JUDGMENT 1. :- This appeal aries out of the order dated 5.7.1994 passed by learned single judge of this court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7977/1992, whereby the learned Single Judge while rejecting the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant observed that it was proper for the petitioner to have filed a civil suit for the redressal of his grievance and in case he avails the remedy of the suit within a period of 30 days w.e.f. the date of passing of the aforesaid order, then the limitation will not come in his way. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned order of the learned Single Judge of this court, this special appeal has been preferred to this court by the petitioner-appellant. 2. The facts which are necessary to be discussed for the purposes of deciding this appeal, briefly stated are that the Rajasthan Financial Corporation (for short "the Corporation") had advertised for auctioning of the plant and machinery of M/s Universal Computers Ltd. Bhiwadi District Alwar on 25.8.1990 at Jaipur. The petitioner-appellant decided to participate in the said auction and in pursuance of the entitlement to participate in the auction a sum of Rs. 3 Lacs was deposited as security money before participating in the auction towards its acceptance of the condition as earnest money. The auction took place on 25.8.1990 in which the appellant participated as aforesaid and had offered a bid of Rs. 71.5 lacs which borne out to be the highest in comparison to the bids made by other bidder at the auction. No negotiations were made with regard to the bids made by the bidders including the appellant after the auction on 25.8.1990 nor any negotiations were held with the appellant by the Corporation on any day or at any time even after 25.8.1990 i.e. the day on which the auction was held as contemplated in the advertisement. The Corporation after having accepted the bid of the appellant had further failed to issue any letter in token of acknowledgement of the bid amount to the appellant on 25.8.1990. Thereafter the appellant made numerous enquiries by meeting several officers of the corporation personally with a view to find out as to what had happened to his bid made on 25.8.1990 but all of no effect and he did not receive any reply from the corporation. 3. Thereafter the appellant made numerous enquiries by meeting several officers of the corporation personally with a view to find out as to what had happened to his bid made on 25.8.1990 but all of no effect and he did not receive any reply from the corporation. 3. Thereafter in November, 1990 the petitioner came to know that Corporation had published another public notice in Hindustan Times edition of 12th October, 1990 (Annexure 2) inviting fresh offers for sale of three industrial units including the unit of M/s Universal Computers Ltd. Bhiwadi District Alwar and had fixed 23.10.1990 as date of public auction in respect of the same. 4. It is apparent from the perusal of Annexure 2 that by inviting fresh offers for bid after having accepted the earlier bid amount from the appellant as well as from others who had participated in the second auction, that the corporation had clearly intended to fetch better price for the sale of the unit of M/s Universal Computers Ltd., Bhiwadi District Alwar, than Rs. 71.5 lacs as offered by the appellant and which amount was accepted at the first auction held on 25.8.1990. During the course of hearing before the learned Single Judge, the Corporation had not disputed either the first bid dated 25.8.1990 which the appellant had made and accepted by the Corporation as well as the public notice dated 12.10.1990 published by the Corporation for the second auction which took place on 23.10.1990 vide (Annexure 2). 5. During the course of hearing of this Appeal the learned counsel for the respondent corporation has disputed the acceptance of the earnest money of Rs. 3 lacs from the appellant with regard to his participation in the first auction and it has also not been disputed by the learned counsel for the corporation that the said amount was ever refunded to the appellant. 3 lacs from the appellant with regard to his participation in the first auction and it has also not been disputed by the learned counsel for the corporation that the said amount was ever refunded to the appellant. The corporation had further not disputed the factual of inviting bids for second auction without cancelling the first auction, while it was the mandatory duty cast upon the corporation to have cancelled the first bid and refunded the money due to the concerned bidders who had deposited their respective bid amounts by way of earnest money with the corporation before publication of advertisement in newspapers for second auction and unless and until the said amounts, the receipt of which was duly acknowledged by the corporation in token of acceptance of earnest money towards their participation in the first auction was done, it was not open to the corporation to have issued a fresh advertisement for second auction by way of public notice dated 12.10.1990 for auction which was held on 23.10.1990 vide Annexure 2. This fact having not been disputed by the corporation either before the learned Single Judge or before us in the present appeal, we are of the considered opinion that it was not open to the corporation to have issued a public notice, dated 12.10.1990 for second auction which was held on 23.10.1990 vide Annexure 2 without refunding the earnest money which was deposited by various bidders including the appellant and without cancelling the first auction, it was not at all open or desirable for the corporation to have invited the bidders from the general public to participate in the second auction. We are further of the opinion that the corporation had acted in highly illegal, arbitrary and capricious manner, since being public autonomous body of the State Government it was the mandatory duty of the corporation to have acted in a fair and just manner by being accountable to the various bidders who had participated in the said auction and in all fairness should have refunded the earnest money of those bidders including that of the appellant who had in all good faith participated in the first auction held on 25.8.1990 and unless and until the corporation had thereafter cancelled the first auction by way of public notice issued through publication in newspaper or by use of media i.e., announcement over Television/Doordarshan or All India Radio, it was not open to the corporation to have issued that advertisement for second auction dated 23.10.1990 as referred to above vide public notice Annexure 2 dated 12.10.1990. 6. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the appellant had vehemently contended at the bar that from the aforesaid contentions as advanced by the appellant earlier before the learned Single Judge of this court by way of writ petition which was decided on 5.7.1994 and subsequently before this court in the present appeal, it is amply clear that the appellant had alongwith other bidders in all fairness had participated in the first auction which was held on 25.8.1990 by the corporation with regard to the sale of plants and machinery of M/s Universal Computers Ltd., Bhiwadi District Alwar and it has also not been disputed before us that the deposit of a sum of Rs. 3 lacs with the corporation as earnest money and which was duly accepted by the corporation has not been refunded to the appellant till date. It was only thereafter that after repeated efforts and enquiries when the appellant failed to get any reply or intimation from the corporation, he was surprised to be informed that without cancelling the first auction as aforesaid, the corporation had invited the fresh auction by way of public notice in Hindustan Times dated 12.10.1990 vide Annexure 2 inviting fresh offers from the bidders for the sale of 3 industrial units including the unit of M/s Universal Computers Ltd., Bhiwadi District Alwar as aforesaid and the date of public auction auction) had also been fixed for 23.10.1990. 7. 7. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant the second auction took place on the scheduled date, i.e., 23.10.1990 but the appellant did not participate in the same nor he was bound to do so in terms of the first auction dated 25.8.1990 or under any terms of auction which might be said to be binding on the appellant, since his first bid was not cancelled and no earnest money was refunded to the appellant and this act and conduct of the corporation had given due assurance to the appellant of his not participating in the second auction in view of the acceptance of the bid made earlier against the first auction. As a matter of public policy and on the principle of accountability of the State functionaries of the corporation to the citizens of this country who are affected by any illegal action of any of its employees or officials they were infact duty bound under the law not to have invited bids for second auction without cancelling the first auction and without refunding the earnest money of the various bidders including that of the appellant who had participated in the first auction. The appellant has also placed on the record of the learned Single Judge the detailed correspondence exchanged between the parties having failed to illicit any favourable response from the corporation, the appellant had been left with no option but to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. During the course of hearing we have also perused the relevant correspondence which pertains to the repeated request made by the appellant to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, R.F.C., Jaipur regarding refund of his earnest money vide his letter dated 7.10.1991 Annexure 8 as well as letter dated 19.12.1991(Annexure 14) from the R.F.C. to the appellant in this regard and letter dated 7.5.1991 (Annexure 12) declining the appellant's request for refund of his earnest money without assigning any reasons for not refunding the said amount. We have also perused the letter dated 30.12.1991 and the legal notice from the appellant's Advocate dated 18.2.1992(Annexure 16) wherein the appellant had made the fervent appeal to the R.F.C. requesting for refund of the earnest money with interest at the @ 12% per annum duly deposited with the K.F.C. on account of acceptance of his hid in the first auction as referred to above. Finally having failed to illicit any response from the corporation to the aforesaid correspondence the appellant had served a registered notice demand for justice on 17.9.1992 which was duly served on the corporation Annexure 18. 9. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the respondents in reply to the aforesaid contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant contended at the bar that it was not at all binding on the corporation to have refunded the earnest money to the appellant because the first auction held on 25.8.1990 was not cancelled and there was no embargo on the corporation under the rues to have issued another advertisement by way of public notice dated 12.10.1990 for the second auction held on 23.10.1990. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that on 25.8.1990 no negotiations had taken place between the parties and the appellant had voluntarily participated in the negotiations and offered the bid of Rs. 71.5 lacs and infact on 25.8.1990 three bidders were present in the negotiations including the appellant who had participated in the bid as against the first auction. 10. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to successfully controvert the aforesaid contentions as advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant nor he has disputed the factum of participation of the appellant either in the first auction which was held on 25.8.1990 nor he has disputed the acceptance of the earnest money of Rs. 3 lacs which the corporation had duly accepted as against his bid for the first auction. He has however, stated that the acceptance of the bid as against first auction made by the appellant was not all binding on the corporation since the corporation reserved its option to invite fresh bids by way of second auction from the public. 