JUDGMENT 1. - The short question with which this court has to address itself in the present writ petition is as to whether the Rajasthan State Cooperative Sheep and Wool Marketing Federation Ltd. (in short "Federation") is State Public Undertaking of the Government of Rajasthan being an instrumentality of the State was justified in initiating a second enquiry against the petitioner on the basis of the original charge-sheet dated 18.6.1985 and to have kept it pending for a long time and not to have completed the same with inordinate delay with a view to cause harassment to the petitioner and whether such an enquiry should not be treated as malafide and illegal and would justify revocation by this Court? 2. Respondent-Federation is registered as a society under the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 as a State Public undertaking of the Government of Rajasthan. It has framed its own byelaws for its day-today functioning. As per bye law No. 66 the Government of Rajasthan has power to appoint Managing Director of the Federation who shall control and supervise the administration set up by it which shall be subject to the supervision and control of the Federation. It is obligatory on the Managing Director to perform such duties and function as the Federation may entrust or delegate to him. Further as per bye-law 47 the business of the Federation shall be carred on and managed by a Board of Directors which will be constituted as hereunder, except as provided in bye-law No. 47 which reads as under "47 (1) The business of the Society shall be carried on and managed by a Board of Directors which will be constituted as hereunder, except as provided in bye-laws 48 (a) Three Directors to be elected from amongst Chairman Primary Sheep Breeders Cooperative Societies. (b) Three Directors to be nominated by the Government including the Managing Director. (c) Two Directors to be nominated by Central Government. (d) One Director from Financing Institution to be nominated by Government. (2) Election of the Directors shall be held in accordance with the Rules and these bye-laws. (3) The term of the Board shall ordinarily be three years." Bye-law No. 48 stipulates as under "48. (c) Two Directors to be nominated by Central Government. (d) One Director from Financing Institution to be nominated by Government. (2) Election of the Directors shall be held in accordance with the Rules and these bye-laws. (3) The term of the Board shall ordinarily be three years." Bye-law No. 48 stipulates as under "48. Notwithstanding anything contained in these byelaws the first Board of Directors including the Chairman who would be Secretary Incharge of Sheep & Wool Department after the registration of the Society shall be nominated by the Government for a period of three years. The Government may extend the period of the nominated Board for a period not exceeding 7 years". 3. Byelaw No. 61 which deals with the powers of the Board stipulates as under "The entire administration and management of the Society shall be vested in the Board. The Board shall have and exercise all such powers and enter into all such agreements, make all such arrangements, take all such proceedings and do all such acts and things as may be necessary for carrying out the objects for which the Society has been established and for securing and furthering its interests subjects to the provision of the Act, the Rules and these bye-laws." Bye-law No. 62(c) provides as under "62-Without prejudice to the general powers conferred by these bye-laws the following powers and authorities are expressly given to and conferred upon the Board. (c)-m From time to time to appoint and at their pleasure remove suspend officers other than Managing Director, and other staff for permanent, temporary or special services and to determine their powers and duties and fix their remuneration and to require security in such instance and to such amount as they think fit, and to make regulations with the approval of the Registrar regarding their pay, promotion, leave, provident fund, disciplinary matters and other conditions of service." 4. The irrelevant facts of the case as briefly stated are that pursuant to the advertisement of the Board for the post of Manager (Marketing), the petitioner was appointed by the Board after he was interviewed on the recommendations of the Selection Committee as Manager (Marketing) vide order, dated 27.6.1980 in the pay scale of Rs. 1150-1650 on probation for period of one year. 1150-1650 on probation for period of one year. After completion of probationary period, the petitioner was confirmed on the said post and presently in the pay scale of Rs.3000-4500 which is equivalent to State Service officers of the Government of Rajasthan. It has been contended by the petitioner that somewhere in January, 1992 when respondent No. 3 Shri Ajeet Kumar Singh, AS, Director, Computer Department Secretariat, Jaipur got annoyed with the petitioner and adopted inimical attitude towards him on account of some business dealings of the Board. In this regard the petitioner has referred to an incident of 20.11.1990 when he had sought permission from the Board for his admission to LL.B course of the University at Jaipur and had passed his LL.B Ist year examination