JUDGMENT 1. - The short question with which this court has to address itself in the aforesaid writ petition is as to whether the management of Jaipur Nagaun Anchalik Gramin Bank (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bank') was Justified in directing de novo enquiry against the petitioner who is an erstwhile employee of the said bank and whose services were terminated by the bank notwithstanding his exoneration by the enquiry officer in the first enquiry which was initiated against him and thereafter whether the institution of the second enquiry which was directed de novo on the basis of the same charge and allegations consequent upon which he stood exonerated earlier was justified, proper and as such sustainable in the eyes of law 2. Brief facts which do arise for consideration of this court are that the petitioner was initially appointed in the services of the respondent-bank as officer on 24.12.1976 and posted as Manager at Shahpura Branch, District Jaipur. In 1981 while he was serving as Manager of Tala Branch of the Bank situated at Tala Tehsil Jumwaramgarh, District Jaipur in the rural area, he had received a communication from the Chairman of the Bank on 20.8.1982 mentioning therein that on the basis of inspection carried by inspecting officer Shri Arvind Kumar Sharma on 16.8.1982, some irregularities were detected regarding the functioning of the said branch. This fact is evident from the perusal of Annexure 1 wherein it is mentioned that the branch was opened at 11.50 a.m. on the day of surprise inspection i.e. 16.8.1982 and it was reported that this was the usual trend of opening the branch after every holiday which was taken as serious matter and for which it was proposed to initiate disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the JNA Gramin Bank Staff Service Regulations, 1981 vide Regulation Nos. 22 and 23 of the said regulations. The other allegations against the petitioner were of leaving headquarters without permission of the competent authority, leaving the keys of the branch in possession of the clerk, not maintaining cash abstract books, not writing of cash receipts and cash payment book, consuming 65 paise postage stamp for sending letter to Head office without entering the same in the dispatch register exhausting cash retention limit and mis-utilisation of the loan amount granted to an employee for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- after borrowing the same from an employee of the said bank and returning the same to him after the delay of three months. 3. The petitioner submitted his reply to the aforesaid imputations of charge to the enquiry officer denying the alleged irregularities specifically. Thereafter on 6.5.1983 an other communication was issued to the petitioner by the Bank which was marked "confidential" and which was a purported charge-sheet, a detailed reply to which was also submitted by the petitioner to the concerned disciplinary authority. From the perusal of the said charge-sheet it is apparent that it is couched in the same language as the first charge-sheet dated 20.8.1982 and the allegations framed against the petitioner as regards both the chargesheets are pare-ameteria and the same. Thereafter an enquiry officer was appointed by the bank who had earlier made surprise inspection of the petitioner's hank and therefore it is further alleged that the said officer was biased against the petitioner being closely related to the presenting officer in the matter. After holding enquiry in which the petitioner was not allowed even to cross-examine the witness who had deposed against him nor he was allowed to lead evidence in rebuttal. The said enquiry officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority. It has been further contented that in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, even the copy of the enquiry report was not supplied to him and as a consequences of which he was deprived of fair opportunity of making representation to the appellate authority. He has further contended that there was no justification to conduct the second enquiry de-novo after dropping the first enquiry in which the petitioner stood fully exonerated of the charge. 4. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner was even denied the benefit of annual grade increment against which he represented to the competent authority on 24.11.1986 for which respondent had no authority or justification to do so mainly on account of pendency of departmental enquiry. He has further contended that even relevant documents which were necessary for preparing his defence were not supplied or made available to him by the enquiry officer which he had submitted his application dated 20.10.1987 and even the defence representative was denied to the petitioner by the bank in the course of de-novo enquiry. He has further contended that even relevant documents which were necessary for preparing his defence were not supplied or made available to him by the enquiry officer which he had submitted his application dated 20.10.1987 and even the defence representative was denied to the petitioner by the bank in the course of de-novo enquiry. Learned counsel has further contended that after completion of aforesaid enquiry a report was submitted by the enquiry officer to the Chairman-cum-Disciplinary authority who issued show cause, notice to the petitioner on 26.8.1991 and in which the proposed punishment sought to be imposed was intimated to which he submitted a detailed reply on 29.8.1991 and for approximately 8 months, no action was taken by the competent authority and this resulted in great prejudice to the petitioner and the disciplinary authority vide its communication dated 30.4.1992 informed the petitioner that same punishment has been maintained against him which was proposed in the show cause notice. 5. