This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 16.5.97 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No.207 of 1995 (1997 (2) GLJ 300). 2. The constitutional validity of the Tripura Additional Sales Tax Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as well as the amended Act was assailed in the above civil rule questioning the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The vires of the Act was also challenged as violative of Article 14, 19 (1) (g) and 304 (b) of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge on overall consideration of the facts and the issues-raised before it. dismissed the writ petition as meritless. Hence the appeal. 3. Mr. K.N Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S.B. Dutta, Mr. S. Bhattacharjee and Mr. S. Dasgupta virtually echoed the same arguments which were raised by Mr. Bhattacharjee. learned senior counsel before the learned Single Judge. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel submitted that the impugned legislation is pith and substance a tax on income and not taxes on the sale or purchase of goods as per Entry 54 of the State List II. According to the learned senior counsel the State Legislature in the garb on additional sales tax levied tax on income and therefore only the Parliament has the legislative competence tc legislate on the subject under Entry 82 of the Union List. Mr. Bhattacharjee secondly contended that the impugned legislation T.vying tax on dealer whose taxable turnover for a year exceeds 10 lakhs of rupees is arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore violative of the constitutional norms enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee different rates of tax on sale on the same goods is imposed by the Legislature on the basis of the turnover of the dealer. The learned senior counsel next submitted that by section 2 (2) of the Act the dealer is prohibited from collecting the additional tax payable under the Act from the purchaser is violative of Article 19 (1) (g). Mr. Bhattacharjee also submitted that section 2 (2) manifests that the levy in question avowedly is a tax on the income of the dealer which the dealer is required to pay; no matter whether it could recoup the cost and make profit or not. Mr. Mr. Bhattacharjee also submitted that section 2 (2) manifests that the levy in question avowedly is a tax on the income of the dealer which the dealer is required to pay; no matter whether it could recoup the cost and make profit or not. Mr. KN Bhattacharjee, the learned senior counsel lastly submitted that the impugned legislation upon the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse and for want of assent of the President under the proviso to clause (b) of Article 304 of the Constitution impugned piece of legislation is ultra vires of the Constitution. In support of his contention the learned senior counsel referred the following excision of the Supreme Court of India: (1) AIR 1961 SC 232 (Atiabari Tea Co Ltd and Khayerbari Tea Co Ltd vs. State of Assam & others); (2) AIR 1964 SC 925 (Khayerbari Tea Co Ltd & another vs. State of Assam" & others); (3) AIR 1964 SC 1729 (A Hajee Abdul Shukoor and Co vs. State of Madras); (4) AIR 1967 SC 1189 (State of Mysore vs. H. Sanjeeviah). 4. Mr. U.B. Saha, the learned Govt Advocate submitted that the points raised in the civil rule is no longer res integra in view of the pronouncement made by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in S. Kodar vs. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2272 followed in M/s K. Mahammad Abdul Khader vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1985 SC 12 and AIR 1997 SC 2021 (Deputy Commercial Tax Officer& others vs. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals & others). 5. Before we address upon the respective merits of the case it would be pertinent to look to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 of the (Tripura Act No. 6 of 1990) Tripura Additional Sales Tax Act, 1990 provides as follows : "2. 5. Before we address upon the respective merits of the case it would be pertinent to look to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 of the (Tripura Act No. 6 of 1990) Tripura Additional Sales Tax Act, 1990 provides as follows : "2. Levy of Additional Sales Tax in the case of certain dealers: (1) (a) The tax payable under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976 (Tripura Act No. 11 of 1976) (hereinafter in this section referred to as the said Act), shall, in the case of a dealer whose taxable turnover for a year exceeds ten lakhs of rupees be increased by an additional rate of tax of 0.25 percent of the taxable turnover : Provided that where in respect of declared goods (goods declared by section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956), the tax payable by such dealer under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, together with the additional tax payable under this sub-section exceeds four percent of the sale or purchase price thereof, the rate of additional tax in respect of such goods shall be reduced to such an extent that the tax and the additional tax together shall not exceed four percent of the sale or purchase price of such goods. (b) The provisions of the said Act shall apply in relation to the additional tax payable under clause (a) as they apply in relation to the tax payable under the said Act. