V. Dutta Gyani, J.- Both these matters arise out of the same judgment dated 30th January, 1997 delivered by the Deputy Commissioner. East Siang District. Pasighat. Arunachal Pradesh in Sessions Trial No.93/94 thereby holding the accused appellant Tadon Tatik guilty of offence punishable under section 302 IPC and imposing capital punishment of death for confirmation of which a reference under section 368 CrPC read with Regulation 30 (1) Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation. 1945 has been made to this Court. The accused has also preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence. 2. Prosecution case stated in brief was that accused Tadon Tatik lived with his wives Smti Sumi Tatik. PW 11 and Parboti Tatik. PW 10. The accused had a son and daughter from his first wife Smti Sumi and a son from second wife Smti Parboti. It appears from the record that the accused who was contractor by profession, had developed strained relations with this first wife and the second wife also complained of ill treatment meted out to them by the accused. There is evidence to suggest that the accused was deeply infatuated to his first wife Smti Sumi and could not bear her separation so much so that he had gone to the extent of cutting his thumb, and sending the same to his wife in case she needed it for putting its impression on the divorce papers. The physical torture to which Sumi was subjected had dragged her away from her husband, she was serving as a School Mistress. 3. On the fateful day i.e. 13th July. 1994 around 12 noon the accused killed his three children A. Tatik. aged about 7 years. G. Tatik. aged about two months and 0. Tatik. aged about 9 years by inflicting injuries on their bodies with knife and axe. It is the prosecution case that even before killing his kids he had served them food and asked them to go to sleep. After having killed them, when he came out of the room he was shouting, as stated by PW 2 and PW 3 that he had finished his children. According to the prosecution case he came to the police station and reported the incident, which was noted and registered as GD Entry, built the same has not been produced during trial. After having killed them, when he came out of the room he was shouting, as stated by PW 2 and PW 3 that he had finished his children. According to the prosecution case he came to the police station and reported the incident, which was noted and registered as GD Entry, built the same has not been produced during trial. It was on the basis of this report lodged by none other than the accused himself that a Police Sub Inspector. PW 13 proceeded to the spot along with the other staff members. Finding that the daughter who still bleeding, she was rushed to local hospital where she was declared dead. After collecting some information PW 13 returned to the police station and lodged the FIR. Ext 8, It was on the basis of this report that a case under section 3 02 IP C was registered and taken under investigation which again was conducted by the same Sub Inspector Police, PW 13. During the course of investigation inquest of the dead bodies were held and that were sent for post mortem examination. Witnesses examined and the accused also made confessional statement allegedly made to and recorded by PW 4. the local Magistrate. 4. On completion of investigation the accused was charged and tried for the above offence, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses to prove the charge and out of them one Obang Mayang, PW 1 turned hostile. Analysing the prose­cution evidence, apart from the confessional statement recorded by PW 4. there is the evidence of PW 2 and PW 4 who claim to be eye witnesses to the occurrence. They were present when the accused came out shouting that he had finished his children. It is this statement which is sought to be used by the prosecution as an extra judicial confession made to PWs 2 and 3. The Medical Officer PW 9 performed autopsy, and PW 10 and 11 are the two wives of accused appellant. PW 13 is a formal witness who has merely submitted the chargesheet against the accused. Thus prosecution case mainly hinges on the testimony of PW 2. PW 3. PW 10 and PW 11 coupled with the confessional statement recorded by PW 4. Since the accused could not. afford to engage and appoint a counsel on his own. Mr. M. Pertin was appointed as defence counsel at State expense. Thus prosecution case mainly hinges on the testimony of PW 2. PW 3. PW 10 and PW 11 coupled with the confessional statement recorded by PW 4. Since the accused could not. afford to engage and appoint a counsel on his own. Mr. M. Pertin was appointed as defence counsel at State expense. Going through the evidence and the statement of the accused as recorded under section 313 CrPC no specific defence appears to have been taken by the accused, speaking his defence was one false implication. The trial Court, however, found him guilty and has proposed the sentence of death subject to confirmation by this Court. 