Rajendra Prasad Ardevi v. Veer Chand — 1997 DIGILAW 1164 (RAJ)

Honble MUKHERJI, CJ.–In village Dhulev nearly 40 miles from Udaipur, there exists a very ancient temple of Shri Rikhabdevji, also known as temple of Shri Kesharia Nathji. The main idol is that of Shri Rikhabdevji, the first Tirthanker of Jains and other idols in the said Devries are those of other Tirthankers and there are foot prints of some deities. The temple of Shri Rikhabdevji has religious and charitableactivities for which pilgrims visiting the temple donate large funds. On May 23, 1947 there was promulgation of the constitution of erstwhile State of Mewar and thereafter the State of Mewar merged with other States and formed the United State of Rajasthan. The management of the temple was placed into the hands of the Devesthan Department of the State of Rajasthan and the Devasthan Department hassince been maintaining and administering the temple as a Trustee de son Tort. Previously two separate writ petitions D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 501 of 1962 and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 407 of 1962 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India were filed in the High Court. The writ petitions were filed on behalf of the Swetamber Murtipujak Jains. The case of the petitioners was that the said temple of ShriRikhabdevji was owned by and belonged to the Swetamber sect of Jains and that the management of the said temple was illegally usurped by the Government of Rajasthan through the Devasthan Department and they prayed for writ of mandamus restraining the State Government from enforcing certain provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act (No. 42 of 1959) and from carrying out the managementof the said temple and asked for a mandate to handover the same to the denomination of the Swetamber Jains. The State of Rajasthan contested the claim of the petitioner and disputed that the said temple was ever exclusive Swetamber Jain temple. On the contrary it was claimed that the said temple is a Hindu temple and was built by the Hindu Ruler of Mewar and Hindus of all sects including Bhils andother members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe as also the Jains of all sects were permitted to worship in the said temple ever since it was built and that it had always been managed by the Hindu Rulers of Mewar. It was refuted that any provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act were unconstitutional. It was refuted that any provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act were unconstitutional. The High Court by its judgment dated 30.3.66 held that the temple was a Swetamber Jain templeand that the management of the said temple was carried on by the State prior to the commencement of the Constitution. The Court in view of Section 52(1)(a) or (c) read with Section 53(2) of the Act directed the State Government to constitute a committee for the management of the said temple as provided in the Act. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 407/62 the petitioners had also contended that the adminis-tration and management of Nakodaji Parasnath Temple (another temple) was being carried on by the Trust Commiteee on behalf of the Swetamber Jain Sangh in which the entire property of the temple vested. It was further contended that in view of the powers vested in the State Government under sub-clause (2) of Section 52 of the Act there was an imminent danger of the State Government taking overthe management and administration of the Trust and that the provisions of the Act, if enforced, would go contrary to the religious faith of the petitioners. Accordingly, the petitioners contended that certain provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. However, the High Court inter alia held that the provisions of Section 52 sub- clause (1)(d) and (e) of the Act were ultravires inasmuch as, Section 53(5) empoweredthe State Government to appoint persons on the Committee of the Management who Right not necessarily be of the same denomination which managed the Trust. The High Court rejected the other contention of the petitioners. Against the judgment of the High Court both the petitioners as well as the State of Rajasthan filed appeal in the Supreme Court bearing C.A. No. 1087/67 and 1119/67 respectively. TheSupreme Court by its judgment and order dated 14.12.73 allowed the appeals filed by the State against both the judgments of the High Court and at the same time dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners in both sets of appeals. it was in the name and style of State of Rajasthan & others vs. Sajjan Lal Panjawat and others (1). it was in the name and style of State of Rajasthan & others vs. Sajjan Lal Panjawat and others (1). The Supreme Court without going into the question whether the temple is aSwetambar Jain temple or a Digamber Jain temple held that it will be sufficient to consider whether the temple is a Jain temple or as alleged by the State, a Hindu temple. But on consideration of the documents admitted, which the State has neither challenged and was also not in a position to challenge, the Supreme Court did not have any doubt that Shri Rikhabdevji Temple is a Jain temple and the StateGovernment produced no evidence to the contrary to show that it is a Hindu temple where Jains of all sects as well as Hindus of all sects including the Bhils are allowed to worship. As regards documents it was observed that there being no document to the contrary filed by the State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court ultimately reached a conclusion that Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a Jain temple. The Supreme Court tookinto consideration the submission