executed and no partition was effected till then. It is, therefore, really not understandable to us how the defendants could purchase the shares of the minors at a consideration price of less than Rs. 1000/- only. 21. Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act gives statutory recognition to some of the powers which a natural guardian can exercise subject to some restrictions. The first restriction is that the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. The second restriction is that he shall not mortgage or create a charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise or even lease out the property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than a year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority, without the previous permission of the Court . 22. In the instant case it is an admitted fact that no permission of the Court was taken for sale of the shares of the minors. 23. Mr. Biswas has, however, argued that mother Kiranbala being the natural guardian was the karta of the family and hence she was competent enough to dispose of the shares of the minors undivided interest in the joint family property. In support of his contention Mr. Biswas has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sri Narayan Bal v. Sridhar Sutar reported in AIR 1996 SC 2371 : (1996 AIR SCW 899). What has been observed by their Lordships in this case is as under (at page 2372 of AIR) :- "Under Section 8 a natural guardian of the property of the Hindu minor, before he disposes of any immovable property of the minor, must seek permission of the Court. What has been observed by their Lordships in this case is as under (at page 2372 of AIR) :- "Under Section 8 a natural guardian of the property of the Hindu minor, before he disposes of any immovable property of the minor, must seek permission of the Court. But since there need be no natural guardian for the minors undivided interest in the joint family property, as provided under Sections 6 and 12 of the Act, the previous permission of the Court under Section 8 for disposing of the undivided interest of the minor in the joint family property is not required. The joint Hindu family by itself is a legal entity capable of acting through its Karta and other adult members of the family in management of the joint Hindu family property. Thus S. 8 in view of the express terms of Ss. 6 and 12, would not be applicable where a joint Hindu family property is sold/disposed of by the Karta involving an undivided interest of the minor in the said Hindu family property." 24. By citing this decision what Mr. Biswas wants to emphasize is that the family was very much joint till then and at that time the mother i.e. Kiranbala was the Karta of the family. But Mr. Nath has drawn our attention to the averments made under para 16 of the written statement and submitted that the statement made under sub-para (16) will clearly indicate that both defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were managing the joint properties. Mr. Nath has, therefore, submitted that in view of the admitted fact how it is possible to entertain the contention that Smt. Kiranbala was the Karta of the family. That apart we have already made our observation that the burden lies on the alienees to prove the legal necessity. But in the instant case there is practically no evidence in support of this contention. Moreover, when it is an admitted fact that the family was joint till then and that the properties were sold due to need of money then how it was possible for the male members i.e. sons of the Kshetra Mohan to purchase the land P.W. 1 deposed that the sale deed Ext. Y was obtained from her mother by creating pressure upon her and her sister. The witness has been cross-examined but on this point we do not find any effective cross-examination. Y was obtained from her mother by creating pressure upon her and her sister. The witness has been cross-examined but on this point we do not find any effective cross-examination. D.W. 1 the only witness who has been examined on behalf of the defendants simply deposed that his mother and his elder sister executed the aforesaid sale deed. He did not actually speak about the legal necessity. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances we are of the view that this sale deed Ext. Y is liable to be set aside and accordingly we do so. The learned trial Court rightly set aside the sale. 25. Now as regards the properties described under Schedules B(b), B(c), B(d) and C(i) the case of the plaintiffs is that these properties were acquired by the defendants from the income of the joint family properties. P.W. 1 who is one of the plaintiffs deposed that her father after purchasing the land described under Schedule 1 not only constructed residential huts but also constructed huts for the purpose of shop sheds, set up saw mills and that some of those huts were let out to tenants and as such from these properties and also from the orchard the monthly income was Rs. 15,000/-. 26. During cross-examination it was not actually denied that there was saw mills and that some huts were let out to tenants. The rent receipt Ext. 1 series also support the version of P.W. 1 that her mother and brothers used to realise rents from different tenants. What was suggested to the witness was that those properties were acquired not by the income of the joint family properties. 