5. Mr. JM Choudhury. learned counsel appearing for the appellant has assailed the conviction on several grounds, according to him the trial has been vitiated for gross violation of basic principles of criminal jurisprudence, there were serious lapses not only on the part of the investigation agency, but the trial Judge as well. Enumerating the gross violation in investigation, learned counsel submitted that Ext 8 was wrongly treated and taken as an FIR. the GD Entry was deliberately suppressed and not placed on record. There was no investigation worth its name except and determined bid on the part of the Investigating Officer to get the confessional statement recorded by PW 4 who in turn has violated all the inbuilt safeguards of section 164 CrPC while recording the statement. Learned counsel while pointing to the gross irregularities in investigation submitted that even if the Code of Criminal Procedure was not applicable to the State of Arunachal Pradesh, a fair investigation is the right of the accused which cannot be denied to him particularly when such provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure which have a vital bearing on Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Provisions relating to investigation as contained in the Regulations, for the purpose so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, are void, in face of Article 13 of the Constitution, so far as irregularities and illegalities committed during trial. 6. Learned counsel pointed out that contrary to all norms of fairness it was the trial Judge himself who directed the Magistrate PW 4 to record confessional statement of the accused how can it be voluntary? 6. Learned counsel pointed out that contrary to all norms of fairness it was the trial Judge himself who directed the Magistrate PW 4 to record confessional statement of the accused how can it be voluntary? While noting that copies of the chargesheet as submitted by police be given to the accused as per order sheet dated 10'7.95. there is nothing in the record to indicate that copies of the chargesheet. statement and documents were in fact, furnished to the accused. The order sheets right from 10.7.95 till the pronouncement of judgment on 30th January, 1997 do not show that the such copies were in fact supplied to the accused. The trial proceeded without furnishing copies of the statements and documents contained in the chargesheet to the accused. Section 207 CrPC casts a duty on the Court to see that the copies of the chargesheet are supplied to the accused and it is in the discharge of this basic duty that the trial Judge has failed. It is not merely a question of formal procedure. The accused must know what is the evidence against him therefore the mandate of section 207 CrPC to supply him statements under section 161/164, if the trial proceeds without such documents being furnished to the accused it would be serious lapse on the part of the Court. The Supreme Court held in the case of State of UP vs. Lakshmi Brahma, reported in AIR 1983 SC 439 . The proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by section 2 (g) of the Code. Obviously section 309 would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till the inquiry to be made is complete. 7. Most of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, as is evident from the endorsements made by the trial Court on the deposition sheets were not conversant with the English language in which their depositions were recorded by the trial Court. There is nothing on record to show or suggest that an interpreter as contemplated by section 278. 279 and 281 CrPC. was in fact appointed by the trial Court. It was not merely a question of witness as understanding the translated version, what was far more important to see was whether the accused understood the nature of the evidence that was accordingly recorded and the proceedings that continued. 279 and 281 CrPC. was in fact appointed by the trial Court. It was not merely a question of witness as understanding the translated version, what was far more important to see was whether the accused understood the nature of the evidence that was accordingly recorded and the proceedings that continued. Section 272 deals with language of each Court it is for the State Govt. to determine what should be the language of the Court. Section 273 CrPC enjoins that the trial must proceed in presence of the accused. The object being he must understand the proceedings going on against him if he does not know the language in which the evidence is being recorded, to make him understood the same an interpreter is to be appointed. It is not a mere procedural requirement but a basic condition of a fair trial. The trial Judge has miserably failed in taking a simple precaution which goes to the root of the trial and vitiated it as a whole in the peculiar circumstances of the case. 8. Criticising the statement of accused as recorded by the trial Court under section 313 of CrPC. learned counsel highlighted the mechanical manner in which not only the questions have framed and typed but surprisingly enough even the answers given by the accused appellant have also been typed, the least that was expected of the trial Judge was to record the answers given by the accused in his own hand. The examination of an accused under section 313 CrPC is subject to the purpose referred to in section 313 to enable him to explain any circumstances appears against him. In the prosecution evidence section 281 CrPC lays down that it must be in the hand of the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge. 9. The confessional statement Ext 1 has not only been illegally admitted in evidence but also acted upon, to a very large measure in basing the order of conviction, ignoring the categorical admission of PW 4 that he did not take the basic precautions required of him to be taken while recording statement of an accused under section 164 CrPC. PW 4 not being a Judicial Magistrate as contemplated by section 164 CrPC the statement Ext 1 was per se inadmissible in evidence. PW 4 not being a Judicial Magistrate as contemplated by section 164 CrPC the statement Ext 1 was per se inadmissible in evidence. There is no judicial lock up in the State, the question of providing time for reflection to enable an accused to make a voluntary statement uninfluenced by police in such a case does not arise. 