Judgment : The petitioners in this original petition are the accused in C.C.No.8 of 1990 on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. This petition is filed by them under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the above-mentioned proceedings for various reasons set out by them in the petition, before adverting to the various grounds put forward in the quash petition, I have decided to set out hereunder the bare minimum facts that could be culled out from the complaint filed against the accused for the purpose of appreciating the arguments advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this proceedings. 2. The respondent in this petition filed a complaint before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai alleging offences under Secs.9(1)(a), 9(1)(b), 9(1)(bb), 9(1)(c) and 9-AA of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 read with Rules 9(1), 173-B, 173-C, 173-F, 173-G and 226 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and Sec.120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The first accused is stated to be the manufacturer of, among other excisable goods, different varieties of Battery Separator Fabrices. Though Battery Separator Fabrics was an excisable goods liable for Central Excise duty, the manufacture of the same was not declared to the Department by the first accused and they were removed without payment of duty and without observing the procedure prescribed under the Central Excise Law. The 2nd accused, the Managing Director of the Company, is responsible for all acts of commission and omission of the A-1 company under Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. Accused 3 and 4 are employed in the Company of A-l as Manager and Sub Manager and are discharging the duties assigned to them by A-l company which includes inter alia the matters pertaining to the compliance with the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 including those relating to production and clearances of Excisable rules manufactured and removed by A-l company. 3. A-l company had been manufacturing Battery Separator Fabrics by employing special technics in weaving from December, 1984 onwards. As per the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and Rules, 1944, the company is expected to declare the products manufactured in the prescribed Pro forma under Rule 173-P whereas no such declaration was filed by the Company for the Battery Separator Fabrics manufactured. As per the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and Rules, 1944, the company is expected to declare the products manufactured in the prescribed Pro forma under Rule 173-P whereas no such declaration was filed by the Company for the Battery Separator Fabrics manufactured. Though the company manufactured Battery Separator Fabrics, they removed the same without declaring to the Department as required under Central Excise Law. In their gate passes, the product was mentioned as “100% unprocessed acrylic fabrics” and the rate of duty was mentioned as “nil”. The description of the product was deceptive and misleading. The company had been clearing such goods since December, 1984 without the knowledge of the Department and without the same, having been declared in the classification list filed by the company under Rule 173-B for other goods. Accused No.1 failed to maintain prescribed Records under Rule 173-G and others. Though the company manufactured the products since December, 1984, the same has not been declared in the classification list. Even if the product is fully exempted, the company is expected to declare the details of the products manufactured by them at the appropriate place in the Classification List. This failure on the part of the first accused amounts to suppression of relevant materials from the proper officer with an intention to evade payment of duty. Though the product is commercially known as Battery Separator Fabrics, in the document, it was mentioned as “100% unprocessed acrylic fabrics”. The above contravention with intent to evade payment of duty attracts penal provision under mue 173-B. Thus, the various of offences for which the complaint was lodged were made out. 4. The accused filed a petition under Sec.245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to discharge them which was taken on file as Crl.M.P.No.758 of 1991 and it was dismissed. Crl.R.C.No.48 of 1992, filed by the accused against that order is separately disposed of by me today. 5. Several grounds are raised in the quash petition to sustain the relief and they are extracted hereunder: (a) The facts of the case as borne out by records conclusively show that the petitioners have not committed any offence and the complaint has been instituted frivolously, with ulterior motive only to harass the accused. 