in the year 1991 and when the II nd year examination of the L.L.B. was about to commence, the petitioner applied for grant of leave from 5.11.1992 to 5.12.1992 to prepare for taking final examination but the same was not allowed by the Managing Director. He again requested for grant of leave from 17.11.1992, 11.11.1992 to 5.12.1992 but the Managing Director had declined to pass orders in this regard, as a result of which academic career of the petitioner was adversely affected. He has also referred to various other incidents as a result of which he was subjected to considerable harassment in his service career. The petitioner has contended that the impugned order of his suspension which was passed in exercise of powers by the department under Rule 13 of the C.C.A. Rules of 1958 was contrary to byelaws No. 62(c) as referred to above and also contrary to the resolution of the Board, dated 14.12.1981 whereby the power regarding appointment of senior officer and taking any disciplinary action against the said officer had not been delegated by the Board to any other officer and only the Board was competent to pass the said order. 5. During the course of hearing Shri Ashopa, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that Rule 13 of the C.C.A. Rules of 1958 had not been adopted by the authority and only the procedure regarding the disciplinary enquiry had been adopted which has been envisaged under Rules 16 and 17 of the C.C.A. Rules, His contention was that the impugned order of suspension dated 12.7.1993 was wholly without jurisdiction apart from being malafide in nature. Prior to passing of the aforesaid order of suspension the petitioner had also earlier been placed under suspension by the Board on 6.6.1986 on the same allegations on the basis of original charge-sheet dated 18.6.1985 wherein some charges were levelled against the petitioner regarding misappropriation and financial irregularities. After service of the said charge-sheet, the petitioner was earlier suspended on 6.6.1986 (first suspension) and disciplinary enquiry was initiated against the petitioner and which was completed on 4.9.1987 and that the matter was placed before the Board of Directors of the Board on 14.10.1987. 6. The Board of directors in its 30th meeting dated 14.10.1987 vide resolution No. 16 authorised the Managing Director to take the decision on the basis of enquiry report and intimated the same to the Chairman of the Board. Thereafter on 21.10.1987 the then Managing Director, directed re-enquiry into the matter for recording further evidence and during the pendency of the said enquiry, the petitioner who had earlier been placed under suspension vide the aforesaid order, dated 6.6.1986, was reinstated in service. The enquiry officer after completing re-enquiry as directed, submitted his report to the Board on 22.7..1989 to the Managing Director and who had after examining the detailed enquiry report as referred to hereinabove vide Annexure-22, had exonerated the petitioner on 19.4.1991. The aforesaid order, dated 19.4.1991 was placed before the Board of Directors alongwith the enquiry report and the same was approved by the Board in its meeting, dated 27.4.1991. 7. From the perusal of enquiry report dated 19.4.1991 (Annexure 22) by which the petitioner stood fully exonerated by the enquiry officer in the earlier enquiry on the same allegations on the basis of which fresh enquiry was directed against the petitioner, it is apparent that the charge of financial irregularities and misuse of his official position as Manager of the Federation at Bikaner was not established, since no positive evidence was led by the respondent-federation which could establish the complicity of the petitioner with regard to the said allegations, as a result of which he had been placed under suspension earlier pending enquiry. The enquiry officer after discussing all the relevant evidence on the record finally came to the conclusion, since there was due sanction and approval of the Board during the period in question as regards the expenditure which the petitioner had incurred an behalf of the federation, hence it would not be proper to allege that the petitioner had made misuse of his official position nor it would be proper to arrive at any conclusion to the contrary against the petitioner that he had incurred the expenditure in excess of the authorised sanction or permissible limit. Hence the enquiry officer finally came to the conclusion that federation has failed to lead any cogent and reliable evidence on the record which would prove the charges against the petitioner and it will be in the interest of justice to exonerate the petitioner and accordingly the disciplinary enquiry which was initiated against the petitioner by the federation in pursuance of the order, dated 18.6.1985 in accordance with Rule 16 of the C.C.A. Rules of 1958 stood concluded and it was further directed that the petitioner will be entitled to full pay and allowances as admissible to him in accordance with Rule 54(24) of the R.S.R. 8. In reply to show cause notice the respondents have contended that the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the suspension order, dated 4.7.1993 because according to Rule 13 of the C.C.A. Rules there is