10. Referring to Articles 21 and 22 (1) of the Constitution, learned counsel stressed and argued that even if the specific provisions of CrPC were not applicable to the State of Arunachal Pradesh the accused appellant could not be deprived of his liberty except according to procedure established by law and it is this procedure established by law which had been blatantly violated not only by the law enforcing agencies but also by the trial Court. Although a defence counsel was provided at State expense, there is absolutely nothing on record to show, what was his standing at the Bar whether he was really equal to the task, which was being entrusted to him. defending an accused charged with triple murder. 11. Flouting all rules of evidence the trial Court has not only allowed inadmissible evidence to go on record particularly Ext 9 allegedly written by the accused from the jail to his wife, but has also made use of the same for charging the accused with falsification of evidence even before the judgment in the case was delivered thus thereby judging the case. Section 315 CrPC prohibits any criticism or comment about failure on the part of the accused to give any evidence. The trial Court has not only criticised the conduct of the accused but has gone to the extent of charging him with evidence, even before considering and evaluating the same for arriving at a just decision of the case. This biased approach on the part of the trial Judge forming and expressing opinion has come under scathing attack by the learned counsel. Even while imposing the death penalty the trial Judge has failed to give a minimal hearing to the accused on the question of sentence thus violating the mandate of law. 12. Mr. Saikia. learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Arunachal Pradesh assisted by Mr. RP Sanna. learned Govt. Even while imposing the death penalty the trial Judge has failed to give a minimal hearing to the accused on the question of sentence thus violating the mandate of law. 12. Mr. Saikia. learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Arunachal Pradesh assisted by Mr. RP Sanna. learned Govt. Advocate of Arunachal Pradesh, while not disputing the submission based on constitutional provisions as made by the learned counsel, argued that the administration of criminal justice in the State of Arunachal Pradesh is by and large governed by the Assam Frontier (Administrations of Justice) Regulations. 1945 which provides for a fair procedure for trial, but there could be individual lapses which cannot be ruled out under any system. Learned Advocate General maintained that clause 32 of the Regulations provides for administration of criminal justice in the State of Arunachal Pradesh that there is no apparent inconsistency as repugnancy between these provisions and the CrPC. It was urged that even if the judicial confession. Ext 1 is excluded from consideration, yet there is sufficient evidence ocular and circumstantial available on record to sustain the conviction as recorded by the trial Court. Considering the cruel and ghastly nature of crime committed, the penalty imposed by the trial Court is justified in circumstances of the case and reference deserves to be accepted. 13. Dealing with the irregularities committed during investigation, the first information report Ext 8, as urged by the appellant's counsel is hit by section 162 CrPC. Admittedly there was a GD Entry, which preceded the lodging of Ext 8 by PW 13 even if this piece of evidence is excluded from consideration, as it ought to be, the moot question is whether an FIR is an indispensible requirement if law to set the investigating machinery in motion? Although G D Entry as made has not been produced and the ejahar report lodged by PW 13, cannot be said to be the first information report within the meaning of 154 CrPC still if there was no FIR there was no bar for investigating the case. The primary object of FIR is merely to record the earliest version of criminal activity and to set the machinery in motion as has been pointed out by the Privy Council in AIR 1945 PC 45. The primary object of FIR is merely to record the earliest version of criminal activity and to set the machinery in motion as has been pointed out by the Privy Council in AIR 1945 PC 45. Nothing material turns, on the lodging of an FIR at best it can be said to be an irregularity of curable irregularity but the same is not true in case of recording of confessional statement that too at the behest of the trial Court. 14. A confessional statement, if not voluntary, amounts to testimonial compulsion which is prohibited under Article 20 of the Constitution even if any clause or provisions of the Regulations permits the police to get such a statement recorded the said provisions being inconsistent with and in derogation of Article 13 of the Constitution would be void to the extent it offends Article 13. 15. It is for the above reason that Ext 1 the confessional statement needs to be considered in some more detail. Even if section 164 CrPC is held to be not applicable, yet the inbuilt safeguards as provided under section 164 CrPC are required to be followed. No judicial confession can be acted upon unless it is volunatary and the safeguards provided under section 164 CrPC. are primarily intended to see that the statement recorded is a voluntary statement. For the present, we are not going into the objection whether PW 4 was a Judicial Magistrate? And whether the confession recorded by him was per se inadmissible in law. Be it noted at this stage that the State of Arunachal Pradesh the judiciary is not yet separated from the executive. 