made in this context by the State of Rajasthan that the management of the temple had been taken over prior to the constitution by the erstwhile Udaipur State or the Mewar State under a law and the said management having continued even after the Constitution in the successor State, namely, the State of Rajasthan and whether or at all the fundamental rights guaran- teed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Writ petitioners were in any manner affected, the Supreme Court held that there was no doubt that any right which the Jains or any one of the two Jain denominations, namely, the Swetambers or Digambers or both might have had in the temple or in its management was lost in the pre-constitution period and stood vested in the State of Rajasthan. The Supreme Court further held that since the respondents writ petitioners lost the right to manage and administer the temple and its properties prior to the Constitution by a valid law, they could not now regain that right on the plea that the law contravenes the right guaranteed under Article 26(d) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court further held that since the respondents writ petitioners lost the right to manage and administer the temple and its properties prior to the Constitution by a valid law, they could not now regain that right on the plea that the law contravenes the right guaranteed under Article 26(d) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court relied uponDargah Committee, Ajmer vs. Syed Hussain Ali (2) and further observed- ``If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination or had been validly surrendered by it or has otherwise been effectively and irretrievably lost to it, Art. 26 cannot be successfully invoked. To the contention that the right to manage the temple and its properties falls under Art. 26(b) and not under Art. 26(d), the answer may be two-fold: (1) the Jains, whether Swetamber or Digamber, had lost the right before the Constitution and Art. 26 would not re-invest the right in them; (2) the administration of property, being dealt with in Art.26(d), should be deemed to be excluded from purview of Art. 26(b). (2). The High Court by its earlier judgment erroneously struck down Section 52(1)(d) and (e) as the provisions of Section 53 did not lay down proper safeguards for leaving the administration of the properties in the hands of a denomination. The Supreme Court however in this context held that in its view the hypothesis on whichthe High Court has based its conclusions is not warranted by the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 53 of the Act. In the first category, apart from the Commi- ttee being constituted from amongst the trustees of public trusts representing the same religion, the Committee can also be constituted from amongst the trustees of the same persuasion. The significance of the word `persuasion and what it con-notes does not seem to have been considered by the High Court. The word `persuasion is a synonym of faith, creed, denomination, religion etc. Websters Third New International Dictionary Vol. II, p. 1688, gives the meaning of `persuasion amongst others (a) as ``a system of religious or other beliefs (the several protestants.....); (b) a group, faction, sect, or party that adheres to a particular system ofbeliefs or ideas or promotes a particular view, theory, or cause.... The same dictionary in vol. Websters Third New International Dictionary Vol. II, p. 1688, gives the meaning of `persuasion amongst others (a) as ``a system of religious or other beliefs (the several protestants.....); (b) a group, faction, sect, or party that adheres to a particular system ofbeliefs or ideas or promotes a particular view, theory, or cause.... The same dictionary in vol. I gives the meaning of ``denomination at p.602 as ``a religious group of a community of believers called by the same name. In other words, in the first category also a Committee can be appointed from persons of the denomination to which the trust belongs, as in the second category this appointment couldbe made from the trustees representing that denomination or persuation, while in the third category from amongst the persons who belong to the said denomination who may not be trustees as such. It is significant to note that ``persons interested falling in the second category have been defined by sub-section (9) of Section 2 as including for the purposes of temples and Maths in clauses (a) and (b), namely, (a)in the case of a temple, a person who is entitled to attend or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the temple or who is entitled to partaking or is in the habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts; (b) in the case of a Math, a disciple of the Math or a person of the religious persuasion to which the Math belongs. Even where the persons interested satisfy the above require-ments, the additional requirement of clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 53 is that such persons must be also persons for whose benefit the trust was founded. A reading of clause (a) of sub-section (5) clearly indicates that the trustees must represent the concerned religion or persuasion which includes a denomination. It could not have been the intention to appoint a Committee of management compri- sing trustees of a public trust of a particular religion or persuasion who do not belong to that religion or persuasion or denomination, nor does clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 53 empowers persons who do not belong in a denomination to be appointed to a public trust of that denomination. Again the word ``denomination is wide enough to include sections thereof, and it cannot threfore, be said as the High Court