D. K. SETH, J. Shri S. N. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioner ad dressed a very interesting question which might he formulated as follows:- "according to him appeal provided under Rule 56 can be withheld under Rule 64, if it is not preferred within six months but 11 it is not withheld and is forwarded to the appellate authority, despite the appeal having preferred beyond six months it is not open to the appellate authority to dismiss the appeal on the ground of its being preferred beyond six months. " 2. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, contends that there cannot he an indefinite period for preferring an ap peal. It has to be preferred within a reasonable period which has been prescribed as six months. Unless sufficient cause has been shown for which the appeal could not be filed within six months, it is always open to the appellate authority to dismiss the same even it is not withheld but the question of not withholding of the appeal does not take away of the jurisdic tion of the appellate authority for deciding all the points that might be raised. 3. In order to understand the respec tive contentions, it is necessary to look into the facts of this case in brief which are admitted. The petitioner having been dis missed by an order dated 9-2-1978 on the ground that he was absconding without any sanction of leave or authority over a long period of time, alleged to have preferred an appeal dated 29-2-1978 sent under certificate of posting. The said ap peal was received on 3-10-1980 in the Department. In 1978 the month of February consisted of 28 days. The certifi cate of posting was disbelieved by the ap pellate authority and held that ththe appeal alleged to have been preferred on 3-10-1980. Therefore, it was dismissed on the ground of its being presented beyond six months. The order of the appellate authority "as on 31-1-1985 being An nexure-7 to the writ petition. The said order when challenged in claim petition No. 200/ (F)/iii/1985 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition), the U. P. Public Services Tribunal No. Ill, Luck-iow vide its judg ment and order dated 29-10- 1985 had af firmed the order of the appellate authority and dismissed the claim petition as time barred. 4. In support of his contention, Mr. The said order when challenged in claim petition No. 200/ (F)/iii/1985 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition), the U. P. Public Services Tribunal No. Ill, Luck-iow vide its judg ment and order dated 29-10- 1985 had af firmed the order of the appellate authority and dismissed the claim petition as time barred. 4. In support of his contention, Mr. Srivastava, relied on the order dated 29-7-1982, being Annexure-6 to the writ peti tion, by which the petitioners appeal was sought to be forwarded to the appellate authority. Learned Standing Counsel points out from the said order that it had dealt with a representation and not an appeal, therefore, it cannot be said that the appeal was forwarded as contended by Mr. Srivastava. The said contention of Mr. Parihar, learned Standing Counsel has been explained by Mr. Srivastava relying on the proviso to Rule 56 of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Ap peals) Rules, 1930 as applicable in U. P. (hereinafter called as the Rules ). Accord ing to him, Rule 56 postulates appeal only against three punishments prescribed therein inflicted under Rule 49 and no appeal lies against punishments other than specified in Rule 56. Therefore, the punishment being one of said three categories provided in Rule 56, no repre sentation lies and it is only an appeal that lies. In the order contained in Annexure-6, the appeal has been referred to as repre sentation. The said contention of Mr. Srivastava stands supported by reason of order contained in Annexure-7 which refers to the same as an appeal and it is not contended either by the learned Standing Counsel nor it does appear from An- nexure-7 that any other representation other than the appeal has ever been preferred by the petitioner. 5. Rule 56 provides as follows:- "56. Srivastava stands supported by reason of order contained in Annexure-7 which refers to the same as an appeal and it is not contended either by the learned Standing Counsel nor it does appear from An- nexure-7 that any other representation other than the appeal has ever been preferred by the petitioner. 5. Rule 56 provides as follows:- "56. (1) Every person included in one of classes (1) to (5) specified in Rule 14, shall he entitled to appeal, as hereinafter provided, from an order passed by a competent authority:- (a) imposing upon him any of the follow ing penalties specified in Rule 49: (i) Reduction to lower post or time-scale, to a lower stage in a time-scale; (ii) Removal from the service of the State which does not disqualify from future employ ment and (iii) Dismissal from service of the State which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment: Provided that in the case of the other penalties specified in Rule 49, the absence of right of appeal shall not debar the punished Government servant from making a repre sentation against the imposition of any one of these penalties to the authority if any, next higher to the punished authority: Provided further that against a penalty of censure imposed by the Governor, the punished Government servant shall be entitled to make a representation to the Governor himself: Provided also that representations made by punished Government servants prior to the commencement of these rules, may also to entertained by the Governor. Note.