JUDGMENT Balakrishnan, J. 1. The question that arises in the above writ appeals is regarding the legality of the selection made by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Kozhikode Division and Ernakulam Division with regard to the appointment of class III staff. W. A, Nos. 1968/96, 1971/96, 55/97 and 56/97 relate to the Ernakulam Division while W. A. Nos. 1940, 1956/96, 93 and 128 of 1997 relate to the Kozhikode Division. 2. The L. I. C. and its officers are the appellant in all the appeals. Both the Kozhikode and Ernakulam Divisions invited applications for appointment to class III posts. The notification stated that the candidates have to appear for a pre-selection test. After inviting applications and scrutinising the same, eligible candidates were called for the written test. Those who were successful in the written test, were called for the interview. Petitioners in the O.Ps. submit that all of them have become successful in the written test and thereafter, they were invited for the interview. According to them after the interview was conducted somewhere during September 1992, they were waiting for the result. They were not informed of the publication of the select list. Finally, in September 1993, when they enquired in the office, they were told that the list was published in November, 1992 and the appointments had already been made. Hence the original petitions were filed challenging the selection. 3. The main contentions raised in the O. Ps. were that: (i) No select list was published and the selection process was not completed in accordance with law. (ii) The selected candidates are either relatives or friends of the officers. (iii) Equal marks were awarded for written test and for interview. (iv) The awarding of 50 per cent marks for the interview is arbitrary, and violative of the rights guaranteed under Art.14 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of fact, more than 12.5 per cent marks should not have been awarded for the interview. (v) The entire interview was a farce and it took only two minutes to interview a candidate. (vi) The interview is a determining factor. As a matter of fact, more than 12.5 per cent marks should not have been awarded for the interview. (v) The entire interview was a farce and it took only two minutes to interview a candidate. (vi) The interview is a determining factor. On the above contentions, the petitioners pray far quashing the circular issued by the Corporation which provided 50 per cent marks for written test and 50 percent marks for viva voce test and for directing the first respondent not to award more than 13 percent of the total marks for the interview and to appoint the petitioners in the office of the Corporation. 4. The respective Divisional Managers have filed counter affidavits in the above cases. According to the counter affidavit, the written test and the viva voce were conducted in accordance with the circular which has been vogue since 1979. It is further contended that there was no nepotism or favouritism. Candidates were selected on the basis of the total marks obtained by them in the written, examination and in the interview. Petitioners' performances in the interview were not upto the mark and hence they were not selected. The interview committee consisted of officers of excellent integrity and there was no scope for any corruption in the interview. Next it was contended that the petitioners having participated in the interview, cannot contend that the prescription of 50 per cent marks for the interview is bad. This rule has been in force from 1979. Interview and the selection were made in accordance with the rules. It is further contended that the petitioners are guilty of delay and laches. It is mentioned that a number of petitions were filed earlier and paper publication was made in those cases. These petitions were filed only subsequently after knowing the disposal of the above original petitions. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that after the impugned selection, the rules have been changed by the LIC, by which 100 marks have been awarded for the written test and 20 marks for viva voce. 5. The learned Single Judge referred to the various decisions of the Supreme Court and then came to the conclusion that awarding of 50 per cent marks for the interview is illegal. But, the learned Single Judge refused to set aside the selection as it will unsettle many appointments. 5. The learned Single Judge referred to the various decisions of the Supreme Court and then came to the conclusion that awarding of 50 per cent marks for the interview is illegal. But, the learned Single Judge refused to set aside the selection as it will unsettle many appointments. The learned Single Judge gave a direction that if any person who has obtained less marks in the written examination than the petitioners has been appointed in the posts, then appointments will be given to the petitioners. 