Honble KHAN, J.–This is petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. against the order dated 30.7.97, passed by Asstt. Collector cum Executive Magistrate, Chomu, Distt. Jaipur in criminal case No. 210/97 u/s. 107/116/151 Cr.P.C. The grievance of the petitioner is that not only the criminal case has been registered against him without any legal justification on totally in-correct and fabricated facts but also that he was wrongfully arrested and kept in detention by the police officers at P/s. Chomu and thereby his fundamental right under article 21 of the Constitution was infringed. (2). The petition arises under the following circumstances : (3). On 30.7.97 the S.H.O. P/s. Chomu, through the Asstt. Public Prosecutor, filed a complaint against the petitioner U/s. 107/116/151 Cr.P.C. alleging therein that on the receipt of telephonic message from the Govt. Senior Secondary School, Chomu, on 29.7.97 that the petitioner and others (Gher-Sailan) were bent upon to commit the breach of public peace he was arrested u/s. 151 Cr.P.C. in order to prevent the commission of a cognizable offence. It was stated in the complaint that the petitioner wanted to change the subject of his younger brother, Harish Kumar Tailor, a student of XI-B in the Govt. Sen. Hr. Sec. School, Chomu, but since the school authorities were not willing to change the subject of Harish Kumar, the petitioner picked up a quarrel with Sh. N.K. Sharma, a senior teacher in the said institution and threatened to commit breach of public peace. On the basis of such complaint the learned Executive Magistrate registered the case u/Sec. 107/116/151 Cr.P.C. and read over the notice u/S. 111 Cr.P.C. to the petitioner. Aggrieved against such sort of proceedings, initiated against him by the Executive Magistrate, the petitioner has approached this court. (4). Dr. S.K. Tiwari, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the present case was not a case of unruly behaviour of a student with the teaching staff of his institution which a case he would have never supported but in fact it was a case of violation of the human rights of a citizen by the police authorities in as much a that there existed no ground for taking action u/s. 107/116/151 Cr.P.C. Dr. Tiwari took me through the contents of the petition and highlighted that the sequence of events, as revealed from the documents, maintained by the police, itself speaks that the police officers at Chomu had prepared forged documents in order to suppress their intentional derogatory, illegal and humiliating conduct against the present petitioner. On merits of the case, Dr. Tiwari submitted that the learned Executive Magistrate did neither prepare any notice u/s. 111 Cr.P.C. nor did he ever read over and explain such a notice to the petitioner. It was also submitted that the very foundation of the proceedings of the criminal proceedings, initiated in the court of the Executive Magistrate, was infirm and unsound having been founded on forged documents and therefore, the continuation of such proceedings against the petitioner amounted to abuse of the process of the court. (5). On 22.8.97 Dr. Tiwari had filed a news item also stating that the provisions of Section 107 and 151 Cr.P.C. were being mis-used by the police and, therefore, this court, the learned counsel had urged, should take cognizance of the matter in such cases and should lay down proper guidelines so that such cases of violation of human rights by unlawful arrests and detention of the citizens by the police may not be repeated. Dr. Tiwari took me to certain decisions of the point and empha- sised that this court, being the protector and guardian of the life and liberty of the citizens, should take note of such cases, whenever they come or are brought before this court and should lay down proper guidelines, safeguarding the rights of the citizens preserving at the same time the right of the police to prevent commission of cognizable offences and discharging their functions and duties with regard to the arrest and detention of the offenders in a legal and lawful manner. (6). Mr. S.M. Poddar, the learned Public Prosecutor, was fair enough to provide all the relevant record of the proceedings, in the present matter, and further submitted that on going through the relevant record this court may form its own opinion of the authenticity of such record and if this court thinks that the police officer had gone away and had, in the discharge of their official duties, intentionally or un-intentionally violated the fundamental rights or human rights of the petitioner, this court may issue suitable and appropriate guidelines to them. Mr. Mr. Poddar, however, emphasised that though the present case was a petty one where the proceedings u/s. 107/116/151 Cr.P.C. are being taken against the petitioner, who was already on bail, yet when Dr. Tiwari had complained of the violation of the fundamental and/or human rights of the petitioner then this court may approach the case from the angle of violation of such rights as well. (7). I have given due consideration to the arguments, advanced by the learned counsel on both sides. On an examination of the material, placed before me inclu- ding General Diary, dated 29.7.97, and the case diary pertaining to F.I.R. No. 458/97 and 459/97, I have felt satisfied that the proceedings u/s. 107/116/151 Cr.P.C., pending against the petitioner in the court of the Executive Magistrate, have no sound basis and foundation and the pendency and continuation of such proceedings against the petitioner amount to abuse of the process of the court. (8). In so far as the question of pendency of present proceedings against the petitioner is concerned, such proceeding may be brought to an end by quashing the order made by the learned Executive Magistrate on 30.7.97. The record of the learned Executive Magistrate contains no notice purported to have been prepared u/S. 111 Cr.P.C. and to have been explained to the petitioner. What the record of the learned Executive Magistrate