Honble TIBREWAL, J.–The petitioner is a divorcee woman. Her grievance in this petition is that she has been wrongly denied appointment as School Teacher Grade III by the District Education Officer (Boys), Jhunjhunu in recruitments for the year 1996-97 even though she was at No. 1 in mrit amongst Divorcee/Widow applicants. (2). The factual position is not disputed in the matter. The Director, Primary and Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner, invited applications from eligible candidates for recruitment in the vacancies of Teacher Grade II and III for the year 1996-97. In the advertisement, `Divorcee/Widow Women formed a separate category in the reserve categories. As per conditions contained in advertisement a divor- ced woman was required to submit a copy of the decree of dissolution of marriage by a competent Court. From the reply of respondents it transpires that reservation for widows and divorcees was as a policy decision of the State Government with an object to make them financially independent for survival and rehabilitation. (3). The petitioner was having requisite academic qualifications prescribed for the post of School Teacher Grade III. She was married with Shri Rajendra Prasad Sharma of Gonkhpur, but her marriage did not prove to be successful. The husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Family Court, at Gorakhpur, which was registered as case No. 191/93. As per the petitioner, both parties were having grievance against each other as allegations and counter allegations were made in the said proceeding. Realising that marriage has proved to be total failure and there was no chance of any possibility of conjugal harmony, the parties thought it advisable to seek divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act (for short `the Act), instead of carrying on a defunct marriage. The Judge, Family Court, Gorakhpur, on being satisfied with the averments made in joint petition seeking dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, passed a decree of divorce vide judgment and order dated 7.7.1994. The husband also paid Rs. 70,000/- by two Bank Drafts of Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 30,000/- to the petitioner- wife towards expenses incurred by her father in the marriage. Since then the petitioner has been living in village Ranawas, District Jhunjhunu with her father and has not re-married. It is not in dispute that petitioner was at No. 1 in merit list of the category of divorcee/widow women. 40,000/- and Rs. 30,000/- to the petitioner- wife towards expenses incurred by her father in the marriage. Since then the petitioner has been living in village Ranawas, District Jhunjhunu with her father and has not re-married. It is not in dispute that petitioner was at No. 1 in merit list of the category of divorcee/widow women. She obtained 64.3% marks, while women securing less marks were given appointment. The reason to deny her appointment, as stated by the respondents, is that the decree of divorce was obtained by mutual consent of the parties. (4). Shri Ajay Rastogi, learned counsel appearing for the divorced lady, strongly contended that action of the respondents in denying appointment to the petitioner is arbitrary, unjust and it amounts hostile discrimination. Learned counsel contended that women securing less marks and being less meritorious have been given appointment, hence, the action of the respondents infringes Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. It was further submitted that policy decision of the State Government to provide employment to divorced or widowed woman is intended to provide them an opportunity to have an independent source of income for sustenance and survival and to live with dignity. In fact, learned counsel contended, the policy has a laudable object so that a divorcee or widow may not have to live in an oppressed and distressed condition on the mercy of others, and no distinction is reasonably permissible in the case of a divorcee on the ground that the decree of dissolution was passed by mutual consent of the parties. Shri Rastogi further contended that under the Hindu Marriage Act, after insertion of Section 13-B by Act No. 68 of 1976, a marriage can be dissolved by mutual consent on fulfilling requirements stated in the Section and such a decree of divorce is good for all purposes like other decrees of divorce passed under Section 13 of the Act and the effect of the decrees in both cases is same. (5). On the other hand, Shri J.M. Saxena, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, argued that petitioners claim to get appointment has been rightly re- jected as divorce decree was obtained by mutual consent. (5). On the other hand, Shri J.M. Saxena, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, argued that petitioners claim to get appointment has been rightly re- jected as divorce decree was obtained by mutual consent. According to Shri Saxena, in such cases if benefit of appointment is given to such divorcees there is always danger of misuse as it is often seen that divorce by mutual consent is obtained to get the benefit. That a divorced woman cannot be given benefit of her own action resulting in a divorce decree. (6). After giving careful and deep consideration to the rival contentions made by learned counsel on both sides, I am of the opinion that denial of employment/appointment to the petitioner, inspite of her being at S. No. 1 in the merit, is an arbitrary and discriminatory action of the respondents. (7). Undisputedly, the decree of divorce, dissolving marriage of the petitioner with Rajendra Sharma, has been passed by a competent court, i.e. the Family Court, Gorakhpur, on July 7, 1994 