Judgment :- RENGASAMY, J. These writs of certiorari have been filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings in C.C. Nos. 670 of 1988, 152 of 1989 and 133 of 1989 on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences). W. P. No. 12715 of 1988, has been filed by the company, viz., English Electric Company of India Ltd., whereas W. P. Nos. 12716 to 12718 of 1988 have been filed by the directors of the company in their individual capacity all for the same purpose of quashing C. C. No. 670 of 1988 on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences). The other two writ petitions have been filed by the company to quash the subsequent criminal proceedings in C. C. No. 152 of 1989 and C. C. No. 133 of 1989 initiated by the respondents In the affidavit of the petitioners, the allegations are that they have been wrongly prosecuted by the respondents before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate without any basis and without following the procedure established by law and the assessment levied by the respondents has been quashed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and in spite of that they have been prosecuted. That the complaints have been filed not by the first respondent-Commissioner of Income-tax and, therefore, the prosecution against them is illegal and have to be quashed Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Uttam Reddi has placed two submissions before this court for quashing the proceedings pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate and they are, that the complaint is not according to law and the prosecution itself is not bona fide. The company and the directors have been prosecuted under section 276C of the Income-tax Act for wilful attempt to evade tax and, therefore, now the complaints have been lodged under section 279 of the Income-tax Act before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. According to learned counsel, Mr. The company and the directors have been prosecuted under section 276C of the Income-tax Act for wilful attempt to evade tax and, therefore, now the complaints have been lodged under section 279 of the Income-tax Act before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. According to learned counsel, Mr. Uttam Reddi, for initiating the proceedings under section 279 the complaint must be at the instance of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner for the alleged offence under section 276C, but in this case the facts reveal that the Deputy Commissioner had addressed the Commissioner for sanction and on the basis of the sanction granted by the Commissioner the complaints have been lodged against the petitioners, that as the amended section 279 of the Income-tax Act is very specific that a person shall not be proceeded against for an offence under the sections including section 276C except at the instance of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, whereas in these cases, only the sanction has been obtained from the Commissioner and, therefore, it will not amount that these complaints are at the instance of the Commissioner and as the section has not been complied with for prosecution, the prosecution is illegal and not in accordance with law, that as the liberty of the petitioners is threatened by the initiation of the prosecution not in accordance with law the petitioners are entitled to seek protection under article 21 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the prosecution has to be quashedThe allegation of the respondents is that the petitioners have another unit in Hosur and for the purpose of getting the income-tax benefits they have inflated the expenses of the other unit also and the records have been fabricated and, therefore, they have committed the offence under, section 276C Whether the accounts submitted by the petitioners will amount to the offence under section 276C is a matter to be considered by the magistrate. But the contention raised before me is that as these complaints have been lodged not at the instance of the Commissioner but at the instance of the Deputy Commissioner the complaints have not been lodged according to law. But it is a matter to be considered by the criminal court before which the matters are pending now. On a perusal of the complaints, in one paragraph it is mentioned that the complaints are at the instance of the Commissioner himself. But it is a matter to be considered by the criminal court before which the matters are pending now. On a perusal of the complaints, in one paragraph it is mentioned that the complaints are at the instance of the Commissioner himself. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Uttam Reddi, would submit that this description in the complaint is totally incorrect as these complaints have been filed only on the sanction accorded by the Commissioner and not at the instance of the Commissioner himself. Anyhow when the complaints read that the petitioners have been prosecuted at the instance of the Commissioner the writ court cannot go into the question whether the complaints have been lodged at the instance of the Commissioner or at the instance of the Deputy Commissioner with the sanction of the Commissioner. Even if it is taken that the Deputy Commissioner had lodged the complaint on the sanction accorded by the Commissioner, it is for the concerned court to interpret whether the sanction given by the Commissioner will amount to prosecution at his instance. Anyhow that is a matter to be adjudicated by the competent court but not by the writ courtThe apex court has held in a series of cases that for any findings on a question of fact no writ will lie unless there are patent errors leading to manifest injustice. Vide Ameteep Machine Tools v. Labour Court and Muni Lal v. Prescribed Authority. Therefore the question whether these complaints have been lodged at the instance of the Commissioner or at the instance of the Deputy Commissioner with the sanction of the Commissioner is a question of fact to be considered by the trial magistrate and this court cannot go into that question at this stage when especially there is nothing to show that there is patent error leading to manifest injustice. Further when the petitioners have got opportunity to raise these matters before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate himself, they cannot come forward with these writ petitions alleging that the prosecution itself is illegal and not according to law. Learned counsel would contend that as the liberty of the petitioners is at stake they have invoked article 21 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings. As mentioned above, whether the respondents/complainants have followed the procedure of law are matters to be considered by the learned magistrate before whom the proceedings are pending now. Learned counsel would contend that as the liberty of the petitioners is at stake they have invoked article 21 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings. As mentioned above, whether the respondents/complainants have followed the procedure of law are matters to be considered by the learned magistrate before whom the proceedings are pending now. Certainly the petitioners have got a right to raise these questions even in the initial stage before the magistrate for the discharge. But it appears that these petitioners filed criminal miscellaneous petitions before this court in Criminal O. P. Nos. 3621 and 3122 of 1989 for the very same relief, viz., to quash the proceedings