ORDER The issue is common in both the revisions. Hence, this common order. 2. Mr.K.A. Sengottian, the petitioner herein, who is the former Minister for Transport, Government of Tamil Nadu, is one of the accused in Spl.C.C.No.15 of 1996 on the file of the First Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Erode and in Spl.C.C.No.155 of 1996 on the file of the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem. Both these cases were taken on the file by the respective courts for the offences under Secs.120-B, 409, 409 read with 109, I.P.C. and under Secs.7, 8 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(c), 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with 109, I.P.C. 3. The allegation against the petitioner in the abovesaid two complaints is that the petitioner and other accused entered into a criminal conspiracy, committed criminal breach of trust, received illegal gratification from the contractors for constructing the bus bodies, purchasing materials, electronic equipments and printing tickets by placing orders at an exorbitant rate which resulted in heavy loss to the Corporation and committed the offence of criminal misconduct as public servants. 4. On appearance by the petitioner and other accused before the courts below, copies were furnished to them by the courts in May, 1997. Before framing of the charges, the petitioner filed applications before the courts below under Sec.239, Crl.P.C. seeking for his discharge. 5. At this stage, on 30.5.1997 the prosecution filed an application in Crl.M.P.No.309 of 1997 in Spl.C.C.No.1 55 of 1996 on the file of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Salem, requesting transfer of the records relating to the abovesaid case to the Special Judge at Chennai, appointed by the High Court in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No.628, Home (Courts-II), dated 30.4.1997. On 10.6.1997 the prosecution filed a similar application before the first Additional District Judge, Periyar District at Erode, in Crl.M.P.No.46 of 1997 in Spl.C.C.No.l5 of 1996, requesting transfer of the records to the Special Judge at Chennai, in pursuance of the above referred to G.O. 6. In the said applications both the courts below gave opportunity to the petitioner and other accused to file their objections. In the said applications both the courts below gave opportunity to the petitioner and other accused to file their objections. After elaborate consideration of the petitions, the counter and the submissions of the respective counsel, both the courts below allowed the petitions filed by the prosecution ordering the transmitting of the records relating to the above cases to the Special Judges at Chennai, by the orders dated 8.7.1997 and 27.6.1997 respectively. These orders are sought to be challenged in these revisions by the petitioner. 7. Mr.N.R.Chandran, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr.Uthirasamy, counsel appearing for the petitioner, though raised several grounds in the memorandum of criminal revision petitions reiterating the grounds urged before the courts below, mainly attacked the impugned orders contending that the courts below have no powers to transfer these cases to the Special Judges who are outside the area. 8. The following is the crux of his submissions: “The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Erode and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem have been appointed as Special Judges under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 by G.O.Ms.No.3223, Home (Courts II), dated 30.12.1982 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 12.1.1983. Though they were appointed under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, by virtue of Sec.26 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, they are deemed to be appointed as Special Judges under Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, these Special Judges appointed under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, have not lost the jurisdiction to try the cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, even though a fresh G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 was issued appointing the Special Judges at Chennai under Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to try some of the cases including the cases in question, in the absence of the cancellation of the earlier G.O. appointing the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Salem and Erode as Special Judges. When there is an existence of jurisdiction to try the above cases, the Special Judges, that is, C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode are not empowered to transfer these cases to another Special Judge, that too, in another area merely on the basis of the G.O. issued by the Government. When there is an existence of jurisdiction to try the above cases, the Special Judges, that is, C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode are not empowered to transfer these cases to another Special Judge, that too, in another area merely on the basis of the G.O. issued by the Government. The G.O. cannot divest the C.J.M., Erode and C.J.M., Salem of their jurisdiction as Special Judges, In other words the existence of the jurisdiction of C.J.M. cannot be busted by virtue of the G.O. by mere reference and consultation with the High Court. In such a situation, the petitions filed by the prosecution in both the cases before the courts below seeking transfer of the records from one Special Court to another Special Court outside the area, cannot be maintained, in the absence of any such provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The powers of transfer from one court to another court in different areas vest only with the High Court and not with the Subordinate Courts. Therefore, the impugned orders suffer from infirmity and illegality and as such, they are liable to be set aside.” 9. Arguing contra, Mr.Shanmughasundaram, learned Public Prosecutor, would press into service the following submissions contending that the submission made by the senior counsel for the petitioner has no substance: “The impugned orders cannot be said to be the orders of transfer as contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The memorandums have been filed before the courts below by the respective investigating agency through the respective Additional Public Prosecutors only to request the courts to sent the records to the Special Judge at Chennai on the basis of G.O.Ms.No.628, Home (Courts-11) Department, dated 30.4.1997 passed by the Government. The very fact that no provision of law was mentioned in those memorandums filed by the respective investigating officers and no other ground was urged for transfer of the records from the Chief Judicial Magistrate to Special Judge at Chennai, would very well establish that these applications could not be construed to be under any of the provision relating to transfer under Crl.P.C. There cannot be any dispute that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had no judicial competence to pass judicial orders transferring a case from the court of one Special Judge to