JUDGMENT Ghosh, J.: These two appeals arise out of a common judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court, dated 14th December, 1995, passed in a writ petition. One of the appeals has been preferred by the Railway Authorities and the other by the writ petitioner. 2. The writ petitioner was an Assistant Sub-inspector of Railway Protection Force of Eastern Railway. He was placed under suspension by an order dated 25th June, 1992 on the ground that a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated against him. Thereafter the writ petitioner was served with a charge sheet dated 16th July, 1992 which contained the following charges:- (a) For gross misconduct in that Sri M. L. Ram, ASI/Cash Guard/Coy, Liluah has increased his assets by his disproportionate income by having a new truck No. 8251 in the name of his son Sri Promode Kumar Prasad who had no adequate income commensurate to the assets as above. (b) Sri M. L. Ram, named above also did not declare about purchase of the said assets in the name of his son, named above, before the Administration and thus violated the service conduct/Rules. 3. By that charge sheet, the Enquiry Officer was nominated and time was fixed for conducting enquiry. No reply to the charge sheet was sought for. 4. During the course of enquiry, witnesses of both sides were examined. Documents were produced And after considering the same, Enquiry Officer found that all admitted that the initial amount of Rs. 1,01,544/- was paid to Sri Promode Kumar Prasad, son of Sri M. L. Ram by Late Biswanath Prasad (grandfather of Promode Kumar Prasad) for purchase of the lorry and as such charge No.1 has not been proved. As regards charge No.2, the Enquiry Officer observed, that ASI M. L. Ram admitted in his defence statement that because of his unawareness about the service conduct/Rule, he did not submit the declaration for the purchasing of the lorry to the name of his son by his uncle Late Biswanath Prasad before the Administration and therefore, charge No.2 for not submitting declaration about the purchase of new asset has been proved. He then concluded that Sri M. L. Ram is not found guilty of charge No. 1, but in so far as charge No.2 is concerned, the finding was the failed to submit declaration about the purchase of said assets in the name of his son before the Administration and thereby violated service conduct/Rules is well proved. Hence, he is guilty of the 2nd charge," 5. The Disciplinary Authority thereupon issued a notice of punishment to the effect as follows:- "I have decided that you are responsible in the above case and have passed the following orders: that you are compulsorily retired from service with immediate effect." 6. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority found Sri M. L. Ram, the writ petitioner, guilty of serious charge and ordered, he should be compulsorily retired from service with immediate effect in the interest of Administration. In passing the said order, the Disciplinary Authority presumed that charge No. 1 had been established. The opinion expressed by the Disciplinary Authority, to the effect that handing over of the initial money over one lac of rupees to the son of the writ petitioner by his grandfather for purchase of the said truck does not appeal to be logical and convincing, was not based on any material record. 7. Against the said order of the Disciplinary Authority, Sri M. L Ram, the writ petitioner, preferred an appeal before, the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal holding that the plea of ignorance of Rules, cannot absolve an offender of the charge of offence. 8. Sri M. L. Ram, writ petitioner, thereafter challenged the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the order of the Appellate Authority by filing a writ petition, which was disposed of on contest by a learned Single Judge of this Court, by an elaborate judgment and order, which is under appeal, the ordering portion whereof is as follows:- "Accordingly, both the orders imposing penalty of major punishment of compulsory retirement from service are set aside. However, the writ petitioner shall be deemed to be of extra-ordinary leave during the period he remained under compulsory retirement from service without any pay and this writ application is accordingly, allowed without any order as to costs." 9. However, the writ petitioner shall be deemed to be of extra-ordinary leave during the period he remained under compulsory retirement from service without any pay and this writ application is accordingly, allowed without any order as to costs." 9. The Railway Authorities in the appeal preferred by them against the said order sought to sustain the order of compulsory retirement on the ground that the plea of ignorance of Rules, cannot absolve an offender of the charge of offence. It was not urged that the charge No.1 had been established before the Enquiry Officer, nor it was urged that the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority, to the effect that making over of initial money to the son of the writ petitioner by his grandfather is not logical and convincing is based on any material on record. On the pleadings and materials on record, it was accepted that the son of the writ petitioner was a major and was not a minor at the time of receipt of the money for purchase of the truck in question. 10. In the appeal preferred by the writ petitioner he contended that the order of dismissal being an illegal order and the same having been set aside, he ought to have been reinstated with full back wages and all facilities to which he would have been otherwise entitled to but could not get by reason of the said illegal orders. 