3 lacs which the corporation had duly accepted as against his bid for the first auction. He has however, stated that the acceptance of the bid as against first auction made by the appellant was not all binding on the corporation since the corporation reserved its option to invite fresh bids by way of second auction from the public. Learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to show any material documents on the record which would justify his said contention and rather we are of the considered opinion that the corporation having accepted the bid for first auction and also having accepted the earnest money from the appellant as aforesaid in token of acceptance of first bid of the appellant, it was neither desirable nor open to the corporation to have issued advertisement for the second auction without cancelling the first auction and the said onus the corporation has admittedly failed to discharge. Learned counsel for the respondents has also not been able to successfully demonstrate as to what were those compelling reasons which had necessitated the corporation to have invited fresh bids for the second auction as aforesaid. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents contended at the bar that no definite period for holding second auction had been indicated under the rules in absence of which it was not binding on the corporation not to have held the second auction. He has further contended that by acceptance of bid there was no legal obligation cast upon the corporation not to have invited the participation of bidders for the second auction, since there was no blanket ban on the corporation under the rules. 12. We are not at all impressed by the aforesaid arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents and rather we are of the view that there is obvious fallacy in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents for the basic reasons that the citizens of the country expect all fairness in State actions to be discharged by the instrumentalities of the State such as corporation in the instant case. It is not merely a case of either the acceptance of the bid or the refund of earnest money but the adamant arbitrary attitude which the corporation had adopted in the manner in which the aforesaid auction were conducted speaks volumes about the conduct and character of the various functionaries of the Public bodies like R.F.C. from whom people accept all fairness in their dealings with general public and do not leave any doubt in our mind that the corporation had in-fact behaved in a most irresponsible and capricious manner by first of all inviting the bids from the helpless citizens like the appellant herein but had also caused undue harassment and humiliation to them by accepting the bid amount and thereafter not refunding the earnest money by making them run from pillar to post in search of justice. Hence we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has committed illegality in dismissing the writ petition vide its impugned order, dated 5.7.1994 on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of filing a suit for recovery of the outstanding amount against the corporation which, in our view, was not the correct approach as adopted by the learned Single judge of this court. The learned single Judge should have rather looked to the substantial justice and should have adopted the approach of fairness of procedure to be adopted by the public functionaries in state actions who are holding responsible posts in the instrumentalities of the State like the R.F.C. in the instant case rather than adopting a narrow technical approach of relegating the appellant by dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy of civil suit which we know from our experience, would only prolong the mental agony of the helpless citizens besides causing great harassment of protracted and long drawn trial in the civil courts. We are fortified in our observations from the following judgments of the apex court as well as other High Courts : 13. Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. and another vs. Union of India & others: 1984(3) SCC 362 Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. & another vs. the Ulhasnagar Municipal Council & another: AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1021 , Dr. We are fortified in our observations from the following judgments of the apex court as well as other High Courts : 13. Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. and another vs. Union of India & others: 1984(3) SCC 362 Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. & another vs. the Ulhasnagar Municipal Council & another: AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1021 , Dr. Smt. Kuntes Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidhyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) & others: AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2186 , Syed Ahmad Sayed Shahazada vs. Ramgopal Bhagwandeen Trivedi & another: AIR 1939 Nagpur 224 , Shri Jayamahal Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Zenith Chemical Works Pvt. Ltd. & another. AIR 1991 Bombay 211 and U.P. State Electricity Board & another vs. M/s Goel Electric Stores, Chandigarh: AIR 1977 Allahabad 494 . 