the court of another Special Judge in the same or different Sessions Division. In the instant case, G.O.Ms.No. 628, dated 30.4.1997 appointing the Presiding Officers posted by this Honourable High Court as Special Judges under Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was passed only after due consultation with tins Honourable High Court as required under the law. This is permissible under Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. When the G.O. is passed for the Specific or class of group of cases, the jurisdiction to try those cases is vested only with the Special Judges, Chennai appointed through the above G.O. irrespective of the territorial jurisdiction of the other Special Judges. The appointment of all the Chief Judicial Magistrate of the respective areas as Special Judges to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act by virtue of Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act would not in any way affect the present G.O., that is, G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 appointing Special Judges at Chennai, since the Special Judges are appointed through the above G.O. irrespective of the territorial jurisdiction of the other Special Judges by virtue of Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Special Judges appointed under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act would relate to the cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act only in respect of the local area. As such the learned Special Judges, that is, the Chief Judicial Magistrates of Salem and Erode, have no judicial competence to transfer a case from the court of one Special judge to the court of another Special Judge. Consequently, the impugned orders transmitting the records to the Special Judge, Chennai, cannot be said to be judicial orders and these orders are only of administrative character and therefore the review of the administrative orders under revision by this Court is not permissible. Hence, the above revisions are not maintainable” 10. By way of reply, Mr.N.R.Chandran, learned senior counsel, would vehemently submit the following: “Having filed affidavits with the petitions before the courts below requesting for transfer, and having allowed the accused party to file the objections, the prosecution, cannot, now resort to make a fresh plea in this Court to the effect that the orders are administrative in nature, more particularly, when the impugned orders were passed by the respective courts after hearing both the parties allowing the applications by the prosecution by giving detailed reasons for the same. Therefore, by any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the impugned orders being challenged in this Court are merely administrative. On the other hand, the above orders are judicial orders and the same could be reviewed and revised by this Court, since those orders were passed by the Judicial Officers in their judicial capacity. Even assuming, though not admitting, that the impugned orders are of administrative character, the lower courts have no authority to pass such administrative orders, especially when they have got jurisdiction to try the cases.” 11. In the light of the respective submissions, the following questions would emerge for consideration by this Court: l. Whether C.J.M., Erode and C.J.M., Salem have got jurisdiction to transfer the cases pending before them to other courts outside the area. 2. Whether C.J.M., Salem and C.J.M., Erode who have already been appointed as Special Judges to try the corruption cases by virtue of Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, could transfer the said cases to the other Special Judges appointed under Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. Whether the C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode have lost the jurisdiction to try the cases even in the absence of the cancellation of the earlier G.O. through which they where appointed as Special Judges as soon as the appointment of Special Judges in other area was made to try those cases under Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 4. Whether the orders transferring the records in these cases by one Special Judge to another Special Judge in other area on the basis of the GO. passed under Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 could be called to be an administrative orders. 5. Whether these Special Judge, namely, C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode appointed under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, to try these cases have got jurisdiction even to pass alleged administrative orders transmitting the records to the other Special Judges on the basis of G.O.Ms/No.628, dated 30.4.1997. 12. Before making an analytical study with reference to the questions raised above, at the outset, 1 deem it fit to refer the relevant and required facts in this matter for the purpose of the best understanding of the cases on hand. 13. 12. Before making an analytical study with reference to the questions raised above, at the outset, 1 deem it fit to refer the relevant and required facts in this matter for the purpose of the best understanding of the cases on hand. 13. The petitioner is one of the accused in Crime No.4 of 1996 of Salem C.B., C.I.D. and Crime No.3 of 1996 of Erode C.B., C.I.D. In both the cases, the charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner and others in December, 1986. The learned C.J.M., Salem, took the case on file on 16.12.1996 in Spl.C.C.No.155 of 1996. The learned C.J.M., Erode, took the case on file on 24.12.1996 in Spl.C.C.No.15 of 1996. 14. On 26.3.1997 a letter of request was sent by the Home (Courts-II) Department of Tamil Nadu Government to the High Court addressing to the Registrar, intimating the desire of the Government for the appointment of Special Judge at Chennai for expeditious trial of the various cases of corruption and possession of disproportionate assets against former Ministers and former M.L.As. and a few civil servants, having regard to the public importance and sensitive nature of the cases. After the consideration, of the said request, the High Court sanctioned for the post of three Special Judges to have the trial of those cases. This was intimated to the Government by letter dated 10.4.1997 through Registrar. 15. By the letter dated 21.4.1997 the Home Department intimated the Registrar about the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.562, dated 17.4.1997 sanctioning the constitution of three Additional Courts to be headed by Special Judges and also for the creation of temporary staff and for the incurring of an expenditure towards the purchase of the furniture, xerox machine etc. for the use of the above courts. 