6. The learned Advocate General, who appeared for the Life Insurance Corporation of India, contended that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is not correct. According to the learned Advocate General, it is not correct to say that awarding of 50 per cent marks for viva voce is arbitrary and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. He submitted that while written test reflects the intelligence of man, the viva voce tests man himself and the twain shall meet for a proper selection. Various decisions of the Supreme Court were cited starting from Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 SC 487 and he contended that it depends upon the facts of each case; while in the matter of admission of students, the Supreme Court has categorically laid down that marks for interview should not exceed 50 per cent, such a rigid rule has not been laid down with regard to employment. Further, the learned Advocate General contended that the Corporation made the selection only in accordance with the rules and this rule has been in practice from 1979. It was his next submission that the petitioners, after having appeared for the interview, cannot turn round and say that the awarding of 50 per cent marks for the interview is illegal. They were sitting on the fence awaiting the decision in the pending cases. He highlighted the fact that the selection was over in September 1992 and the appointments were made from October, 1992 onwards. Petitioners waited till September 1993, after they became aware of the judgment in O. P. No. 14793 of 1992. Thus, there is gross delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in the O. P. The learned Advocate General further contended that once the learned Single Judge refused to set aside the selection, he should not have given the direction to appoint the petitioners. 7. Thus, there is gross delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in the O. P. The learned Advocate General further contended that once the learned Single Judge refused to set aside the selection, he should not have given the direction to appoint the petitioners. 7. Learned counsel, Sri P. Ravindran, who appeared for most of the respondents supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge. According to him, the awarding of 50 per cent marks for interview is arbitrary. He highlighted the fact that the petitioners are persons who have come out from the Universities and have not become so mature as to be put to a tough interview. On the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court, he contended that even in public employment, the awarding of 50 per cent marks for interview is very high. He contended that in appointments which are only based on the marks obtained in the interview, there was no illegality in prescribing high marks for the interview, But, in the present cases, the appointment was with regard to class III posts and the candidates were those who were fresh from the University. With regard to delay and laches, he contended that the select list was not published and the petitioners approached this court when they became aware of the selection and appointment. He further contended that a discretion has been exercised by the learned Single Judge and a direction was given to appoint the petitioners because only they had approached this court for reliefs. Hence he prayed for dismissal of the writ appeals. Learned counsel Sri Devan also appeared for some of the petitioners and supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 8. The first question that has to be answered is as to whether the awarding of 50 percent marks for the interview is legally sustainable and whether any interference is called for in these cases because this rule has been followed since 1979. The question regarding the awarding of marks for interview came up for consideration in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 S.C. 487 . That case related to admission to educational institutions. There 100 marks were awarded for written test and 50 marks for viva voce. The Supreme Court held that the marks awarded for viva voce was high. But, the Supreme Court refused to set aside the selection. 9. That case related to admission to educational institutions. There 100 marks were awarded for written test and 50 marks for viva voce. The Supreme Court held that the marks awarded for viva voce was high. But, the Supreme Court refused to set aside the selection. 9. The next case is Leela Dhar v. State of Rajasthan (1981) 4 SCC 159 . That was a case with regard to recruitment of Munsiffs. There 200 marks were awarded for written test and LOO marks were awarded for viva voce. In fact, it is in this case that His Lordship Justice Chinnappa Reddy observed that the written examination assesses the man's intellect and the interview test the man himself and 'the twain shall meet for a proper selection". In this case, the decision in AIR 1981 S.C. 487 was distinguished on the ground that it related only to admission to educational institutions and not public appointments. The Supreme Court upheld the selection even though the marks awarded for interview were high. The matter again came up for consideration in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (1985) 4 SCC 417 . There, two groups of persons competed in the selection one from the ex-servicemen and the other from the general category. Regarding the ex-servicemen, the marks awarded for the interview was 33.3 percent while the marks awarded to the general category was 22.2 percent. Even though the court found that the marks awarded for the interview was excessive, the selection was not set aside. But the court found that since a large number of candidates were called for interview and high marks were awarded for viva voce, a direction was given that all candidates who secured a minimum of 45 per cent marks in the written examination should be given another opportunity to appear in the next selection. 