5. Several grounds are raised in the quash petition to sustain the relief and they are extracted hereunder: (a) The facts of the case as borne out by records conclusively show that the petitioners have not committed any offence and the complaint has been instituted frivolously, with ulterior motive only to harass the accused. (b) In the counter filed by the complainant in Crl.M.P.No.758 of 1991, it was stated by the complainant that while taking the case of prosecution, the policy of trying the department in several cases of classification disputes under the High Court stay was also taken into account; the company had obtained a stay from the High Court in number of cases in the past involving the total liability of Rs.11 crores appropriately. So, lodging prosecution was considered necessary, in view of the persistent refusal of the company against honouring its liability and for seeking to abuse the process of the court. This according to the accused would show the extraneous considerations in the mind of the complainant and bad faith on their part. (c) There is no provision in the Central Excise Act to levy excise duty on the unprocessed gray fabrics and only on undergoing the processes specified in the Act excise duty is leviable on the processed fabrics. One variety of the man-made fabrics manufactured by the petitioner-Company is used in the manufacture of Batteries and the users call these fabrics as Battery Separator Fabrics. The Battery manufacturers after purchasing the grew fabrics by heat setting process convert it to acquire Tabular formations to insert cathodes used in the batteries. From 1.3.1986, the first accused-Company filed fresh classification list classifying all the products manufactured by them under the New Central Excise Tariff Act, reckoning raw materials used. After perusing the manufacturing process, and the ingredients contained in the manufactured product, the Excise Authority had approved all these Classification List indicating the duty liable to be levied and paid. The company had cleared all its manufactured products paying the approved excise duty, and the statutory records, periodically verified and approved by the Central Excise Authorities. The grey fabrics called by the manufacturers as “Battery Separator Fabrics” were classified under Chapter 55 reckoning the man-made philement used in it and the same was approved as per the above proposal accorded by the department, the company had cleared all these fabrics. The grey fabrics called by the manufacturers as “Battery Separator Fabrics” were classified under Chapter 55 reckoning the man-made philement used in it and the same was approved as per the above proposal accorded by the department, the company had cleared all these fabrics. (d) On 28.5.1987, the Assistant Collector, Central Excise visited the petitioner-Mills and made enquiries about the various fabrics and its end uses. Only thereafter a show cause notice was issued to the Company as to why the gray fabrics used as Battery Separators should not be classified under the Heading 58.06 of the Central Excise Tariff Act and why the approved Classification List should not be modified accordingly. Thereafter, the department after receiving the explanation, classified the grey fabrics under the Heading 59.09 and not under the Heading 58.06 as proposed by them in the show cause notice. (e) Consequent to the reclassification, there were departmental proceedings against the first accused regarding the duty payable on account of such reclassification and an order came to be passed by the Assistant Collector restricting the demand period from 1.12.1986 to 28.2.1987 as against the proposed period of 1.12.1986 to 31.5.1987. The different duty was quantified at Rs.1,93,34273. An appeal was filed and in the appeal, the earlier order was modified stating that the demand on account of the re-classification should be only for the period from 18.2.1987 to 28.2.1987. Thus, the differential duty was quantified at Rs.1,24,778 which was paid. (f) One year after the finality was reached as stated above, the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai initiated fresh proceedings by issuing a show cause notice against the first accused Company demanding differential duty from 28.2.1986 18.2.1987 invoking the power under the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Central Excise Act. The differential duty thus came to be quantified at Rs.5,36,608.90 for the above-mentioned period. The Collector of Customs had acted without jurisdiction in resorting to the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act since the facts available in this case do not warrant it. (g) The Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 came into force from the midnight of 28.2.1986 and the first accused-Company had filed appropriate Classification List declaring the Battery Separator Fabrics under the Heading 55 of the above-mentioned Act. All clearances thereafter of this Battery Separator Fabrics are strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act. (g) The Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 came into force from the midnight of 28.2.1986 and the first accused-Company had filed appropriate Classification List declaring the Battery Separator Fabrics under the Heading 55 of the above-mentioned Act. All clearances thereafter of this Battery Separator Fabrics are strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act. As per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and this Court, revised classification can operate only prospectively and not retrospectively and therefore there is no power to demand differential duty retrospectively. Though the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai was informed about this position, yet the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai confirmed his demand. Based on the above action taken by the Collector which is non est in law, the present complaint had been filed claiming the non-payment of differential duty for the period 28.2.1986 to 18.2.1987 would amount to evasion of excise duty punishable under Sec.9 of the Act. Once the dispute between the department and the accused had reached a finality, by the order in Appeal No.229 of 1987 on the file of the Collector of Appeals, Madras, the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai had no jurisdiction to initiate fresh proceedings on the same cause of action and it would amount to double jeopardy. 