16. Again, on 21.4.1997 the Secretary to Government, Home Department, sent a letter enclosing a list of F.I.Rs. and charge-sheets filed in various cases of corruption and possession of disproportionate assets and requesting the Registrar to send necessary draft notification for the allotment of cases for the three courts constituted under G.O.Ms.No.562, dated 17.4.1997. On receipt of this letter, the draft notification was sent. 17. and charge-sheets filed in various cases of corruption and possession of disproportionate assets and requesting the Registrar to send necessary draft notification for the allotment of cases for the three courts constituted under G.O.Ms.No.562, dated 17.4.1997. On receipt of this letter, the draft notification was sent. 17. Then, on 30.4.1997 G.O.Ms.No.628 was issued by the Government providing for the establishment of three Additional Courts at Chennai presided over by the Special Judges for exclusive trial of certain cases investigated by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption and Crime Branch, Criminal Investigation Department. The relevant portion of the Notification is as follows: “In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby appoints the Judge specified in column (1) of the Table below, as Special Judges to try the cases specified in column (2) thereof, as they are officers specified in the Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, investigated by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption and the Crime Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, Chennai.” 18. As per the Table annexed to the above referred G.O.. the case in Crime No.3 of 1996 of Erode C.B., C.I.D. (Spl.C.C.No.15 of 1996 on the file of C.J.M., Erode) was allotted to the Special Judge No.1 at Chennai, that is XI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Chennai and the case in Crime No.4 of 1996 of Salem C.B., C.I.D. (Spl.C.C.No.155 of 1996 on the file of C.J.M., Salem) was allotted to XII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, that is, Special Judge No.2 at Chennai. This G.O. has been published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 30.4.1997. 19. In pursuance of the publication of the above G.O., the respondent, the investigating officer in Crime No.4 of 1996 of Salem C.B., C.I.D. filed a memo on 30.5.1997 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem, in Spl.C.C.No.155 of 1996 in Crl.M.P.No.309 of 1997 praying for the transfer of the F.I.R. and other connected documents in the Spl.C.C.No.155 of 1996 to the XII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, who has been appointed as Special Judge-11 under G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 to try the above case. Along with this memo, a copy of the G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 was also enclosed. 20. On service of the copy of the above memo on the accused, objections were filed on 13.6.1997 and 18.6.1997. Along with this memo, a copy of the G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 was also enclosed. 20. On service of the copy of the above memo on the accused, objections were filed on 13.6.1997 and 18.6.1997. The main objection was that the petition for transfer on the basis of a G.O. was not maintainable and the said G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 was also against the provision of Chapter XIII of Crl.P.C. and hence, the same cannot be acted and that the case cannot be transferred from the said court to a court which is outside the local jurisdiction. 21. After consideration of this memo objections and submissions, on 8.7.1997 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem ordered transmitting and submitting the records in the above case to the XII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge as Special Judge II. 22. The respondent, the investigating officer in Crime No.3 of 1996 of Erode C.B., C.I.D. filed an affidavit along with petition on 10.6.1997 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Erode, in Spl.C.C.No.15 of 1996 in Crl.M.P.No.46 of 1997, requesting transfer of the records to the Special Court I on the basis of G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997. 23. As in the other case, this was also objected by the petitioner and other accused on the ground that the transfer could not be made merely on the basis of the G.O. and that High Court alone would have the powers of transfer under Sec.407, Crl.P C. to transfer the case from one district to another district. 24. After hearing both the parties, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Erode, by his order dated 27.6.1997 allowed the petition by the prosecution directing the sending of the records in the above case to the Special Judge-1 (XI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge) at Chennai. 25. In the meantime, the petitioner herein filed a writ petition before this Court on 15.6.1997 for the issue of a writ of certiorari challenging G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 and to quash the same. On 17.6.1997, Jayasimha Babu, J. admitted the writ petition and ordered to issue notice. While admitting the writ petition, this Court in its interim order directed that the three Special Judges at Chennai shall not proceed to commence recording of evidence in the case in which the petitioner is the accused but however observed that all steps up to the stage of commencing recording of evidence shall be proceeded with. While admitting the writ petition, this Court in its interim order directed that the three Special Judges at Chennai shall not proceed to commence recording of evidence in the case in which the petitioner is the accused but however observed that all steps up to the stage of commencing recording of evidence shall be proceeded with. This apart, following observation also has been made in the said interim order: “At this point of time, the consultation between the State Government and the High Court had in fact, taken place and the allocation of the cases to the three courts was, in fact, done by the High Court, though the formal notification was issued by the Government, it cannot be assumed that the Additional Courts, before which these cases are to be tried, do not have the jurisdiction to try the cases.” 26. In the light of the above facts and situation, let me now go into the arena of discussion, venturing to answer the questions raised above. 27. Admittedly, both the cases pending before the courts below have reached up to the stage of framing of the charges. In both these cases, the petitioner and others have filed applications under Sec.239, Crl.P.C. under Chapter XIX, Crl.P.C. requesting the court to discharge them and not to frame charges against them. Therefore, once the courts took the case on file and entertained the applications for discharge by the accused, in order to decide whether to frame charge or not, the courts have begun their judicial functions in exercise of the powers conferred on them under the relevant sections relating to the procedure as contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the relevant sections of the special statutes. In such a situation, any order passed by the courts below, so long as they have got jurisdiction to try the case, will have to be necessarily considered as judicial order. 