10. In Mohinder Sain Garg v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 662 , the Supreme Court held that the allocation of mote than 15 percent marks for viva voce is illegal. But, there also, the Supreme Court did not set aside the selection. In Ashok v. State of Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 28 , the Supreme Court held that the allotment of 33.3 percent marks was excessive and arbitrary. But, there also, the Supreme Court did not set aside the selection. In Ashok v. State of Karnataka (1992) 1 SCC 28 , the Supreme Court held that the allotment of 33.3 percent marks was excessive and arbitrary. There the court found that large number of candidates have been selected though they had secured much lesser marks than the appellants in the qualifying examination but had secured very high marks in the viva voce. That being the admitted position, there was a direction to appoint the appellants. 11. From the above decisions, it can be safely presumed that the awarding of 50 per cent marks for interview is excessive. But that does not necessarily mean that the selection should be set aside. In fact, the learned Single Judge has also not set aside the selection. But the learned Single Judge has given a direction to appoint the petitioners, if anybody who had obtained lesser marks than the petitioners has been appointed. 12. So, the next question for consideration is whether the direction given by the learned Single Judge can be held to be sustainable. The rule of awarding 50 per cent marks for viva voce was in existence from 1.979 and the appellant Corporation had been only following the rule. Now, the Corporation has amended the rule and reduced the marks for the viva voce. The respondents herein appeared for the interview knowing fully well that the interview carries 50 percent of the total marks. Even though a contention is raised at the time of argument that they were not aware of such a stipulation, it cannot be believed for a moment. The selection is made on the basis of Ext. P3 instruction. The respondents cannot merely say that they were not aware of such instruction. Actually, the respondents were sitting on the fence. They were watching the progress of the selection and when they found that they were not selected, they challenged the selection. In this context, it is pertinent to note that earlier some writ petitions were filed challenging the same selection and they were disposed of by judgment, dated 24th June 1993, in O.P. No. 14793 of 1992 and connected O.Ps. Paper publication was also made in the above said cases. The respondent did not join as parties in the above original petitions of file any O.P. immediately. Paper publication was also made in the above said cases. The respondent did not join as parties in the above original petitions of file any O.P. immediately. But, it was only about three months after, the present original petitions were filed. So, this is not a case where the respondents deserve any sympathy as they were waiting outside watching the result of the earlier original petitions filed. Further, in these cases, it has not been definitely established that excessive marks were given in the interview and that persons who had obtained much less marks than the respondents have been selected because of the marks obtained by them in the interview. There is nothing to show that the marks obtained in the interview was the determining factor. We have already referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court, which, even though found that the selection was bad, did not set aside the same. In AIR 1981 S.C. 487 (Ajay Hasia's case] no relief was granted to the petitioners. In (1985) 4 SCC 417 (Ashok Kumar Yadav's case], a direction was given allowing the persons who had secured more than 45 per cent marks in the written examination to appear for the next selection. In (1991) 1 SCC 662 (Mohinder Sain Garg's case] also, no relief was granted. In (1992) 1 SCC 28 (Ashok's case) the court actually found that excessive marks were granted in the interview and hence a direction was given to appoint the appellants. It was observed in Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co, v. District Board, Bhojpur (1992) 2 SCC 598 as follows: "The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence." In Madan Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1995) 3 SCC 486 , it was observed as follows: "The question as to whether the candidates who had got more marks in the written test as compared to the selected respondents is in the realm of assessment of relative merits of candidates considered by the expert committee before whom these candidates appeared for the viva voce. Merely on the basis of petitioners' apprehension or suspicion that they were deliberately given less marks at the oral interview as compared to the rival candidates, it cannot be said that the process of assessment was vitiated. It has to be kept in view that there is not even a whisper in the petition about any personal bias of the Members of the Interview Committee against the petitioners. They have also not alleged any mala fides on the part of the Interview Committee in this connection. Consequently, the attack on assessment of the merits of the petitioners cannot be countenanced." Here in the present case, even though it is stated that the relatives of the officers were appointed, no evidence was adduced to establish that. Thus, no bias or mala fides has been established. In the above view of the matter, we do not find any justification for the direction granted by the learned Single Judge to appoint the respondents. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is modified to the extent that the direction to the Life Insurance Corporation to appoint the respondents is set aside. Appeals are allowed.