I. P. VASISHTH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner seeks a writ of Habeas Corpus for being set at liberty on quashing the detention order dated 24-9-1996, (Annexure 1) passed by District Magistrate, Pratapgarh under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (here-in-after referred to as the Act) which was approved by the respondent No. 3, State of Uttar Pradesh and later on confirmed on 19-11-1996 in pith and substance by the same respondent on the recommendations of the Advisory Board constituted under the Act. ( 2 ) THE gist of the matter is that since the criminal activities in which the petitioner was allegedly involved since late 1993 were likely to create problems in the maintenance of public order, therefore, on 9-9-1996 Inspector In-charge of P. S. Lalganl Kotwali submitted a detailed report to the Superintendent of Police, Pratapgarh (Annexure 3) proposing his detention under Section 3 (2) of the Act so as to ensure the maintenance of public order. He also detailed a history of petitioners criminal activities including the latest on when on 4-7-1996 at around 4-5 P. M. he committed a broad-day light sensational murder in the crowded market of village Keshavpur. Agreeing with his report, in 11-9-1996 the Superintendent of Police, Pratapgarh transmitted all the relevant papers to the District Magistrate for taking appropriate steps with regard to the proposed detention. In the light thereof, the latter passed the impugned order on 24-9-1996, which was served on the petitioner on the next day in jail where the was under detention with regard to the aforesaid murder case registered per crime No. 265 of 1996 at P. 5, Lalganj for the offences punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 (2) of the S. C. S. T. Act. ( 3 ) COPIES of the relevant documents including the grounds of detention numbering ten were supplied to the petitioner and papers were forwarded to the State Government for its approval, granting the requisite approval, the State Government referred the matter to the Advisory Board which recommended the detention. Accordingly the State Government passed the final order dated 19-11-1996 contained in Annexure 1 for twelve months detention under Section 3 (2) of the Act. Accordingly the State Government passed the final order dated 19-11-1996 contained in Annexure 1 for twelve months detention under Section 3 (2) of the Act. ( 4 ) ASSAILING his detention on all conceivable grounds, the petitioner primarily complained of lack of application of mind both on the part of the District Magistrate as well as the state authorities at the time of passing and approving the initial order dated 24-9-1996 because at that time he was in Jail in connection with a murder case which was alleged to have taken place on 4-7-1996 and there was no likelihood of his being released on bail inasmuch as he had not even applied for it that the relevant material, which should have gone into the process of consideration by the District Magistrate i. e. , the defence version with regard to his alleged involvement in a number of cases in which he was already on bail had not been placed before him (District Magistrate) by the police. ( 5 ) RESISTING the proceedings, the respondents controverted the petitioners averments on all counts, and claimed having placed the entire relevant material before the detaining authority at the time of passing the impugned order. It was, however, not denied that the petitioner was on bail in all the earlier cases and that in the latest case arising out of a murder on 4-7-1996 in the market place of village Kashavpur, enumerated as ground No. 1 in the order of detention, he was in jail at the relevant time. The explanation, however, was that his confinement in the judicial custody at that time could not, all by itself, be a legitimate ground to dispute the validity of the detention order. ( 6 ) WE have carefully scrutinised the entire available data and heard the parties at length. For the proper appreciation of the point in issue, first of all, we will have to examine the phraseology and scheme of Section 3 of the Act, Clause (1) thereof authorises the State and Central Governments to order preventive detention of any person whose activities to their satisfaction, are likely to prejudice the defence or security of India or its relations with any foreign power. It further authorises the Governments to detain any foreigner either with a view to arrange his expulsion from or to regulate his activities in India; Clause (2) authorises the Governments to go in for preventive detention of any person whose activities, to their satisfaction, could be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, or to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. ( 7 ) THE primary power is thus vested either in the Central Government or the State Government. However, Clause (3) thereof authorises them to delegate these powers to the District Magistrate or the Police Commissioner by issuance of a notification, which in the first instance would have a life span, of only three months. This tenure could of course, be extended at different stages and from time to time by way of three months installments. Clause (4) imposes a rider on such delegate to seek the approval of the Government by transmitting the entire relevant record in a manner that the approval is accorded within twelve days (infusive) of the detention; during the meanwhile the grounds of detention and the relevant material which went into process for forming the satisfaction of the detaining authority were also to be supplied to the detenu within a period which could not be later than ten days from the date of detention. Clause (5) casts certain obligation on the State Government to inform the Central Government about all such detention. ( 8 ) IN the same sequence, it may also be worthwhile to note that Section 9 provides for the constitution of the Advisory Board, whereas Section 12 obliges the Government to refer all such detentions to the said Board and Section 11 (1) mandates that the Advisory Board will submit its report to the appropriate Government within a period of seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. It also prescribes the other relevant procedure for the transmission of its opinion. Section 12 (2) in crucial in the sense that when, the Advisory Board reports that there is no sufficient cause for the detention of the concerned person, the appropriate Government is under a legislative mandate to release the detenu forthwith, whereas