seemed to assume, that a section of the denomination managing the property may not be the same as trustees of public trusts representing the same religion, even if the public trust has the same object as that of the public trust, the management of which is being transferred to the Committee. If Section53(5)(a) is read in the manner suggested by the Supreme Court the difficulties pointed out by the High Court would not arise at all. (3). It appears, therefore, that merely because the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 53 enable the Government to appoint a Committee from the two categories specified in that clause, it does not mean that the Government will appointor can appoint persons who are not constitutionally entitled to be appointed to that particular trust. If the temple is a Swetamber temple, merely because the Digambers, like Swetambers are also Jains, it does not empower the Government to appoint them as a Chairman and members of the Committee of management. The very fact that the Legislature has provided for the ascertainment of the generalwishes of the persons interested is a positive direction to the State Government to take those wishes into consideration in the manner to be prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. This provision furnishes a safeguard against the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Committee to manage the trusts who do not subscribe to or adhere to the tenets of a particular religion or denomination to whichthe trust belongs. No such appointment can be made which contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and if any such appointment is made, those who have a right to challenge it, can do so and have the appointment struck down. In this view clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 52 read with sub- section (5) of Section 53 as interpreted by the SupremeCourt cannot be held to be invalid. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of sub- section (3) of Section 17 of the Act. In this view clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 52 read with sub- section (5) of Section 53 as interpreted by the SupremeCourt cannot be held to be invalid. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of sub- section (3) of Section 17 of the Act. The Supreme Court thus held that (i) Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a Jain temple; (ii) that the management of the temple is vested in the State of Rajasthan, (iii) a Committee would be constituted under sub-section (5) of Section 53 of the Act from amongst the trustees of the same reli-gion or persuation i.e. of the same faith, creed, denomination, religion or/and a group, faction, sect or party that adheres to a particular system of beliefs or ideas or promotes a particular view, theory, or cause or/and of same denomination, i.e. a religious group of a community of believers called by the same name or from amongst the persons who are not trustees but belong to the denomination to whichtrust belongs or/and the person interested i.e. a person who is entitled to attend or is in the habit of attending the performance or worship or service in the temple or who is entitled to partaking or is in the habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts and who do subscribe or adhere to the tenets of the particular religion or denomination to which the trust belongs. The Supreme Court further held that Section 53(1)which applies to the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji, authorises the State Government to appoint a Committee to manage the public trust from such date as the State Government may appoint. Under Section 53(2) on or before such date is fixed in respect of a public trust, the State shall constitute, by notification in the Official Gazette a Committee of management and such Committee shall be deemed to beworking trustee of the said public trust and its endowment. Under Section 53(2) on or before such date is fixed in respect of a public trust, the State shall constitute, by notification in the Official Gazette a Committee of management and such Committee shall be deemed to beworking trustee of the said public trust and its endowment. Under Section 53(5) the Chairman and members of a Committee of management shall be appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette from amongst-(a) trustees of public trusts representing the same religion or persuasion and having the same objects, and (b) persons interested in such public trust or in the endow- ments thereof or belonging to the denomination for the purpose of which or for the benefit of whom the trust was founded in accordance with the general wishes of the persons so interested so far as such wishes could be ascertained in the prescribed manner. (4). One Veer Chand, one Deewan Singh, one Kanhaiya Lal, one Ganpat Singh, one Ganesh Lal and one Gend Mal who were Jains and residents of Udaipur on behalf of Swetamber Jain Sangh and as members of Murtipujak Swetamber Jain Sangh, Udaipur filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21 of 1981 before a Single Bench of this Court inter alia claiming for the following reliefs: ``(i) to issue a writ of mandamus or any appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 26 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 specially Sections 17/18, 52, 53 and for the compliance of the directions in the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 14.12.73; (ii) to issue a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to issue a list of Public Trusts to which Chapter X applied as required under Section 52(2) of the said Act and specially to include the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji which was being directly managed