A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal from jail, Durjodhan Ray (hereinafter referred to as the accusedt) calls in question legality of his conviction for commission of offence punishable under Section 302, India Penal Code, 1860 (in short, I. P. C. T), and sentence of imprisonment for life, as awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur. Accused stood charged for allegedly having committed homicidal death of Purusottam Ray (hereinafter referred to as the deceasedt) ( 2 ) IN a nut shell, prosecution case is as follows: On 8-6-1990 information was lodged at Laikera Police Station to the effect that the accused caused homicidal death of deceased by pelting stones at him. Due to pelting of stones bleeding injuries were caused, which led to death of the deceased ultimately. Information was lodged by Rukman Baboo (P. W. 6) who claimed to be an eyewitness to the occurrence along with several others. The time of incident was indicated to be around 10a. m. in the morning. On the basis of F. I. R. lodged investigation was undertaken. On completion of investigation, Charge - sheet was placed. ( 3 ) THE accused pleaded innocence and false implication by the prosecution. ( 4 ) ELEVEN witnesses were pressed not service to further the prosecution version. P. Ws. 6, 7, 8, and 9 claimed to be eye - witnesses to the occurrence. Learned trial Judge placed reliance on the evidence of P. Ws. 6 and 7, while observing that the scenario as described by P. Ws. 8 and 9 cannot be accepted in its entirety. He found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. ( 5 ) MR. A. K. Mohapatra learned counsel appearing for the accused, pleaded that the evidence of P. Ws. 6 and 7 should not have been acted upon as it is not credible. With reference to the observation made by the learned trial Judge with regard to evidence of P. Ws. 8 and 9. it is submitted that the prosecution has presented an exaggerated version. and therefore. the evidence should have been discarded in its entirety. Alternatively it is pleaded that a case under Section 302. I. P. C. is not made out. Mr. S. C. Satpathy, learned Addi. Standing Counsel on the other hand supported the judgment of conviction and sentence. ( 6 ) SO far as acceptability of P. Ws. and therefore. the evidence should have been discarded in its entirety. Alternatively it is pleaded that a case under Section 302. I. P. C. is not made out. Mr. S. C. Satpathy, learned Addi. Standing Counsel on the other hand supported the judgment of conviction and sentence. ( 6 ) SO far as acceptability of P. Ws. 6 and 7t evidence is concerned we find that P. W. 6 was the informant and report was lodged immediately after the occurrence. The police station is at a distance of about 15 kilometres from the place of occurrence, and therefore there is no delay in lodging the report. Accused and P. Ws. 6 and 7 are co - villagers and it has not been indicated as to why these two witnesses would falsely implicate the accused. So far as partial acceptance of evidence of P. Ws. 8 and 9 is concerned it is to be seen that the learned trial Judge has not discarded their evidence as lacking credency. On the other hand he has accepted a part of their version. ( 7 ) COMING to applicability of the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of large number of other co - accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. However, where large number of other persons are accused the Court has to carefully screen the evidence. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons, Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance in different jurisdiction in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance in different jurisdiction in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called a mandatory rule of evidence See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh. Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from, those who were convicted. See Gurucharan Singh and another v. State of Punjab. The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead - stop. The witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. See Sarhad sb. Belly Nayata and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Umar Ahir and others v. The State of Bihar. An attempt has to be made to, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. See Sarhad sb. Belly Nayata and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Umar Ahir and others v. The State of Bihar. An attempt has to be made to, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the contact and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made, is to discard the evidence in toto. See Zwiecle Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Balakd. Singh and others v. State of Punjab. As observed by the Apex Court in State v. Smt. Kalki and another, normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to liable the category to which a discrepancy may be categorised. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a partys case, material discrepancies do so. That being the position, the learned trial Judge was justified in placing reliance on the evidence of P. Ws. 6 and 7. ( 8 ) COMING to the alternative plea relating to non - application of Section 302, I. P. C. to the facts of the case, the factual position as described by P. Ws. 6 and 7 is to the effect that the deceased was running and the accused was pelting stones at him from a distance. After the deceased fell down the process of pelting of stones continued. ( 9 ) IN the Scheme of the I. P. C. , culpable homicide is genus and murdert is the species. All murdert is culpable homicide but not vice versa. Speaking generally culpable homicide and special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murdert. For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence. ( 9 ) IN the Scheme of the I. P. C. , culpable homicide is genus and murdert is the species. All murdert is culpable homicide but not vice versa. Speaking generally culpable homicide and special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murdert. For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence. I. P. C. practically Section 299 A person commits culpable homicide - if the act by which the death is caused is done recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is defined as murder in section 300. The second may be termed as Tculpable homicide of the second degree. This is punishable under the First Part of section 304. Then there is culpable homicide of the third degree. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under Second Part of Section 304. The academic distinction between murdert and culpable homicide not amounting to murder has vexed the Courts for long: The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. Section 300 Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is done INTENTION (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely (4) with the knowledge that the act is so to cause death. imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily (a) with the intention of causing (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or injury as is likely to cause death and without any excuse for incurring thet risk of causing death or such injury as mentioned above. ( 10 ) ON a glance of the above table, it is clear that not only the actus reus, but also the mental elements of intention or knowledge, required by two sections, are the same and the only distinction between the offence lies in the degree of risk to human life which the offender intends or knows. If death is likely to result, it is culpable homicide; if it is the most probable result, it is murder. An Injury likely to cause death within the meaning of Section 299 (2) may, or may not, fall within the descriptions, mentioned in Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300, which both clauses together do not equal culpable homicide in Section 299 (2 ). The offence will amount to murder if the conditions, laid down in anyone, or more of the four clauses of Section 300, are satisfied. If the offence comes under Section 299, or under one or other, of the exceptions to Section 300, it will be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. If an act is done with the knowledge that the doer is likely by such act to cause death, the offence is culpable homicide unless the act done is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and is committed without any excuse, in which case the offence is murder. If the act is clone with the intention of causing any bodily injury as is likely to cause, death the offence is culpable homicide unless the offender knows that the act done is likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is caused or if the bodily injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. The degree of knowledge is a question of fact. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances it cannot be said that Clause third of Section 300 is attracted to the facts of the case. However, knowledge can be attributed to the accused. Appropriate conviction, therefore, would be under second limb of Section 304 I. P. C. The conviction is altered and instead of conviction under Section 302, I. P. C. accused is convicted under Section 304, Part II, I. P. C. Custodial sentence of eight years would meet the ends of justice. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. Appeal allowed partly. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. Appeal allowed partly. .