under the scheme of Clause (1), it may accept the recommendatory opinion of the Advisory Board and continue with the detention for such period as it thinks fit. As a necessary corollary it follows that the appropriate Government has the powers to order the premature release also by revocation of the detention order. In any case the maximum period of detention cannot exceed twelve months as per Section 13 of the Act. ( 9 ) THE position thus emerges to the extent that a District Magistrate can exercise the delegated powers of the State Government for passing the detention order under Section 3 (3) read with Section 3 (2) of the Act provided the Government has authorised him to do so by way of a notification whose tenure at one given time would not exceed three months but in any case this detention has to be approved by the State Government within a period of twelve days and the recommendatory opinion of the Advisory Board has to be obtained within seven weeks from the date of detention before passing the final order under Section 12 (1) of the Act to authorise detention upto a maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. Since the law of preventive detention, i. e. , incarceration without trial is an extraordinary measure, rather an impingement on subjects liberty, therefore, a strict and stringent construction is placed on the relevant provisions so as to avoid the misuse of powers; interpretative benefits would, of course, go to the subject. Hence, neither the State nor its instrumentalities can trifle with the subjects liberty in a routine or casual manner, they are rather supposed to act with due diligence, caution and with the requisite expediency. ( 10 ) THE necessary crrolary would, therefore, be that if the detention is not recommended by the Advisory Board with seven weeks, the order of detention would die a natural death resulting in the immediate release of the detenu. To put it in other words notwithstanding the appropriate release of the detenu. To put it in other words, notwithstanding the appropriate Governmentts approval, the initial order of detention passed by the District Magistrate cannot extend beyond seven weeks, so much so that even if the order were to be passed by the appropriate Government itself at the very outset, its life span (initial order) would also be limited to a maximum period of seven weeks. ( 11 ) IN this case the impugned order passed at the initial stage on 24-9-1996, as contained in Annexure 1 was made operative for a period of three months. It is this very order which was approved by the State Government in its entirely. As seen in the preceding discussion, neither the State Government nor the District Magistrate had any authority under the law to pass an initial detention order for three months. At the risk of repetition. it may be pointed out that as a delegatee the District Magistrate was just empowered to pass a detention order and place the record before the appropriate Government in a manner that the latter could approve it within period upto twelve days from the date of detention. Thus by passing the three months detention order the District Magistrate exceeded his authority under Section 3 (2) and 3 (3) of the Act, whereas the State Government also exceeded its jurisdiction in approving such an order. Transgression of statutory powers in this manner could not be for any other reason except the lack of application of mind, and once the detaining and approving authorities are found to be lacking in addressing themselves in all seriousness while curtailing somebodys liberty under the Act, the natural consequence thereof would be the collapse of the detention order itself. ( 12 ) THE learned Government Advocate submitted that the State Government had not approved the time schedule of the initial detention order. Its approval was rather limited to the factum of detention alone and that was how that a reference was made to the Advisory Board and the final order of detention was passed on 19-11-1996 directing the detention for twelve months only on the recommendation of the Advisory Board. According to him the initial order merged in the final order of detention, with the support of the recommendation of the Advisory Boara and so the irregularity it any committed at the time of issuing the initial order pales into insignificance. ( 13 ) NO judicial precedent could, however, be cited by the learned counsel in support of his proposition. According to him the initial order merged in the final order of detention, with the support of the recommendation of the Advisory Boara and so the irregularity it any committed at the time of issuing the initial order pales into insignificance. ( 13 ) NO judicial precedent could, however, be cited by the learned counsel in support of his proposition. On the other hand, we are of the considered opinion that fixing of the period of detention, at three months, by the District Magistrate could not be confined to the periphery of an irregularity, as a matter he had no jurisdiction to do so, and an order without jurisdiction is void ab initio. Its mischief cannot be cured as a mere irregularity particularly when even the Approving authority at that stage had not such powers. There is no gain-saying that under the scheme of the Act his approval is accorded much before coming into picture the role of the Advisory Board. ( 14 ) WITH reference to the cases of Vijai Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and Rabindra Kumar Ghosal v. State of West Bengal respectively, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that at least grounds No. 2 to 10 (both inclusive) were stale inasmuch as they related to the old incidents going back to December, 1993, January. 1996, whereas the detention order was passed in late September. 1996. It is besides the point that from his angle even the first ground of detention pertaining to an incident of 4th July, 1996 was also state. ( 15 ) THE explanation from the other side was that in this case there was a continuity of action in criminality, ranging from incidents of murder, broad day light eye-teasing and robberies, which was taken into consideration by the appropriate authority in view of the latest incident of 4-7-1996 to form an opinion that his movements required to be curtailed and curled to take care of the public order. Our attention was drawn towards the cases of Gora v. State of West Bengal, Smt. Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Hirabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, for the proposition that there could be no hard and fast rule or determining the staleness of the previous incidents if they were found to be reflective of a history of criminality. ( 16 ) WITHOUT being unnecessarily tangled in the technical web, we would like to steer clear by observing that each and every case requires determination in its own peculiarities and the totality of the situation, but with due regard to the personal liberty of the individual as well as the enormous stakes of the public at large in the maintenance of public order. ( 17 ) THE matter in hand another salient feature inasmuch as at the time of passing the impugned order the petitioner was already in jail in connection with a murder case and had not applied for bail. There is nothing on record to show that he had ever contested his interest in judicial lock up at various stages of remand in that case. There is no legal prohibition in passing a detention order under the Act against a person who is already in jail but then the detaining authority has also to show that there was reasonable apprehension and likelihood of his being released from jail. ( 18 ) IT is in this context that the Court has to appreciate that the case pertaining to grounds No. 2 to 9, the petitioner had sought and obtained bail, whereas in the latest incident of July. 1996 enumerated as ground No. 1 of detention no such effort was made on his behalf; and it goes without saying that the earlier incidents started from December. 1993 by way of murder, followed by robberies. Having regard to the pronouncement in the case of Kumarinisha v. Union of India, it is difficult to visualise that there could be any reasonable apprehension or likelihood of the petitioners release on bail in the murder case of July, 1996 when he had not even opposed his remand to the judicial custody. ( 19 ) THE learned Standing Counsel placed reliance on the case of Kartic Chandra Guha v. State of West Bengal that even likelihood of is being released on bail could be taken into consideration because bail being the rule and jail an exception, it is usually seen that the Sessions and the High Courts are liberal in bail matters. It might be so, but this element of likelihood has to be plausible and in the realm of a reasonable feasibility, rather than a fanciful proposition. It might be so, but this element of likelihood has to be plausible and in the realm of a reasonable feasibility, rather than a fanciful proposition. As mentioned herein-before, it is in the totality of the context that the issue requires determination having regard to the background of criminal activities attributed to the detenu by the State itself. It will be going too far to say that he would have been granted bail just for the asking of it. After all in such type of cases notice is usually given to the State to highlight its side of the story, moreover if the latter deems it appropriate, it could still forestall the release by passing the detention order during the intervening period. ( 20 ) BE that as it may, the detention in this case appears to be unsustainable for want of the entire relevant material before the detaining authority at the time of passing of the initial order on 24-9- 1996. On the showing of the respondents themselves, the petitioner was on bail in all the other nine cases enumerated at grounds Nos. 2 to 9 in Annexure 2, which is a part of the detention order. In those cases, even charges-sheets has been submitted in the Court and the trials were pending. In para Nos. 33 and 34 of his petition, the petitioner raised a specific averment that the police authorities were fully aware of this fact, but neither the relevant bail applications nor defence projected by him in those cases by way of his counter version or even the orders passed by the Court concerned were placed before the District Magistrate for his consideration. Neither of these paras was controverted by the respondents in their counter-affidavit in this particular aspect of the assertion. The natural inference would, therefore, be that these documents were not placed before the District Magistrate and the latter was not made aware of his counter version and the defence against his prosecution in those cases. ( 21 ) IN the cases of Ashadevi v. Shivraj, State of U. P. v. Kamal Kishore Sam and M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, it was held by the Apex Court that the police failure to place such type of documents which could enable the District Magistrate to have a peep into the defence of the detenu would be fatal to the detention order. ( 22 ) REFERENCE may also be pertinent to the case of Union of India v. Manoharlal Narang. In that case detention was ordered under COFEPOSA by the authorities at Delhi, which was successfully assailed before Delhi High Court. The Union of India took the matter by way of an appeal before the Apex Court, which while declining to grant any stay imposed certain conditions on the detenu including an obligation to report at the police station as an interim arrangement. Pending adjudication of that appeal, a second order of detention was passed, but the Court orders passed by way of interim arrangement in the earlier petition were not placed before the detaining authority. The learned Judge refused to sustain the subsequent detention and held that the order was passed without taking into consideration the relevant material. The contention that the State was under no obligation to collect and procure relevant material from the Court proceedings and other departments relating to the defence of the detenu was repelled and deprecated. ( 23 ) IN his zeal to support the impugned order, the learned Government Advocate argued that the District Magistrate was obliged only to address himself to the maternal placed before him by the sponsoring and recommending authorities (police) and if the material so provided to him was sufficient to justify the detention, it could not be quashed. Acceptance of the proposition would run counter to the observations of the summit Court in the above said case of Union of India v. Manoharlal Narang (supra), and we, therefore, have no hesitation in turning it down at the threshold. ( 24 ) HENCE for reasons recorded above, we are not inclined to sustain the impugned detention in pursuance to the orders dated 24-9-1996 contained in Annexure 1. The same is accordingly quashed. As a natural consequence thereof, the detenu is ordered to be released and set at liberty forthwith, if no longer wanted for any other case. Petition allowed. .