6. There is no wilful intention to evade payment of duty which alone would constitute an offence under that section. In the present case there was no evasion of payment of duty since the Battery Separator Fabric had been cleared by the first petitioner-Company from 28.2.1986 as per the classification approved by the department and entering the same in the statutory records. In the complaint, all relevant facts have been deliberately suppressed. The proceeding of the Assistant Collector and the order of the Statutory Appellate Authority have not been mentioned in the complaint. The second, third and fourth accused, being the officers of the first accused-Company, are made as accused on the allegation that they have guided and abetted in the alleged evasion of duty by the first accused company. The second accused was the Managing Director from 1.4.1986 and the third accused retired from service in the year 1990. The Administrative office of the first accused-Company is at Bangalore and the Managing Director of the Company looks after the administration from Bangalore. The second accused was the Managing Director from 1.4.1986 and the third accused retired from service in the year 1990. The Administrative office of the first accused-Company is at Bangalore and the Managing Director of the Company looks after the administration from Bangalore. These are the broad grounds on which the quashing of the complaint is sought for. 7. I heard Mr.N.S.Sivam the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr.P.N.Prakash, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would formulate the points in the following manner: (a) Thecomplaint did not contain the relevant materials to charge the accused. (b) No clear allegations against the Director and Manager. (c) No clear allegations are made in the complaint to proceeding against the accused 2 to 4. (d) Since there is no specific averment in the complaint against the accused, the case should not have been taken on file. (e) The second accused joined in the company as a Managing Director on 1.4.1986 and the period of evasion as per the complaint is 28.2.1986 to 28.2.1987. This being so, the charge of conspiracy against the second accused could not be made out. (f) The complaint is lodged without reference to the order of the Assistant Collector on the subject and the statutory order of the Appellate Authority, Madras. (g) Once the matter reached the finality under the orders of the statutory appellate authority, the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai had no jurisdiction to proceed further departmentally and the act of the Collector in starting the proceedings afresh is without jurisdiction. (h) Any revision of classification can have only prospective effect. Mr.P.N.Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in this case would state that the entire arguments advanced on behalf of the accused in this case is wholly misconceived and without any basis. 7A. carefully applied my mind to the arguments of the learned counsel on either side. Sec.9 of the Act is the Penal Section and it prohibits contravention of any of the provisions of the notification (a): evading the payment of any duty (b): removal any excisable goods in contravention of etc., etc., (bb); and failing to supply any information which one is required by rules made under the Act to supply etc., etc., (c). Sec.9-AA deals with the offences committed by the companies. Sec.9-AA deals with the offences committed by the companies. Rule 9 speaks about the time and manner of the payment of duty; Rule 173-B deals with the assessee filing List of goods for approval of the proper Officer; Rule 173-C deals with the assessee filing Price List of goods assessable ad valorem; Rule 173-G speaks about the procedure followed by the assessee and Rule 226 deals with the maintenance of the entry books, stock accounts, and warehouse registers. Sec.l20-B of the Indian Penal Code speaks about the conspiracy. 8. The first accused-Company till 1.6.1987 had been clearing Battery Separate fabrics manufactured by them as “100% unprocessed acrylic fabrics” is not disputed. It is also not in dispute that this fabric declared above attracts “nil” duty and that the clearance of those fabrics was after compliance of the statutory requirements provided under the Act and the Rules. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner-Company was inspected on 28.5.1987 and at that time, it was noticed that the first accused-Company was manufacturing different varieties of Battery Separator Fabrics. However those Battery Separator Fabrics were declared by them as “100% unprocessed acrylic fabrics”. Only thereafter, the first accused-Company filed a classification list on 31.5.1987 with effect from 1.6.1987 declaring the product as “Fabrics for Battery Separator unprocessed=100% acrylic”. This item attracts excise duty is also not in dispute. It is no doubt true as a result of such fresh classification list, the above-mentioned fabric was reclassified under a different Heading. The records also establish that on account of sub reclassification, differential duty was demanded by the Assistant Collector of Excise for the period from 1.2.19S6 to 31.5.1987. But, ultimately the demand was restricted to the period from 1.12.1986 to 28.2.1987 and the duty was quantified at Rs.1,93,342.73. On appeal, the Collector of Appeals modified the period of demand from 18.2.1987 to 28.2.1987 and reduced the duty payable at Rs.1,24,778. It is also true that exercising the powers conferred under the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act, fresh proceedings departmentally were taken. 