JUDGMENT 1. - All these Revision Petitions have been filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short the Code') by the plaintiff-petitioners against the common order dated 11.4.1997 passed by the learned District Judge, Udaipur thereby dismissing Civil Misc. Appeals Nos. 58, 59, 60, 61, 62 & 64/97 preferred against the orders dated 21.2.1997 whereby the learned Civil Judge (JD), (North) Udaipur, similarly dismissed applications for temporary injunctions filed along with the main suits by the plaintiff-petitioners. 2. It may also be mentioned that the learned District Judge vide his impugned order disposed of the Civil Misc, Appeals so preferred by the present petitioners along with one more Civil Misc. Appeal No. 63/97 preferred by Kanti Lal but, however, Kanti Lal is not before this Court. Since all other plaintiff-petitioners have preferred these Revision Petitions and, accordingly, since they involve common questions of fact and law,the same are proposed to be disposed of by this common order. 3. Briefly, for the disposal of the present controversy, it is worthwhile to mention that the plaintiff-petitioners, brought suits for permanent injunctions in the trial Court and also simultaneously filed applications under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of the Code. The plaintiffs, as evidenced from all the plaints filed by them, averred that there are as many as 48 plots of land popularly known as 'Katpatries' over which the plaintiffs have also placed tin-sheds, situated in Dhanmandi, Udaipur. Since all these 'katpatries' belonged to and are of the ownership of the respondent-State, the plaintiffs were rented out these katpatries and some of them are holding more than one kat-patries' on lease from the State. They have inter alia pleaded that initially the rent payable for each 'katpatri' was fixed at Rs. 5/- per month but, subsequently, progressively the same was fixed and payable at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month. The plaintiffs were carrying on their business of Food-grains etc. in their respective plots of 'kat-patries' as lessees and they have been regularly paying rent, lastly, at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month. 4. However, as regards the present controversy, it has been averred that the defendant-respondents, in the month of January 1993, arbitrarily, capriciously and without knowledge and consent of the plaintiff-petitioners, increased and enhanced the rate of monthly rent from Rs. 32/- to Rs. 32/- per month. 4. However, as regards the present controversy, it has been averred that the defendant-respondents, in the month of January 1993, arbitrarily, capriciously and without knowledge and consent of the plaintiff-petitioners, increased and enhanced the rate of monthly rent from Rs. 32/- to Rs. 139/- and they were required to pay at the enhanced rate with effect from 1.11.1992. Therefore, in they suits as well as applications for temporary injunctions, it was maintained that the defendant-respondents had unilaterally, in absence of any agreement or a consent of the plaintiffs, changed the terms of contract of lease entered into by the plaintiffs with the defendants and the same was exorbitant as well as illegal and, therefore, the defendant-respondents be restrained by issuing temporary injunctions not to force the plaintiffs to pay enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 139/- per month and to, instead, realise rent at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month. 5. The defendants did not dispute the factum of the suit-plots (kat-patries') having been leased out to the plaintiff-petitioner and, lastly, their paying rent at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month but, on the contrary, it was pleaded that the disputed properties formed a part of the 'Nazool' property vesting in the State and the Government of Rajasthan had framed rules for management and disposal of the 'Nazool' property and so, the property also leased out as per the provisions of the rules prescribed in respect of the property. The suit-properties were leased out long back and there was no increase or enhancement of the rent of Rs. 32/- per month being paid by the plaintiff-petitioners for last about 20 to 21 years. Accordingly, as per Rule 19(c) of the Rajasthan Nazool Buildings (Disposal by Public Auction) Rules, 1971 (for short 'the Rules of 1971'), the State Government is vested with the power to revise the rate of rent after every fifth year of such 'Nazool' buildings regarding which it has been decided that they are not to be sold u/Cl. (a) of this rule and this revision of rent will be equal to the current market rate of rent to be assessed by the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. concerned. Accordingly, the respondent No. 2 assessed the rent of each plot at the rate of Rs. (a) of this rule and this revision of rent will be equal to the current market rate of rent to be assessed by the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. concerned. Accordingly, the respondent No. 2 assessed the rent of each plot at the rate of Rs. 139/- per month and, consequently, vide notices dated 21.10.1992 issued by the respondent No. 2 to the plaintiff-petitioners they were required to pay rents on their plots (kat-patries) at the rate of Rs. 139/ instead of Rs. 32/-. Accordingly, the defendant-respondents maintained that the notices of the enhanced rent so assessed in terms of the provisions of the said Rule 19(c) of the Rules of 1971 were issued as early as on 21.10.1992 and the plaintiff petitioners were required to pay monthly rent at the enhanced rate with effect from 1.11.1992 to which none of the plaintiff-petitioners objected nor did any of them show any cause against the disputed enhancement and, consequently, since there was no protest or opposition to the enhancement of the rent of the disputed property and, any how, with an ulterior motive, after a lapse of about 4 years, the plaintiff-petitioners have instituted these suits which are groundless and, accordingly, there is no merit in the applications for temporary injunctions as well. 6. After hearing both the sides, the learned trial Judge (Civil Judge) dismissed all applications so moved for grant of temporary injunctions by the plaintiff-petitioners vide his orders dated 21.2.1997 which were all subjected to an appeal before the learned District Judge, who, vide his impugned order dated 11.4.1997, while upholding the conclusion of the trial Court that the plaintiff-petitioners could not establish existence of a prima facie case for issuing temporary injunctions in their favour and, besides, the questions of any irreparable injury and the balance of convenience were also not in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners and hence while affirming the impugned orders of dismissal of the temporary injunctions of the plaintiff-petitioners passed by the learned trial Judge, all the appeals were dismissed and hence these Revision Petitions. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned counsel for the respondents and have also considered the legality and propriety of the jurisdiction exercised by the lower Courts along with the relevant record relied upon by the contesting parties. 8. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned counsel for the respondents and have also considered the legality and propriety of the jurisdiction exercised by the lower Courts along with the relevant record relied upon by the contesting parties. 8. The main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, admittedly, all the plaintiff-petitioners were paying, lastly, monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 32/- only to the respondents and abruptly at their back and without their consent and in absence of any agreement contrary to the one under which the plaintiff petitioners, as lessees, came to occupy the suit-properties pursuant to an agreement with the defendant-respondents, the latter arbitrarily and unilaterally enhanced monthly rent from Rs. 32/- to Rs. 139/- which is excessive and exorbitant and the respondents are legally not authorised and empowered to unilaterally enhance the monthly rent of suit-properties and to threaten the plaintiff-petitioners to pay rent at enhanced rate and, accordingly, the notices so issued and consequential demand of enhanced rent is illegal and unauthorised and the same being void, the defendant-respondents cannot be allowed to realise enhanced rent and to threaten legal and rightful possession and occupation of the suit-properties by the plaintiff-petitioners and, therefore, when there was a strong prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners, the learned trial Judge and, so also the learned lower appellate Judge, did not appreciate the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the light of relevant legal provisions and, instead, taking a superfluous view of the circumstances, were swayed away merely by the allegations of the defendants-respondents that there was a delay of about 4 years after notices of enhanced rent were served to have imposed a litigation on the defendant-respondents with an ulterior motive to avoid payment of enhanced rent which was assessed by the respondent No. 2 in a rational manner and, subsequently, the respondents were notified of this enhanced rate of rent being payable in terms of the provisions of Cl. (c) of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1971. 9. (c) of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1971. 9. Accordingly, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the disputed rate of enhanced rent was worked out as per the prevalent Rules is respect of the suit-property which is nothing but a 'Nazool' property vesting in the respondent No. 1 and in view of this fact disputed increase and enhancement of the rent from the plaintiff-petitioners, by no stretch of imagination, could be termed to be either excessive or unauthorised and hence the proceedings initiated by the respondents cannot be held to be void thereby enabling the plaintiff-petitioners to obtain any relief there against by way of temporary injunctions. Besides, he has further submitted that even if, looking to the nature of the controversy, it is held that there is a prima facie case worth being tried by the trial Court, at the same time, the questions of balance of convenience and irreparable injury, if any, resulting to the petitioner is not established and, in the circumstances, in case any temporary injunction is granted for which both the lower Courts did not find any justification, it would cause great hardship and irreparable injury to the State since the State exchequer would stand deprived of enhanced rent to which it is entitled whereas, in case, rent is realised at the enhanced rate, in case of ultimate decision going in favour of the petitioners, the enhanced rent, if any, realised by the respondents can be justifiably ordered to be adjusted against the future rent payable by the petitioners and, in view of these submissions, he further submitted that the petitioners have not been able to make out any case strong enough to disturb the concurrent findings of the lower Courts holding that there was no justification for granting. temporary injunctions to the petitioners. 10. The crucial point for determination is whether the lower Courts have committed any illegality or material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction in refusing to grant temporary injunctions to the plaintiff-petitioners thereby not restraining the defendant-respondents from realising the rent of the suit-properties at the enhanced rate of Rs. 139/- per month. 11. Before reverting to the main controversy, it is undisputed that the suit-properties, being small plots of land popularly and locally known as 'kat-patries' are located in Udaipur City. The plaintiff-petitioners have also laid tin-sheds over these plots. 139/- per month. 