Judgment Nagendra Rai and S.K.Chattopadhyaya JJ. 1. With the consent of the parties, this application is being disposed of at the stage of admission itself. 2. The petitioner has, field the present writ application challenging certain provisions of the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995. 3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the parties it is necessary to state briefly the facts of the case. The petitioner was an employee of Heavy Engineering Corporation and superannuated on 1.2.1992. At the time of his retirement the Family Pension Scheme, 1971 framed under the provisions of Sec. 6A of the Employees Provident Fund (Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was applicable. On 16th November, 1995 the Government framed the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995. The 1971 Scheme ceased to operate with effect from 16th November, 1995 in view of Paragraph 44 of the 1995, Scheme. According the sub-para 2 (a) of Paragraph 1 this scheme came into force on the 16th day of November, 1995. Paragraph 2 (b) provides that subject to the provisions of this scheme the employees have an option to become the members of the Scheme with effect from the 1st April, 1993. Para 7 gives option to certain classes of employees to join the Scheme. This option has been given to those employees only who were out of employment on or after 1st April, 1993. Sub-para 2 (b) of para 1 and para 7 are quoted hereinbelow: 1. Short title, commencement and application.-- (1) This scheme may be called the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995. 2. (b). Subject to the provisions of this scheme the employees have an option to become the members of the scheme with effect from the 1st April, 1993. 7. Option for joining the scheme.--(j) Every employee who is a member of the Employees Provident Fund or of Provident Funds of factories and other establishments exempted under Sec. 17 of the Act and/or Paragraph 27-27-A of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 but is not a member of the Family Pension Fund immediately before the commencement of this Scheme, shall have the option to join this scheme. (2) Employees referred to in sub-paragraph (1) and the members of the Family Pension Scheme, 1971, who were out of employment on or after the 1st April, 1993 may also exercise the option to become members of this scheme. (2) Employees referred to in sub-paragraph (1) and the members of the Family Pension Scheme, 1971, who were out of employment on or after the 1st April, 1993 may also exercise the option to become members of this scheme. (3) The option referred to in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be exercised within a period of six months from the 16th day of November, 1995. 4. According to the counsel for the petitioner the provisions providing option to certain classes of employees from 1st of April, 1993 is an arbitrary one because its being a beneficial scheme, it should apply to all the employees who were out of employment prior to coming it no force of the said scheme. His grievance is that the date fixed for exercising option is arbitrary and on this ground sub-paragraph 2 (b) of Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 7 of the said Employees Pension Scheme have to be struck down on the ground of arbitrariness for the reason that it has no nexus with the object of the scheme. 5. From the counter affidavit it appears that the Employees Pension Scheme was introduced in the Parliament sometimes in March, 1993 and it was to be implemented from 1.4.1993. However, the bill could not be passed and later on an ordinance was progulmated from implementing the said scheme in 1995 to make it effective from 16th day of November, 1995. As the scheme was originally planned to be made applicable from 1.4.93 an option was given to the employees retiring in between 1.4.93 to 15.1.95 to avail the benefits of the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995. 6. In support of his submission, counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision rendered in the case of D.S. Nakara and Ors. V/s. Union of India, reported in -- wherein it was held that classification in revised pension formulla between pensioners on basis of date of retirement is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the constitution. 6. In support of his submission, counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision rendered in the case of D.S. Nakara and Ors. V/s. Union of India, reported in -- wherein it was held that classification in revised pension formulla between pensioners on basis of date of retirement is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the constitution. He has also relied on the decision in the case of Premilobail Vishnu Dixit V/s. State of Maharashtra , wherein the Apex Court relying upon the law laid down in Nakaras case (supra) held that if widows and dependents of deceased Government servants since after September, 22, 1977 would be entitled to benefits of family pension scheme without the obligation of making contribution, those widows who were denied the benefits on the ground that the government servants having not agreed to make the contribution, could not be differently treated because that would be introducing an invidious classification among those who would be entitled to similar treatment. 