condition precedent to place an employee under suspension-(a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or pending, or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is in investigation or trial. It has further been contended that the petitioner had ample opportunity to defend his case before the disciplinary authority and the C.C.A. Rules are applicable to the case of the employees of the federation, since the federation had adopted the R.S.R. and C.C.A. Rules vide Resolution, dated 29.4.1991 in absence of the Rules of federation itself. In the same breath, the respondents have contended that federation cannot be treated as an instrumentality of the State within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, present writ petition is not maintainable. In the same breath, the respondents have contended that federation cannot be treated as an instrumentality of the State within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, present writ petition is not maintainable. Apart from the above, they have further contended that even suspension order which was passed subsequently by the appointing authority on the same charges as a result of which the petitioner stood exonerated pursuant to the findings of the enquiry officer as aforesaid in the earlier enquiry report, the respondents were fully empowered to initiate fresh enquiry into the matter by appointing an enquiry officer subsequently. They have further contended that since the suspension order was approved by the Board vide Resolution of the Board dated 22.2.1994 hence the action of the Managing Director was fully justified and the petitioner had rightly been placed under suspension looking to_ the seriousness of the charges. It has further been contended that the Managing Director as well as the General Manager had fully discharged their duties in accordance with the provisions of the Rules and the explanation was sought from the petitioner in view of the administrative orders which do not tantamount to prejudicial acts towards the petitioner with a view to humiliate him and they cannot be levelled as malafides. The respondents have thus supported their action which, according to them, was in accordance with law and within the domain of the authority. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions and also the relevant documents on the record as well as the legal position on the subject. 9A. The respondents have thus supported their action which, according to them, was in accordance with law and within the domain of the authority. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions and also the relevant documents on the record as well as the legal position on the subject. 9A. As regards the first contention of the respondents that the federation cannot be treated as instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution of India, I am of the view that this contention is wholly untenable and devoid of merit, since the respondents themselves have so stated in para 3 of their reply that the federation had adopted the C.C.A. Rules and R.S.R. and the suspension order dated 12.7.1993 which they had earlier passed against the petitioner was in accordance with Rule 13 of the C.C.A. Rules and the action taken by them by instituting disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner was in pursuance of the resolution, dated 29.4.1991 which was in accordance with R.S.R. which the federation had adopted for its employees and its day- to-day functioning. 10. With regard to the above, I am of the considered view that once the respondents themselves have taken a positive stand by adopting R.S.R. and C.C.A. Rules, it is not open to them to plead to the contrary by saying that the federation is not an instrumentality of the State. Further from the perusal of bye-laws of the federation it is apparent that they have adopted its Rules and Regulations which are in accordance with R.S.R. and C.C.A. Rules. 11. As regards the next contention of the respondents regarding the validity of the earlier suspension order, dated 18.6.1985, I am of the view that when the petitioner stood fully exonerated by the disciplinary authority pursuant to the disciplinary enquiry which was initiated against the petitioner vide his report, dated 19.4.1991 and thereafter the petitioner was reinstated in service with full emoluments as admissible to him in accordance with the Rules, the effect of earlier suspension order, dated 18.6.1985 .stood fully washed off. Thereafter the respondents were not justified in instituting the subsequent disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner on the basis of the same charges and on the same allegations which had become nonest in lieu of the exoneration order dated 19.4.1991 which was adopted and acted upon by the respondents. Thereafter the respondents were not justified in instituting the subsequent disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner on the basis of the same charges and on the same allegations which had become nonest in lieu of the exoneration order dated 19.4.1991 which was adopted and acted upon by the respondents. Hence the obvious conclusion which emerges is that the earlier order as well as the subsequent order, dated 12.7.1993 Annexure 18 by which the