Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, the former Chairman of the Tiruvallur Municipality has challenged the validity of clause (b) of G.O.Ms. No. 1182 Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department dated 27.11.1987 and prayed for issue of a writ of Declaration, declaring that the said G.O. is illegal. 2. It is not necessary to go into the various facts set out by the petitioner as the Writ Petition could be disposed of on the legal contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner. Though the respondent has been served on 25.3.1988, the respondent/State Government has not chosen to file counter. 3. The impugned G.O.Ms. No. 1138 reads as follows:— Tamil The petitioner challenges the clause (b) viz. , (M) of the said G.O. Clause (b) of the G.O. as contended by the counsel for the petitioner is a nullity, unenforceable and it should be quashed. 4. Under Part III Chapter VI “Taxation and Finance” Property Tax and other taxes is leviable by the Municipal Council. Section 81 of the Tamilnadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 (herein after referred to as the Act) enables the Municipal Council to levy property tax on all buildings and lands within the municipal limits, subject to exemptions set out in the Act or any other law. Section 82 provides the prescriptive method of assessment of property tax. Section 124 provides that the rules and tables embodied in Schedule IV shall be read as part of said Chapter. In Schedule IV of Taxation and Financial Rules, provisions common to taxes in general have been provided for. The procedure for assessment has also been prescribed in the said schedule. Rule 23 provides for Appointment of Committees, viz. , Taxation Appeals Committee. Rule 25 prescribes an appeal shall be made in writing and shall set-forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the decision or other proceeding appealed against. Rule 26 prescribes the limitation within which such Taxation appeals have to be preferred. Rule 26A prescribes other conditions as well. Rule 28 provides that an assessment or demand of any tax shall be final subject to the decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee thereon. Chapter III provides for the constitution of Municipal Authorities. Rule 26 prescribes the limitation within which such Taxation appeals have to be preferred. Rule 26A prescribes other conditions as well. Rule 28 provides that an assessment or demand of any tax shall be final subject to the decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee thereon. Chapter III provides for the constitution of Municipal Authorities. Sec. 23-A provides there shall be a Taxation Appeals Committee, which shall consist of the Chairman of the municipal council who shall also be the chairman of the Taxation Appeals Committee and four Councilors elected by the Council. Sub-Section (2) of Section 23-A prescribes that the business of the Taxation Appeals Committee shall be transacted in accordance with the rules made by the State Government in this behalf. 5. In exercise of powers conferred by clause (iii) of Section 23A and 308 of the Act, the Tamil Nadu Municipal Taxation Appeals Committee (Transaction of Business) Rules have been framed. A conjoint reading of the said provisions of the Act and the Rules, makes it clear that the Taxation Appeals Committee is a statutory body and as such it exercises quasi judicial function as prescribed under the provisions of the Act. The exercise of quasi judicial function by the Appeals Committee has to be in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Further a reading of Rule 23, 25, 26A and 27 makes it clear that the Taxation Appeals Committee has to decide the appeal on merits according to the statutory provisions and there is no restriction on such appeal powers of the Taxation Appeals Committee. The assessment or demand of any taxation is final subject to the decision of the Taxation Appeals committee. Rule 28A provides that the powers of the Appeals Committee under rule 23 could be exercised by Special Officer appointed by the State Government and during such period, the Taxation Appeals Committee shall cease to exercise the powers. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 28A further provides that Special Officer appointed under Sub-Rule (1) shall have the powers of the Taxation Appeals Committee under Rule 23 as well as Rules 25 to 28 as are necessary for the purpose of exercising his powers under the said Sub-rule and he shall be entitled to the same protection as the Taxation Appeals Committee is entitled to. Thus even when a Special Officer is appointed, it is made clear that he is substituted in the place of the Taxation Appeals Committee and he has all the powers of the Taxation Appeals Committee, while deciding the appeal, which is a quasi judicial function. Being a quasi judicial authority, there being no statutory restrictions at all with respect to the powers of the said Committee and its function in deciding the appeal, it is not known as to how the Government under Clause (b) of the impugned G.O. can restrict the powers of such Taxation Appeals Committee. Clause (b) of the impugned G.O. restricts the powers of the Taxation Appeals Committee, whereby the Government has directed that Taxation Appeals Committee shall order reduction tax of only by 5% out of the increased tax. Such administrative directions run counter to the statutory provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder. The impugned G.O. has been issued presumably in exercise of powers conferred under Art. 162 of the Constitution of India, and it is not referable to any rule making power of the Government conferred under Section 303 of the Act. 6. The powers that have been conferred on the Taxation Appeals Committee is a quasi judicial power. The statutory provisions have been made as to the time within which an appeal should be preferred, as to how the appeals have to be entertained and disposal of has also been provided for in the Rules as well as in the Act. Such being the position, it is hot known as to how the respondent could issue the impugned G.O. The impugned G.O. has been issued in exercise of executive powers of the State. The executive power of the State cannot be exercised in the field which is already occupied by laws made by the Legislature. Any instruction, direction or notification issued in exercise of the executive power of the State, which is contrary to any statutory provisions, is without jurisdiction and is a nullity. The executive power of the State under Art. 162 of the Constitution of India extends to matters with