11. During the course of argument, the learned Counsel appearing for both the parties relied on the following Rule and submitted that the said Rule and no other Rule governs the field :- "Where a Railway servant enters into a transaction in respect of movable property either in his own name or in the name of any member of his family, he shall within one month from the dale of such transaction report the same to the Government if the value of such property exceeds Rs. 10,000 00 p. in the case of Railway servant holding any Group-“A” or “B” post or a temporary Gazatted Officer or Rs. 5,000 00 p. in the case of a Railway servant holding any Group-“C” or Group-“D” post.” 12. The aforesaid Rule is sub rule (3) of Rule 18 of the Railway Service Conduct/Rules, 1966. 13. 10,000 00 p. in the case of Railway servant holding any Group-“A” or “B” post or a temporary Gazatted Officer or Rs. 5,000 00 p. in the case of a Railway servant holding any Group-“C” or Group-“D” post.” 12. The aforesaid Rule is sub rule (3) of Rule 18 of the Railway Service Conduct/Rules, 1966. 13. The aforementioned Rule obliges a Railway servant to report to the Government if he enters into a transaction in respect of movable property either in his own name or in the name of any member of his family. If the Railway servant does not enter into a transaction, but someone else enters into a transaction in the name of any member of his family, the Rule does not oblige the Railway servant to report such transaction to the Government. In respect of charge No. 1, it was accepted that the transaction in respect of the truck in question was entered by a third person, with a major son of the writ petitioner. In such circumstances, the subject Rule did not make it obligatory on the part of the writ petitioner to report such transaction to the Government. From a reading of the subject Rule, it appears to us that the charge No.2 could only be said to have been proved if charge No.1 had been proved. The charge No.1 had two limbs. The first one was acquisition of the subject truck by the writ petitioner in the name of his son and the second was that the sums involved in such acquisition was beyond the reasonable resources of the writ petitioner. None of these limbs was proved. Therefore, charge No.2 ought to have been held not proved, since there was no infraction of the subject Rule by the writ petitioner. 14. Simply because the writ petitioner had contended in his defence statement that as he was unaware about the service conduct/Rule he did not submit the declaration for purchasing the subject truck, it could not be held that he violated the service conduct/Rule. If the writ petitioner was aware of the Rule he would have submitted that he was not required to furnish any such declaration. If the writ petitioner was aware of the Rule he would have submitted that he was not required to furnish any such declaration. If the Rule does not make it obligatory on the part of the writ petitioner to submit a declaration in respect of purchase of an asset made by his adult son with the money provided by his grandfather, then non-furnishing of a declaration in regard to such purchase cannot be said to be in violation of the service conduct/Rule. 15. In that view of the matter, we concur with the order of the learned Single Judge to the extent he set aside both the orders imposing penalty of major punishment for compulsory retirement from service. 16. As far back as on 3rd November. 1961, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of five learned Judges, in (1) Debendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1961 SC 1334 , while considering a Rule which provided that the period of absence from duty shall not be provided as period spent on duty unless such competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purposes, observed:- "This Rule has no application to cases like the present in which the dismissal of a public servant is declared invalid by a Civil Court and he is reinstated. This rule, undoubtedly enables the State Government to fix the pay of a public servant whose dismissal is set aside in a departmental appeal. But in this case the order of dismissal was declared invalid in a civil suit. The effect of the decree of the civil suit was that the appellant was never to be deemed to have been lawfully dismissed from service and the order of reinstatement was superfluous. The effect of the adjudication of the Civil Courts is to declare that the appellant had been wrongfully prevented from attending to his duties as a public servant. It would not in such a contingency be open to the authority to deprive the public servant of the remuneration which he would have eared had he been permitted to work." 17. The effect of the adjudication of the Civil Courts is to declare that the appellant had been wrongfully prevented from attending to his duties as a public servant. It would not in such a contingency be open to the authority to deprive the public servant of the remuneration which he would have eared had he been permitted to work." 17. Therefore, an adjudication that the order of the dismissal is illegal and consequent setting aside of the order of the dismissal presupposes that the order by which the employee had been dismissed is not inexistent and by virtue, of such non existent order if the employee had been prevented from attending to his duties, the employer cannot be deprive the employee of the remuneration, which he would have earned, if that non-existent order had not been passed or used against the employee to prevent him from attending to his duties. Thus, when an illegal order of dismissal is set aside as a Rule the employee is entitled to all the benefits to which he was deprived of by reason of such illegal order. 18. The Courts, however, exercising equitable jurisdiction curved out certain principles as an exception to that Rule. There exceptions were passed on equitable principles. Suppose, during the period between the order of dismissal and its setting aside, if the employee was fruitfully engaged otherwise then, to prevent unjust enrichment, the Court exercising equitable jurisdiction, directs that the employee shall not be entitled to the financial benefits to which he was deprived of by reason of the illegal dismissal order. Similarly, if the Court sets aside the order of dismissal by giving benefit of doubt to the employee or by considering the fact that but for an evidence, which was otherwise apparent but could not be pinpointed for sustaining the dismissal order, the Court exercising equitable jurisdiction at times directs deprivation of financial benefits to the employee concerned. The aforesaid two exceptions to the general Rule are, however, not exhaustive. There may be other instances where the Court while setting aside the order of dismissal does not direct restoration of the benefits to which the employee was deprived by reason of the order of dismissal which has been directed to be set aside. 