petitioner was placed under suspension for the second time by respondent No.3, was obviously malafide, without jurisdiction and having been passed in colourable exercise of the powers. As a matter of fact the respondents were neither justified nor had acted in accordance with law when they had directed initiation of a fresh enquiry vide their order, dated 13.7.1993 (Annexure 24) of the charge-sheet dated 18.6.1985 of which the petitioner stood fully exonerated by the competent authority as aforesaid. Hence the contention of the respondent that the suspension order passed subsequently by the competent authority which was passed earlier on the basis of same charges of which the petitioner stood fully exonerated earlier and was reinstated in service and thereafter there was absolutely no justification on the part of the respondents to have directed initiation of a fresh enquiry into the matter and it is not open to the respondents to contend that the legality of the administrative order is not open to challenge since they do not tantamount to prejudicial acts. Such contention is wholly devoid of merit and cannot be held tenable in law. 12. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the respondents had not been able to establish or place any cogent material on the record which would justify the impugned action of the respondents for conducting enquiry afresh on the basis of same charges and on the same allegations of which the petitioner stood exonerated as referred to above. 12. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the respondents had not been able to establish or place any cogent material on the record which would justify the impugned action of the respondents for conducting enquiry afresh on the basis of same charges and on the same allegations of which the petitioner stood exonerated as referred to above. Prima facie I am of the considered opinion that it is well settled proposition of law that where power is required to be exercised by a competent authority in a particular manner it should be exercised in the said manner only and adopting all other modes of performance which necessarily are forbidden if they lead to a conclusion which would be contrary to the conclusion arrived at in favour of the delinquent official by the competent authority which had earlier instituted a disciplinary enquiry against the delinquent and its result has been in favour of the delinquent. Hence obviously there would be no justification to support the impugned actions or orders passed by the competent authority which would be contrary to its own orders passed earlier.I am fortified in my aforesaid observations from judgments of the apex court in the matter of Hukama Chand Shyam Lai v. Union of India; AIR 1976 SC 789 (para 18) , Mahendra' Singh Gill and Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. : AIR 1978 SC 851 , Syed Syfulla v. Supdt. of Police, Shimoga : 1982 (3) SLR 145 , Deputy Inspector General of Police Central Range, Ernakulam and others v. V.N. Sankaran and others : 1982 (3) SLR 44, 1961 (1) , London and Westcliff Properties Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government and another 1961 (supra) All E.R. 610 (At page 617) and Express Newpapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India : 1986 (1) SCC 133 (At page 141). 13. 13. In the matter of Hukam Chand Shyam Lai v. Union of India (supra) the apex court observed as under : "It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way it should be exercised in that manner or not at all and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden" In the matter of Mahendra Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (supra) the apex court observed as under "When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out." In the matter of Syed Syfulla v. Supdt. of Police (supra) Karnataka High Court observed as under : "De Novo departmental enquiry. Disciplinary authority disagreed with the report of enquiry officer who exonerated the official, directing De Novo enquiry. Disciplinary authority could only direct further enquiry and not De Novo enquiry. Proceeding held illegal." 14. In the matter of London and Westcliff Properties Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government and another 1961 (supra) decided by Queen's Bench Division (Ashworth, J.) on 26th, 27th January, 1961 , the learned Queen's Bench while considering the validity of compulsory purchase order made by a local authority under the Housing Act, 1957, observed that the court. may take into consideration matters occurring subsequently to the making of the order and upto the moment when the Minister confirms the same, it was held that the compulsory purchase order deserves to be quashed for the reason that the use of land proposed to be made by the local authority after its acquisition involved a contravention of relevant provisions of the Act of 1957 which rendered the acquisition itself ultra-vires and the confirmation of the order by the concerned Minister did not prevent the court's intervention on the basis of the Inspector's report and the disregard of the proposed contravention rendered the confirmation ultra- vires. It was further observed as under "When an Act of a lower Authority is ultra-vires, the order of a superior or appellate authority who confirms it becomes equally ultra-vires." 