JUDGMENT S. P. BHARUCHA, J. - The respondents manufactured rigid PVC pipes which fell under Tariff Item 1 5-A (2) of the Central Excise Tariff. The said goods were exempted from the whole of the excise duty leviable thereon until 27-2-1982. On 28-2-1982, by reason of a notification which, we have ascertained, was issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules (being Notification No. 52/82-CE) the effective rate of duty on the said goods became 8 per cent ad valorem. On 22-4-1982, another notification issued under the same provisions again wholly exempted the said goods from payment of excise duty. 2. The respondents filed a claim for refund of the duty paid on the said goods cleared by them between 28-2-1982 and 21-4-1982. It was contended that these goods had been manufactured before 28-2-1982, when they were fully exempt from payment of duty, and, hence, no duty was payable on them, although they had been cleared after 28-2-1982. The claim having been rejected by the authorities below, the respondents filed an appeal before the Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. It was contended that the said notification dated 28-2-1982, (No. 58/82-CE) had been issued under the provisions of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931; that this notification had been withdrawn when notification dated 21-4-1982, a restoring total exemption was issued and the Finance Act passed; and, therefore, the duty paid at the rate of 8 per cent ad valorem as aforestated was refundable. The Tribunal found the case covered by its earlier order in the case of Jindal Paper and Plastic Ltd. V. CCE. Following that order, it held that no duty had been payable on the said goods for the relevant period and, hence, the respondents refund claim was admissible. 3. Learned counsel for the Revenue, in this appeal against the judgment and order of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, has drawn attention to the fact that the Revenues appeal to this Court in the case of Jindal Paper and Plastic Ltd. above referred to has been allowed (by the order dated 26-8-1996, in Civil Appeals Nos. 4572-73 of 1989), following the decision in CCE v. Vazir Sultan Thbacco Co. 4572-73 of 1989), following the decision in CCE v. Vazir Sultan Thbacco Co. Ltd. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the aforesaid judgments were distinguishable because the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, applied and that, since the Finance Act had not been passed levying duty on the said goods at the rate of 8 per cent ad valorem, the duty collected for the period during which the Finance Bill was pending was refundable. 4. Section 4 of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, states that a declared provision shall have the force of law immediately on the expiry of the day on which the Bill containing it is introduced. It also states, as learned counsel for the respondents emphasised, that a declared provision shall cease to have the force of law under the provisions of the Act on the expiry of the 75th day after the day on which the Bill containing it is introduced. Where a declared provision ceases to have the force of law, collections made on the basis thereof have to be refunded under the provisions of Section 5. 5. As we have pointed out, the goods were at all relevant times excisable. For the period prior to 27-2-1982, the rate of duty thereon was nil. Thereafter, until 21-4-1982, the effective rate of duty was 8 per cent ad valorem and after 21-4-1982, the rate of duty was again nil. During the period 28-2-1982 to 21-4-1982, the rate of duty was 8 per cent ad valorem by reason of an exemption notification issued under the provisions of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules. The decision in Vazir Sultan case1 squarely applies, as was observed by this Court when it allowed the appeal of the Revenue in the similar case of Jindal Paper and Plastic Ltd. The provisions of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, have no application. 6. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The refund application made by the respondents is rejected. No order as to costs.