contains is the order-sheet, dated 30.7.97, wherein it is mentioned that a notice u/S. 111 Cr.P.C. was read over and explained to the petitioner, who pleaded not guilty to such notice. That is not the requirement of Section 111 Cr.P.C. Section 111 Cr.P.C. provides that when a Magistrate acting under Section 107, Sec. 108, Sec. 109 or Section 110 Cr.P.C. deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under such sections, he shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required. The record of the proceedings of the court of Executive Magistrate does not disclose the compliance of the provisions, contained in Section 111 Cr.P.C. As stated above, the alleged notice does not speak of the terms for which the order was to remain in force nor of the number, character and class of sureties, which the petitioner was required to furnish. Therefore, on this technical aspect only the notice purported to have been issued to the petitioner u/s. 111 Cr.P.C. by the learned Executive Magistrate was required to be quashed and that being simply a procedural irregularity, the learned Magistrate could have been asked to proceed with the disposal of the case according to law. But, on going through the entire record of the case, as was pointed out by Dr. Tiwari to me, I felt convinced that the very foundation of issuing the said notice pur- ported to have been issued u/s. 111 Cr.P.C. was legally infirm and un-sound. (9). It is not in dispute that the petitioner and his brother are the students in the Government Sen. Hr. Sec. School, Chomu. It appears that the petitioner wanted to change the subject of his younger brother and, therefore, he approached the concerned Senior teacher Sh. Navin Kumar Sharma. It further appears that the two exchanged some hot words between themselves and that led to the lodging of the respective First Information Reports by them against each-other with the Police Station Chomu. Sh. Hardan Singh, Principal of the Institution, appearing in person with Navin Kumar Sharma, Sr. Teacher, at the Police Station, presented a written report wherein it was alleged that the petitioner had mis-behaved and used crimi- nal force against Sh. N.K. Sharma, Sr. Teacher, and assaulted him at about 1.45 P.M. on 29.7.97. On the basis of this report G.D. Report No. 1466 is stated to have been registered at 3.05 PM and on the basis of such report Crime No. 458/97 u/s. 332, 353 IPC was registered against the petitioner. (10). The petitioner also appears to have gone to the police station at 3.10 P.M. on that very day, i.e. 29.7.97 and reported the police officers that six or seven teachers had assaulted him. He filed his written report to that effect before the police officers. (10). The petitioner also appears to have gone to the police station at 3.10 P.M. on that very day, i.e. 29.7.97 and reported the police officers that six or seven teachers had assaulted him. He filed his written report to that effect before the police officers. G.D. Report No. 1467 was registered at 3.10 P.M. and on the basis of such G.D. Report Crime No. 459/97 u/s. 147, 323 IPC was registered. The registration of these two cases, on the basis of the F.I.Rs., lodged by the rival parties, clearly suggests that they had by themselves gone to the P/s. at around 3.00 P.M. Now what is shown to have been written in the General Diary is that at about 2.10 P.M. the police officers at P/s. Chomu received an information from the Govt. Sen. Hr. Sec. School, Chomu, to the effect that certain boys were likely to commit breach of peace there. This information is shown to have been registered at G.D. No. 1464 but no time has been mentioned in the Diary regarding its registration. On the basis of this G.D. Report, Chittar Mal, S.I., alongwith other police officers, is stated to have left for the school premises and allegedly reaching there at 2.45 P.M. to have found the present petitioner threatening the school teachers. Allegedly the petitioner was bent upon to commit some cognizable offence against the teachers. The police offi- cers, therefore, arrested him u/S. 151 Cr.P.C. and brought him to the Police Station. It was on the basis of this report that, subsequently, the complaint u/s. 107/116/151 Cr.P.C. was filed by the S.H.O., P/s. Chomu, in the court of the Executive Magistrate, Jaipur. The petitioner was kept in detention during all this period and he was released on bail by the Executive on the next day. (11). Here, it was urged by Dr. Tiwari that if a telephonic message had infact been received by the police at the police station and the police officers had reached the Institution and arrested the petitioner there and brought him back to the police station at 2.45 P.M., the petitioner could not have been in a position to appear before them as a free citizen at 3.10 P.M. and lodged his F.I.R. Similarly, in that sequence of events Sh. Hardan Singh, Principal would have either delivered his report to the police officers in the institution itself or in any case at the police station soon thereafter. Dr. Tiwari submitted that the petitioner could have been arrested u/S. 151 Cr.P.C. to prevent the commission of a cognizable offence and proceeded against as per provisions u/Ss. 107/116 Cr.P.C. But if the alleged offence had already been committed at 1.45 P.M., there was no occasion for the police to have arrested the petitioner u/S. 151 and proceed against him u/S. 107/116 Cr.P.C. The sequence of events themselves indicates that the things had not taken place as they were purported to have taken place. If the petitioner as also the Principal Hardan Singh had themselves appeared at about 3.00 P.M. at the Police Station, the petitioner could not have been in detention or in the custody of the police at 2.45 P.M. That clearly indicates that the G.D. Report Nos. 1464 and 1465 were subsequently written and are not true pieces of documents. Since the foundational facts, pointedly referred to by Dr. Tiwari in the record of the General Diary maintained by the police officers at police station Chomu could not be otherwise explained by the learned Public Prosecutor, I find much force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel. (12). Section 151 Cr.P.C. occurs in Chapter XI Cr.P.C. The title given to this Chapter is `Preventive Action of the Police. This Chapter contains five Sections of which the first three are relevant for our purpose and are reproduced as under : ``Sec. 149: Police to prevent cognizable offences.