-Such representation will not or dinarily be entertained unless it is preferred within six months from the date on which the Government servant concerned was informed of the order of punishment. (b) discharging him in accordance with the terms of his contract if- (i) he has been engaged on a contract for a fixed or for an indefinite period and has rendered under either form of contract con tinuous service for a period exceeding five years at the time when his services are terminated; or (ii) he comes under the provisions of Rules 58 (3); (c) reducing or withholding the maximum pension including an additional pension, admis sible to him under the Rules governing pensions. (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall be con strued to confer on any person a right of appeal against an order passed by the Governor. " 6. (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall be con strued to confer on any person a right of appeal against an order passed by the Governor. " 6. A plain reading of the said rule indicate that the appeal can be preferred against the three penalties mentioned in Clause (a) of Rule 56 (1 ). In case of penal ties specified in Rule 49 other than those mentioned in Rule 56 (1) (a), a repre sentation can be made despite of absence of right of appeal. The expression "absence of right of appeal" has been expressed, as "absence or right of appeal". It appears that the word or is a misprint. Inasmuch as the insertion of word or does not make out any sense. If the word or read as of then only it gives out a sense. Thus it shows that the provision deals with the cases of other penalties specified in Rule 49, even in the absence of right of appeal, can be represented against. Thus it is abundantly clear that the representation is provided for penalties other than those provided in Rule 56 (1) (a ). It was never the intention of the legislature to provide both the remedies of appeal and representation together. On the other hand it had provided appeal in respect of three penal ties while representation in respect of the rest. However, the note appended to Rules 56 (1) (a) governs the representation only because of the clear expression used in the said note read with the existence of Rule 66 (2), 67 (2), 68 and 69 respectively. Therefore, in order to understand the question of limitation we would be refer ring to other Rules at appropriate stage. The question of limitation with regard to the appeal is therefore not governed by the note appended to Rule 56. 7. For the present purpose, it is necessary to have a look on Rules 64, 65, 66, 67 and 69 respectively which are quoted below:- "64. The question of limitation with regard to the appeal is therefore not governed by the note appended to Rule 56. 7. For the present purpose, it is necessary to have a look on Rules 64, 65, 66, 67 and 69 respectively which are quoted below:- "64. An appeal may be withheld by an authority not lower than the authority whose order it is preferred if- (1) it is an appeal in a case in which under these Rules no appeal lies, or (2) it does not comply with the provision of Rule 63, or (3) it is not preferred within six months alter the date on which the appellant was informed of the order, appealed against no reasonable cause is shown for the delay, or (4) it is a repetition of previous appeal and is made to the same appellate authority by which such appeal has been decided and no new facts or circumstances are adduced which afford grounds for a reconsideration of the case; (5) it is addressed to an authority to which no appeal lies under these rules : Provided that in every case in which an appeal is withheld the appellant shall be in formed of the fact and the reasons for it: Provided that an appeal withheld on ac count only of failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 63 may be re-submitted at any time within one month of the date on which the appellant has been informed of the with holding of the appeal and, if re-submitted in a form which complies with those provisions shall not be withheld. 65. No appeal shall lie against the with holding of an appeal by a competent authority. 66. (1) Every appeal from a person serving under a local Government to the Governor General in Council or the Secretary of State in Council which is not withheld under these Rules shall be forwarded by the local Government to the Governor General in Council with an ex pression of opinion, every appeal to the Secretary of State in Council which is received by the Governor General in Council from a local Government or from the head of a department under the Governor General in Council and which is not similarly withheld shall be trans mitted by the Governor General in Council with an expression of his opinion. (2) Save as provided in sub-rule (1) every appeal which is not withheld under these rules, shall be forwarded to the appellate authority by the authority from whose order the appeal is preferred with an expression of opinion. 67. (1) The local Government shall for ward quarterly to the Governor-General-in-Council a list of to the Governor-General (sic) in Council or the Secretary of State in Council which have been withheld by the local Govern ment together with the reasons for withholding the same. The Governor-General in Council shall in the same manner forward quarterly to the Secretary of State a list of appeals to the Secretary of State in Council which have been withheld by a local Government or by the Governor- General in Council. (2) Save as provided in sub-rule (1) a list of appeals withheld under Rule 64, with the reason for withholding them shall be forwarded quarterly by withholding authority to the appel late authority. 