respect to which Legislature of the State has power to make laws. The Government business is conducted under Art. 166 (3) of the Constitution in accordance with the Rules of Business made by the Governor. The executive power of the State under Art. 162 of the Constitution of India extends to matters with respect to which Legislature of the State has power to make laws. The Government business is conducted under Art. 166 (3) of the Constitution in accordance with the Rules of Business made by the Governor. The executive power of the State cannot be exercised in the field which is already occupied by the laws made by the legislature. The Apex Court in (1991) 4 SCC 243 - State of Sikkim v. Dorjee Tshering Bhutta had held thus:— “The executive power of the State cannot be exercised in the field which is already occupied by the laws made by the legislature. It is settled law that any order, instruction, direction or notification issued in exercise of the executive power of the State which is contrary to any statutory provisions, is without jurisdiction and is a nullity.” The First Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the executive power of the State Government under Art. 162 of the Constitution of India in two decisions reported in ILR (1996) 3 Madras 1508 - Arunachalam v. State of Tamilnadu and I.L.R. (1996) I Madras 1007 — Chandra v. Government of Tamil Nadu in I.L.R. (1996) 3 Madras 1508, the Division Bench while quashing G.O.Ms. No. 542 Local Administration and Water Supply Department dated 29.4.86 had struck down the said G.O. as the State has tried to exercise its executive power in respect of the matter which is covered by the Registration Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The Division Bench has held thus:— “Thus, the State has tried to exercise its executive power in respect of the matter, which is covered by the Registration Act and the Rules framed thereunder. There is no doubt that the legislative power of the State extends to all matters in respect of which the State Legislature has power to make laws, But from this, it does not follow that the executive power of the State can be exercised in respect of the matter which is covered by the law enacted by the competent Legislature and the Rules framed thereunder. The law so enacted by the competent legislature and the rules framed thereunder are to be scrupulously followed by all concerned including the State Government. The law so enacted by the competent legislature and the rules framed thereunder are to be scrupulously followed by all concerned including the State Government. Thus the executive power of the State cannot be exercised over the subject occupied by law passed by the competent Legislature which is otherwise known as Theory of Occupied Filed. Thus, the State Government has overstepped their power by issuing the impugned Government Order in their purported exercise of power under Art. 162 of the Constitution. If the State Government felt that there was urgency in the matter it would have very well resorted to the provisions relating to the issuance of Ordinance. It is also very interesting to notice that even after a lapse of 10 years, so such law is passed. Fortunately for the petitioners, interim orders have been passed in their Writ Petitions. Therefore, the registration of documents is taking place in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act and the Rules framed thereunder and any other law governing the matter.” In ILR (1996) 1 Madras 1007 K.A. Swamy, C.J. presiding over the Bench, while quashing the G.O.Ms. No. 559 analysed the entire case law on the subject and in the light of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1955 SC 549 Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab held that the impugned Government Orders not only cover the field by the legislature by enacting statutes as pointed above but are also contrary to the provisions contained in those statutes. 7. It is not as if by the impugned G.O. a gap in the Rules is sought to be filled up by the respondent. Further as already held, it is a quasi-judicial function and the Appellate Authority exercises its power while deciding the appeal at the instance of the aggrieved party with respect to levy and assessment of property tax. There could be no restriction with respect to such quasi judicial powers of the Appellate Authority and at any rate by the Administrative G.O. issued under executive powers of the State. For the reasons stated Clause (b) of the impugned G.O. is declared as null and void. 8. After hearing of the Writ Petition, the learned Government Advocate brought to my notice the issuance of subsequent G.O.Ms. For the reasons stated Clause (b) of the impugned G.O. is declared as null and void. 8. After hearing of the Writ Petition, the learned Government Advocate brought to my notice the issuance of subsequent G.O.Ms. No. 52 Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department dated 11.1.1990 by which the respondent directed the ceiling of 5% on reduction of enhanced property tax while disposing of appeal petitions by the Taxation Appeals Committee in Municipalities and Municipal Townships ordered in the G.O.Ms. No. 1138 dated 27.11.1987 be deleted. This G.O. is dated 11.1.1990. Between 27.11.1987 and 11.1.1990 very many cases could have been decided by the Taxation Appeals Committee, following the clause (b) of the impugned G.O. Though the said G.O. is not in existence as on date, there shall be a direction that orders passed based on the impugned order by the Taxation Appeals Committee i.e. clause (b) of the impugned G.O. have to be clarified. It is true that G.O. restricting the quasi judicial powers of the Appellate Authority has been removed subsequently. In the circumstances this Court holds that the impugned portion of the Government Order is not binding on the Appellate Authority. As held in ILR (1996) I Madras 997 - D.P.F. Textiles Limited v. Union of India such a direction is issued. Thus there shall be a direction to all the Municipal Taxation Appeals Committees, Clause (b) of the impugned G.O. which is a nullity is not binding on the Taxation Appeals Committee and it is well open to the Appeals Committee to pass appropriate orders on the appeals, if any, pending, and orders will be passed on merits without reference to clause (b) of the impugned G.O. 9. In the result, this Court holds that the clause (b) of G.O.Ms. No. 1182 MA & WS Department dated 27.11.1987 is a nullity and it is not binding on the Taxation Appeals Committee, which Committee has to decide the appeals on merits and without reference to the said clause. No costs.