11. Before reverting to the main controversy, it is undisputed that the suit-properties, being small plots of land popularly and locally known as 'kat-patries' are located in Udaipur City. The plaintiff-petitioners have also laid tin-sheds over these plots. The last rent of each of the suit plot agreed to be paid by the petitioners was Rs. 32/- per month. It is also not disputed that the rent, pursuant to the relevant and enabling provisions of the Rules of 1971 with subsequent amendments thereto, no increase was made in the rate of monthly rent payable by the petitioners. They are paying monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 32/- last for about 20 to 21 years. 12. As is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, respondent No. 2, in exercise of the enabling powers vested u/Cl. (c) of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1971, assessed the monthly rent of each of the suit plot at the rate of Rs. 139/- per month, being demanded from the petitioners, was fixed and demanded as a result of unilateral action on the part of the respondents. However the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents has been that pursuant to working out of the rate of rent which could be enhanced to and demanded from the plaintiff-petitioners, as above, they were duly served with notices dated 21.10.1992 and the rent at the enhanced rate was not imposed retrospectively and, accordingly, the same was made payable with effect from 1.11.1992. However, none of the petitioners came forward throwing a challenge against fixation, enhancement and demand of the enhanced rent from the plaintiff-petitioners. They acquiesced to the enhanced rent and after an inordinate delay and a lapse of about 4 years, abruptly, they have foisted present suits on the defendant-respondents with an ulterior motive so that the defendant-respondents may be restrained from realising the enhanced rent otherwise not challenged previously by the plaintiff-petitioners. 13. In view of these circumstances, for the purpose of granting any temporary injunction, the three necessary conditions to be fulfilled before exercise of any discretion in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners, are, existence of a prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience and when all these three conditions are necessarily fulfilled, there may be a justification for granting temporary injunction to the plaintiff-petitioners. 14. 14. It is also a well settled principle that the discretion exercised by the lower Court in the matter of granting or refusing temporary injunction cannot be interfered with in revision unless the order exercising discretion can be termed as perverse or having been passed on some extraneous consideration. Similarly, an order passed without jurisdiction is also liable to revision and interference. However, as also held in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria, AIR 1976 SC 2621 , where there is a concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below that the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case or that they have a prima facie case and that balance of convenience was in their favour the interference by the High Court with such findings is not justified. Therefore, High Court may be justified in interfering with any order of temporary injunction granted to the petitioners on the ground that there was a prima facie case but the balance of convenience and the question of irreparable loss to the plaintiffs have, at the same time, not been considered. 15. Therefore, High Court may be justified in interfering with any order of temporary injunction granted to the petitioners on the ground that there was a prima facie case but the balance of convenience and the question of irreparable loss to the plaintiffs have, at the same time, not been considered. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of his contentions has relied on the decision rendered in the Commissioner, Devasthan v. Rampal, 1989 (1) CCC 447 , Hari Kishan v. The State of Rajasthan, 1982 (1) WLN (UC) 303 and a decision dated 25.2.1991 passed in Prem Kumar v. The State of Rajasthan, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1551 of 1989 to supplement has arguments that the defendant-respondents cannot enhance rent unilaterally because rent was payable according to the bilateral contract as such and, therefore, the defendant-respondents were not legally authorised to have enhanced contracted rent payable by the petitioners and in view of these circumstances, his further submission is that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff-petitioners against the demand and realisation of enhanced rent and, consequently, when a prima facie case has been made out, there is no escape from the conclusion that the questions of irreparable loss or so also balance of convenience are also established in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners and the lower Courts committed a serious illegality while holding that the petitioners failed to establish all these three essential requirements necessarily to be established for issuing temporary injunctions in their favour and, accordingly, while refusing to grant temporary injunction to the plaintiff-petitioners, they failed to exercise their jurisdiction thereby committing material irregularity in exercise thereof which has necessarily resulted in irreparable injury to the plaintiff-petitioners occasioning a failure of justice warranting reversal of impugned findings of lower Courts and granting of temporary injunctions as prayed for in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners. 16. As discussed hereinbefore, the plaintiff-petitioners were served with the notice dated 21.10.1992 no dispute has been raised there against by the petitioner. 