28. There is no controversy in the fact that the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Salem and the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Erode are the Special Judges to try the cases relating to the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act in respect of the local area, since they were appointed as Special Judges under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.3223, dated 30.12.1982. Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act provides thus: “6. Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act provides thus: “6. Power to appoint Special Judges: (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary for such area of areas as may be specified in the notification to try the following offences, namely: (a) an offence punishable under Sec.161, Sec 162, Sec.163, Sec.164, Sec.165 or Sec.l65-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or Sec.5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 1947 (2 of 1947); (b) any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abatement of any of the offences specified in Cl.(a). (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Special Judge under this Act unless he is, or has been, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898). 29. Under Sec.6, by the notification dated 12.1.1983 appointing the Chief Judicial Magistrate specified in Column (1) of the Table annexed therewith as Special Judges for the districts specified in Column (2) thereof to try offences specified in Sub-sec.(1) of the said Sec.6 and committed within the local area comprising the districts specified in Column (2) of the said Table. 30. The following is the relevant portion of the notification: “Investiture of Powers.G.O.Ms.No.3223, Home (Courts II) 30th December, 1982 (Margazhi 5, Thunthubi, Thiruvalluvar Aandu-2013). O.1. HO 16/83 - In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (Central Act XLVI of 1952) and in supersession of the Home Department Notification l/HQ/394/80, l/HQ/395/80 and 1/HQ/396/80, dated 1.12.1980 published at pages 193-194 of Part (IX) of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated the 17th December, 1980, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby appoints the Chief Judicial Magistrate specified in column (I) of the Table below as Special Judges for the districts specified in column (2) thereof to try offences specified in Sub-sec. (I) of the said Sec.6 and committed within the local area comprising the districts specified in column (2) of the said Table. Table Chief Judicial Magistrates (1) Districts (2) 1. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu Chengalpattu District. 2. Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Arcot at Cuddalore South Arcot District. 3. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore. Coimbatore and Nilgiris Districts. 4. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Periyar District in Erode. Periyar District. 5. Table Chief Judicial Magistrates (1) Districts (2) 1. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu Chengalpattu District. 2. Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Arcot at Cuddalore South Arcot District. 3. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore. Coimbatore and Nilgiris Districts. 4. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Periyar District in Erode. Periyar District. 5. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dharmapuri and Krisinagiri. Dharmapuri District. 6. Chief Judicial Magistrate, K.K.Dist. at Nagercoil. K.K. District. 7. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai Madurai North and South District. 8. Chief Judicial Magistrate, North Arcot at Vellore. North Arcot. 9. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai. Pudukottai District. 10. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ramanathapuram. Ramanathapuram District. 11. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem. Salem District. 12. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tanjore at Kumbakonam. Thanjavur East and West District. 13. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trichy. Trichy District. 14. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli. Tirunelveli District. T.V.Venkataraman, Commissioner and Secretary to Government”. This notification would show that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Erode and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem were appointed to try the offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 referred in Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, committed within the local area. 31. Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 declares thus: “3. Power to appoint Special Judges: (1) The Central Government or the State Government may, by notification in the “Official Gazette, appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas or for such case or group of cases as may be specified in the notification to try the following offences, namely: (a) any offence punishable under this Act; and (b) any contingency to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in clause (a). (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Special Judge under this Act unless he is or has been a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)”. 32. (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Special Judge under this Act unless he is or has been a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)”. 32. The conjoint reading of Sec.6 of the Criminal law (Amendment) Act, 1952 and Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 would make it clear that the Government has got power to appoint Special Judges for such area or areas in which the offence has been committed only under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, Whereas under Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the Government has got powers to issue notification to appoint as many as Special Judges as may be necessary not only for such areas, but also for a case or group cases as may be specified in the notification irrespective of the areas. It is in this context, Sec.26 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is quite relevant. Sec.26 of the Act would provide as follows: “26. Special Judges appointed under Act 46 of 1952 to be Special Judges appointed under this Act: Every Special Judge appointed under the Criminal law (Amendment) Act, 1952, for any area or areas and his holding office on the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be a Special Judge appointed under Sec.3 of this Act for that area or areas and, accordingly, on and from commencement, every such judge shall continue to deal with all the proceedings pending before him on such commencement in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 33. It is quite clear from this section that there is no necessity for a fresh notification appointing Special Judges to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, in respect of a particular area or areas in which offence has been committed. In other words, the notification issued under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 appointing the Chief Judicial Magistrate of various districts shall be deemed to be a Special Judge a appointed under Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in relation to