14. In the matter of Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. and another vs. Union of India (supra) the Central Excise Department had levied and collected excise duty on certain goods manufactured by the first appellant on the basis that they failed under item 23-A(1) of the first schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. On 20.02.1976, the appellants applied for refund of excess duty paid by them to the department on the ground that the goods could only be subjected to levy under the residuary Item 68 in that Schedule after its insertion, the Asstt. Collector rejected the claim of the appellants. The appellants filed a writ petition against the impugned order in Special Civil application before the High Court but since the appellants had also filed an appeal against the very same order before the Collector, the department objected. Thereupon the appellant withdrew the petition without prejudice to the remedy by way on appeal which was dismissed by the Govt. of India and it was only thereafter that a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the order of Government of India, was filed in the High Court. The High Court while reversing the impugned order of the Collector held that the goods came within Item 68 and were liable to bear excise duty accordingly but look the view that the appellants were only entitled to refund of the excise duty paid by them after a particular date on which they had raised the dispute. The High Court while reversing the impugned order of the Collector held that the goods came within Item 68 and were liable to bear excise duty accordingly but look the view that the appellants were only entitled to refund of the excise duty paid by them after a particular date on which they had raised the dispute. It was held in the appeal before the apex court that since the appellant had made excess payment on being assessed by the department and such payment cannot be treated as voluntary payments precluding them from recovering the same and since the conduct of the appellant was also not of such a nature as would disentitle them to claim refund of the excess payments, they are entitled to claim the refund of the excess amount deposited by way of excise duty by them. The apex court further held that High Courts had the power under Article 226 for purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights and statutory rights, to make consequential orders for repayment of money realised by Government without the authority of law. It was further held that this was an alternative remedy provided by the Constitution in addition to but in superssion of the ordinary remedy by way of suit in the absence of any provision which would bar such a suit either expressly or by necessary implication. It was further held that there is no period of limitation prescribed by law in respect of petitions filed under Article 226 and whether a relief should be granted to a petitioner under Article 226 where the cause of action had arisen in the remote past is matter of sound judicial discretion governed by the doctrine of laches. Where a petitioner who could have availed of the alternative remedy by way of suit approaches the High Court under Article 226, it is appropriate ordinarily to construe any unexplained delay in the filing of the writ petition after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit as unreasonable. This rule, however, cannot be a rigid formula. Each case has to be judged on its own facts and circumstances touching the conduct of the parties, the change in situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opposite party or to the general public. 15. This rule, however, cannot be a rigid formula. Each case has to be judged on its own facts and circumstances touching the conduct of the parties, the change in situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opposite party or to the general public. 15. In the matter of Century Spinning & Manufacturing Company vs. the Ulhas Nagar Municipal Council (supra) the apex court while dealing with an identical situation held that a party claiming to be aggrieved by the action of a Public body or authority on the plea that the action is unlawful, high-handed, arbitrary or unjust is entitled to a hearing of its petition on the merits. It was further held that Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of facts on promises made by them, relying on which other persons have entered their position to their prejudice. The obligation arising against an individual out of his representation amounting to a promise may be enforced ex-contractual by a person who acts upon the promise; when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against public body shall be in certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation may be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity and consequentially the petitioner was held not entitled to be relegated to a remedy of civil suit merely because the questions of facts are raised in the petition. 16. In the matter of Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidhyalaya (supra) the apex court in confirmation of its earlier views as aforesaid held as under: "Further it is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of writ petition, when an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution that on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instance case, the Vice Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power was absolutely without jurisdiction. In the instance case, the Vice Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review was a nullity; such an order could be challenged before the High Court by a petition tinder Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under section 68 of the U.P. State University Act." 17. The ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the apex court also find its rationale reflected in the aforesaid decisions of the High Court.As a result of the above discussions we find force in the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and are of the view that the appellant deserved to succeed. Consequently the appeal is accepted, the impugned order dated 5.7.1994 passed by learned single judge of this court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7927/1994 is quashed and set aside. The respondents-R.F.C. is directed to refund the security amount of Rs. 3 lass which was deposited by way of earnest money by the appellant with the respondent-corporation at that time of acceptance of his bid dated 25.8.1990 which amount has been lying in deposit with the corporation till date with interest @ 12% p.a. within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order, failing which the appellant shall further be entitled to interest at the penal rate of 18% p.a. from due date till payment. The appellant shall also be entitled for payment of cost which we quantify at Rs. 10,000/-.Appeal allowed with costs. *******