16. As discussed hereinbefore, the plaintiff-petitioners were served with the notice dated 21.10.1992 no dispute has been raised there against by the petitioner. They did not challenge those notices for about four years and, accordingly, though it is premature to hold as to whether they are, by conduct, estopped from challenging the unilateral enhancement in the monthly rent payable by the petitioners but, for the present, there is no escape from the conclusion that they did not challenge unilateral action of the defendant-respondents for almost 4 years and, consequently, in unison, all the plaintiff petitioners have brought suits along with applications for granting temporary injunctions thereby restraining the defendant-respondent from realising rents of the suit-property at the enhanced rate. However, since this controversy is as yet to be resolved after full-fledged trial to be conducted by the trial Court, for the present, even if it is assumed that there is a serious dispute about the unilateral action of demand of enhanced rate to be tried by the trial Court, assuming existence of a prima facie case to be tried, besides, in addition thereto the Court is required, at the same time, to consider existence of questions of irreparable injury being caused to the petitioners in case temporary injunction is not granted, in the instant case, even after service of notice of enhanced rates by the defendant-respondents, the plaintiff-petitioners did not respond to or agitate any grievance there against for about four years and there has been no increase in the rate of rent being paid by the plaintiff-petitioners for about last 20 to 21 years. The suit plots are situated in the City like Udaipur and the plaintiff-petitioners are being benefited by carrying on their business in food-grains etc. and, as also contended by the defendant-respondents, the rents of such property are sky-rocketing and, on the other hand, the rent so far being paid by the plaintiff-petitioners at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month is normal and grossly inadequate as compared to the market rate prevalent in Udaipur itself. Resultantly, in absence of comparative enhancement in the rate of rent, being so far paid by the plaintiff-petitioners, the defendant-State is suffering a great economic loss which is a loss of public at large. 32/- per month is normal and grossly inadequate as compared to the market rate prevalent in Udaipur itself. Resultantly, in absence of comparative enhancement in the rate of rent, being so far paid by the plaintiff-petitioners, the defendant-State is suffering a great economic loss which is a loss of public at large. Therefore, in case no temporary injunction is granted against the defendants the result would be that the plaintiffs would be required to pay enhanced rate of rent at the rate of Rs. 139/- per month instead of Rs. 32/- and the difference amount come to Rs. 107/- per month only and it cannot be taken to be exorbitant or excessive as compared to the market rate of rent prevalent in Udaipur City itself. Besides, in case, as also held by the lower appellate Court, excess rent is charged, if any, consequent upon final decision, could be adjusted against the future rent payable by the plaintiff-petitioners and, in absence of temporary injunction, it would not, by any stretch of imagination, cause any irreparable loss to the plaintiff petitioners. So also, as regards question of comparative hardship, in case of realisation of enhanced rent, the same would stand adjusted against the future rent payable by the plaintiff-petitioners and, on the contrary, in case any temporary injunction is granted, it would deprive the defendant-State to a rightful source of revenue and consequential loss to the State exchequer which would also be an equal loss to the public at large. Therefore, the resultant balance of convenience is wholly in favour of the defendant respondents and, accordingly, the lower Courts did not commit any illegality or any material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction while holding that the questions of irreparable loss as well as balance of convenience were not found to be existing in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners and, instead, the same weighed heavily in favour of the defendant-respondents warranting no grant of temporary injunctions as prayed for by the plaintiff-petitioners. 17. On the basis of above discussion, when the lower Courts have concurrently, in exercise of their jurisdiction refused to grant any temporary injunction, in absence of illegality or any material irregularity in their jurisdictional exercise, this Court is not justified to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Courts below. 18. 17. On the basis of above discussion, when the lower Courts have concurrently, in exercise of their jurisdiction refused to grant any temporary injunction, in absence of illegality or any material irregularity in their jurisdictional exercise, this Court is not justified to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Courts below. 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 SC 153 has observed as under: "The High Court cannot, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 115, correct errors of fact howsoever gross they may be or even errors of law. It can only do so when the said orders have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. It is only in case where subordinate Court has exercised its jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, when the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly involved." 19. Besides, even if some irregularity is assumed to have been committed on the ground that there was a seriously triable issue before the trial Court, the impugned orders, thereby refusing grant of temporary injunctions, cannot be termed to have either occasioned a failure of justice or having resulted in causing any irreparable injury to the petitioners and so also there cannot be any justification for interfering with the impugned orders. 20. Consequently, on the basis of aforesaid discussion and ultimate conclusion arrived at, these petitions are devoid of any merit and hence liable to be dismissed. 21. Accordingly, all these Revision Petitions along with their respective stay petitions are hereby dismissed and the impugned orders passed by the lower Courts are hereby affirmed. However, the learned trial Judge is directed that the suits should be expeditiously tried and, as far as possible, the same be disposed of within a period of one year from receiving of copy of this order by the trial Court. No order as to costs.Revision dismissed. *******