15. It was further observed as under "When an Act of a lower Authority is ultra-vires, the order of a superior or appellate authority who confirms it becomes equally ultra-vires." 15. D.D. Basu in his book on Administrative Law, 3rd Edition at page 173 has opined that statutory act if ultra-vires becomes a nullity subject of course to the doctrine of sever ability and when an act of lower authority is ultra-vires, the order of superior authority or appellate authority who confirms the same becomes equally ultra-vires.In the matter of Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) on the question of malafides on part of the administrative authority, question which had arisen for consideration before the apex court was as to whether the same is open to challenge in the sphere of administrative law. It was observed by the apex court as under "Allegation should be definite and specific and not vague. Persons against whom such allegations are made must controvert the same by filing counter affidavit before the court. Court would accept the allegation as true if the same are not rebutted" It has further been observed as under "Allegation of malafide if raised in a properly maintained writ petition, can be examined by the court even if the same is denied by the party against whom it is made." 16. In the matter of Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others (supra), a construction was raised on leased land in Delhi by the petitioner Newspaper Company with an increased FAR of 360 with a includible basement for installation of Printing Press for publication of newspaper in violation of the Municipal bye-laws. The question which was raised by the petitioner in Special Leave Petition before the apex court was as to whether in such circumstances the construction raised by the petitioner-company was legal and in compliance with the terms and conditions of the lease- deed? Notices of re-entry upon forfeiture of lease were served upon the petitioner by Delhi Municipal Corporation. The validity of the said impugned notices became subject matter of question upon challenge by the petitioner in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Notices of re-entry upon forfeiture of lease were served upon the petitioner by Delhi Municipal Corporation. The validity of the said impugned notices became subject matter of question upon challenge by the petitioner in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The apex court relying on the dictum of its judgment in the matter of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India Ltd. : 1979 (3) SCC 489 AIR 1979 SC 1628 , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India : 1978 (1) SCC 248 = AIR 1978 SC 597 and E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. : 1974 (4) SCC 3 = AIR 1974 SC 555 held that the material available in this case was sufficient to hold that the impugned notices suffer from, vice of arbitrariness and non-application of mind and hence they are liable to be quashed while two Hon'ble Judges in concurrence held that the impugned notices of re-entry upon forfeiture of lease and threatened demolition of the Express building are intended to and meant to silence the voice of the Indian Express and its immediate threat to freedom of press being violative of Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 14 of the Constitution of India and therefore the writ petitions are maintainable, and consequently the impugned notices threatening re-entry and demolition of construction are invalid and have no legal value and must be quashed and set-aside, but the question with regard to the breach of contract of lease or of other statutes relating the construction of the buildings are the questions which cannot just be decided on the basis of affidavits and such matters should be decided in regular civil proceedings by taking detailed evidence involving examination and corss-examination of the witnesses. The impugned notice were quashed and set-aside and the respondents were directed not to take further actions in pursuance of the same. 17. As a result of the above discussion, I am of the view that the petitioner deserves to be succeeded. The impugned orders dated 12.7.1993 by which the petitioner was placed under suspension (Annexure 19) and dated 13.7.1993 (Annexure 24) by which a De-Novo enquiry was directed to be initiated against the petitioner are quashed and set- aside. Since the petitioner has already been reinstated in service of the respondents, no fresh direction is necessary in this regard. The impugned orders dated 12.7.1993 by which the petitioner was placed under suspension (Annexure 19) and dated 13.7.1993 (Annexure 24) by which a De-Novo enquiry was directed to be initiated against the petitioner are quashed and set- aside. Since the petitioner has already been reinstated in service of the respondents, no fresh direction is necessary in this regard. The petitioner shall be entitled to all the consequential benefits as admissible to him from due date in accordance with the Rules. There will be no order as to costs.Writ Petition allowed - Impugned orders of suspension and of de nove enquiry quashed. *******