–Every police offi- cer may interpose for the purpose of preventing, and shall, to the best of his ability, prevent the commission of any cognizable offence. Sec. 150: Information of design to commit cognizable offences.–Every police officer receiving information of a design to commit any cognizable offence shall communicate such information to the police officer to whom he is subordinate, and to any other officer whose duty it is to prevent or take cognizance of the commission of any such offence. Sec. 150: Information of design to commit cognizable offences.–Every police officer receiving information of a design to commit any cognizable offence shall communicate such information to the police officer to whom he is subordinate, and to any other officer whose duty it is to prevent or take cognizance of the commission of any such offence. Sec. 151 : Arrest to prevent the commission of cognizable offences.–(1) A police officer knowing of a design to commit any cognizable offence may arrest, without orders from a Magistrate and without a warrant, the person so designing, if it appears to such officer that the commission of the offence cannot be otherwise prevented. (2) No person arrested under sub-Sec. (1) shall be detained in custody for a period exceeding twenty-two hours from the time of his arrest unless his further detention is required or authorised under any other provisions of this Code or of any other law for the time being in force. (13). A plain reading of Sections 149 to 151 Cr.P.C. discloses that a police officer, knowing of a design of a person to commit any cognizable offence, may arrest, without orders from the Executive Magistrate or without a warrant, the person so designing, if it appears to such officer that the offence committed cannot be otherwise prevented. It means that it is on the basis of his knowledge about the likely commission of a cognizable offence that a police officer may proceed u/S. 151 Cr.P.C. against a person in order to prevent the commission of the cognizable offence. In the instant case if Hardan Singh, Principal of the Institution, and the petitioner had reached the police station at 3.05 P.M. and 3.10 P.M. respectively there could have been no occasion for the police to arrest the petitioner at earlier point of time. However, if the petitioner had been arrested at 2.45 P.M. u/S. 151 Cr.P.C. in order to prevent the commission of cognizable offence, then no offence u/S. 353 and 332 IPC, which were cognizable offences, could have been committed by the petitioner. (14). In view of the above discussion I hold that Sh. Hardan Singh, Principal of the Institution, and the petitioner had themselves reached the Police Station around 3.00 P.M. and had lodged their respective reports. (14). In view of the above discussion I hold that Sh. Hardan Singh, Principal of the Institution, and the petitioner had themselves reached the Police Station around 3.00 P.M. and had lodged their respective reports. The petitioner could not have been arrested at 2.45 P.M. and that the police had shown his arrest at 2.45 P.M. and kept him in detention upto 30.7.97 when he was produced before the learned Executive Magistrate, unlawfully. The G.D. report, making the very foundation for proceedings u/s. 107/116 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner in this case appear to have been subsequently made, therefore, since the very foundation of proceedings u/s. 107/116 Cr.P.C. is inherently bad and appear suffering from malice and ill-will, such proceedings cannot be allowed to continue. There is thus no escape from the con- clusion that the continuation of the proceedings of the criminal case in the court of the Executive Magistrate amounts to abuse of the process of the court and such abuse is required to be prevented. That being so, the proceedings of criminal case No. 210/97 u/S. 107/116/151 Cr.P.C., pending in the court of Asstt. Collector Cum Executive Magistrate at Chomu against the petitioner are hereby quashed and terminated. (15). The other arguments, advanced by Dr. Tiwari before me regarding the violation of human rights of the petitioner requires a few observations by this Court in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case. I would, therefore, like to briefly comment upon that aspect of the case, which has been projected before me by Dr.S.K. Tiwari, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in a very learned manner. (16). It is said that the international human rights movement was borne in and out of Second World War as the jurisprudence of terror and violence practised by Adolf Hitler left several thousands corpuses of mortals and debris of demolished cities on the face of earth. The ashes of those several thousands mortals and the debris of good many civilized and developed cities created an awakening of cons- cience in the world community that such barbaric act should not again be repeated and the God made world be not destroyed by the mortals. The ashes of those several thousands mortals and the debris of good many civilized and developed cities created an awakening of cons- cience in the world community that such barbaric act should not again be repeated and the God made world be not destroyed by the mortals. The United Nations, therefore, adopted a declaration of human rights on 10th December, 1948, wherein it was resolved that the people of the United Nations ``re-affirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of human person, in the equal rights on men and women and in ``universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. For our purpose