7. From the facts of Nakaras case it will appear that an artificial date was fixed classifying the retiring employees into two different classes though they were governed by the same rule and were similarly situated. That case was considered by a constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Krishna Kumars case reported in 1990 (4) SCC 207 and it was held that different dates of retirement benefits can be fixed for the employees retiring on different dates. Recently the Apex Court considered the question whether different retiral benefits can not be conferred on the employees retiring on different dates in the case of State of Rajasthan V/s. Savanivatra Karmachari Hitkarai Samittee, reported in -- . It was held therein that it is permissible to introduce different retirement benefits for the government servants on the basis of the date of retirement. The only requirement is that the government has to prescribe the date in a reasonable manner having regard to the relevant facts. It is relevant to quote paragraph 22 of the said judgment which reads as follows: After considering the respective contentions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, it appears to us that after the impugned decision was made by the Rajasthan High Court, this Court has considered that import of the decision rendered in D.S. Nakara case. It is relevant to quote paragraph 22 of the said judgment which reads as follows: After considering the respective contentions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, it appears to us that after the impugned decision was made by the Rajasthan High Court, this Court has considered that import of the decision rendered in D.S. Nakara case. This Court has noticed the ratio of D.S. Nakara case as indicated in Krishana Kumar case and in Indian Ex-Service League case and also in Rajasthan Pensioner Samaj case, it has been clearly indicated by this Court that the Government servant can be governed by different sets of retiral benefit rules with reference to their holding of office from cut off date. In Krishana Kumar case it has been indicated that in D.S. Nakara case this Court considered a case where an artificial date was specified classifying the retires into two different classes even though they where governed by the same rules and were similary situated. Such classification where both the grounds were governed by the same rules amounted to deprivation of one group of the benefit of liberalisation of pension rules. It was only in that situation it was held in D.S. Nakara case that situation it was held in D.S. Nakara case that specification of the date from which the liberalisation pension rules were to come into force was arbitrary. This Court, in D.S. Nakara case clearly indicated that it was not a new scheme but only a revision of the existing scheme and it was not a new retiral benefit, but it was a case of upward revision of existing benefit. In D.S. Nakara case it was pointed out that if it was wholly a new concept, a new retiral benefit, one could have appreciated an argument that those who had already retired could not accept it. The constitution Bench in Krishena Kumar case has upheld different sets of retiral benefits being made applicable to the employees retiring prior to 1..4. 1977 and retiring thereafter. It has been indicated by the Constitution Bench in Krishena Kumar case that any argument to the contrary would mean that the Government can never change the condition of service relating to retiral benefits w.e.f. a particular date. 1977 and retiring thereafter. It has been indicated by the Constitution Bench in Krishena Kumar case that any argument to the contrary would mean that the Government can never change the condition of service relating to retiral benefits w.e.f. a particular date. It has, however, been pointed out that the State cannot back a date out of its hat but it has to prescribe a date in a reasonable manner having regard to the relevant facts and circumstances. 8. Law is well settled that retirement benefits can be fixed to the government servants on the basis of their date of retirement provided classification is not arbitrary and irrational. In the present case the enforcement of the 1995 scheme has been made from 16th day of November, 1995. As the bill was introduced in the Parliament in the year, 1993 and the same could not be passed, the Central Government with a view to give benefits to those employees also who could not avail of the beneficial period of non- passing of the bill, has given the option to become member of the scheme. In our view, giving option to the employees retired from the back date i.e. from 1st of April, 1993, in the facts of the case is reasonable and does not suffer from any arbitrariness. This apart, so far the petitioner is concerned, he retired while the earlier scheme was in force and the present scheme has come into force in 1995, and, as such, it cannot be said that his interest." in any way is prejudiced by not allowing the benefits of the present scheme to him. The only point raised on benefit of the petitioner, in our view, has no substance. 9. In the result, we find no merit in this application which is, accordingly, dismissed.