27. D.W. 1 who is one of the defendants deposed that property described under Schedule B(a) belonged to defendant No. 1 and him and these were sold in the year 1978 i.e. prior to the institution of the present suit. He also deposed that property described under Schedule B(b) was the property of his wife and that she purchased it from her own source of income. According to him the property described under Schedule B(c) was purchased by him in the year 1979 from his own source of income. The question which needs consideration is whether he had any separate income. The witness did not specifically state what was his separate income at that time. According to him the property described under Schedule B(c) was purchased by him in the year 1979 from his own source of income. The question which needs consideration is whether he had any separate income. The witness did not specifically state what was his separate income at that time. That there was no partition amongst all the co-sharers is very much apparent from the documentary evidence marked as Ext. 2 series. The document marked as Ext. 2 series clearly shows that there was some partition amongst the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and plaintiff No. 1. These documents clearly indicate that all the co-sharers were not participants of any valid partition. Moreover, Ext. 3 series letter dated 28-5-1984 addressed to the Chairman, Agartala Municipality by Renu Bala Bhowmik, the defendant No. 3 clearly indicates that the properties were not partitioned till then. That apart, it is not actually denied that there was some income of the properties left by Kshetra Mohan. What D.W. 1 stated in this regard was that the monthly income from the properties left by his father was Rs. 750/-. Here it may be mentioned that in the written statement it was stated that the monthly income was initially Rs. 500/- and subsequently it was raised to Rs. 1,000/-. P.W. 1 deposed that from saw mills, ponds, rented shop house, orchard etc. the monthly income was about Rs. 15,000/-. 28. So, considering all aspects and particularly in view of the fact that D.W. 1 could not establish the fact that he had sufficient income to purchase the properties described under Schedule B(c) we are of the view that this contention of the defendants is not acceptable. 29. Now as regards the properties described under Schedule B(d) i.e. purchase of Truck, the case of the defendants is that Niyati Bala took a loan of Rs. 1,68,000/- from the U.Co. Bank and thereafter purchased the Truck. Although P.W. 1 claimed that this Truck was purchased from the income of the joint family properties, the Ext. T document shows that Niyati Bala actually took, loan of Rs. 1,68,000/- from the U.Co. Bank. In view of this evidence we are of the view that this Truck was actually purchased by Niyati Bala on taking loan from the U.Co. Bank and not from the income of the joint family properties. T document shows that Niyati Bala actually took, loan of Rs. 1,68,000/- from the U.Co. Bank. In view of this evidence we are of the view that this Truck was actually purchased by Niyati Bala on taking loan from the U.Co. Bank and not from the income of the joint family properties. But the claim of Niyati Bala that she purchased other landed properties of Schedule B on selling gold and on getting money from her father i.e. from stridhan is not acceptable as there is no cogent evidence. It is true that the properties if established to have been gifted to the bride before the marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of giving farewell are stridhan properties. But here in the instant case there is no evidence to show if Niyati Bala recevied any such stridhan. 30. Mr. Biswas, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has at last argued that the Ext. Y document cannot be rejected as the plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 5 did not bring the suit within the period of limitation after their attainment of majority. It is true that the suit was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation after their attainment of majority. But P.W. 1 who was admittedly a minor at the time when this Y kabala was executed deposed that she and her other sister came to know about that deed and other deeds only during the meeting for amicable settlement held in the year 1984. The suit was filed on 30-3-1987. Here it is necessary to mention that there is no pleading in the written statement to the effect that the plaintiffs Nos. 2-5 did not bring the suit within the prescribed period of limitation after their attainment of majority. We are therefore, of the view that since it was not a question of a controversy no issue was required to be framed. The learned counsel Mr. Biswas has at least made a submission for remanding the suit. But in view of the evidence of D.W. 1 we do not find any cogent reason as to why the suit should be remanded. However, in view of our above finding of facts we are of the view that the property described under Schedule B(d) i.e. the Truck should be excluded from partition. But in view of the evidence of D.W. 1 we do not find any cogent reason as to why the suit should be remanded. However, in view of our above finding of facts we are of the view that the property described under Schedule B(d) i.e. the Truck should be excluded from partition. The rest properties i.e. the suit properties excluding the property described under Schedule B(d) i.e. Truck are liable to be partitioned. 31. It is not in dispute that the third son of Kshetra Mohan, namely, Sibabrata dies unmarried and that during pendency of the suit plaintiff No. 1, namely, Kiran Bala died. D.W. 1 in his cross-examination stated that plaintiffs and defendants were entitled to have 1/9th share of the suit properties. So, after the death of Sibabrata and plaintiff No. 1 we find that plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are entitled to get 1/7th (one seventh) share of the suit properties excluding the suit properties described under Schedule B(d) i.e. the Truck. 32. The result is that the appeal is partly allowed. Each of the parties as indicated above is entitled to get 1/7th (one seventh) share of the suit property excluding the property viz. the Truck as described under Schedule B(d) of the plaint. Under the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. 33. We however, feel it to record that during hearing of this appeal our attention was drawn to the provisions laid down under Order 32A(3) of C.P.C. We accordingly, asked the parties to make an endeavour for amicable settlement. But they were unable to compromise the suit. However, the parties may approach the trial Court if they can settle up the matter amicably. Send down the records to the trial Court along with a copy of this judgment immediately. 34. H. K.K. SINGH, J. :- I agree. Appeal partly allowed.