D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was appointed as work agent in the Public Works Department, in the State of uttar Pradesh on 27. 5. 1960 in the pay scale of Rs. 55-65. Subsequently, it is alleged that he was posted as work supervisor with effect from March. 1974 in the pay scale of Rs. 330-495. ( 2 ) SRI J. K. Tewari, learned counsel, holding brief of Sri Shashi Nandan, contends that he continued in the said post of work supervisor and, therefore, by reason of Rule 56 (a) Proviso of financial Hand Book the petitioner is eligible to continue till the age of 60 years on the basis of amendment incorporated on 8th July, 1987 in the said Rule. ( 3 ) SRI Parihar learned standing counsel on the other hand contends that the petitioner was in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1,500 in the year 1986 and he had retired on the said scale. Therefore, he cannot claim to continue till the age of 60 years. Learned standing counsel has relied on the relevant Rules and Circular governing the service of work charge employees. ( 4 ) I have heard both the learned counsel for the parties. Sri Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on various decisions, to which reference will be made at a later stage. Sri tewari, contends that since the petitioner continued on the same post which was a Group d post prior to 1985 even if the scale is revised or changed, the petitioner would still remain Class IV employee, having been appointed prior to 5. 11. 1985 and, therefore, eligible to retire only on attainment of the age of 60 years. Rule 56 (a) provides that all employees are to retire on attainment of 58 years of age but those persons who have been appointed prior to 5. 11. 1985 and holding Group-D post, in that event he would be retiring on attainment of 60 years of age. The said proviso to Rule 56 (a) is also qualified by Explanation which provides that the above proviso will be applicable only in cases where there has been no change in the status or upgradation after 27. 2. 1982. ( 5 ) THEREFORE, it is necessary in order to determine as to whether the Proviso to Rule 56 (a) is applicable in the case of the petitioner. 2. 1982. ( 5 ) THEREFORE, it is necessary in order to determine as to whether the Proviso to Rule 56 (a) is applicable in the case of the petitioner. If the petitioner holds Group-D post, in that event he would be eligible to retire on attainment of 60 years of age. Relying on the definition of Group-D post, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that if minimum of the pay scale is less than Rs. 354, in that event the person is to be treated as holding Group-D post. According to him prior to 5. 11. 1985, he was in the pay scale of Rs. 330-495. Therefore, according to him, he was holding the post within the purview of Group-D post namely the basic pay of the petitioner then in the said scale was less than Rs. 354. ( 6 ) LEARNED standing counsel has relied on the work Charge Establishment Rules in which chapter 10 provides for retirement, pension and gratuity. The said Chapter deals with the work charge employees. The notification printed in the said Chapter is dated 11. 5. 1984. The said notification provides that, "no work charge employee shall remain in service, ordinarily after attaining the age of superannuation, as fixed for equivalent post in the, regular establishment, but in some establishment it is noted that despite crossing superannuating age some employees were continued in service. Therefore, it was decided that the services of such employees are to be terminated on the basis of prescribed age of superannuation for which categorisation of the employees have been prescribed. In clause (1), it is provided that those employees who are placed in the pay scale of Rs. 305-390 would be retired at the age of 60 years and in clause (2), it is provided that all other employees excepting in the scale of Rs. 305-390 would be retiring at the age of 58 years. The petitioner being work charged employee is governed by the said rule. The petitioner was placed in the pay scale of Rs. 330-495 before 5. 11. 1985, which is an admitted case of the petitioner, inasmuch as he was placed in the said scale as has been stated in para 3 of the writ petition in 1974. Therefore, on 5. 11. 1982 the petitioner having not been in the pay scale of Rs. 330-495 before 5. 11. 1985, which is an admitted case of the petitioner, inasmuch as he was placed in the said scale as has been stated in para 3 of the writ petition in 1974. Therefore, on 5. 11. 1982 the petitioner having not been in the pay scale of Rs. 305-390 he comes within clause (2) of the said Notification dated 5. 11. 1984. Since this notification is meant specifically for work charge employees specifying the scale, therefore, it cannot be said that by reason of the fact that the petitioner had been working as work supervisor which is Group d post, he is eligible to retire on attaining the age of sixty years. ( 7 ) THUS again the learned standing counsel has disputed that the post of work supervisor is group-D post. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the job of work supervisor is to supervise the work of labours. Learned standing counsel, therefore, contends that if the job of work supervisor is that of supervising the work of labours, it can never be Group-D post. Whether it is Group-D post or not, is not relevant for our purpose to decide the controversy, since it is the question as to the age of retirement. In view of notification dated 11. 5. 1984 unless a person is in the scale of Rs. 305-390 being a work charge employee, he cannot claim benefit of retirement on attainment of the age of sixty years. The petitioner has also admitted in para 7 of the writ petition that his pay was fixed at Rs. 950-1,500 in the year 1986. Sri Parihar, learned standing counsel has relied on the notification dated 14. 11. 1996 relating to work charge employees. By the said notification superseding all other notifications, the date of retirement has been prescribed on the basis of scale of pay, as mentioned therein. In the said notification, it has been provided in clause (1) that those who are in the pay scale of Rs. 750-940 or in the pay scale of Rs. 775-1. 025 or in the scale of Rs. 825-2. 000 and were appointed before 5. 11. 1985, would be retiring at the age of sixty years. But one who is in the said scale, if appointed after 5. 11. 750-940 or in the pay scale of Rs. 775-1. 025 or in the scale of Rs. 825-2. 000 and were appointed before 5. 11. 1985, would be retiring at the age of sixty years. But one who is in the said scale, if appointed after 5. 11. 1985, would be retiring on attaining the age of 58 years, in clause (2), it has been further provided that who are in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1,500, they shall be retiring on attainment of the age of 58 years. Thus, it appears that so far as the persons holding the pay scale of Rs. 950-1,500 are due to retire on attaining the age of 58 years irrespective of the fact whether they were appointed prior to 5. 11. 1985 or after 5. 11. 1985. Admittedly, the petitioner had been in the pay scale of Rs. 945-1,500 since the year 1986, therefore, he is covered by the said notification dated 14. 11. 1996 by which the persons in such scale would be eligible for retirement on attaining the age of 58 years irrespective of the date of their appointment. ( 8 ) IN that view of the matter the proviso to Rule 56 (a) is qualified to the extent as prescribed in the notifications dated 11. 5. 1984 and 14. 11. 1996 respectively so far as the work-charge employees are concerned. Even if the petitioner claims that he was continuing in the same post, which is Group-D post even though by reason of Explanation, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted because the scale of the same post has been upgraded by reason of granting him the scale of Rs. 950-1,500 and as such proviso becomes inapplicable by reason of such upgradation. By a notification dated 2. 7. 1996, the Government has notified that in respect of work charge employee, the retirement age is to be determined on the basis of notification dated 11. 5. 1984 read with the decision of this Court dated 18. 4. 1996 in special Appeal No. 238 of 1993, Pooran Singh v. State of U. P. and others. We have already seen that by notification dated 11. 5. 1984, only those persons who were placed in the scale of Rs. 305-390, are to be retired on attaining the age of 60 years. 4. 1996 in special Appeal No. 238 of 1993, Pooran Singh v. State of U. P. and others. We have already seen that by notification dated 11. 5. 1984, only those persons who were placed in the scale of Rs. 305-390, are to be retired on attaining the age of 60 years. In the said Special Appeal No. 238 of 1993, it was held on the basis of the said notification dated 11. 5. 1984 that only those persons who are in the pay scale of Rs. 305-390 are to be retired on attaining the age of 60 years and others will be retired on attaining the age of 58 years. in compliance of the said order dated 18. 4. 1996, notification dated 14. 11. 1996 has since been issued after having quoted relevant direction in the notification itself. Thus, the said notification appears to be in consonance with the decision in the said Special Appeal No. 238 of 1993. Thus, the said notification cannot be said to be bad in law, in any manner and cannot be questioned unless and until the ratio decided in the said Special Appeal No. 238 of 1993 is overruled. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner sought to urge, placing reliance on various notifications, that the petitioner had been working in the same post and that his nature of work was that of group-D employees and, therefore, he is eligible to retire on attaining the age of 60 years. He relied on the decision in the case of Ram Tej Pathak v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 (1)UPLDEC 593, wherein it was held that if a person is in Group-D post prior to the cut off date, in that event the age of retirement of such persons would be 60 years and not 58 years, in terms of the Government Order dated 30. 