B. P. BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and order dated March 20, 1992, passed by the learned trial Judge rejecting the writ application. ( 2 ) THE subject matter of challenge in the writ application was an order of requisition dated May 5, 1986, passed under section 3 (1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The property was sought to be requisitioned for "the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, viz. , for construction of Government building for Government Offices and residential quarters to the requisitioned land described in the schedule below". The land which was sought to be requisitioned was more or less 0. 1347 hectares or 0. 3329 acres comprising premises No. 6, Camac Street (portion), Calcutta, The total land area of the premises in one bigha 6 cattahs 10 chattaks 68 sq. ft. , and that area of land under requisition appears to be one-third of an acre. In the order of requisition, the particular portion of the property sought to be requisitioned has not been disclosed. ( 3 ) THE appellants case is that the appellant Nos. 1 to 8 are the owners of the premises No. 6, Camac Street, and the appellant Nos. 1 to 8 entered into an agreement with the appellant No. 9, by which the appellant Nos. 1 to 8 agreed to sell the property to the appellant No. 9 in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in the said agreement. After the agreement was made, the possession of the property was transferred to the appellant No. 9. A portion of the said building was originally let out to the State Planning Board at a monthly rent of Rs. 6000/-, and that the possession of the entire premises excluding the area under the possession of the State Planning remained with the planning Board, the respondent No. 4 herein. In the instant case, it appears that the appellant No. 9, by the letter dated January 24, 1986, submitted certain proposals for the consideration of the Government of the State of West Bengal. In the instant case, it appears that the appellant No. 9, by the letter dated January 24, 1986, submitted certain proposals for the consideration of the Government of the State of West Bengal. The said proposals were as follows :-"a. (I) The existing area under the tenancy of the State Planning Board was to be given free without any cost to the State Planning Board in the new construction whereby the State Planning Board was to become the absolute owner of the said property. (ii) If any extra space is required by the State Planning Board, the excess area was offered to be sold at the fair and reasonable price to be determined in consolation with the Land Acquisition Collector. B. Alternatively, an equivalent area under the tenancy was offered at the existing rent and further area if required, at the fair rent to be determined in consultation with the Land Acquisition Collector. " ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, it appears, that, discussions were held between the learned Advocates of the parties. But ultimately the said proposal was not finalised. Under such circumstances, the order of requisition was issued on May 5, 1986. The matter was heard on affidavit by the learned trial Judge and the learned trial Judge had held that the requisition of the property was not for the purpose which was definitely a public purpose, and that it was further held by the learned trial Judge in his judgment that the service by Government to the people in a democratic country like India is essential to the life of the community and if any other construction is given such an expression, that would be contrary to the legislative intent and/or the purpose. It was further held by the learned trial Judge that the purpose, whether permanent or temporary one, was wholly immaterial under the law inasmuch as after the property is requisitioned under section 3 of the said Act, if it was found that the property was required for a permanent purpose, in that event the same may be acquired under section 4 of the said Act. No affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the State controverting any of the allegations made in the petition and that the allegations made in the writ application remained uncontroverted. No affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the State controverting any of the allegations made in the petition and that the allegations made in the writ application remained uncontroverted. In the writ application it was specifically asserted that instead of accepting the offers made as herein before stated, whereby the appellant No. 9 practically offered a gift of Rs. 30 lakhs by way of providing new construction of 7000 sq. ft. area free of cost to the State Government, the State Government had, for some oblique and extraneous considerations, failed to reciprocate in the manner in which they should have done. It was further specifically alleged that excepting alleging in words as to the construction of the Government building for Government offices and residential quarters, "the Government does not intend to construct any building or residence at the said premises. The Government have no funds nor they have made any allocation and/or sanction for the said purported purpose. The said order is being passed at the instance of certain vested interests and not for any public purpose or public interest. The said order is in violation of the principles of natural justice and totally arbitrary. The respondents have not considered and/or deliberately for extraneous consideration have failed to apply their mind to the offers made by the petitioners. " ( 5 ) IT was further alleged that the purported order was nothing but a colourable exercise of the powers vested on the said respondent Nos. 1,2, and 3 the same was not a bonafide exercise of the authority and power vested on the respondents. It was further alleged that the said notices had been issued in gross abuse of the powers vested in the respondents. ( 6 ) THE question involved in this appeal is whether construction