by the State and to appoint a committee of a management as in terms of Section 53 of the said Act. (iii) to issue a mandamus or other appropriate direction, order to quash the judgment of the Devasthan Commissioner dated 25.3.80 which is in derogation of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court and which is illegal, unwarranted and without jurisdiction; (iv) to issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate direction to order Registration of Shri Rikhabdevji, Dhulev under provision of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 in the name of the petitioners as prayed in the petition for registration dated 16.12.1975; (v) to issue an appropriate writ, direction or order to quash the order dated 29.9.79 and restraining the State from compliance thereof and not to raise any Dwaja Dhand (Flag Staff) without consulting the denomination of the Swetamber Murtipujak Sangh to which the petitioners belong and without response to their tanets and Acharyas; (vi) to issue a suitable writ, or direction to quash the order dated 29.9.79 restraining the State from changing the denominational character of the temple by putting up a Dhwaja Dhand (Flag Staff) without consulting the denomination of Swetamber Murtipujak Sangh Jains to which the petitioners belong; and (vii) to issue such writ, direction or orders of the non petitioners to protect the denomination of Swetamber Jains in performing their religious ceremonies at the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji, and (viii) to issue any other suitable writ, order or direction in favour of the petitioners in the interest of justice which may be warranted in the circumstances of this case and to protect their rights under Arti- cles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. One Shreyans Prasad Jain and six other persons on behalf of Digambar Sect of Jain Sangh filed a writ petition before the learned Single Judge being S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 2247 of 1983 inter alia praying for the grant of following reliefs: ``(i) by a writ of mandamus or any other writ, direction or order, it be held and declared that the temple of Shri Rishabhdevji at Dhulev in Udaipur District is a Digamber Jain temple; (ii) by a writ, direction or order, the respondents no.1 and 2 be directed to publish a list of public trusts fully and faithfully complying with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 53 of the Act of 1959 within a period of not exceeding four weeks or such other time as the Honble Court deems just; (iii) by a writ, direction or order the respondents Nos. 3 to 8 and all other persons of the Shwetamber sect of Jains in India be restrained from interfering in any manner whatsoever as to affect the rights of the Digambar Jains; (iv) by a writ, direction or order the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 be direc- ted to appoint a Managing Committee consisting solely of Digambar Jains within a period of six weeks or such other time as the Honble Court deems proper; (v) that all other orders be made and directions given as may be deemed just and proper in order to safeguard and protect the rights of the Digambar Jains; (vi) costs of the writ petition be allowed. Rajendra Prasad Ardevi, Pujari of Shri Rishabhdevji Kesarianathji, Mahesh Bhandari, Dharam Narain Manaria and Lal Shanker Rawal on behalf of themselves and as representatives of the Hindu public also filed an application in the writ appli-cation to be impleaded as a party or to intervene in the writ application on the ground that in the writ petition the writ petitioners are seeking to quash the judgment dated 25.8.80 passed by the Devasthan Commissioner which was in favour of Hindus and, therefore, they are necessary parties to the writ application. It was further prayed in the application that in the writ petition the writ petitionersare further seeking relief by way of change in the management of Rikhabhdevji temple and if this relief is granted to them without giving an opportunity of hearing to the applicant interveners the persons belonging to Hindu faith as well as Adiwasis who perform puja and other ceremonies in the said temple would be deprived of their right to perform puja by the new management. It was further stated on behalfof the said applicants interveners that by filing the writ petition the writ petitioners are seeking to quash the order dated 29.9.79 as passed by the Assistant Commissioner and are trying to restrain the State Government from compliance of the said order as regards raising of any Flag Staff without consulting the denominations of Swetamber Murtipujak Sangh to which the writ petitioners did belong to and with-out response to their tenets and Acharyas. The application submitted by the present appellants in D.B. Civil Special Appeals No. 456 and 502 of 1997 came to be dismissed by order dated 2.12.1993 but in Review Petition No. 148/94 the application filed by the said appellants was allowed and the order dated 2.12.1993 came to be modified and the appellants were allowed to intervene in the writ application. (5). The learned Single Judge on the face of two writ applications being filed before this Court being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21 of 1981 where Deewan Singh and five others were the writ petitioners and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2247/83 where Shreyans Prasad Jain and others were the writ petitioners and where the appellants in D.B. Civil Special Appeals No. 456 of 502 and 1997 were the intervenersdirected the Assistant Commissioner to issue a public notice in such manner as he may think proper for inviting suggestions for the constitution of the Committee of management. The Assistant