1. 1993. In the said case, the petitioner was Tube-well operator and was not work charge employee, i. e. , one of the distinguishing feature, apart from the facts that in the present case by notification dated 11. 5. 1994 the scale was mentioned, for which 60 years of age of superannunation was prescribed which was not under consideration in the said judgment. Thus, the ratio decided in the said case cannot be attracted in view of particular facts and circumstances of present one. 5. 1994 the scale was mentioned, for which 60 years of age of superannunation was prescribed which was not under consideration in the said judgment. Thus, the ratio decided in the said case cannot be attracted in view of particular facts and circumstances of present one. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relies in the case of All india Judges Association v. Union of India and others, 1991 (2) UPLBEC 1387, in support of his contention that the nature of work done by the employee is the relevant consideration for fixation of age of retirement. There is no specific provision alike notification dated 11. 5. 1984 which specifically prescribed that the persons in the scale of Rs. 305-390 would be entitled to retire on attaining the age of 60 years, was under consideration. The said retirement was not fixed by the notification dated 11. 5. 1984 on the basis of nature of work but on the basis of pay scale. Therefore, the ratio decided in the said case, namely, All India Judges Association (supra) cannot be of any help to the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 10 ) RELIANCE was placed on the decision in the case of Sobhnath Dubey v. State of U. P. and others. 1989 (1) UPLBEC 797, on behalf of the petitioner, but the said judgment has also not referred to the notification dated 11. 5. 1984, neither it was mentioned that the case was related to the work charge employee. Therefore, the ratio decided in the said case also cannot be attracted, in the present facts and circumstances of the case. The decision in the case of M. P. Pradhan v. Union of India, 1991 (1) UPLBEC 454, was cited next. But the said case also does not help the petitioner, in the facts and circumstances of the case. Inasmuch as consideration there was as to the date of entry in service. Therefore, it was held that the persons who had entered as apprentice, was to be treated as to have entered the service on the date of entry into service on apprentice and by reason of the petitioner having entered in service prior to the cut off date on apprentice, he was given the benefit of retirement on attaining the age of 60 years. But in the said case, the facts and circumstances which are involved herein, namely, in respect of work charge employees as well as notification dated 11. 5. 1984 being not the subject-matter of consideration. The said judgment has not referred to or dealt with the notification dated 11. 5. 1984 nor it was found that the petitioner therein was work charge employee. Therefore, the said decision also does not help the petitioner. The decision in the case of Orissa Electrical Union v. State of orissa, 1996 (11) SCC 240 , has next been cited. But the said case was altogether different inasmuch as in the said case, Class-IV employees alone were entitled to the benefit of superannuation at the age of 60 years even though performing the same nature of work, but fitted in Class-III and upward posts were eligible to retire on attaining the age of 58 years. In the said case, it was sought to be urged that there was conflict between the decision in the case of State of orissa v. Charon Mohanty, 1995 (1) SCC 470 and M. Dutta v. State of Orissa, 1996 (7) SCC 203 . In the said case. It was found that there is no conflict between the case of Mohanty and dutta, referred to above. A case was sought to be made out that those cases required reconsideration that an unreasonable classification has been made in respect of persons, namely, electricians, plumbers, fitters, etc. in Class IV and Class III posts and thereby prescribing different date of retirement in respect of same group of persons performing the same nature of job simply because of fitment in Class III posts and Class IV posts. But the Supreme Court had found that the said contentions had no substance. The categorisation was wholly a reasonable classification. Thus, the said case rather helps, the contention of Sri Parihar, learned standing counsel that the nature of work is not the criterion to be determined and it is the criterion that has been laid down for the purposes of granting certain benefits to certain class of people even if it is on the basis of pay scale alone, as in the case of Orissa Electrical Union (supra), that is the determining factor. ( 11 ) FOR all these reasons, I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the contentions of Sri tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner, who ably argued the case. The writ petition, therefore, fails as to costs. .