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, no dealer referred to in sub-section (1) shall be entitled to collect the additional tax payable under the said sub-section. (3) Any dealer who collects the additional tax payable under sub-section (1) in contravention of the provision of sub-section (2) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees and no Court below the rank of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any such offence. 3. Penalty for collection of additional tax by dealer. (3) Any dealer who collects the additional tax payable under sub-section (1) in contravention of the provision of sub-section (2) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees and no Court below the rank of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any such offence. 3. Penalty for collection of additional tax by dealer. If any dealer collects any amount by way of additional tax or supporting to be by way of additional tax, in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 2, the assessing authority concerned may, after giving such dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard, by order in writing impose upon him by way of penalty, a sum not exceeding one and a half times of such amount: Provided that no proceedings under this section shall be commenced after a period of five years from the expiry of the year in which the amount has been collected: Provided further that no prosecution for an offence under sub-section (3) of section 2 shall be instituted in respect of the same facts on which penalty has been imposed under this section." Section 2 of the Tripura Additional Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1994 provides as follows : "2 Amendment of section 2. In section 2 (a) of the Tripura Additional Sales Tax Act, 1990 for the words and figures 'rate of tax 0.25 percent of the taxable turnover' the words and figures 'rate of tax 0.50 percent of the taxable turnover' shall be substituted." 6. The Act is designed to augment the tax on sale of goods imposed by the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976. Additional tax is levied on those dealers whose taxable turnover for a year exceeds Rs. 10 lacs. In actuality it is imposed on the sum total of the sales handled by a dealer during a year. It is nothing but an increase in the rate of sale tax whenever the turnover of the dealer whose taxable turnover for year exceeds Rs. 10 lacs. 10 lacs. In actuality it is imposed on the sum total of the sales handled by a dealer during a year. It is nothing but an increase in the rate of sale tax whenever the turnover of the dealer whose taxable turnover for year exceeds Rs. 10 lacs. Entry 54 of List II of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India relates to "Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods, other than newspapers subject to the provision of Entry 92A of List I." The entry authorises taxation on sale subject to the conditions, contained in Article 286 of the Constitution or tax on sale or purchase of goods other than newspaper, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter State trade, or commerce as envisaged in Entry 92A of List I. A sale tax is a tax on sale. The economic theory as well PS economists views sales tax as an indirect tax. From the legal stand point the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the words and expression those are used in the Act. When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the express provision of the Act, is to be given full effect under the law. A sales tax need not be an indirect tax. That the seller must possess concommitant right to pass the burden of tax to the consumer is not an essential characteristic of a sale tax law. We do not think it necessary to go further into this question. In view of the pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1958 SC 452 and Konduri Buchirajalingam & others reported in AIR 1958 SC 756 . In the aforesaid two decisions the Supreme Court clearly laid down the law that a sale tax need not be an indirect tax and that a tax can be a sale tax, though the primary liability for it is put upon the person without giving him any power of recoup the amount of tax payable from any other party. It is thus clear that a tax on sale does not lose its essential characteristics merely because the seller was not given the opportunity to reimburse the amount of tax from any other authority normally from the customer. It is thus clear that a tax on sale does not lose its essential characteristics merely because the seller was not given the opportunity to reimburse the amount of tax from any other authority normally from the customer. The levy in question under no circumstances can be looked as a tax on income within the meaning of Entry 82 of the Union List. On close scrutiny of the provision of the Act we are clearly of the view that the incidence of the additional sale tax squarely falls on the dealer. 