16. What we are primary concerned with is the substantive part and aspect of the confession as recorded by PW 4. A mere glance at the confessional statement Ext 1 would show that there is interpolation and overwriting in the timings, as to when the accused was brought and how long was he kept in the Court, where his statement is said to have been recorded. This anxiety on the part of the recording Magistrate to interpolate the timings without even bothering to put his initials thereunder, clearly indicates that a change in the time as earlier recorded has been made, the other columns are left blank. This anxiety on the part of the recording Magistrate to interpolate the timings without even bothering to put his initials thereunder, clearly indicates that a change in the time as earlier recorded has been made, the other columns are left blank. His own evidence shows that this interpolation in timings was with regard to the amount of time that given to the accused for reflection. Hardly any time appears to have been given to the accused if one figures overwritten and interpolated by the Magistrate, that was interpolation cannot be lightly brushed aside, more so. when it is found in such an important document which forms the basis of conviction. It has a direct relation with the procedure established by law as contained in Article 21 of the Constitution, as already indicated above, even if one ignores sensation procedural requirements of section 164 CrPC, Article 21 and the protection it affords to the accused cannot be ignored. 17. The Supreme Court in Sk Ishaque vs. State of Bihar AIR 1995 SC 980 , dealing with section 164 CrPC has held that from the plain language of section 164 CrPC and the rules and guidelines framed by the High Court regarding the recording of confessional statements of an accused under section 164 CrPC, it is manifest that the said provisions emphasise an inquiry by the Magistrate to ascertain the voluntary nature of the confession. This inquiry appears to be the most significant and an important part of the duty of the Magistrate recording the confessional statement of an accused under section 164 CrPC. The failure of the Magistrate to put such questions from which he could ascertain the voluntary nature of the confession detracts so materially from the evidentiary value of the confession of an accused that it would not be safe to act upon the same. Full and adequate compliance not merely in form but in essence with the provisions of section 164 CrPC and the rules framed by the High Court is imperative and its non compliance goes to the root of the Magistrate's jurisdiction to record the confession and renders the confession unworthy of credence. Full and adequate compliance not merely in form but in essence with the provisions of section 164 CrPC and the rules framed by the High Court is imperative and its non compliance goes to the root of the Magistrate's jurisdiction to record the confession and renders the confession unworthy of credence. Before proceeding to record the confessional statement, a searching enquiry must be made from the accused as to the custody from which he was produced and the treatment he had been receiving in such custody in order to ensure that there is no scope for doubt of any sort of extraneous influence proceeding from a source interested in the prosecution still lurking in the mind of an accused. In case the Magistrate discovers on such enquiry that there is ground for such supposition he should give the accused sufficient time for reflection before he is asked to make his statement and should assure himself that during the time of reflection, he is completely out of police influence. An accused should particularly be asked the reason why he wants to make a statement which would surely go against his self interest in course of the trial, even if he contrives subsequently to retract the confession. Besides administering the caution, warning specifically provided for in the first part of sub-section (2) of section 164 namely, that the accused is not bound to make a statement and that if he makes one it may be used against him as evidence in relation to his complicity in the offence at the trial, that is to follow, he should also, in plain language, be assured of protection from any sort of apprehended torture or pressure from such extraneous agents as the police or the like in case he declines to make a statement and be given the assurance that even if he declined to make the confession, he shall not be remanded to police custody. 18. The Magistrate who is entrusted with the duty of recording confession of an accused coming from police custody or jail custody must appreciate his function in that behalf as one of a judicial officer and he must apply his judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy his conscience that the statement the accused makes is not on account of any extraneous influence on him. That indeed is the essence of a voluntary statement within the meaning of the provisions of section 164 CrPC and the rules framed by the High Court for the guidance of the subordinate Courts. Moreover, the Magistrate must not only be satisfied as to the voluntary character of the statement, he should also make arid leave such material on the record in proof of the compliance with the imperative requirements of the statutory provisions, as would satisfy the Court that sits in judgment in the case, that the confessional statement was made by the accused voluntarily and the statutory provisions were strictly complied with. 19. A right to speedy trial has now been recognised as part of fair, just and reasonable procedural implicitly in Article 21 of the Constitution. See Abdul Ramhan Antulay vs. RS Nayka, AIR 1992 SC 1701 . 