suffice it to say that we gave ourselves the fundamental political and civil rights in Part-III of our Constitution and at the same time we dedicated ourselves to follow certain principles which were known as directive pri- nciples of state policy and are enshrined in Part-IV of the Constitution. The difficulty, however, was that whereas rights given to the citizen in Part-III were enforceable at law, the directive principles contained in Part-IV were not so enforceable at law, but soon the Apex Court started reading the directive principle of State policy in the fundamental rights of the citizen through Article 21 of the Constitution relating to fundamental right of citizen for life and liberty. Thus the right to live with dignity and honour became a part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. (17). Human rights are inherent in all human beings and find expression in the Constitution and legal systems of all the civilized countries throughout the world. The very basis of such rights in the rule of law which only can sustain democratic values in any polity and society. Therefore, it is necessary that wherever instances of violation to or erosion in or dis-respect to such rights are noticed by the courts, a strict view be taken of such invasion, erosion and violations. (18). The Apex Court has time and again pointed out in a number of cases that notice of custodial violence should be taken by the courts. Therefore, it is necessary that wherever instances of violation to or erosion in or dis-respect to such rights are noticed by the courts, a strict view be taken of such invasion, erosion and violations. (18). The Apex Court has time and again pointed out in a number of cases that notice of custodial violence should be taken by the courts. It has been pointed out in the case of Jogendra Kumar vs. State of U.P. (1), wherein a young man of 28 years of age was called by S.P. Ghaziabad in his office for making enquiries in some cases and was detained there, that : ``No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite another. The police officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to do so. Arrest and detention in police lock-up of a person can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self- esteem of a person. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence mad against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in this own interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the persons complicity and even so as to the need to effect arrest. (19). Their Lordships considered the same point in the case of Neelabati Ben Bahera vs. State of Orissa (2) and made following pertinent observations : ``It is axiomatic that convicts, prisoners or undertrials are not denuded of their fundamental rights under Article 21 and it is only such restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be imposed on the enjoyment of the fundamental right by such persons. It is an obligation of the State to ensure that there is no infringement of the inde- feasible rights of a citizen to life, except in accordance with law, while the citizen is in its custody. It is an obligation of the State to ensure that there is no infringement of the inde- feasible rights of a citizen to life, except in accordance with law, while the citizen is in its custody. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, undertrials or other prisoners in custody, except according to procedure established by law. There is a great responsibility on the police or pri- son authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life. His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State strict and admits of no exceptions. The wrong- doer is accountable and the State is responsible if the person in custody of the police is deprived of his life except according to the procedure established by law. (20). In this case their Lordship had awarded damages against the State to the mother of a young man beaten to death in police custody. The doctrine of ``forging new tool as part of the duty of the Apex Court, was propounded by his Lordship Dr. A.S. Anand, J. and such doctrine did not make the award of compensation as a remedy in tort but a remedy in public law. It must be a matter of great pride and satisfaction for all of us that the principles propounded by his Lordship were followed by Hardie Boys, J. of the Court of Appeal in Newzealand in the case of Simpson vs. Attorney General (3) in the following words : ``Another valuable authority comes from India, where the constitution empowers the Supreme Court to enforce rights guaranteed under it. In Nilabati Baher vs. State of Orissa, 1993 Cr.L.J. 2899, the Supreme Court awarded damages against the State to the mother of a young man beaten to death in police custody. The court held that its power of enforcement imposed a duty to ``forge new tools, of which compensation was an appropriate one where that was the only mode of redress available. The court held that its power of enforcement imposed a duty to ``forge new tools, of which compensation was an appropriate one where that was the only mode of redress available. This was not a remedy in tort but one in public law based on strict liability for the contravention of fundamen- tal rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply. These observations of Anand, J. at page 2912 may be noted. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. (21). In the case of D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal (4) his Lordship Dr. A.S. Anand, J. of the Apex Court had further pointed out that in its Third Report the National Police Commission in India expressed its deep concern over custodial violence and lock-up deaths and inter-alia suggested the following remedial measures: ``.........An arrest during the investigation of a cognizable case may be considered justified in one or other of the following circumstances : (i) The case involves a grave offence like murder, dacoity, robbery, rape etc., and it is necessary to arrest the accused and bring his movements under restraint to infuse confidence among the terror stricken victims. (ii) The accused is likely to abscond and evade the processes of law. (iii) The accused is given to violent behaviour and is likely to commit further offences unless his movement are brought under restraint. (iv) The accused is a habitual offender and unless kept in custody he is likely to commit similar offences again. It would be desirable to insist through departmental instructions that a police officer making an arrest should also record in the case diary the reasons for making the arrest, thereby clarifying his conformity to the specified guidelines....... (22). (iv) The accused is a habitual offender and unless kept in custody he is likely to commit similar offences again. It would be desirable to insist through departmental instructions that a police officer making an arrest should also record in the case diary the reasons for making the arrest, thereby clarifying his conformity to the specified guidelines....... (22). The recommendations of the Police Commission, as his Lordship obser- ved, reflects the constitutional concomitants of the fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom. These recommendations, however, have not acquired any statutory status so far. (23). After having examined the issue at sufficient length his Lordship issued the following in para 36 of the Report to be followed in all cases of arrest and deten- tion till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures : ``(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register. (2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may be either a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest. (3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the testing witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a fried or a relative of the arrestee. (4) The time place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest. (5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained. (6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is. (7) The arrestee where he so request be also examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any, present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The ``Inspection Memo must be signed both the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee. (8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the penal of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the concerned State or Union Territory, Director, Health Services should prepare such a penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well. (9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, refer- red to above, should be sent to the illaqa Magistrate for his record. (10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation. (11) A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board. (24). (11) A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board. (24). In para 37 His Lordship warned that the failure to comply with the requirements hereinabove mentioned shall, apart from rendering the concerned official liable for departmental action, also render him liable to be punished for contempt of court and the proceedings for contempt of court may be instituted in any High Court of the country, having territorial jurisdiction over the matter. (25). In para 38 his Lordship further observed that the requirements, referred to above flow from Article 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution and need to be strictly followed. These would apply with equal force to the other governmental agencies also to which a reference had been made earlier by his Lordship. (26). In para 39 it was made clear that these requirements were in addition to the constitutional and statutory safeguards and do not detract from various other directions given by the courts from time to time in connection with the safeguarding of the rights and dignity of the arrestee. (27). In view of the mandate contained in para 37 this court has all the reasons to believe that the State Government has complied with the requirements, issued by his Lordship in para 36 above. However, to ensure that the mandatory requirements attracting the law of contempt of the highest court in the land have been complied with or not, this court requires the Director General of Police and the Home Commissioner of Govt. of Rajasthan to inform this court in writing whether the police stations throughout the State have complied with the requirements, as issued by their Lordships in D.K. Basus case (supra). (28). If the police officers at Police Station, Chomu, are found to have violated the requirements, as mentioned above, and which make the law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution, proper legal steps for their punishment, as indicated in para 37 of the report, shall separately be instituted on the receipt of the report from the Director General of Police and the Home Commissioner, of the State of Rajasthan. It may be stressed upon the erring officers that governance is not by men but by Rule of Law and that, if we have to survive as a democratic polity and a civilized people, we should respect the law of the land and the basic human rights of each-other, should sincerely subscribe to the view that ``Be you ever so high, the law is above you. (29). Since the present case requires no more comments from this court, I leave the case record with full faith in the high ups in the police administration in the State to submit their reports, within 15 days of the receipt of the copy of this order by them, of the compliance of the law of the land as laid down by the Apex Court in para 36 in D.K. Basus case, which has been reproduced above. The Deputy Registrar (Judl.) shall send a copy of this order each to the Director General of Police (Admn.) Rajasthan, Jaipur, and Home Commissioner, Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur by their names with D.O. letters. (29). In the result, the petition is allowed.