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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1997 DIGILAW 118 (MP)

Goverdhandas Prasnani v. Tikamdas

1997-03-05

S.C.PANDEY

body1997
ORDER 1. This is an appeal filed by the appellant, under section 32 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act' for short), against the order dated 3.2.95, passed by 3rd Additional District judge, Jabalpur, in M.C.A. No. 19/92, arising out of order dated 18.10.92, passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur, in Case No. 3-A/90-(1)/90-91. 2. The respondents filed an application under section 10 of 'the Act' before the Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur. In the application, it was stated that the rent was Rs. 400/- but it should have been Rs. 1,400/- and this was the prayer that the standard rent should have been fixed at Rs. 1,400/-. The applicant, however, raised a preliminary objection by filing an application that the Rent Controlling Authority, cannot proceed to decide the application under section 10 of 'the Act' until and unless a notice, as provided under section 9 of 'the Act', is given to the tenant by the landlord. The Rent Controlling Authority rejected the objection of the appellant. In appeal, the order of the Rent Controlling Authority was maintained. 3. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties. In this appeal, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is to the effect that the application under section 10 of 'the Act' is maintainable only when a notice under section 9 of 'the Act' is given to the tenant by the landlord. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that since the landlord has applied and has requested the Rent Controlling Authority to increase the rent from Rs. 400/- to Rs. 1,400/-, therefore, the aforesaid notice under section 9 of 'the Act' was a must and in absence of such a notice the Rent Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to proceed further. 4. On the other hand, the contention of learned counsel for the respondents is that from the language of section 9 of 'the Act' it appears that it is not mandatory as it does not provide that the Rent Controlling Authority shall not proceed under section 10 of 'the Act' without the service of notice upon the tenant. It cannot be, therefore, argued that by way of implication a notice is a must or it is mandatory, before filing an application under section 10 of 'the Act'. It cannot be, therefore, argued that by way of implication a notice is a must or it is mandatory, before filing an application under section 10 of 'the Act'. The alternative argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents is that unless and until the standard rent is fixed, there is no question of service of notice under section 9 of 'the Act' . When the landlord wants an increase in the standard rent, as provided by section 8 of 'the Act', then only a notice is a must, otherwise, the proceedings under section 10 of 'the Act' could go on for fixing the fair rent. The learned counsel for the respondents also says that a landlord is not entitled to charge more than the standard rent as per provisions of 'the Act' and, therefore, it is possible that the rent may not be fixed at the rate of Rs. 1,400/-. It could be even reduced. The application is for fixing the standard rent in accordance with law and it would be, according to the respondents, Rs. 1,400/-. The decision in the case of Akhtar Russin Munshi Baker Russin v. Deshraj Balmukund, reported in AIR 1955 MB 21, is not applicable for the simple reason that the language of section 7 ofM.B. Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (15 of 1950) was to the effect that without service of notice the proceedings under section 4 of M.B. Sthan Niyantran Vidhan (15 of 1950), of fixing the fair rent under that Act could not be undertaken. 5. Having heard the counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that there is nothing to show that section 9 of 'the Act' was expressly meant to be made applicable to proceedings under section 10 of 'the Act', for fixing the standard rent for the first time. It is clear from the provisions of section 6 of 'the Act' that a landlord cannot charge more than anything in excess of the standard rent and the wordings of section 9 of 'the Act' indicate that the increase should be lawful. The lawful increase can only be subject to the increase in the standard rent as provided under 'the Act'. Section 8 of 'the Act' provides for such an increase. The lawful increase can only be subject to the increase in the standard rent as provided under 'the Act'. Section 8 of 'the Act' provides for such an increase. In the opinion of this Court when an application is made for the first time for fixation of fair rent, section 9 of 'the Act' will not be applicable and it shall not be mandatory to serve a notice to the tenant by the landlord that he wants to enhance the standard rent. The first application is for fixing the standard rent in accordance with law. It could be more than the agreed rent or it could be less. Merely because the landlord estimates the standard rent at a higher rate of rent than the agreed rent, it cannot be said that the application is for increasing the rent. The stage of increasing the rent will arise only when the standard rent is already fixed. If landlord wants the rent enhanced under section 8 of 'the Act' when the standard rent has already been fixed, he must serve the notice under section 9 of 'the Act' upon the tenant. The purpose of service of such notice is to make the tenant aware about the fact that the landlord is likely to take enhanced rent after, expiry of thirty days from the date of notice. The words of section 9 (1) of 'the Act' mention 'lawful increase' and it is defined u/s. 2 (c) of 'the Act' to mean lawful ihcrease under the provisions of 'the Act'. Thus, the aforesaid words in section 9 of the 'the Act' obviously point out to section 8 of 'the Act'. Once the standard rent is fixed for the first time, it shall be chargeable from the date of tenancy in view of section 6 of 'the Act'. However, the increase in rent under section under section 8 of 'the Act' is made recoyerable after expiry of thirty days from the date on which notice is given as per section 9 of 'the Act'. In view of this matter, there is no substance in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 6. In view of this matter, there is no substance in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 6. Records of Rent Controlling Authority in this appeal and the connected M.A. No. 508/95 shall be sent back immediately and the parties are directed to appear before the Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur, on 21st of April, 1997 for taking further dates.