the area only. In other words, the notification issued under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 appointing the Chief Judicial Magistrate of various districts shall be deemed to be a Special Judge a appointed under Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in relation to the area only. In the event of Government taking decision to have trial for such case or group of cases irrespective of the areas, then there shall be a fresh notification under Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In such a situation, Sec.26 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 would not come into play. 34. However, as pointed out by the senior counsel for the petitioner, the notification issued under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 appointing C.J.Ms. of specified districts including Salem and Erode to try the corruption cases in the area in which offence has been committed has not been cancelled in the subsequent G.Os. But this position, in my view, would not affect in any way the competency of the State Government to issue notification under Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to appoint Special Judges to have the trial of such case or group of cases irrespective of the area in which offence was said to be committed. Suppose, if the State Government has passed G.O. under Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act appointing some other Judge as Special Judge in the very same area for which already a Special Judge was appointed under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, then there will be some force in contending that though the subsequent G.O. under Sec.3(1) appointing some other Judge in the local area was passed by the Government under Sec.3(1), the Special Judge already appointed by the earlier notification issued under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, would still have jurisdiction, in the absence of the cancellation of the said G.O. 35. But in the instant case, this position does not arise. But in the instant case, this position does not arise. In the year 1983 by the notification dated 12.1.1983 a general G.O. has been issued under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 appointing Special Judges to try some of the offences mentioned in I.P.C. and some of the offences mentioned in Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by appointing all the Chief Judicial Magistrates of respective districts to have trial of those cases, especially when it relates to the offences committed in the local area. 36. But now, in pursuance of Sec.3(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which provides for the appointment of Judges for the trial of all the offences contained in Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 irrespective of the areas where the offence was committed, the State Government has appointed three Special Judges to try a group of cases arising out of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 after due consultation with the High Court. 37. No doubt it is true, Sec.26 enumerates that the appointment of Special Judges under Sec.6 of the Act, 1952 must be deemed to be under Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. But as indicated earlier, it would relate to the areas only, not with reference to the appointment of Special Judges to conduct the trial of such case or group of cases irrespective of the areas. In view of the fact situation, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that once the State Government under Sec.3(1) issues notification appointing some Special Judges at Chennai in consultation with the High Court, of course administratively, to conduct the trial of a group of cases in view ofthe public importance, thejurisdiction vested with the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Erode by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.3223, Home (Courts-II), dated 30.12.1982 published in the Gazette on 12.1.1983, is lost. 38. In this context, the observation by Jayasimha Babu, J., in the interim order dated 17.6.1997 is also relevant. In that order it is observed that it cannot be assumed that the Special Judges at Chennai, before whom these cases are to be tried, do not have the jurisdiction to try these cases, particularly when consultation between the State Government and the High Court had taken place and that the-allocation of cases to three Special Judges was in fact done by the High Court. Therefore, in view of the competency of the Government to issue such a notification under Sec.3(1) appointing Special Judges irrespective of the areas and in view of the above observation of this Court in the interim order in the writ petition, the three Special Judges so appointed did have jurisdiction. I am of the opinion that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Erode and the Chief judical Magistrate, Salem will have no jurisdiction to proceed with the case any further. It is also relevant to note that this Court in the writ petition by interim order directed the Special Judges at Chennai that all steps up to the stage of commencing recording of evidence shall be proceeded with. Therefore, once the Special Judges at Chennai get jurisdiction on the strength of G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.97, as recognised in the interim order by this Court in the writ petition in my view, the jurisdiction of the C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode is ousted. In other words, on 30.4.1997 the date on which the G.O. has been issued, the C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode have lost their jurisdiction and consequently, they cannot proceed with the case further in any manner. Therefore, subsequent to the release of G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997, the learned Special Judges, that is the Chief Judicial Magistrates appointed under Sec.6 of the Act, 1952 are not competent to pass any judicial order, as they have be come functus officio. 39. Much was said about the alleged judicial character of the impugned orders assigning various reasons and findings for transfer of the records after having entertained the petitions from the prosecution and the counter from the accused party and heard both. No doubt, in the petitions filed by the prosecution before both the courts below, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the Investigating Officer had prayed for transfer of the records from that court to the Special Judge at Chennai. Even though the word ‘transfer’ has been used by the investigating agency in the last prayer column, the reason for the said prayer mentioned in both the petitions is that already Special Judges have been appointed in pursuance of G.O.Ms.628, dated 30.4.1997 and as such, the courts below would have no jurisdiction and that therefore, the records to be transferred to the Special Judges. 