which is sought for now also and this court has held that the ingredients of those offences are matters of evidence and the petitioners have opportunity to urge all their contentions at the appropriate stage and the inherent powers need not be invoked to evaluate the averments in the complaint. On this ground this court has dismissed the criminal miscellaneous petitions which were filed to quash the proceedings. When this court has already considered that the proceedings before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate cannot be quashed as the allegations raised by the petitioners are matters of evidence and the petitioners have to seek the very remedy before the concerned magistrate, they are not expected to repeat the very same contention once again in this court even though the form of relief sought for is under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Anyhow the relief is the same, though the same is sought for under two different forums. As mentioned above, whether the complaints have been lodged properly and in accordance with law is a matter for consideration by the magistrate. Anyhow the relief is the same, though the same is sought for under two different forums. As mentioned above, whether the complaints have been lodged properly and in accordance with law is a matter for consideration by the magistrate. Therefore, that aspect cannot be gone into in these writ proceedingsThen coming to the mala fides alleged, in these proceedings, learned counsel would submit that the assessments made by the income-tax authorities have been quashed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, while the appeals were pending before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, that the respondents have lodged these complaints only for the purpose of getting the reward which was announced under the Government scheme when the matter was pending before the appellate authority, that they could have waited till the disposal of the appeal and the filing of these complaints when the appeals were pending before the appellate authority itself would indicate that somehow or other they wanted to prosecute the petitioners which exhibit mala fide and, therefore, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. The apex court has held in P. Jayappan v. S. K Perumal, First ITO, that there is no provision in law which provides that a prosecution for the offences under section 276C or section 277 of the Income-tax Act cannot be launched until reassessment proceedings initiated against the assessee are completed. The appeal before the appellate authority is a continuation of the proceedings and for the reason that appeal was pending it cannot be stated that no prosecution should be launched till the disposal of the appeal. Further though the appellate authority also has allowed the appeal it has observed that the assessee was in error in claiming enhanced relief so as to include the notional interest on the balance outstanding with the head office and on such notional interest the assessee was not entitled to any relief under sections 80HH and 80-1 of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, the observation made by the Tribunal makes it clear that the petitioner company has claimed certain reliefs to which they were not entitled and they included the notional interest for the purpose of the same relief. Whether this conduct on the part of the company will amount to offence or not is not a question of fact to be considered by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Whether this conduct on the part of the company will amount to offence or not is not a question of fact to be considered by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. When the competent authority, viz., the income-tax appellate authority itself has made an observation that the assessee has claimed certain benefits though they are not entitled to, it cannot be argued that in view of the order of the appellate authority the petitioners cannot be prosecuted. Anyhow as held by the apex court till the assessment proceedings are over, the authority need not wait for launching the prosecution against the assessee for the alleged offence. Further whether the prosecution of the petitioners during the pendency of the appeal proceedings will amount to mala fides or not also is a question of fact depending upon the conduct of the prosecuting agency. That aspect cannot be considered by the writ court and, therefore, both the grounds urged by learned counsel are not sustainable, in these proceedings when especially the relief is sought for to quash the proceedings which are pending before the judicial authorityOne more fact is that the petitioners have now once again filed criminal original petitions before this court for quashing the proceedings which are pending before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on the ground that the assessment has been set aside by the appellate authority. As rightly argued by learned counsel for the respondents there cannot be two parallel proceedings for the very same relief of quashing the prosecution. When the petitioners have chosen the forum under the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings that shows that they have remedy under the Criminal Procedure Code. When such remedy is available to them, they are not entitled to approach the writ court for the very same relief of quashing the proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India making out the allegation that as the provisions have not been complied with, the liberty of the individual is at stake. Learned senior counsel, Mr. When such remedy is available to them, they are not entitled to approach the writ court for the very same relief of quashing the proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India making out the allegation that as the provisions have not been complied with, the liberty of the individual is at stake. Learned senior counsel, Mr. S. V. Subramaniam, appearing for the respondents, would submit that article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be used against the proceedings before the court of law and he relies upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in Sheikriyammada Nalla Koya v. Administrator, Union Territory of Laccadives, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands, 1967 AIR(Ker) 259, wherein the court has held that article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to set aside the order passed by the court. Even though in this case no order is passed, but only the proceedings are pending before the competent court. Article 226(1) reads that notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, manda mus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. It would indicate that the writs can be issued only against any person or authority referred to in article 226 of the Constitution of India including the Government, but this cannot be exercised against a court of law. As rightly argued by learned counsel, the wording of this article is that "to any person, or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government", excludes the judicial forum. Therefore, I fully agree with learned counsel that these petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be directed against the proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate, viz., Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences). Therefore, the writ petitions are not sustainable and are dismissed accordingly, with costs.