7. Equal protection within the meaning of Article 14 enjoins the right to equal treatment in-similar circumstances both in the matter of privilege as well as in the matter of liabilities. The right to equality does not mean that every law must have universal application. Equality clause will operate among the equals. Who are by nature, attainment and circumstances are in equal footing. Article 14 does not debar the State from its right in classifying persons for legitimate purposes. It is true that taxation law is no exception to Article 14 of the Constitution and the tax law can be declared to be ultra vires and violative of Article 14. if the classification itself is unreasonable and arbitrary. The burden of establishing that a classification is discriminatory and arbitrary rests upon the persons those who impeach the same as violative of the equality clause. If the burden of showing discrimination is heavy in any other case, it is heavier when a taxing statute is challenged. The onus will lie on the person complaining discrimination. Jhe burden of proof is to prove and established not the possible inequality; it must have to show and establish that there is hostile and unequal treatment. The impugned enactment are the economic measure undertaken by the State to increase the State coffer. While adjudging the validity of the economic statute, the Court is not to judge such a statute in a very rigorous standard. Aftepall while exercising its legislative power, the Legislature is required to make fiscal adjustment which are inherently complicated in nature and therefore larger latitude are to be given to the Legislature in the case of formulating economic measure. In such a matter the Legislature exercise the sovereign legislative function and therefore Legislature must possess enormous discretion in the matter of formulating fiscal policy in the area of taxation. In such a matter the Legislature exercise the sovereign legislative function and therefore Legislature must possess enormous discretion in the matter of formulating fiscal policy in the area of taxation. Even in the case where the impost is imposed differently to different class of persons, it can not be faulted as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Legislature is free not only in the choice of articles to be taxed but also is within its jurisdiction to impose different rates of taxation and adopt different modes of assessment etc. (Reference Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh vs. State of UP, reported in (1963) 1 SCR 220 and N. Venugopala Rasi Varma vs. Union of India, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 681 ). In the instant case the Legislature imposed additional taxes on those dealers whose turnover exceeds Rs.10 lacs. The levy was imposed on a class it has not counted the individuals as individual. In this context, it would be pertinent to mention the decision of the Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Shillong & another vs. N. Taking Roy Rymbai reported in 103 ITR 82. The relevant passage of which is reproduced below : "Where it is true that a taxation law cannot claim immunity from the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution, and has to pass, like any other law, the equality test of that Article, it must be remembered that the State has, in view of the instrinsic complexity of fiscal adjustments of diverse elements, a considerably wide discretion in the matter of classification for taxation purposes. Given legislative competence, the Legislature has ample freedom to select and classify persons, districts, goods, properties incomes and objects which it would tax, and which it would not tax, so long as classification made within this wide and flexible range by a taxing statute does not transgress the fundamental principles underlying the doctrine of equally. It is not vulnerable on the ground of discrimination merely because it taxes or exempts from tax some incomes or objects and not others. Nor the mere fact that a tax falls more heavily on some in the same category, is by itself a ground to render the law invalid. It is not vulnerable on the ground of discrimination merely because it taxes or exempts from tax some incomes or objects and not others. Nor the mere fact that a tax falls more heavily on some in the same category, is by itself a ground to render the law invalid. It is only when within the range of its selection, the Jaw operates unequally and cannot be justified on the basis of a valid classification, that there would be a violation of Article 14. (see East India Tobaco Co vs. State of Andhra Pradesh; Vivian Joseph Ferriera vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay; Jaipur Hosiery Mills vs. State of Rajasthan)." 8. We are also not impressed with the arguments of the learned senior counsel Mr. Bhattacharjee, for the appellants that the levy in question in any way imposed any restriction on trade, commerce and inter course amongst the States within Article 304 of the Constitution of India thereby requiring assent of the President under the proviso of clause (b) of Article 304. The levy in our view has not either directly or immediately imposed any restrain or limitation on trade, commerce and inter course and thus is outside the ambit of Article 3 01 of the Constitution of India. The argument that all taxes should be governed by Article 301 of the Constitution whether or not their immediate impact on trade is immediate or mediate direct or remote adopts in our opinion an extreme approach which cannot be upheld. (Atiabari Tea Co Ltd vs. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232 is recalled). The sales tax does not directly make any affect or make any impact on the trade and commerce (reference Andhra Sugar Ltd vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1968 SC 599 and State of Madras vs. N.K. Nataraja Mudaliar, reported in AIR 1969 SC 147 ). The Supreme Court observed that normally a tax on sale of goods does not directly or immediately affect the free flow of the trade or free movement of transport of goods from one part of the country to other. The tax is on the sale. The movement is incidental to a consequence of the sale. The Supreme Court observed that normally a tax on sale of goods does not directly or immediately affect the free flow of the trade or free movement of transport of goods from one part of the country to other. The tax is on the sale. The movement is incidental to a consequence of the sale. In M/s Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. & another vs. State of Punjab & another reported in AIR 1990 SC 820 , the Supreme Court adopted the view mentioned in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. The law in this regard is pithily spelt out by the Supreme Court in the above case which are cited below: "22. It is manifest that free flow of trade between the two States does not necessarily or generally depend upon the rate of tax alone. Many factors including the cost of goods play an important role in the movement of goods from one State to another. Hence the mere fact that there is difference in the rate of tax on goods locally manufactured and those imported would not amount to hampering of trade between the two States within the meaning of Article 301 of the Constitution. The need of taking resort to exception will arise only if the tax impugned is hit by Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution. If it is not then Article 304 of the Constitution will not come into picture at all. See the observations in Nataraja Mudaliar's case at pp 843-6 (of 1968 (3) SCR 829 : at pp 156-58 of AIR 1969 SC 147 (supra) of the report. It has to be borne in mind that there may be differentiations based on consideration of natural or business factors which are more or less in force in different localities. A State might be allowed to impose a higher rate of tax on a commodity either when it is not consumed at all within the State or if it is felt that the burden falling on consumers within the State, will be more than that and large benefit is derived by the revenue. The imposition of a rates of sales tax is influenced by various political, economic and social factors. Prevalence of differential rate of tax on sales of the same commodity cannot be regarded in isolation as determinative of the object to discriminate between one State and another. The imposition of a rates of sales tax is influenced by various political, economic and social factors. Prevalence of differential rate of tax on sales of the same commodity cannot be regarded in isolation as determinative of the object to discriminate between one State and another. Under the Constitution originally framed revenue from sales tax was reserved for the Slates. 28. Concept of economic barrier must be adopted in dynamic sense with changing conditions. What constitutes an economic barrier at one point of time often cease to be so at another point of time. It will be wrong to denude the people of the State of the right to grant exemptions which flow from the plenary powers of legislative heads in List II of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. In a federal polity, all the States having powers to grant exemption to specified class for limited period, such granting of exemption cannot be held to be contrary to the concept of economic unity. The contents of economic unity by the people of India would necessarily include the power to grant exemption or to reduce the rate of tax in special cases for achieving the industrial development or to provide tax incentives to attain economic equality in growth and development; when all the States have such provisions to exempt or reduce rates the question of economic war between the States inter se or economic disintegration of the country as such does not arise. It is not open to any party to say that this should be done and this should not be done by either one way or the other. It cannot be disputed that it is open to the States to realise tax and thereafter remit the same or pay back to the local manufacturers in the shape of subsidies and that would neither discriminate nor be hit by Article 304 (a) of the Constitution. In this case and as in all constitutional adjudications the substance of the matter has to be looked into to find out whether there is any discrimination in violation of the Constitutional mandate." 9. As expressed earlier, the economic wisdom of taxation is within the exclusive domain of the Legislature. No materials are placed before us to hold that the impugned legislative device imposed any unreasonable burden on the petitioners or that the taxation measure is confiscatory. As expressed earlier, the economic wisdom of taxation is within the exclusive domain of the Legislature. No materials are placed before us to hold that the impugned legislative device imposed any unreasonable burden on the petitioners or that the taxation measure is confiscatory. In our considered opinion the impugned legislation have not in any way transgressed any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The power of judicial review reposed on the constitutional Courts cannot be conceived as a super legislative power to adjudge the legislative wisdom or value of legislative policy determination unless the legislation is beyond he legislative competence or is violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution. 10. We have given our anxious consideration on the matter. We however do lot find any valid reason to differ from the conclusion of the learned Single Judge. In our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition. We therefore do not find any merit in the writ appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed. However there shall be no order as to costs.