9. On appeal, the Collector of Appeals modified the period of demand from 18.2.1987 to 28.2.1987 and reduced the duty payable at Rs.1,24,778. It is also true that exercising the powers conferred under the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act, fresh proceedings departmentally were taken. 9. The sheet-anchor of the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner appears to be that the complaint is the result of the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai exercising the power under the proviso to Sec.11 -A of the Act; the complaint has been lodged against the accused claiming that the non-payment of the different duty for the period from 28.2.1986 to 18.2.1987 would amount to evasion of excisable duty punishable under Sec.9 of the Act; since any duty becomes payable on account of a reclassification can only be prospective, no action could be taken on the basis of such reclassification with retrospective effect. In support of this line of argument, and to substantiate the grounds raised in the quash petition, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner cited a number of judgments. However, the sum and substance of the complaint could be seen from it is that the accused have been clearing goods “Battery Separator Fabrics” which are excisable goods, from ¡ 984 on a declaration that it is “100% unprocessed acrylic fabrics” which attracts “nil” duty. From 1.6.1987, this Battery Separator Fabrics, which have been manufactured by the accused even earlier had come to be assessed for duty, it is not as though the accused had started manufacturing this Battery Separator Fabrics, only from the date viz., 31.5.1987 on which date they filed a fresh classification list. The fact that the Battery Separator Fabrics have been manufactured by the accused even long before is not even disputed by them. However, their stand appears to be that these battery Separator Fabrics were also disclosed by them in the returns submitted by them in compliance to the statutory requirements and therefore their clearance as such cannot be an offence under the Act. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that any revision in duty arising consequent to a reclassification can be effective only prospectively and not retrospectively. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that any revision in duty arising consequent to a reclassification can be effective only prospectively and not retrospectively. In this context, he would state that the re-classification was done with the re-classification was done with effect from only 1.6.1987 and therefore the present complaint filed claiming that the non-payment of differential duty for the period from 28.2.1986 to 18.2.1987 would amount to evasion of excise duty is not maintainable. For this purpose, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions: (a) Rainbow Industries (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Vadodara Rainbow Industries (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Vadodara , (1994)74 E.L.T. 3 (S.C); (b) Tamil Nadu Housing Board and unreported judgment dated 23.6.1997 in Writ Appeal No.472 of 1993. I carefully went through the judgments in the light of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The question that came up for consideration in the first case was whether in the absence of any amendment in law or judicial pronouncement, the reclassification could be prospective or retrospective. The Supreme Court of India answered on the facts of that case, that it can be only prospective. In the second case, the question came up for consideration was the scope of the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and when that power could be exercised. To the same effect are the decisions referred to above as (c) and (d) viz., Nat Steel Equipment Private Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise viz., Nat Steel Equipment Private Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise , (1988)34 E.L. T. 8 (S.C)and Collector of Central Excise v. Chemphar Drugs & Liniments Collector of Central Excise v. Chemphar Drugs & Liniments , (1989)40 E.L.T. 276 (S.C). 11. Likewise, the competency of the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai in exercising the power conferred under the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act especially when the same issue had become final departmentally between the parties had been argued at length. 