Honble PRASAD, J.–This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 13.5.97 passed by the learned Single Judge, by which the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner (present respondent Gyan Singh) and directed the respondents (present appellants) to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. It was further ordered that the petitioner may be proceeded with in a departmental enquiry in accordance with law. (2). It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that respondent-petitioner Gyan Singh was given appointment vide appointment order Annexure P. 1 dated 29.9.89. In the appointment order it was mentioned that the appointment is being offered without there being a medical check-up and character certification. It was, also, mentioned in the appointment order that if after the medical check-up and character verification it would be found that the appointee was ineligible, the appointment will be cancelled and he will be discharged from the government service. After passing and issuance of the appointment order Annexure P. 1, the petitioner-respondent continued in service. However, vide order Annexure P. 3 dated 13.9.91, the services of respondent-petitioner Gyan Singh were dispensed with by a simple order of discharge on finding that his conduct is not satisfactory. It is further contended that the respondent- petitioner was a probationer and was appointed on the contingency of medical fitness and character verification. Ultimately when it was found that the respondent-petitioner has been proceeded agai- nst formally under the Rajasthan Gundas Act and had a criminal record with a dubious character, his services were dispensed with by a simple order of discharge and such order cannot be considered to be an order of penalising him without holding an enquiry and is not such an order which casts a stigma on him. Since the termination order does not cast any stigma and is not penal in nature, therefore, the State was within its right and competence to dispense with the services of the respondent- petitioner. (3). It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that a probationers right to hold the post is not an indefeasible right as during the tenure of probation, the employer has a right to judge the conduct of an employee and on having found unsatisfactory conduct, , the employer can always remove such a probationer from service. (3). It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that a probationers right to hold the post is not an indefeasible right as during the tenure of probation, the employer has a right to judge the conduct of an employee and on having found unsatisfactory conduct, , the employer can always remove such a probationer from service. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance over : Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary & Ors. vs. Sushil Kumar (1), whereby the Honble Apex Court held :- ``Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though the respondent was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable in the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for reconsideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the ques- tion. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. (4). Learned counsel for the appellants has further placed reliance over a judg- ment of the Supreme Court in : Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore vs. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar & Anr. (2) wherein it was observed:- ``If an employee who is on probation or holding an appointment on temporary basis is removed from the service with stigma because of some specific charge, then a plea cannot be taken that as his service was temporary or his appointment was on probation, there was no requirement of holding any enquiry, affording such an employee an opportunity to show that the charge levelled against him is either not true or it is without any basis. But whenever the service of an employee is terminated during the period of probation or while his appointment is on temporary basis, by an order of termination simpliciter after some preliminary enquiry, it cannot be held that as some enquiry had been made against him before the issuance of order of termination, it really amounted to his removal from service on a charge as such penal in nature. When an appointment is made on probation, it pre-supposes that the conduct, performance, ability and capacity of the employee concerned have to be watched and examined during the period of probation. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the respondent- petitioner was appointed on probation on the conditions of medical fitness and verification of character, his termination order is plain and simple order of discharge and, therefore, the law enunciated by the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court governs the field. He has further placed reliance over a decision of the Supreme Court in : M. Venukgopal vs. Divisional Manager (3) whereby it was held that the termination of the services of the employee, being on probation, is in terms of the order of appointment read with Regulation 14 of the Regulations, and does not suffer from any infirmity as even under general law, termination of the services of a probationer on assessment of over-all performance, is valid. Therefore, if respondent-petitioner Gyan Singh, on being found a person having the ante- cedents of a recorded Gunda and has been removed from service then by no stretch of imagination it can be he was a person of such a character that he reserves to be retained in the police service and, therefore, there was nothing wrong in the order of termination passed against the respondent-petitioner. (5). Learned counsel for the appellants has further cited a case decided by the Honble Supreme Court in : K.V. Krishnamani vs. Lalitkala Academy (4) wherein it has been held that ``During probation, it was found that his services were not satisfactory and reasons were given in support thereof. Thus they do not constitute foundation but motive to termination of the services. The Supreme Court found that there was nothing wrong in termination of the services of the appellant. (6). Thus they do not constitute foundation but motive to termination of the services. The Supreme Court found that there was nothing wrong in termination of the services of the appellant. (6). Replying the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner has urged that issuing of the order of termination entails the respondent with civil and penal consequences and casts a aspersion against the character and integrity of the respondent- petitioner and such termination, without giving any notice and without affording reasonable opportuni- ty of hearing or without holding any enquiry, is liable to be vitiated. It has been emphatically pleaded that unless the principles of natural justice are followed, the termination is null and void. According to him, it is the first principle of civil jurisprudence which is accepted by all the laws that a man should be given a notice and afforded an opportunity of hearing before any action is proposed against him. He has quoted from an English decision given in the matter of : R.V. University of Cambridge that ``Even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence, `Adam, says God, where are thou ? Hast thou not eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou should not eat. (7). Learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner has further relied-upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in : M/s. East India Commercial Company Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, Calcutta (5), Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (6) and Olga Tellis (7) wherein demolition without notice was held to be bad. He has, also, placed reliance over a decision of the Supreme Court in : Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner (8) wherein it has been held that ``administrative power in a democratic set-up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice. Nor is there ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gains access. For fairness itself is flexible, progmatic and relative conception, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophesticated abstraction. On the strength of this judgment also, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner states that the termination of the petitioner was without notice and enquiry and, therefore, bad in the eye of law. (8). For fairness itself is flexible, progmatic and relative conception, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophesticated abstraction. On the strength of this judgment also, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner states that the termination of the petitioner was without notice and enquiry and, therefore, bad in the eye of law. (8). Learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner has, also, placed reliance over some other judgments but all these judgments are to the same effect. Without taking this aspect into consideration that all these cases relate to such actions which do not relate to the service of a civil servant and, also, have no relation to the service conditions of probations, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner has cited them for the requirement of notice and enquiry which are not relevant when the case relating to a probationer is considered in the light of the aforesaid circumstances and for this simple reason, all these cases do not govern the field. All these cases relate to such circumstances which involve separate consequence and, therefore, the notice and enquiry were held imperative by the Supreme Court in those circumstances and they have no relevance in the present controversy. (9). Learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner further urged that the order, though terms as an order of termination plain and simple but if unveiled, it will be found that it was actuated by the fact that certain criminal cases were found registered against the respondent-petitioner. He has, also, placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in : Purshottam Lal Dhingaras case (9) and in Anoop Jaiswals case (10). (10). This Court has dealt with these cases in a decision rendered by one of us (Honble Mr. Justice M.G. Mukherji, C.J.) in : Mohammed Yusuf vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (11) wherein Anoop Jaiswals case was noticed and it was found that ``if the order of discharge is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct and there was no reasonable opportunity to defend to the delinquent employee, the order is liable to be struck down. (11) wherein Anoop Jaiswals case was noticed and it was found that ``if the order of discharge is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct and there was no reasonable opportunity to defend to the delinquent employee, the order is liable to be struck down. It was, also, observed in Anoop Jaiswals case that ``because of one incident of delayed attendance in physical training of the writ petitioner-appellant while he was on probation, it led to the order of discharge under Clause (b) of Rule 12 of the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954 and the Court was satisfied on following the earlier decision in Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab (12) which deals with the cases of probationers discharged from service without complying with Article 311(2) of the Constitution where it was found that ``no abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination that the services are terminated, it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. It was further observed that ``it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Before a probationer is confirmed, the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any of the rules governing a probationer in this respect, the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude, the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged and no punishment is involved in this. But in those cases the authority may hold an enquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to give him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of his probation. (11). Therefore, in the aforesaid decision it was observed by this Court that the decision to discharge was taken after the over-all assessment of the performance of the employee in terms of the condition of his appointment and in confor- mance to the Service Rules. (12). (11). Therefore, in the aforesaid decision it was observed by this Court that the decision to discharge was taken after the over-all assessment of the performance of the employee in terms of the condition of his appointment and in confor- mance to the Service Rules. (12). Lastly, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner contended that in terms of rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1989, wherein a Character Certificate is delineated to be given to a particular incumbent under such circumstances, it is stated that in view of certain criminal acts, the Character Certificate cannot be withheld and, thus, it is contended on behalf of the respondent-petitioner that if the character certificate for a criminal case could not have been withheld then if certain criminal cases were found to be instituted against the respondent-petitioner, his services could not be dispensed with. In support of this contention, learned counsel for respondent-petitioner has placed reliance over Shish Ram vs. State of Rajasthan (13). (13). As regards the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner, on the basis of rule 13 of the Rules, is concerned, it may be observed that the decision relied-upon by him does not govern the field because rule 13 only speaks of the character certificate. Any person, who has been proceeded under the Rajasthan Gundas Act and is entitled to be appointed, is neither governed by Rule 13 nor by any of the cases under reference. However, some reservation may be expressed by us regarding the observations of the learned single Judge in the aforesaid judgment wherein the learned Single Judge observed that the pendency of the criminal case does not involve moral turpitude and the petitioner could not be denied appointment. (14). However, since neither the judgment nor the rule is an authority on the point involving Gunda activities, which is the case under reference, it can be said that the case of the respondent-petitioner is not governed by the aforesaid judgment. (14). However, since neither the judgment nor the rule is an authority on the point involving Gunda activities, which is the case under reference, it can be said that the case of the respondent-petitioner is not governed by the aforesaid judgment. If a police employee has the antecedent of a Gunda and has been proceeded with under the Rajasthan Gundas Act, then what message will the public at large get from the character of such a person, is not a matter of speculation and under such circumstances, if the order of simple discharge has been passed against the probationer like respondent-petitioner on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct, then the law cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner asking for fulfilment of the requirements of principles of natural justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution, will not come to his rescue and are not attracted to the facts at all. This is more so under the circumstance that the terms of the appointment itself clearly mentioned that the respondent-petitioner is appointed on the condition that the character verification is yet to be done and the petitioner will be liable to be discharged if anything turns- out against him on character verification etc. (15). On the theory of piercing of veils it can be observed that the act of the appellants, in no way, would show that they were actuated by any such circumstance which was either irrelevant or detrimental to the status of the respondent-petitioner so as to cast a stigma on him and, therefore, we do not find-in that this line of the arguments can be called into play in the present case. The order of appointment, by virtue of which the petitioner got employment, has clearly given a sufficient notice of an eventuality to the petitioner that in case his character is found unsatisfactory, he is liable to be removed from service. The respondent-petitioner was a probationer and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court : Pandurangs case (supra) and in Delhi Administration vs. Sushil Kumars case (ibid) that there appears to be no infirmity in the order of discharge of the respondent-petitioner from the service. The termination order is a plain and simple order of discharge of a probationer on unsatisfactory conduct and, therefore, it is perfectly valid. The termination order is a plain and simple order of discharge of a probationer on unsatisfactory conduct and, therefore, it is perfectly valid. In this view of the matter, the findings arrived-at by the learned Single Judge that the termination order was vitiated on account of not holding the enquiry, is unsustainable and deserves to be set-aside. (16). In the result, the appeal filed by the appellants is allowed; the judgment dated 13.5.97 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 394 of 1992 is set-aside and the writ petition filed by respondent-petitioner Gyan Singh stands dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs through-out.