68. An appellate authority may call for any appeal admissible under these rules which has been withheld by a subordinate authority and may pass such orders thereon as it considers fit. 69. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the State Government may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for the record of any case decided by an authority subordinate to it in the exercise of any power conferred on such authority by these rules and- (a) confirm, modify or reverse the order passed by such authority; or (b) direct that a further inquiry be held in the case; or (c) reduce or enhance the penalty im posed by the order; or (d) make such other order in the case as it may deem fit: Provided that where it is proposed to en hance the penalty imposed by any such order, the Government servant concerned shall be given an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed enhancement. 69-A (i) Whenever a petition is preferred under Rule 69, it shall contain all material state ments and arguments relied on by the petitioner and shall be complete in itself. It shall be accom panied by certified copies of the order against which the petition is directed and of order, if any, passed in the case by the subordinate authorities. 69-A (i) Whenever a petition is preferred under Rule 69, it shall contain all material state ments and arguments relied on by the petitioner and shall be complete in itself. It shall be accom panied by certified copies of the order against which the petition is directed and of order, if any, passed in the case by the subordinate authorities. (ii) If any of the material statements or copies of the orders are wanting, the Superin tendent of the Administrative Department con cerned of the Secretariat shall return the incom plete petition to the person, concerned fixing a date allowing reasonable time for re-submission after completion. Failure to comply within the specified time shall make the petition liable to be summarily rejected. (iii) If the petition is illegible or unintel ligible or contains language which is in the opinion of Government disrespectful or im proper, or is unreasonably delayed, the petitioner may be rejected on this very ground. Note.-If a petition is sent more than six months after the date on which the Government servant was informed of the impugned order the petition shall be deemed to have been un reasonably delayed. (iv) If the Government on perusal of the petition and paper filed therewith, finds that there are prima facie grounds for interference, may call for the records of the case to examine it on merits, otherwise, the petition shall be sum marily rejected. " 8. Rule 64 provides that an appeal may be withheld by an authority not lower than the authority who had passed the order of punishment. In the present case, admittedly the authority who had passed the order contained in Annexure-6 is not the authority lower than the punishing authority. By means of the said order it appears that he has forwarded the appeal for being decided by the appellate authority. While so forwarding he has noted the date and mentioned that the appeal was not available in the depart ment before 3-10-1980. Despite such delay instead of withholding the same, he had forwarded the appeal to the appellate authority. 9. Now the question that an appeal can be withheld on the ground mentioned in sub-rules (1) to (5) of Rule 64 are con cerned except sub-rule (3) other sub-rules of Rule 64 are applicable is not a case sought to be established before this Court. 9. Now the question that an appeal can be withheld on the ground mentioned in sub-rules (1) to (5) of Rule 64 are con cerned except sub-rule (3) other sub-rules of Rule 64 are applicable is not a case sought to be established before this Court. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 64 employers the authority not lower than the punishing authority to withhold the appeal on the ground that if it is not preferred within six months after the date on which the appel lant was informed of the order and no reasonable cause is shown for the delay. Admittedly, in the present case no reasonable cause has been shown for the alleged delay, on the other hand, it was sought to be explained that it was preferred within time. But it was not believed. However, the forwarding authority who was supposed to withhold the appeal on the ground of delay had forwarded the same to the appellate authority taking the same to be within time. He did not address on the question of sub-section (3) of Rule 64 in the order contained in Annexure-6 on which point the learned Standing Counsel has laid great stress. 10. Now the question arises whether despite sub-rule (3) if the forwarding authority had omitted to address himself on the said question despite materials being before him had forwarded the ap peal whether still then it would be open to the appellate authority to decide the ques tion or in other words even if it was so addressed the same would still remain open to the appellate authority for decision. 