of Government buildings for Government and residential quarters is for the purpose of maintenance of supplies and services essential in the life of the community, and whether the construction of Government buildings for Government offices and residential quarters are supplies or services essential to the life of the community within the scope and ambit of the provisions of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The said Act is provided for requisition and speedy acquisition of land for certain purposes and section 3 (1) of the said Act provides:" (1) If the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community (or for increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas) or for providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage, or for the creation of better living conditions in rural or urban areas, not being an industrial or other area excluded by the State Government by a notificationaly in this behalf, by the construction or reconstruction of dwelling places in such areas (or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto), the State Government may, by order in writing, requisition any land and may make such further orders as appear to it to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning :" ( 7 ) THE scope and ambit of the power of requisition was considered in the case of Howrah Mill Limited v. State of West Bengal, reported in 92 Calwn 1136, which was affirmed by the Division Bench in the case of Remington Rand of India v. Howrah Mills Company Limited, reported in 1991 1 Callj 295. In that case, it was held:"the word 'essential' means indispensably necessary: important in the highest degree, requisite, that which is required for the confirmed existence of a thing. The words 'supplies and services essential to the life the community' cannot be given such a wide meaning so as to include a typewriter machine. A word in a statute has to be interpreted in a manner which carries out the intention of the legislature in its true perspective. Reading the preamble of the said Act, it is abundantly clear that the power under section 3 of the said Act, can only be invoked for the purposes specifically mentioned therein and as such it is difficult to hold that manufacture of typewriter machine is a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and essential to the life of the community. Whether a particular thing is required for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community has to be construed according to its need for proper enjoyment of life. Whether a particular thing is required for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community has to be construed according to its need for proper enjoyment of life. The words 'supplies and services' are qualified by the word 'essential' and hence all supplies and services cannot be said to be essential unless it can be shown that it is indispensably necessary for the community. " ( 8 ) IN Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited v. State of West Bengal, reported in 98 Calwn 1090, the Division Bench of this court, of which the learned trial Judge was a party, held that the word 'essential', according to the Black's Law Dictionary, means, "indispensibly necessary: important in the highest degree; requisite, that which is required for the continued existence of a thing". ( 9 ) IT was further held that the words 'supplies and services essential to the life of the community cannot be given such a wide meaning. A word in statute has to be interpreted in manner which carry out the intention of the legislature in its true prospective. Reading the preamble of the said Act, it is made abundantly clear that the power under section 3 could only be invoked for the purposes specifically mentioned therein and that it is difficult to hold that manufacture of typewriter machine is a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, inasmuch as, community as a whole could not require typewriter machine as essential supplies and services to the community even if it is easily or freely available. ( 10 ) IT was further held that when powers are circumscribed under statute, the power has to be exercised for the purpose for which statute was passed. All powers have got its limit when the legislature thought it fit that the power of requisition could only be exercised in some limited cases, the power has to be exercised to fulfil purpose for which it was enacted incidentally. It may be mentioned that under the ordinary law of acquisition, namely Land Acquisition Act, the property could be acquisitioned but before an acquisition is made for a company, certain statutory requirements cannot be bye-passed by invoking the summary and emergency power under the impugned Act. The impugned Act could only be invoked for specified purposes. It may be mentioned that under the ordinary law of acquisition, namely Land Acquisition Act, the property could be acquisitioned but before an acquisition is made for a company, certain statutory requirements cannot be bye-passed by invoking the summary and emergency power under the impugned Act. The impugned Act could only be invoked for specified purposes. Under the provision of the impugned Act, the property could be requisitioned if the situation and/or the purpose is mentioned under the Act, is fulfilled and there-after, if it is necessary to keep the property, in that event, the same may be acquired. The purpose of the Act is for speedy requisition in order to meet the situation. In the instant case, the facts and circumstances under which the power has been exercised in the manner, was beyond the scope of section 3 of the said act. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 , wherein it was held that if the Government wants to take over the property for an indefinite period of time, the Government must acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the Government by the only for a public purpose which is of a transitory character. If the public purpose for which the premises are required is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception no order can be passed requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order of requisition if passed, would be a fraud upon statute, for the Government would be requisitioning premises when they really speaking they want the premises for acquisition, the object of taking the premises being not transitory but permanent in character. ( 11 ) SIMILAR view was taken with regard to the scope or ambit of section 3 (1) of the said Act in this case of Syed Fateaj Ali v. State of West Bengal, reported in 93 Calwn 992. ( 12 ) ADMITTEDLY, the property was requisitioned for a permanent purpose. ( 11 ) SIMILAR view was taken with regard to the scope or ambit of section 3 (1) of the said Act in this case of Syed Fateaj Ali v. State of West Bengal, reported in 93 Calwn 992. ( 12 ) ADMITTEDLY, the property was requisitioned for a permanent purpose. Law is now well settled by decision of the Supreme Court in the case of H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 , wherein it was held that if the Government wants to take over a property for indefinite period of time the Government must acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition is exercisable by the Government only for a public purpose which of tansitory character. If public purpose for which the premises are required is of perennial or permanent in nature or character from the inception no order can be passed requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order of requisition would be a fraud upon the statute, for the Government would be requisitioning the premises when they really speaking they want the premises for acquisition, the object of taking the premises being not transitory but permanent in character, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in that case is fully applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case and that admittedly, the power of requisition was exercised for a permanent purpose which was permanent and perennial from the very beginning and that the order of requisition was passed about 3 years after requisition was made for acquisition of the property, Under the scheme of the Act when the property is required to be requisitioned for a temporary purpose and it transpires to the Government that the property would be required for a definite period in that event the period which was originally requisitioned for a temporary purpose because of the existence or continuance of the purpose for which the property could be acquired, subsequently under section 4 (2) of the Act. If the order of requisition is bad the order of acquisition does not become automatically valid. If the order of requisition is bad the order of acquisition does not become automatically valid. ( 13 ) WHEN the legislature had clearly laid down the specific purposes for which the property could be requisitioned, the State Government had to form an opinion on the basis of the relevant materials on record that the property in question was required for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. In the instant case, it appears that the State Government had travelled beyond the power conferred under the statute. It was stated on behalf of the State that the purpose was a public purpose. Under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, the property could be acquired for any public purpose. But when the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 had been enacted by the State Government for the purpose of requisition and speedy acquisition of land for certain specified purposes, and when in fact, there is another general law on subject viz. the Land Acquisition Act, in that event the State Government cannot travel beyond the scope of power conferred under this special Act and to acquire the property which was otherwise permissible to acquire under the Land Acquisition Act in the garb of power under section 3 (1) of the said Act. When there is a general statute and a special statute and when the special statute clearly provides certain definite purpose for which the Act could be invoked, the State Government had no jurisdiction to travel beyond the purpose enumerated under the Act and acquired it for a different purpose. Land Acquisition Act is a general law for acquisition of the property and this means a special law enacted for some special purposes and the provisions of this Act could be only invoked for the purpose specifically provided under the Act. In the instant case, the only power that was conferred upon the State Government was to requisition the property for some specified purposes. Admittedly, the State Government has travelled beyond the subject specified for the purpose for which the power could be exercised. The exercise of a statutory power is invalid unless the repository has acted honestly and in good faith. The deliberate promotion of a purpose be it public or private, alien to that for which the power was conferred is to be regarded as an act of bad faith. The exercise of a statutory power is invalid unless the repository has acted honestly and in good faith. The deliberate promotion of a purpose be it public or private, alien to that for which the power was conferred is to be regarded as an act of bad faith. It is well settled that where a prima facie case of misuse of power has been made out, it is open to a court to draw the inference that unauthorised purpose had been if the competent authority fails to adduce any grounds supporting the validity of its conduct. ( 14 ) THE point at issue raised in this appeal is practically covered by the decision of the Division Bench in Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Limited v. State of West of West Bengal, reported in 98 CWN 1990. There was no answer to the question when there is a general law in the field, namely the Land Acquisition Act, which confers power upon the State Government to acquire any property for a public purpose and without