Commissioner was directed to forward suggestions so received alongwith his comments to the State Government through the Commissioner. The State Government was further directed to vest the management of thepublic religious trust under Section 53(1) in a Committee so appointed under Section 53(5) of the Act. The learned Single Judge thought that it was necessary for the State Government to direct the Assistant Commissioner to take steps for constitution of the Committee under Section 53(5) of the Act. The State Government was further directed to vest the management of thepublic religious trust under Section 53(1) in a Committee so appointed under Section 53(5) of the Act. The learned Single Judge thought that it was necessary for the State Government to direct the Assistant Commissioner to take steps for constitution of the Committee under Section 53(5) of the Act. While constituting the Committee, the Commissioner was to keep in mind the category of persons who can be the members of the Committee as mentioned in paragraph 11 of the Supreme Court, judgment. For giving effect to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court the Assistant Commissioner might be required to determine as to whether the temple is a Swetamber temple or a Digamber temple and if such question is agitated, the parties shall be given due opportunity to produce and prove relevant material necessary for adjudication of the question. It was, therefore, ordered by the learned Single Judge that directions under Rule 36 of the Rules should be issued by the State Government to the Assistant Commissioner within a period of three months from the date of the judgment and thereafter the AssistantCommissioner should proceed to conduct an enquiry as required under the law with regard to constitution of Committee of management and the State should appoint the Committee of management in accordance with law. (6). On the prayers made by the petitioners in one of the writ applications for the registration of the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji under Sections 17 and 18 of theAct the said application was rejected by the Assistant Devasthan Commissioner by order dated 30.9.96. An appeal was preferred by the petitioners to the Devasthan Commissioner and the same was also dismissed by the order dated 25.3.1980 wherein the Devasthan Commissioner held that the registration could not be made under the Act and further held that the appellants could not be given reliefs underSections 52 and 53. An appeal was preferred by the petitioners to the Devasthan Commissioner and the same was also dismissed by the order dated 25.3.1980 wherein the Devasthan Commissioner held that the registration could not be made under the Act and further held that the appellants could not be given reliefs underSections 52 and 53. The learned Single Judge also thought that the Trust cannot be registered as a public trust under Section 17 of the Act because the management of the trust is vested in the State Government and Section 77 of the Act excludes the application of the provisions of the Public Trust Act, if the public trust is adminis- tered by any agency under the control of the State Government and thus the findingrecorded by the Devasthan Commissioner as regards registration of the Trust was found correct by the learned Single Judge which did not call for any interference. The other finding that the petitioners could not be given any relief under Sections 52 and 53, according to the learned Single Judge, was contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court and the same stood set aside. (7). The learned Single Judge further observed that as per Chapter X of the Act which applies to the public trust, which is vested in the State Government, there was provision that the State Government should, after the commencement of Chapter X of the Act, publish in the official gazette a list of the public truts to which Chapter X applies. It was held by the Supreme Court that Shri Rikhabdevji PublicTrust vested in the State of Rajasthan and the learned Single Judge, therefore, thought it necessary that the State Government was to comply with the provisions of Section 52(2) of the Act. Since the State Government had failed to carry out the legislative direction contained in sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the Act and even though Chapter X of the Act had come into force on July 1, 1962 and the Legislaturedirected the State Government to publish the list in the Official gazette as soon as practicable and more than 20 years had passed but no list has been published complying with the provisions of law, it was found to be incumbent on the State Government to publish the list in the official gazette of public trusts to which Chapter X applies. The learned Single Judge thought that the Legislatures mandatehas to be complied with within a reasonable time and the period already elapsed which was beyond the comprehension of a reasonable period required for fulfilling the mandate of law. The learned Single Judge thought it wise to direct the State Government to publish the list of Public Trusts to which Chapter X shall apply within a period of six months from the date of the judgment. We have duly applied ourmind to this aspect of the matter over which the learned Single Judge passed directions on the State Government. We are of the considered opinion that no interference is called for at this stage so far as the learned Single Judges judgment regarding the publication of the list of all public trusts is concerned, which should be done within three months from this date. (8). In D.B. Civil Special Appeals No. 456 and 502 of 1997 Rajendra Prasad Ardevi who claims himself to be a Brahmin Pujari of