19. The aforesaid two exceptions to the general Rule are, however, not exhaustive. There may be other instances where the Court while setting aside the order of dismissal does not direct restoration of the benefits to which the employee was deprived by reason of the order of dismissal which has been directed to be set aside. 19. While considering whether the benefits to which the employee was deprived should be restored or not, the Court of Equity is required to take note of the degree of the illegality of the order. This may be explained in this way that if the Services of an employee is terminated by resorting to an utter illegal action, which has no nexus to the Rules, and if in such a case, despite the order of dismissal being set aside, the employee is not given the benefits to which he was deprived by reason of such illegal order, then the same would itself tantamount to a punishment without committing a crime and lead to giving a free hand to the Disciplinary Authority to victimise their subordinates. 20. Therefore, it is the obligation of the Court of Equity to give reasons for not restoring back the benefits to which an employee was deprived by reason of an illegal order of dismissal while setting aside the said order of dismissal, i. e. when the Court is passing an order against the general Rule. 21. In this case, the learned Single Judge has not given any reason for depriving the writ petitioner of the benefits to which the writ petitioner would otherwise have been entitled to as a general Rule after setting aside of the order of dismissal, which was found to be an it legal order. 22. The charge in the instant case was that the writ petitioner had acquired a truck in the name of his son. The money invested for acquiring the truck was disproportionate to the income of the writ petitioner. And the writ petitioner did not give a declaration in regard to the acquisition of the truck to his employer. Before the Enquiry Officer, it was admitted that the truck in question was acquired by the adult son of the writ petitioner. It was also proved that the initial purchase price of the truck had been paid by the grandfather if the son of the writ petitioner. Before the Enquiry Officer, it was admitted that the truck in question was acquired by the adult son of the writ petitioner. It was also proved that the initial purchase price of the truck had been paid by the grandfather if the son of the writ petitioner. Therefore, it was also admitted that the truck in question was neither acquired by the writ petitioner, nor he had spent any money for acquisition of the same. In that event the writ petitioner had no obligation in terms of the Rules, set out above, to give any declaration. The order of termination, therefore, was utterly illegal and had been passed without any authority whatsoever. It is nobody's case that during the period between the order of dismissal and setting aside of the same, the writ petitioner was otherwise fruitfully engaged. In the matter of setting aside the order of dismissal, in this case, no benefit of doubt is required to be given to the writ petitioner. Even in these circumstances, if the writ petitioner is deprived of the benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled to if that order of dismissal had not been passed at all, then the same would tantamount to punishing the writ petitioner for a crime not committed by him. 23. In (2) Union of India v. Sri Babu Ram Lalla reported in AIR 1998 SC 344, the Supreme Court observed that since the order of termination of service of the respondent was rightly held to be a nullity he was entitled to be paid salary on the footing that he had always continued in service and the void order was never inexistence in the eye of law. 24. The order of dismissal in the instant case was passed de hors the Rules and without authority. It had and has no sanctity of law. It was created by taking recourse to something which was not in existence. The order was, therefore, a void order. Once that order was set aside. It should be deemed that the same was not inexistence and therefore, the writ petitioner cannot be deprived of the benefits to which he would have been other wise entitled to but for the said void order. 25. In those circumstances, we dismiss the appeal filed by the Railway Authorities and allow the appeal of the writ petitioner. 26. It should be deemed that the same was not inexistence and therefore, the writ petitioner cannot be deprived of the benefits to which he would have been other wise entitled to but for the said void order. 25. In those circumstances, we dismiss the appeal filed by the Railway Authorities and allow the appeal of the writ petitioner. 26. We, therefore, hold that the learned Single Judge was right in setting aside both the orders imposing penalty of major punishment by way of compulsory retirement from service passed against the writ petitioner. We, however, set aside the direction of the learned Single Judge as contained in the order under appeal, to the effect that the writ petitioner shall be deemed to be on extra ordinary leave during the period he remained under compulsory retirement from service without any pay. We declare that the writ petitioner shall be entitled to all the benefits to which he was entitled to but was deprived of by reason of the subject orders imposing penalty of major punishment by way of compulsory retirement from service. There shall be no order as to costs. Khare, C. J.: I agree.