resorting to the provisions of that Act, why the summary procedure, as laid down in the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, had been resorted. The West Bengal Act II or 1948, provides for requisition of land in some limited purposes where such speedy requisition is necessary and that the learned trial Judge was wholly wrong in holding that under the West Bengal Act II of 1948, any land can be requisitioned for a public purpose which is contrary to the provisions of the Act. ( 15 ) ADMITTEDLY, the land was requisitioned for a permanent purpose. Construction of Government offices and quarters cannot be said, by any stretch of imagination, a purpose which comes within the scope and ambit of the West Bengal Act II 1948. ( 16 ) IN H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 , it was held that the two concepts, one of requisition and the other of acquisition are totally distinct and independent. Acquisition means the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature and extent of that title may be. The entire bundle of rights which was vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the acquirer leaving nothing to the former. Acquisition means the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature and extent of that title may be. The entire bundle of rights which was vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the acquirer leaving nothing to the former. The concept of acquisitions has an air of permanence and finality in that there is transference of the title of the original holder to the acquiring authority. But the concept of requisition involves merely taking of "domain or control over property without acquiring rights of ownership" and must by its very nature by of temporary duration. ( 17 ) IT was further held that if the Government wants to takeover the property for an indefinite period of time, the Government must acquire the property, but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the Government only for a public purpose which is of a transitory character. If the public purpose for which the premises are required is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception, no order can be passed requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order of requisition, if passed, would be a fraud upon the statute, for the Government would be requisitioning the premises when really speaking they want the premises for acquisition, the object of taking the premises being not transitory but permanent in character. ( 18 ) ACCORDING to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in H. D. Vora's case (supra), the order of requisition, in the instant case, cannot be allowed to stand. Further, it would lead to a most impractical and absured situation that on a requisitioned land a permanent structure would be made when the property right would remain with the appellants and under order of requisition only the possessory right is acquired. It would lead to an absurdity. If such a construction is given, the same would result in an unworkable, impracticable, anomalous and illegal result and it is well settled principle that where an enactment prohibits doing of a thing, the prohibition is taken to extend to the doing of it by indirect or round about means. It is a clear case where the repository of the power have not exercised the power bonafide and/or for the very purpose for which the property could be requisitioned. It is a clear case where the repository of the power have not exercised the power bonafide and/or for the very purpose for which the property could be requisitioned. The allegations made in the writ application were not denied or disputed by the respondents by filling affidavits and accordingly, on the principle of non-traverse all the said allegations have to be accepted on their face value. The challenge thrown by the appellant writ petitioner that the same was not bonafide and was used for colourable purpose, had not been denied or disputed. ( 19 ) IN Westminister Corpn. v. London and North Western Railway Co. , (1904) 1 Ch. 759 at 767, which was followed in Webb v. Minister of Housing and Local Government, (1965) 1 WLR 755 at 784, that "you are acting malafide if you are seeking to acquire land for a purpose not authorised by the Act". It is also well settled principle that it is undoubtedly an abuse of discretion for an authority to act in bad faith. Bad faith consists of dishonest use of power. This is held in Cannock Chase DC v. Kelly, (1978) 1 WLR 1. ( 20 ) IN the instant case, a part of the property has been requisitioned and this question has been considered by the learned single Judge of this court in the case of Sm. Subhasini Devi v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1977 (2) CLJ 476, in which it was held that the requisition of a portion of a big plot of land, without describing the specific portion clearly amounts to unambiguous an clearly unidentifiable, and accordingly, it was held that this was a case under the West Bengal Act II of 1948. In this case, it was held that since the order of requisition takes effect along with the issue of the order, the description of the land sought to be requisitioned must be specific, unambiguous and clearly indentifiable. The description, as given in the order of requisition, was too vague and unworkable. As such the order of requisition having been challenged, must be deemed to be invalid. ( 21 ) ACCORDINGLY, for the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge and the writ application in the appeal is allowed. The order of requisition dated May 5, 1986, is hereby set aside. As such the order of requisition having been challenged, must be deemed to be invalid. ( 21 ) ACCORDINGLY, for the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge and the writ application in the appeal is allowed. The order of requisition dated May 5, 1986, is hereby set aside. This order will not prevent the respondents from acquiring the property in accordance with law. Appeal allowed.