11. Likewise, the competency of the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai in exercising the power conferred under the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act especially when the same issue had become final departmentally between the parties had been argued at length. In support of this argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted the following citations: (a) Union of India v. Shamlal Dey and others Union of India v. Shamlal Dey and others , 1978 E.L.T. 528), (b) Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd. S.S.Kothari In re S.S.Kothari In re (1987)30 E.L.T. 156 (Cal.), (f) Camlin Private Ltd. v. Union of India and another Camlin Private Ltd. v. Union of India and another , 1982 E.L.T. I (Bom.), (g) J.K.Synthtics Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others J.K.Synthtics Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others 1981 E.L.T. 328 (DeL.) Again these are all case laws, in my view, which are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. In the first case above referred to, it is stated that the criminal court, in a prosecution under Sec.85 of the Gold Control Act, which is analogous to Sec.9of the Central Excise Act can take into consideration the fact that in departmental adjudication, the Authorities have not imposed any penalty on the accused for the same offence. The second case above referred to relates to the question of jurisdiction; the availability of alternative remedy, and the validity of additional show cause notice when issued after the passing of adjudication order. In the third case, it was decided once a finding on a contention raised before it is decided by the Superior Authority, it is binding on the Subordinate Authorities in subsequent proceedings. In the fourth case, the question whether the doctrine of precedents will apply with full rigour to the quasi-judicial authority or not was called upon to be decided as well as the question whether a quasi-judicial decision can be reopened by issuing a fresh show cause notice without the original order itself being set aside. In the next case referred to above, it is laid down that the earlier decisions are binding on the subsequent proceedings. To the same effect is the other two judgments referred to above as (f) and (g). 12. In the next case referred to above, it is laid down that the earlier decisions are binding on the subsequent proceedings. To the same effect is the other two judgments referred to above as (f) and (g). 12. All the case laws cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and referred to above by me do not apply to the facts of the case on hand. These are all the decisions which the company could have made use of in their favour when they were confronted with the proceedings of the Collector of Central Excise, Madurai. All these case laws arose out of departmental proceedings which were challenged before the Court of Law on the ground whether the reclassification will have prospective and retrospective effect and when the power under the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act could be exercised. The case before the Criminal Court in the instant case is that the accused had cleared the goods, viz., Battery Separator Fabrics, from the year 1984 onwards without properly declaring them. Whether there has been a proper declaration at all in respect of the above mentioned goods and whether the declaration already made as “100% unprocessed acrylic fabrics” is a sufficient declaration in the eye of law for the above-mentioned goods is a matter for evidence and trial. Despite my best efforts, I am unable to find as to how all the case laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner till this stage and referred to above would be of any help to the accused. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the accused are not useful to decide the points raised in this quashing petition. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners then submitted that on the allegations made in the complaint, the second accused cannot be proceeded with. The relevant allegation in the complaint as against A-2 to A-4 are extracted hereunder: “A-2 the Managing Director of the Company is responsible for all acts of commission and omission of the Company A-l under Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The relevant allegation in the complaint as against A-2 to A-4 are extracted hereunder: “A-2 the Managing Director of the Company is responsible for all acts of commission and omission of the Company A-l under Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. A-3 and A-4 are employed in the Company A-1 as Manager and Sub Manager and are discharging the duties assigned to them by the Company A-1 which includes inter alia, the matters pertaining to the compliance with the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 including those relating to production and clearances of excisable goods manufactured and removed by the Company A-l.” In the quashing petition, it is stated that the second accused became the Managing Director of the first accused company from 1.4.1986 and that the third accused retired from service in the year 1990. The date of joining of the second petitioner in his capacity as Managing Director and the retirement of the third petitioner in the year 1990 as put forward in the petition to quash is not admitted by the complainant as correct. Sec.9-AA of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 relates to offences by Companies. According to it, when the accused is a Company, every person who, at the time when the offence was committed was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company, of the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. This is a rebuttable presumption. To my mind, the allegations made in the complaint in regard to A-2 to A-4 satisfy the requirements of Sec.9-AA of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that on the allegations made in the complaint accused 2 to 4 cannot be made liable. One other argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that when the second accused became the Managing Director-for the