40. The word ‘Transfer’ is found in the Secs.406, 407, 408 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 40. The word ‘Transfer’ is found in the Secs.406, 407, 408 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under these sections either Sessions Court or High Court or Supreme Court would transfer the case only in certain contingencies. But in the instant cases, no such contingency was urged in the applications filed by the investigating agency before the courts below. In fact, as correctly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, no section was mentioned in the applications filed by the respondent, requesting for the transfer of the records to Special Judges at Chennai. Therefore, in my view, the Special Judge-cum-C.J.M. of Erode and Salem had neither jurisdiction to go on with the case nor had judicial competence to transfer a case from the court of one Special Judge to another Special Judge, that too, in different area. 41. The petitions filed by the respondent before the respective courts were only with the prayer for transfer on the basis of G.O.Ms.No.628, Home (CourtsII), dated 30.4.1997 passed by the Government. There is no other ground urged for the transfer of the records, Therefore, the word ‘transfer’ mentioned in the prayer of the petitions filed by the respondent before the courts below could not be equated with the power of transfer vested with the various courts on various contingencies as provided in Criminal Procedure Code. 42. The entire reading of the memorandum, affidavit and petition filed by the investigating agency in both the cases would make it evident that the investigating agency in both the cases wanted the lower courts to transmit and submit the records by sending the same to the Special Judges at Chennai, appointed under the G.O. 43. In the light of the above situation, it is perfectly clear that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had no judicial competence to pass a judicial order transferring a case from that Special Court to another Special Court in different Sessions Division, especially when they have lost their jurisdiction as early as 30.4.1997. Admittedly, these impugned orders have been passed only on 27.6.1997 and 8.7.1997. Under these circumstances, it could very well be taken that the orders transmitting and submitting the records to Special Judges at Chennai are only administrative in nature and they would have the judicial character. 44. Admittedly, these impugned orders have been passed only on 27.6.1997 and 8.7.1997. Under these circumstances, it could very well be taken that the orders transmitting and submitting the records to Special Judges at Chennai are only administrative in nature and they would have the judicial character. 44. Even in the impugned orders both the courts below have observed that they have no jurisdiction to try and that therefore they have to submit the records to the Special Judges, who have been specially appointed to try those cases. 45. The relevant observation in the order in Crl.M.P.No.309 of 1997 in Spl.C.C.No.155 of 1996 (Crl.No.4 of 1996 of Salem, C.B., C.I.D.) is as follows: “I am of the opinion that this Court's jurisdiction to try the case arising in Crl.No.4 of 1996 C.B.C.I.D. Salem has been taken away and as such the newly constituted XII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Chennai alone has got jurisdiction to try that offence……………..On the point I answer that this Court can submit the records to the XII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Chennai in pursuance of G.O.628, Home (Courts II), dated 30.4.1997.” 46. The observation in the order in Crl.M.P.No.46 of 1997 in Spl.C.C.No.15 of 1996 (Crl.No.3 of 1996 of Erode C.B. C.I.D.) is as follows: 47. Though both the courts below have unnecessarily considered the various contentions raised by the respective parties and gave a finding to hold that the said application was maintainable, ultimately, both the courts have decided to transmit and submit the records only on the basis of G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997. In such a situation, this Court cannot held that the orders passed by the courts below are judicial in character merely because the courts below have canvassed and considered various aspects, which are of no relevance to the point in issue. 48. In view my above discussion, I hold that the courts below have no judicial competence subsequent to the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.628 to pass any judicial order and that therefore, the impugned orders are purely administrative orders, because there is no other alternative for the courts below to pass any other order expect to send the records to the concerned Special Judges, since as stated above, the operative portion of the impugned orders directing the sending of the files to the court of Special Judges at Chennai. in pursuance of the G.O., cannot be assailable, as it is administrative in character. 49. The other discussion contained in the earlier paragraphs in the impugned orders would not in any way alter the nature and character of the orders. 50. Mr.N.R. Chandran, learned senior counsel cited some authorities in support of his contentions referred to above. 51. The first decision is Diwani Chanel v. State of U.P. Diwani Chanel v. State of U.P., 1976 Crl.L.J. 1823. This is a case where a petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. was filed before the court to set aside the order of the Special Judge, west refusing to recall the witnesses already examined when the case was pending before the Special Judge, East. In this case one Diwan Chand was prosecuted for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. This was originally tried by the Special Judge, West who had jurisdiction in the area to which the case belonged. After examination of some witnesses, this case along with some other cases was transferred to the Special Judge, East, through a notification of the Government. So, a transfer application was moved before the High Court and the High Court observed that the Special Judge, East had no jurisdiction over the district in which the offence had been committed and so the High Court transferred the case, to the Special Judge, West, In the meantime, some witnesses had been examined by the Special Judge, East. So, after transfer a request was made before the Special Judge, West to recall all the witnesses examined before the Special Judge, East. This was rejected by the Special Judge, West. In this context, the High Court held that all the witnesses examined before Special Judge, East have to be recalled as Special Judge, East had no jurisdiction. So, after transfer a request was made before the Special Judge, West to recall all the witnesses examined before the Special Judge, East. This was rejected by the Special Judge, West. In this context, the High Court held that all the witnesses examined before Special Judge, East have to be recalled as Special Judge, East had no jurisdiction. In the light of the above facts, the following observation has been made by the Allahabad High Court: “Where more than one Special Judges are appointed for the same area under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 the Government can allot some cases to one Judge and other cases to another Judge but the Government cannot transfer the trial of a case pending in the court of one Special Judge to another Special Judge and the proceedings before the transferee Judge would be without jurisdiction.” This decision would not apply to the case on hand, since it relates to the notification transferring of a group of cases to another area. Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act does not provide for the appointment of Special Judges outside the jurisdiction for such case or group of cases, whereas Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides for the appointment of Special Judges for group of cases irrespective of the area. Such being the situation, the citation referred to above by the reamed senior counsel will be of no use. 52. The next decision is Ratilal v. State of Delhi Ratilal v. State of Delhi, A.I.R 1954 Punjab 178. In fact, the Allahabad High Court's judgment reported in 1976 Crl.L.J. 1823 took support from this decision to take the view that there can be no appointment can be for a particular area, under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. 53. Thus, both these decisions would relate to Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act with reference to the particular area and not with the group of cases as referred in Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, I am not able to countenance the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner on the strength of these decisions. 54. Therefore, I am not able to countenance the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner on the strength of these decisions. 54. It is at this stage, quite relevant to refer some of the decisions quoted by the learned Public Prosecutor in order to support his contention that the impugned orders being administrative in nature cannot be reviewed or revised by the High Court either under the revisional powers or under the inherent powers. 55. In Kula Chandra Butt v. Emperor Kula Chandra Butt v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1946 Pat. 191 while referring the impugned order passed by the Magistrate in his administrative capacity, the Patna High Court would observe as follows: “As I have observed above, Sec.561-A comes into operation only when the impugned order is passed by a “court”. If the order moved against in the High Court is one passed by an executive officer of the Crown in his administrative capacity, in my opinion, Sec.561 -A is not attracted, In the present case it may be that the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, getting information that there was a dispute between two private individuals about the right to possession of a going concern in which the public was vitally interested, decided to take action against the Defence of India Rules. This action he took during the pendency of a criminal case, but that action he took not in the case itself. Hence, any orders passed by him transferring possession from party to another, rightly or wrongly cannot be said to be an order passed in a judicial proceeding. All the cases cited above, relied upon by counsel for the petitioner, were cases in which the police or the Magistrate himself had passed certain orders purporting to act under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence, there orders and their actions in pursuance of their orders were held liable to be revised by the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction as recognised by Sec.561-A of the Code.” 56. In Ahmad Din v. Rijha Singh Ahmad Din v. Rijha Singh, A.I.R. 1950 All. 652 it is observed as follows: “Sec.561-A empowers the High Court to interfere if necessary when something contrary to law has been done by a Subordinate Court. It thus presupposes that there is an order of a court. In Ahmad Din v. Rijha Singh Ahmad Din v. Rijha Singh, A.I.R. 1950 All. 652 it is observed as follows: “Sec.561-A empowers the High Court to interfere if necessary when something contrary to law has been done by a Subordinate Court. It thus presupposes that there is an order of a court. But where an order is passed by a Magistrate in his executive capacity, his order cannot be interfered under Sec.561-A as that Section has no application in such a case……L cannot possibly accept the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the order passed by the City Magistrate on 29th November, 1949 was an order passed either in his capacity as a court or in the course of judicial Proceedings……In these circumstances, whether the order passed by the City Magistrate on 29th November, 1949 was an order passed either in his capacity as a court or in the course of judicial proceedings… In these circumstances, whether the order passed by the City Magistrate in his executive capacity was proper or improper it is clear that this Court cannot treat it as an order of a court and in the circumstances no interference is called for.” 57. In var ln re. Devaiah var ln re. Devaiah, A.I.R. 1969 A.P., 444, it is stated as follows: “It is not intended to vest the High Court with any omnipotent power. The order be made by the High Court under Sec.561-A to secure the ends of justice must be in relation to a proceeding in the High Court or in any Subordinate Criminal Court and that proceeding too must have judicial character and must not be a proceeding of an executive or administrative character.” 58. In K.Sudesthamma v. State of A.P. K.Sudesthamma v. State of A.P., 1985 Crl.L.J. 1890 the Andhra Pradesh High Court would observe as follows: “Here in the case before us, the parole is an administrative order and not even a quasi judicial order and therefore, Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to the facts of this case. Thus, even though the order passed by the Government in granting parole to the respondents is bad in law, in view of the fact that the application before me is filed under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the same is liable to be dismissed, and the same is dismissed accordingly.” 59. Thus, even though the order passed by the Government in granting parole to the respondents is bad in law, in view of the fact that the application before me is filed under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the same is liable to be dismissed, and the same is dismissed accordingly.” 59. In J. Boopalan v. Inspector of Police J. Boopalan v. Inspector of Police, 1992 Crl.L.J. 1235 Janarthanam, J., while referring all the above decisions would observe as follows: “The inherent power of the High Court can only be extended to make suitable orders to prevent the abuse of process of the court but it does not empower this Court to interfere with the orders passed by the executive authorities and the order under this section to secure the ends of justice must be in relation to a proceeding in this Court or in Subordinate Criminal Court and that proceeding too must have a judicial character and not of an executive or administrative one.” 60. In Ganga Prasad v. State Ganga Prasad v. State, A.I.R. 1965 All. 240 the Allahabad High Court, while holding the order of transfer of the case from one Bench to another Bench, would observe as follows: “To me, it appears to be plain that the petitioner seeks an order which touches the executive and the administrative business of the court……The impugned order is admitted to be an administrative order….. If the High Court cannot, under Sec.561-A, Crl.P.C. interfere with administrative orders passed by the subordinate executive officers, it seems still more difficult to hold that the High Court can interfere, revise or review administrative orders passed by a Bench or by the Chief Justice of the High Court.” 