20. Article 21 has received a creative connotation it demands that any procedure which takes away the life and liberty of a person must be reasonable just and fair. As reported in Smti Triveni Ben vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1989 SC 1335 . 21. This is the law of the land as laid down by the Supreme Court that procedural fairness cannot be denied to the accused on the ground that the CrPC as such is not applicable to a particular State in this case the State of Arunachal Pradesh. Now. let us recall and recapitulate what has happened in this instant case. First of all. the police report, FIR and the statements of witnesses as recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 and the confessional statement were not furnished to the accused as required under section 207 CrPC. It is the mandate of section 207 and the demand of procedural fairness that these documents must have been supplied to the accused and the trial Court should have seen to it before proceeding with the trial that these documents are furnished to the accused to enable him to prepare for his defence but the order sheets do not indicate that they were so furnished. The evidence was recorded in English the trial Court proceeded without an interpreter what was the nature of proceedings and what was the evidence adduced against the accused should at least be understood by him even that opportunity was denied at least not reflected from the trial Court's record. The evidence was recorded in English the trial Court proceeded without an interpreter what was the nature of proceedings and what was the evidence adduced against the accused should at least be understood by him even that opportunity was denied at least not reflected from the trial Court's record. What was that procedural fairness the trial Court not only forms an opinion but expresses the same even before conclusion of trial that the accused had indulged fabricating the evidence for his defence by writing a letter assuring it to be so yet it was not open to the trial Judge to have commented in this manner denouncing the defence it could only be done after the trial was over and judgment delivered. 22. Although it is on record that a counsel was appointed to defend the accused at State expense but the question is was it really enough'? It is a case of triple murder whether the counsel provided at State expense was really equal to the task did the learned trial Judge apply his mind to this aspect? The Supreme Court has categorically held that the free legal assistance at State cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which may involve jeopardy to his life and personal liberty and this fundamental right is implicit in the requirement of just, fair and reaonable procedure prescribed by Article 21 of the Constitution. It has further been held that the exercise of this fundamental right is not conditional upon the accused apply for free legal aid and cannot be denied if he failed to apply for it illiteracy, poverty and ignorance of rights and entitlements under the law abounds leading to deception, exploitation and deprivation of rights and benefits and it may be noted that this was held in a case from Arunachal Pradesh in Sukudas vs. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 991 . 23. This right to free legal aid has been further elaborated in Kishore Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 2140 holding that a poor accused has a right to effective and meaningful defence at the trial. Assigning young and inexperienced defence counsel against and experienced Public Prosecutor in a trial wherc there has been a heinous nature of crime alleged against the accused would be violative of Articles 14. 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Assigning young and inexperienced defence counsel against and experienced Public Prosecutor in a trial wherc there has been a heinous nature of crime alleged against the accused would be violative of Articles 14. 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court observed that senior counsel should volunteer to defend indigent accused. The law is well enunciated but the realities of the case indicate that the accused although provided a counsel at the State expense, was deprived of an effective and meaningful defence at the trial. 24. For the foregoing reasons the trial held against the accused cannot be said to be just, fair and reasonable. An implicit requirement of Article. 21 of the Constitution the conviction and sentence, is liable to be set aside, it is accordingly set aside. Appeals stands disposed in terms and the reference stands answered accordingly and a denovo trial in accordance with law in the light of what has been stated above is ordered it should proceed day to day so as to avoid any further delay as such the accused has been sentenced to death. One can imagine the mental agony and torture that he had to undergo during these months. It is therefore all the more necessary that the trial is expedited and held day to day with strict and rigid adherence to procedural fairness. Let the copies, all the documents as required to be supplied to the accused under section 207 be first supplied to him. A counsel of a reasonable standing equal to the task be appointed to defend him at State expense and trial proceed day to day to avoid delay. The Registry is directed to send back the record immediately.