11. The said question is to be dealt with on the basis of the object as would be diciphered from the relevant rules to be interpreted having regard to the scheme of the rule itself. It appears that in Rule 65 it has been provided that no appeal shall lie against the withholding of an appeal by a competent authority. Therefore, when the appeal is preferred, the competent authority is duty bound to look into the matter in exercise of his jurisdiction as to whether he would withhold or forward the appeal. Therefore, even if he omits fi ad dress himself on the said point, it cannot be said that the said question has been still to be looked into by the appellate authority. Therefore, even if he omits fi ad dress himself on the said point, it cannot be said that the said question has been still to be looked into by the appellate authority. Then again Rule 66 (2) provides that if the appeal is not withheld it is to be forwarded to the appellate authority together with an expression of opinion against the order against which the appeal is preferred. In fact Anncxure-6 contains such an expression of opinion of the for warding authority which is apparent from the reading of Annexure-6. Similarly, Rule 67 (2) provides that it is incumbent on the forwarding authority to forward a list of appeals withheld under Rule 64 with the reason for withholding them shall be for warded quarterly by withholding authority to the appellate authority. Therefore with holding an appeal is not final and he has to forward a quarterly report on these with holding appeals. By virtue of Rule 68, the appellate authority may call for any appeal since been withheld by a subordinate authority. Whereas Rule 69 provides that the State Government may, of its own mo tion or otherwise, call for the record of any case decided by an authority subordinate to it in the exercise of any power conferred on such authority by the said rule and may pass appropriate orders. Thus it appears that the said rule indicates that the discre tion to withhold the appeal is subject to the decision of the appellate authority. Only when an appeal is withheld with the reason for withholding the same under Rule 67 (2), the appellate authority may take decision as to whether it should be allowed to be withheld or he should decide the same. But once the appeal is not with held then it is the duty of the forwarding authority to forward the same expressing his opinion on the merit of the case. Once such appeal is forwarded with such opinion without being withheld, then the appellate authority is not required to look into the question as to whether the same should have been withheld. There cannot be double screening of the same situation as has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adil Rashld Khan v. District Development Officer, Badaun and others, 1996 (2) UPLBEC 812. There cannot be double screening of the same situation as has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adil Rashld Khan v. District Development Officer, Badaun and others, 1996 (2) UPLBEC 812. It can not be conceived that there should be a scope of double screening in respect of same procedure which had never been the intention of the legislature. Inasmuch as if the question of limitation could have been decided by the appellate authority himself in that event there would not have been necessity to provide any provision for screening the appeal. In that event, it would render the provisions of Rule 64 (3) wholly redundant or infructuous. The legislature never waste words. No part of a provision can be said to be meaningless redundant or infructuous. The appeal could have been withheld under Rule 64. If it is not so withheld then it is not open to the appellate authority to decide the ques tion of withholding. In asmuch as the same would put the appellate authority in the shoes of the forwarding authority and he will be exercising a power which was to be exercised by an authority subordinate to him, a situation which is very difficult to reconcile with the scheme of the rule. It would also amounts to come down to a position at a stage before the appeal is forwarded to the appellate authority ta which the appellate authority is not en titled. Then again the period of six months had never been intended to be mandatory by reason of Rule 67 (2) which empowers the forwarding authority to submit a quarterly report of withheld cases before the appellate authority. While Rule 68 empowers the appellate authority to call any appeal admissible under these rules which has been withheld by a subordinate authority. Thus the period of six months had never been intended to be an absolute bar. The intention of the legislature and the object of the rule is clear from the successive safeguard provided by means of Rule 67 (2) read with Rule 68. 12. In that view of the matter it ap pears that the order passed by the appel late authority since been affirmed by the Tribunal is wholly against the provisions contained in Rules 64 (3) read with Rules 66 (2), 67 (2), 68 and 69. 12. In that view of the matter it ap pears that the order passed by the appel late authority since been affirmed by the Tribunal is wholly against the provisions contained in Rules 64 (3) read with Rules 66 (2), 67 (2), 68 and 69. In the circumstan ces, order dated 19-10-1985 contained in Annexure-9 as well as the order dated 31-1-1985 contained in Annexure-7 cannot be sustained and are accordingly hereby quashed. A writ of certiorari do issue ac cordingly. The appellate authority would be free to decide the appeal on merit in accordance with law according to his own wisdom without being influenced by an observations made in this order with regard to the merit of the case. It may be recorded that I have not expressed an) opinion with regard to the merit of the case. It was sought to be contended by Mr. Parihar, learned Standing Counsel, relying on the decision in the case of State of U. P. v Ashok Kumar Singh, that offence o: absconding is sufficient for dismissal from service. The said question can be looked into by the appellate authority on its own merit. It is expected that the appellate authority would decide the appeal as earl; as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date a certified copy o this order is produced before him. 13. Thus the writ petition stands al lowed. 14. There will, however, be no order as to cost. Petition allowed. .