61. In Kunga v. Joseph Anthey Kunga v. Joseph Anthey, 1961 MLJ. (Crl.) 50 the Kerala High Court, while dealing with the powers of the High Court in a case where administrative and executive orders have been questioned, would quote as follows: “The petitioners complain that the rights of the respondents are disputed and that there is no provision of law either in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in any other enactment empowering a Magistrate to direct police to interfere in such matters. It is therefore contended that this Court should interfere and quash the proceedings. Sec.561-A comes into play only when the order impugned is passed by a court acting judicially. It is therefore contended that this Court should interfere and quash the proceedings. Sec.561-A comes into play only when the order impugned is passed by a court acting judicially. If the order is passed by the Magistrate in his executive capacity and not as a court, Sec.561-A will have no application.” 62. Even though, all the above referred decisions would relate to the inherent powers of this Court regarding the competence to interfere with the administrative orders or executive orders, the same analogy, in my view, would apply to the revision powers of this Court under Sec.401, Crl.P.C. as well when these orders are considered to be administrative orders which have been passed by the courts below without invoking any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court has to eventually hold that the revision powers conferred under Criminal Procedure Code cannot at all be exercised. 63. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the impugned orders are not liable to be set aside by this Court, as this Court has no jurisdiction to do the same, as the orders by the courts below were merely passed in their administrative capacity. 64. To sum up, the following are the answers to the questions raised in this case: (1) The lower courts have no jurisdiction to try the case and they have also no jurisdiction to transfer the cases pending before them to other courts outside the area. Therefore, the sending or submitting of the papers to the Special Judges at Chennai cannot be said to be a transfer as provided in Criminal Procedure Code. However, in view of the G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 there is no other alternative for the lower courts except to send the records to Special Judges at chennai by passing orders to the said effect. (2) C.J.M., Salem and C.J.M., Erode, though were already appointed as Special Judges by virtue of Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act on the strength of the notification dated 12.1.1983, have necessarily to send the records to the Special Judges at Chennai appointed by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997, as the earlier G.O. would relate to the local area, whereas the later G.O. relates to the group of cases as provided under Sec.3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (3) The lower courts cannot have any jurisdiction to try the cases on the dates of the passing the impugned orders, i.e., on27.6.1997 and 8.7.1997 for two reasons. (i) G.O.Ms.No.628 was passed under Sec.3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 under the second limb of Sec.3(1), namely, for such case of group of cases, on 30.4.1997, Once the State Government under Sec.3(1) issues notification dated 30.4.1997 appointing Special Judges at Chennai to conduct the trial of group of cases, the jurisdiction vested with the C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.3223 published on 12.1.1983 is lost, (ii) Admittedly, in the interim order dated 17.6.1997 Jayasimha Babu, J. in W.P.No.8582 of 1997 observed that the Special Judge at Chennai have got jurisdiction to try the cases and directed those judges to proceed with the cases up to the Stage of Commencing recording of evidence, So, virtually on the dates of the lower courts’ orders, the lower courts have necessarily to send the papers to the Special Judges at Chennai to enable them to comply with the order dated 17.6.1997 of Jayasimha Babu, J. Therefore, on the dates of the impugned orders the lower courts have no jurisdiction to proceed with the case in any manner. (4) Once there is no jurisdiction to try the case or to pass any judicial orders in the above cases, the lower courts are duty bound to send the records to the concerned courts as per the G.O. and in the light of the interim order passed by this Court. Under those circumstances, orders passed transmitting the records to the concerned courts, shall be necessarily considered to be administrative orders. (5) Even though the C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode along with the other C.J.Ms, have been appointed as Special Judges under Sec.6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, they cannot claim the existence of the jurisdiction as the same is lost by virtue of the fresh G.O.Ms.No.628 providing for the posting of Special Judges irrespective of area. Therefore, the lower courts having lost their judicial competence to pass any judicial orders could only send the records by passing order in administrative capacity. 65. However, my observations made above should not be taken into mean that I have decided about the validity about the G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997. Therefore, the lower courts having lost their judicial competence to pass any judicial orders could only send the records by passing order in administrative capacity. 65. However, my observations made above should not be taken into mean that I have decided about the validity about the G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997. To make it clear, I would observe that the validity of the said G.O. could be decided only in the writ petition in W.P.No. 8582 of 1997, which is now stated to be pending before the Division Bench, Neither the C.J.Ms. of Erode and Salem not this Court in these revisions could not decide about the validity of the said G.O. However, I would make it clear that so long as the G.O.Ms.No.628, dated 30.4.1997 is in force, though the same has been challenged in the writ petition which is pending, the Special Judges at Chennai alone will have jurisdiction to deal with these cases and not the C.J.Ms, of Salem and Erode. 66. For the foregoing analysis, in the absence of any merit in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, I am to hold that the revisions are not maintainable in law. Therefore, the revisions are liable to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed. Consequently, Crl.M.P.Nos. 2895 and 2896 of 1997 are also dismissed. Sh.-----Petition dismissed.