Judgment :- 1. These applications have been filed by the legal representatives of the original petitioner V. Masilamani Chettiar. V. Masilamani Chettiar filed the petition O.P. No. 369/89 under Sections 222, 255 and 276 of the Indian Succession Act for grant of Probate. His brother V. Shanmugham Chettiar lodged a caveat and the Original Petition was converted and registered as a Testamentary Original Suit in T.O.S. No. 14/89. Pending the suit Masilamani Chettiar died on 20-8-1994. The applicants filed these applications for excusing the delay of 396 days in filing the application to set aside the order of abatement dated 19-11-1994, to set aside the abatement of suit T.O.S. No. 14/89, to excuse the delay of 325 days in filing the application to bring the legal representatives of the deceased Masilamani Chettiar on record and to bring on record the applicants as plaintiffs 2 to 6 in the T.O.S. 2. In support of the applications, the applicants have stated that after the death of the original petitioner, the first applicant herein fell sick, that their Counsel Mr. K. Kumaraswamy also expired and that they were all in complete darkness and were not aware of the proceedings till they received summons in Application No. 6346/94 in C.S. No. 532/88 filed by the respondents herein. They further stated that after coming to know about the suit proceedings they filed vakalat in C.S. No. 532/88 on 5-12-1994, that their Counsel informed the applicants to file the necessary application to bring the legal representatives of Masilamani Chettiar on record in T.O.S. No. 14/89, that they filed an application to bring the legal representatives of Masilamani Chettiar on record in the above matter on 31.10.1995 in Diary No. 30391 after a delay of 346 days, that the second applicant herein was the only person looking after the business left by his father and the other family members, that he could not contact his Advocate and instruct him to file the petition in time and that the delay caused was not wilful, deliberate or wanton. 3. The contesting respondent has filed a counter opposing the applications. In particular, in paragraph 3 of the counter, the respondent has stated that even according to the applicants, the affidavit and Judges Summons had been served on them in December, 1994 and they had waited till October, 1995 to file the applications. 3. The contesting respondent has filed a counter opposing the applications. In particular, in paragraph 3 of the counter, the respondent has stated that even according to the applicants, the affidavit and Judges Summons had been served on them in December, 1994 and they had waited till October, 1995 to file the applications. There is a pointed reference in the counter that the affidavit and the Judges Summons in the applications had been prepared as early as October, 1994, but the date in the affidavit and Judges Summons had been corrected as October, 1995 and that therefore the applicants had not made out a case for condoning the delay. The counter also further states that the petitioners pleaded ignorance of the pendency of the T.O.S. though one and the same counsel had been appearing both for the applicants and the deceased plaintiff. 4. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. K. Chandramouli appearing for the applicants submitted, relying on two Bench decisions of this Court in P. Rama Naidu and others v. Rangayya Naidu and others (AIR 1933 Madras 114=(1932) 36 L.W. 922) and Govind M. Asrani v. Jairam Asrani and another (1963-II M.L.J. 433=76 L.W. 492 that if, in a pending application for the issue of Probate, the sole executor died before proving the Will, it would be competent for a legatee or any other person interested to intervene and continue the proceedings to prove the Will and obtain Letters of Administration in his own right. 5. Countering this argument, Mr. P. Devadoss, learned Counsel for the respondent, relied on the decisions in Bhagwan Swaropp and others v. Mool Chand and others (AIR 1983 Supreme Court 355) and Perumal Gounder and 6 others v. Annamalai Gounder (1996-I-.W. 521) and contended that when a suit or an appeal abated, a very valuable right accrued to the other party and such a right was not to be ignored or interfered with lightly in the name of doing substantial justice to the party, as depriving a party of a lawful right created in the interest of administration of justice in the absence of good grounds resulted in injustice to the party concerned, and according to the learned Counsel, the applicants had not made out a case for condoning the delay. 6. 6. In P. Rama Naidu and others v. Rangayya Naidu and others, referred to supra a Bench of this Court in identical circumstances held that in an application for Probate by executor, any beneficiary could intervene and on the death of the executor, the beneficiaries could continue proceedings, In the opinion of the Bench, the applicants right stood independent of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this position, if realised, would clear the way of much irrelevant discussion. Mr. Devadoss seeks to distinguish this decision that in the instant case, the applicants did not derive any benefit under the proceedings as the executor himself is the legatee and therefore there is no question of the executor representing anybody else in the proceedings. 7. However in Govind M. Asrani v. Jairam Asrani and another (1963-11 M.L.J. 433=76 L.W. 492) it has been clearly laid down that in all cases where after the death of the sole executor, the legatees or the persons interested (emphasis supplied) seek to intervene and continue the proceedings, the application for coming on record should be made as one seeking the directions of Court and not under Order 22, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This position of law is unassailable and cannot be taken exception to. The two decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent Mr. Devadoss do not arise under Probate Proceedings. Even then in the Supreme Courts decision cited, the Apex Court has clearly warned that a hypertechnical approach if carried to end, may result in miscarriage of justice. If the trend is to encourage fairplay in action in administrative law, it must all the more inhere in judicial approach. Such applications have to be approached with this view; whether substantial justice is done between the parties or technical rules of procedure are given precedence over doing substantial justice in Court. “Undoubtedly, justice according to law; law to be administered to advance justice” and ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the applications of the legal representatives, who wanted to come on record. 8. The other case Perumal Gounder and 6 others v. Annamalai Gounder (1996-I. L.W. 521) relates to impleading of legal representatives under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure after dismissal of the petitions for excusing the delay in filing the legal representative petition and seeking to set aside abatement. 8. The other case Perumal Gounder and 6 others v. Annamalai Gounder (1996-I. L.W. 521) relates to impleading of legal representatives under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure after dismissal of the petitions for excusing the delay in filing the legal representative petition and seeking to set aside abatement. The High Court rightly interfered in revision and set aside the error under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision does not in any way advance the case of the respondent. 9. May be, the present applications should have been as one seeking the directions of Court and not under the provisions of Order 22, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the Court is not powerless and it can always mould the relief to the parties after taking note of the actual state of affairs. 10. The Division Bench in Govind M. Asarani v. Jairam Asrani (1963-11 M.L.J. 433=76 L.W. 492) also based its decision on the principle of stare decisis and accepted the decision in Rama Naidu v. Rangayya Naidu (AIR 1933 Madras 114=36 L.W. 922) I respectfully follow the decision of the Bench and hold that the applicants are persons interested and they are well within their rights to seek to intervene and continue the proceedings. They are directed to amend the main plaint in a suitable manner and to continue the proceedings to prove the Will and obtain Letters of Administration in their own right. They are directed to file the necessary applications for the said purpose. The petitions are ordered accordingly. No Costs.