much before the advertisement calling applications for the recruitment. It is true that the decree has been passed under Section 13-B of the Act by mutual consent of the parties. Section 13-B, providing divorce by mutual consent, was introduced by Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 68 of 1976). Prior to this amendment a marriage could not be dissolved by a consent decree, even consent of the parties was fair and genuine due to failure of marriage. Section 13-B has been inserted by the Legislature with a view to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent where the parties genuinely felt that conjugal harmony was not possible in future and the marriage was broken down completely beyond all re-approachment or reconciliation, instead of dragging the matter for a long time and to face an ordeal of a complete trial with allegations and counter allegations against each other. Life is precious and a matrimonial dispute, in fact, is a joint problem of the spouses and it involves the entire family. Where relations between the spouses become so strained, with no hope of reconciliation in future, it is always in interest of all that such unsuccessful marriage is dissolved as early as possible. When there is no possibility of conjugal harmony to be restored between the parties, the inevitable and proper course is to part with each other. Where relations between the spouses become so strained, with no hope of reconciliation in future, it is always in interest of all that such unsuccessful marriage is dissolved as early as possible. When there is no possibility of conjugal harmony to be restored between the parties, the inevitable and proper course is to part with each other. Section 13-B, therefore, provides divorce by mutual consent and safeguards are contained in the section itself, which reads as under :- ``13-B. Divorce by mutual consent.–(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. (2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub- section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree. (8). Section 23 of the Act provides further safeguards so that the provision of divorce by mutual consent may not be abused or misused by the parties. A decree of divorce on the ground of mutual consent can be granted by the Court only after being satisfied that such consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or under influence and the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent. (9). A decree of divorce by mutual consent is as good as a decree of divorce obtained under Section 13 of the Act. The effect of a decree of divorce, whether obtained under Sec. 13 or 13-B, is dissolution of marriage for all purposes - giving right to the parties to marry again. (9). A decree of divorce by mutual consent is as good as a decree of divorce obtained under Section 13 of the Act. The effect of a decree of divorce, whether obtained under Sec. 13 or 13-B, is dissolution of marriage for all purposes - giving right to the parties to marry again. A decree of divorce by mutual consent carries a presumption that it has not been obtained in collusion or otherwise by force, fraud or undue influence on any of the parties. Consent decrees per-se in matrimonial matters are not collusive as would be evident from legislative intent. The apprehen- sion of abuse or misuse from a consent decree is prima facie unfounded as the concerned competent court is required to take necessary care and pre-cautions and is to be satisfied that petition is not collusive and consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or under influence of any of the parties. (10). In the instant case there are circumstances to show that consent decree of divorce has not been obtained for ulterior object. Firstly, the decree has been passed in the year 1994 much prior to the policy decision of the State Government and publication of the advertisement for recruitment. The petitioner has been living with her father in village Ranasar in district Jhunjhunu which is far away from her husbands native place. In the order, dissolving marriage, there is a mention of pay- ment of Rs. 70,000/- by two bank drafts to the petitioner. The payment of Rs. 70,000/- by bank drafts also shows that the decree could not be as a result of collusion. (11). Then, there is no such mention in the advertisement that a consent decree of divorce shall not entitle a divorcee women to get appointment. In the advertisement, contrary to it, it is stated that the decree of divorce should not be on the ground of adultery, cruelty or wilful desertion of the wife. (12). On merits, admittedly, the petitioner had secured highest percentage of marks amongst divorced/widowed women as she was at S. No. 1 in merit list of the reserve category of `Divorce/Widow Women. Women with lesser marks have been given appointment. Hence, denial of appointment to the petitioner, on the face, is arbitrary and discriminatory and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the petitioner has been wrongly denied appointment. (13). Women with lesser marks have been given appointment. Hence, denial of appointment to the petitioner, on the face, is arbitrary and discriminatory and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the petitioner has been wrongly denied appointment. (13). In view of the matter, the petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to give appointment to the petitioner on the post of School Teacher Gr. III from the date of giving appointment to others under reserved category of `Divorcee/ Widow Women, with continuity of service but no back salary. The petitioner shall also be entitled to get costs of this litigation - quantified Rs. 1,000/-.