Shri Rishabdevji Kesarianathji alongwith three others for and on behalf of themselves and as representatives of Hindu public have presented two appeals contending inter alia that the impugned order dated February 3, 1997 passed by the learned single Judge would render invalid the judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and others vs. Sajjan Lal Panjawat and others (supra). It is contended by them that from a perusal of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court and the judgment dated February 3, 1997 passed by the learned Single Judge, it would beclear that on the one hand the learned Single Judge proceeded with the view that the judgment rendered by the Honble Supreme Court is factually a judgment in rem about the nature of the temple and about its management and on the other hand the learned Single Judge has directed that the State is to constitute by notification in the official gazette a Committee of management and such Commi-ttee should be deemed to be the working trustee of the said public trust and its endowment. It was submitted by the appellants in these two appeals and also in the two appeals filed by the State that from a bare reading of the Supreme Court judgment it is evident that the Supreme Court has held that the State Government can appoint a Committee to manage the public trust but the Supreme Court did nothold that the State Government is under an obligation to appoint a Committee to manage the public trust. Thus the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in making a direction so passed byhim in his order dated February 3, 1997 giving a mandate on the State Government to constitute by notification in the official gazette a Committee of management and such Committee is to be deemed to be the worworking trustee of the public trust and its endowment, was wholly illegal, invalid, unwarranted and contrary to the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court. It was further submitted that the order dated February 3, 1997 passed by the learned Single Judge directing the State Government to constitute the committee to manage the public trust under Section 53 of the Act of 1959 was not at all in consonance withthe clear cut finding recorded by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Sajjan Lal Panjawat (ibid) since the Supreme Court judgment no where held that the State Government is under an obligation to constitute a management Committee under Section 53 of the Act for the State managed temples/public trusts. What the Supreme Court has only observed was that if the State Government preferred toconstitute a management Committee under Section 53 of the Act, in that case only the persons belonging to a particular faith, religion or persuation are entitled to be included as trustee or Chairman of the Committee. The question involved in these appeals are whether the State Government is under an obligation to constitute a Management Committee for State managed temples as in the case of temple of ShriRishabhdevji. The question involved in these appeals are whether the State Government is under an obligation to constitute a Management Committee for State managed temples as in the case of temple of ShriRishabhdevji. In other words, whether the provisions contained in Section 53 of the Act with regard to the constitution of the Management Committee are mandatory or directory and when the Supreme Court has held that the State Government, if it wishes, could appoint a Committee of management, the learned Single Judge over-stepped his jurisdiction and resorted to a futile exercise of jurisdiction impro-perly on the premise that the State Government was bound to constitute a Management Committee and such finding is wholly in derogation of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court and cannot be sustained. It was further submitted that from a bare reading of Section 52(1) of the Act it becomes wholly clear that the State Government has been left with a discretion to appoint a Management Committeeand to fix a date from which it would start functioning and the State Government is under no legal obligation to appoint a Management Committee in respect of every public trust to which Chapter X of the Act applies. The learned Single Judge thought that the provision of Section 53(1) was mandatory so far it relates to the appointment of a Committee. In Section 53(1)(a) the legislature used the word `may pur- posely, which denotes the nature of the provision. The State Government may appoint a Management Committee in respect of a public trust where in its discretion the management is required to be transferred from the State Government to the Management Committee. It was the submission of the appellants that the learned Single Judge has taken this provision as mandatory as if that it would satisfy the obligation on the part of the State wheresas in fact there was no legislative mandate for the State Government under Section 53 of the Act to constitute a management Committee for the State managed temples or public trusts. Thus according to the submission of the appellants the learned Single Judge in this re-gard mis-construed the law in giving direction to the State Government that it has to constitute a Management Committee and this finding cannot be sustained in law. (9). Thus according to the submission of the appellants the learned Single Judge in this re-gard mis-construed the law in giving direction to the State Government that it has to constitute a Management Committee and this finding cannot be sustained in law. (9). The learned Single Judge recorded a finding that the Trust cannot be registered as a public trust under Section 17 of the Act because the management of the Trust is vested in the State Government and Section 77 of the Act excludesthe application of the provisions of Public Trusts Act if the public trust is administered by any agency under the control of the State Government, but on the other hand the learned Single Judge has held that the finding recorded by the Devesthan Commissioner that the writ petitioners could not be given any relief under Section 52/53 would be contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court. Such finding deser-ves to be set aside. (10). Mr. Jasmatia drew our attention to the decisions in the Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh vs. Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd. & Ors (3), Jamatraj Kewalji Govani vs. State of Maharashtra (4) and T.R. Sharma vs. Prithvi Singh & Anr. (5) to contend that when the use of the word is `may as in Sec. 53(1) of the RajasthanPublic Trust Act, 1959 the State Government has the discretion in the matter to vest a management of a public trust in a Committee of Management to be constituted by the State Government as provided in the other provisions of Section 53 and the State Government may appoint different dates for different public trusts for the purpose of this section. As to whether or not the State Government would appointat all a Committee of management should be left to the discretion of the State Government but once it decides to go in for such appointment of a Committee of management and fix a date for the purpose, the State Government would be under an incumbent duty subject to the provisions contained in Section 54 to constitute a Committee of Management. The word ``shall is used in sub-section (2) of Section53 to show the imperative character of the State Governments obligation once it fixes a date under sub-section (1) of Section 53 to constitute a Committee of management. The word ``shall is used in sub-section (2) of Section53 to show the imperative character of the State Governments obligation once it fixes a date under sub-section (1) of Section 53 to constitute a Committee of management. However before it fixes a date and appoints a Committee, the government must have due regard to the wishes of the denomination no doubt as was directed in the statute and also delineated in the decision in State of Rajasthanvs. Sajjan Lal (supra). Mr. Jasmatia asked us to take an over all view of the situation and find out whether the language of the statute contains an imperative compulsion on the part of the State Government to appoint a Committee of Management and whether there is any scope for discretion left to the State Government for taking appropriate steps in this regard for which the learned Single Judge has passed direc-directions under Rule 36 which is to be issued by the Government to the Assistant Commissioner to proceed to conduct an enquiry as required under the relevant rules with regard to constitution of Committee of management. For this purpose he should ascertain the wishes of the persons interested under sub-section (5) of Section 53 first after giving a public notice for the purpose and after receiving thesuggestions for the constitution of the Committee of Management, the Assistant Commissioner shall forward such suggestions longwith his comments to the State Government through the Commissioner and the State Government will be at its discretion to apply its mind whether or not it will at all vest the management of the public religious trust under sub- section (1) of Section 53 in a Committee so appoin- ted under sub- section (5) of that section. We do not think it will be necessary for the State Government to direct the Assistant Commissioner straight away to take steps for constitution of the Committee under Section 53(5) of the Act but merely to ascertain the wishes of the persons after giving a pubic notice in such manner as for inviting suggestions for the constitution of the Committee of management, if it is deemed necessary at all and such suggestions so received are to be forwarded to the State Government through the Devesthan Commissioner. The Assistant Commissioner has also to determine the question as to whether the temple is a Swetamber or Digamber temple and if such question is agitated, the parties shallbe given due opportunity to produce and prove relevant materials necessary for adjudication of the question. We think without making it mandatory on the part of the State Government to appoint the Committee of Management in such circumstances and taking any decision finally at this stage, the matter would left open to the State Government so that even though under Rule 36 of the Rules, a directionmay be issued by the State Government on the Assistant Commissioner within a period of three months and thereafter the Assistant Commissioner proceeds to conduct an inquiry as required under the law as regards the possibility of the constitution of Committee of Management in this regard and ascertains the wishes of the parties interested and further determines whether the temple is a Swetamberor Digamber temple, there should be due scope of application of mind left with the State Government in this regard. With these observations we modify the judgment of the learned Single Judge accordingly. We reiterate over again that Mr. Jasmatia appearing for the State Government has already agreed to abide by the directions as passed by the learned Single Judge which stands affirmed by us that the StateGovernment within a period of three months from today should publish a list of the public trusts to which Chapter X of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 does apply. (11). The impugned order stands modified accordingly as indicate above and the appeals stand disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.