first accused Company only on 1.4.1986 ( i. e., his assumption) then, how can he be held responsible for having conspired to duty from 28.2.1986 onwards. There is no reference at all in the complaint to the date 28.2.1986 and from where the learned counsel gets it I am unable to understand. There is no reference at all in the complaint to the date 28.2.1986 and from where the learned counsel gets it I am unable to understand. As already referred to by me, the allegation in the complaint was that the goods were cleared from the year 1984 under a conspiracy and since from 1.6.1987 a reclassification was done, subject to evidence and proof, the period of offence should be from 1984 to the date on which the reclassification was done. In support of his submission that the accused No.2 cannot be made liable at all for the offence of conspiracy on the ground that he came to occupy the office only later, the learned counsel cited the following judgments viz., Sharadchandra Shripad Marathe v. Gurushant Gangadhar Kamble and others viz., Sharadchandra Shripad Marathe v. Gurushant Gangadhar Kamble and others , (1986)25 E.L.T. 915 (Bom.), Banwari Lal Jhunjhunwala and Sharadchandra Shripad Marathe v. Gurushant Ganga Kamble Sharadchandra Shripad Marathe v. Gurushant Ganga Kamble , (1989)44 E.L.T. 11 (Bom.).In the first case, the conspiracy between the accused was stated to be from the year 1981 to 1984. The person who moved the Court was originally accused No.17 in that Calendar Case. He was implicated in that case relying upon Sec.l20-B of the Indian Penal Code. On facts, it was found that the said person became a Direction only on 19.11.1985. He was also found not to have participated in any of the proceedings of the Board of Directors on the date of paid viz., 9.12.1985. On those facts, the court held that the petitioner before it could not be held to have been involved in the conspiracy to evade payment of duty. In the next case, the period of violation was from September, 1981 to February, 1983. It was pleaded on behalf of the concerned employee and accepted by the department that so far as that particular person was concerned, he joined the services of the concerned company only on 1.4.1984. On the fact of that case, the show cause notice issued against that person concerned was quashed. In the third case, the conspiracy for evasion of duty was from 30.9.1983. Once particular accused ceased to be a Director of the Company even from 29.7.1983 and his petition for quashing was allowed on the ground that he was not in the employment of the company on the date when conspiracy started. In the third case, the conspiracy for evasion of duty was from 30.9.1983. Once particular accused ceased to be a Director of the Company even from 29.7.1983 and his petition for quashing was allowed on the ground that he was not in the employment of the company on the date when conspiracy started. It was found in the fourth case that the petitioner in that case joined the company as a Director only on 19.11.1985, a few days before the raid was effected and had not participated in any of the earlier proceedings leading to the conspiracy of evasion of excise duty during the period from 1981 to 1984. On those facts, the complaint was quashed. In the case on hand, the allegation in the complaint is that the violation was submitted from the year 1984 onwards. Conspiracy is like a train and many people will get in and get out. Evidence may shown that a particular accused took part in the conspiracy for a period. Yet all the people who participated in the conspiracy at one point of time or the other were always held liable for the ultimate object achieved by the conspiracy. The mere fact that the second accused became a Managing Director of the first accused Company only on 1.4.1986 (which is not admitted by the complaint) by itself would not be a ground to quash the complaint against him. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner next argued that the complaint does not disclose all the relevant materials to implicate the accused and therefore the complaint must be quashed as a whole. Mainly reliance is placed on the Assistant Collectors order exercising the power under Sec.11-A of the Act and the orders of the appellate authority. It is true that information relating to the two orders above referred to have not been disclosed in the complaint. To what extent those two orders will come in favour of the accused is a matter for evidence and trial. In any event, when proceedings departmentally as well as proceeding in a Court of Law have been recognised as an acceptable procedure, I am unable to persuade myself that the orders passed departmentally and the failure to disclose the same in the complaint would in any way affect the filing of the complaint and taking cognizance thereof. In any event, when proceedings departmentally as well as proceeding in a Court of Law have been recognised as an acceptable procedure, I am unable to persuade myself that the orders passed departmentally and the failure to disclose the same in the complaint would in any way affect the filing of the complaint and taking cognizance thereof. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions: a) B. Lakshmichand v. Government of India a) B. Lakshmichand v. Government of India , 1983 E.L.T. 322 (Mad.), (b) Vidyawati and (e) Ramesh lnder Singh and another v. Assistant Collector, Customs and Central Excise Ramesh lnder Singh and another v. Assistant Collector, Customs and Central Excise , (1985)22 E.L.T. 712 (P. & H.). The first case arose out of departmental proceedings; adjudication; appeal; revision and then a Writ before this Court. While disposing of the writ petition, a learned single Judge of this Court held that the proceedings should not be allowed to be prosecuted on vague and camouflaged hypothesis and prejudice must be presumed to have been caused to the accused in those circumstances. The second case arose out of a revision filed by the accused to set aside the charges framed against them by the lower court. The judgment in that case lays down the the emphasis regarding the absence of material or record that the person concerned was in-charge and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the firm. In the case on hand, there are necessary allegations against the accused 2 to 4. To the same effect is the last judgment referred to above viz., (c). On a perusal of the last two judgments, I am of the opinion that since there are enough allegations in the complaint filed before the court in this case to implicate accused 2 to 4, those judgments cannot be of any use to the accused. In this context, the learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 67. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was disposing of an appeal which came on special leave against the judgment of the Delhi High Court. In this context, the learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 67. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was disposing of an appeal which came on special leave against the judgment of the Delhi High Court. While disposing of that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held the need for the necessary allegations to be made against the Officers of the Company when the Company commits the offence. I have already held in this case that the allegations in the complaint are enough to proceed against A-2 to A-4. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner then cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab , A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866 and Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan , A.I.R. 1983 S. C. 67 to contend as to what would be the power of the High Court under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am fully aware that in all cases for quashing, complaint can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations in the complaint as they are, without adding or substracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings. According to me, the allegations made in the complaint make out a prima facie case against the accused. There is no legal bar against the institution of the complaint. The allegations made in the complaint is a matter for proof during trial. In an offence of this nature, it is not possible to make a roving enquiry even at this stage to find out whether the trial will end in conviction or not. 16. The learned counsel also relied upon a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Jagannath Gopal & Co. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Amritsar. Jagannath Gopal & Co. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Amritsar. 16. The learned counsel also relied upon a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Jagannath Gopal & Co. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Amritsar. Jagannath Gopal & Co. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Amritsar. , (1994)70 E.L.T. 63 (P. & H)In that case, the appellate authority quashed the order of the Collector with the result that the case of the Department that the petitioners have indulged in clandestine removal of the Sodium silicate was not accepted. On facts therefore, no default was committed by the petitioner in the payment of the excise duty. In that situation, the matter having been finally settled by the appellate authority, no prosecution on the same facts was held to be competent. In the case on hand, the facts are not similar. One other judgment of the Bombay High Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is reported in EWAC Alloys Limited v. Union of India EWAC Alloys Limited v. Union of India , (1995)80) E.L.T. 759 (Bom.). In that case, a writ petition challenging the order passed the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Central Excises Salt Act, 1944, and the criminal prosecution launched against the assessee pursuant to the said earlier order came up for consideration. The court allowed the writ petition and consequently criminal prosecution was also quashed. I find on facts that case is distinguishable to the case on hand. 17. One other argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the complainant had admitted the fact that already proposals have been sent to the Government of India for withdrawing the complaint and therefore they should not be allowed, on the principle of promissory estoppel, to proceed with the complaint. Mr.P.N.Prakash, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposed this submission stating that there cannot be any estoppel against Statute. Even assuming that proposal have been sent for withdrawal of the complaint, yet that would not be taken as a ground to quash the proceedings. No accused can insist withdrawal of a case as a matter of right. Even on the question of quashing the complaint and at the instance of the accused, the learned counsel for the respondent would argue that on the facts and circumstances of this case, the quashing petition cannot be entertained. No accused can insist withdrawal of a case as a matter of right. Even on the question of quashing the complaint and at the instance of the accused, the learned counsel for the respondent would argue that on the facts and circumstances of this case, the quashing petition cannot be entertained. In support of his plea about the powers of the High Court under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Counsel cited a number of judgments and they are as follows: (a) Mrs.Rupan Deol Bajan and another v. Kanwar Singh Gill and another Mrs.Rupan Deol Bajan and another v. Kanwar Singh Gill and another , (1995) 4 Crimes 171, (b) State of Bihar and another and Supreme Court as follows: “The settled principle of law that at the stage of quashing a F.I.R. or complaint, the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. Of course as has been pointed out in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , (1992)1 S.C.C. (Supp.) 535an F.I.R. or a complaint may be quashed if the allegations made therein are so assured and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” In the second case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stated as follows: “The High Court would do well to discipline itself not to undertake quashing proceedings in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction when the material collected by the Investigating officer is under gaze of judicial scrutiny.” The practice of treating the affidavit filed and documents produced before it by the accused as evidence was deprecated in that judgment. In the last judgment referred to above mala fides or animus of complaint or prosecution were held to be not relevant in quashing a criminal proceeding. In that context, the Hon’ble judges held as follows; “If the complaint which is made is correct and an offence had been committed which will have to be established in a court of law, it is of no consequence that the complaint was a person who was inimical or that he was guilty of mala fides. In that context, the Hon’ble judges held as follows; “If the complaint which is made is correct and an offence had been committed which will have to be established in a court of law, it is of no consequence that the complaint was a person who was inimical or that he was guilty of mala fides. If the ingredients which establish the commission of the offence or misconduct exist then, the prosecution cannot fail merely because there was animus of the complainant or the prosecution against the accused. Allegations of mala fides may be relevant while judging the correctness of the allegations or while examining the evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be ground for quashing the prosecution.” 18. A feeble point is also raised in the quashing petition that the accused have already been proceeded departmentally and therefore to prosecute them on the same cause of action and on the same set of facts would amount to exposing them to the period of double jeopardy. In answer to this, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent cited a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported Assistant Customs Collector Bombay v. L.R.Melwani Assistant Customs Collector Bombay v. L.R.Melwani , A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 962. In that case, it has been held that to get the benefit of Sec.403 of the Criminal Procedure Code or Art.20(2) of the Constitution of India, it is necessary for an accused person to establish that he had been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and he is convicted or acquitted of that offence, and the said conviction or acquittal is in force. Criminal prosecution of the accused for alleged smuggling is not barred merely because proceedings were earlier instituted against him before the Collector of Customs. Adjudication before a Collector of Customs is not a prosecution nor the Collector of Customs a ‘Court’. How far the proposals sent by the complainant to the Government of India for withdrawing the complaint would operate against the complaint on the principle of estoppel, the learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in State of Maharashtra v. Jethmal Himatmal Jain State of Maharashtra v. Jethmal Himatmal Jain , 1994 Crl.L.J. 2613. The learned Judge, in that case, held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply to criminal cases. Last but not the least the learned Counsel for the respondent also brought to my notice Sec.9-C of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which statutorily creates a presumption against the accused which presumption is one of rebuttal. Considering the entire facts of the case and applying my mind carefully to the various case laws cited before me, I have no hesitation in holding that the no grounds whatsoever at all have been made out to quash the proceedings in this case. Accordingly, I find no merits in any of the submissions made by the learned counsel. Therefore, I have no other option except to dismiss the petitioner. However, since the Calendar Case is of the year 1990, the learned trial Magistrate is directed to dispose of the said case on merits within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the steno copy of the order of this Courtwithout in any way waiting for an official communication of the same through the Registry of this Court. The Registry is directed to despatch forthwith all the records received in connection with this quashing petition as well as in connection with Crl.R.C.No.48 of 1992 to the trial court.