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the petitioner has moved to this court by way of the instant writ petition on the forwards inter-alia wherein he has challenged the purported charge-sheet dated 10.5.1983 (Annexure 2) as well as the enquiry proceedings against the petition and the order, dated 30.4.1992 (Annexure 12) and dated 31.1.1994 (Annexure 13) passed by the disciplinary authority. Considering the nature of the charge, defence and other circumstances the disciplinary authority vide impugned. order, dated 30.4.1992 (Annexure 12) imposed the penalty of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect and also major penalty of dismissal from service in respect of charge No. 5(b). Thereafter the petitioner amended his writ petition and also challenged the order, dated 31.1.1994 (Annexure 13) passed by the appellate authority which had upheld the order of the disciplinary authority dated 30.4.1992. 6. During the course of hearing of Mr. K.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner stated at the bar that the punishment of dismissal from service amounts to imposition of major penalty which was not justifiable keeping in view the nature of allegations and the charges framed against the petitioner. He has further contended that only charge No. 5(b) which was to the effect that the petitioner while he was serving as Manager of the Bank had granted loan to a part-time employee for Rs. 5,000,1- which amount had been admittedly disbursed to him. He has further contended that only charge No. 5(b) which was to the effect that the petitioner while he was serving as Manager of the Bank had granted loan to a part-time employee for Rs. 5,000,1- which amount had been admittedly disbursed to him. The allegation of the bank is that after disbursement of the loan amount, the petitioner took an amount of Rs. 4,000.00 from the said loanee and after the delay of about two and a half months, the said loan amount was deposited with the bank in the borrower's savings account. Thus the petitioner had refunded the said amount to the loanee meaning thereby that at the most the petitioner had taken the loan of the above amount from an employee and returned the same to him for which the punishment of dismissal from service was not at all justified and was not sustainable in law in keeping in view the nature of allegations and the alleged irregularities committed by the petitioner. In my view this cannot be termed as misappropriation of the funds and at the most it is mere an irregularity which too stood cured since the petitioner had returned back the said amount to the loanee by depositing the same in his savings account on the basis of mutual understanding between the parties and for which serious punishment of dismissal from service should not have been awarded to the petitioner. I am further of the view that the impugned order of disciplinary authority where it had adopted an unique method of imposing separate punishments for each charge by imposing punishments of stoppage of 19 annual grade increments with cumulative effect and two grade increments with cumulative effect which means that in all 21 grade increments had been stopped, is virtually a denial of one grade increment for each year of service and by depriving the said employee of benefits which are admissible to the petitioner for having rendered 21 years of service which are neither justifiable nor can be held as valid and sustainable in law which is not only contrary to the settled norms of service jurisprudence but also contrary to fair play, justice and all norms of disciplinary enquiries and service jurisprudence. 7. 7. I am further of the view that there is no evidence on the record which can be termed as justifiable for sustaining the aforesaid Punishments imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary authority and consequently the various penalties imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary authority vide impugned orders dated 30.4.1992 (Annexure 12) and dated 31.1.194 (Annexure 13) on the basis of the purported charge-sheet dated 6.5.1983 (Annexure 2) are quashed and set aside. 8. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner had placed reliance upon the following judgments:- S.K. Giri v. Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and others, 1995 (5) SLR 220 , Doddaraju v. District & Sessions Judge, 1995 (7) SLR 558 , Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. B.M. Patil and another, 1995 (8) SLR 319 , Union of India & others v. Giriraj Sharma, 1995 (7) SLR 695 , Dola Govinda Das v. Union of India & Ors., 1981 Lab.l.C. 1461 , State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan, AIR 1961 SC 1623 , Postmaster Head Post Office, Punalur and Anr. v. B. Usha. Extra Departmental Stamp Vendor, Head Post Office, Punalur, 1988 (1) SLR 69 , Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar and others, 1993 (4) SCC 727 and Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1991 (1) SCC 588 . 9. In the matter of S.K. Giri v. Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (supra) wherein similar controversy had arisen for consideration of the apex court in appeal to the apex court against the impugned decision of Delhi High Court was as to whether punishment of dismissal from service which was challenged and assailed on ground was as to whether it was not disproportionate to the charge and the petitioner was entitled to his reinstatement in service while maintaining his continuity in service with a further direction to the Bank that the arrears of salary etc. for the period in dispute shall not be paid and he will only be entitled to the benefit of continuity of service. 10. To the same effect is the decision of Karnataka High Court in the matter of Doddaraju v. District Judge (supra) wherein the reinstatement of the petitioner in service was directed by the High Court without any direction as regards the payment of arrears by way of back wages. 11. 10. To the same effect is the decision of Karnataka High Court in the matter of Doddaraju v. District Judge (supra) wherein the reinstatement of the petitioner in service was directed by the High Court without any direction as regards the payment of arrears by way of back wages. 11. As a result of the above observations, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.4.1992 (Annexure 12) and order 31.1.1994 (Annexure 13) are quashed and set aside. The petitioner will stand reinstated in service with the direction that he will only be entitled to payment of notional benefits besides the benefit of continuity of service w.e.f. the date of dismissal. He shall not be entitled to the benefits of past arrears for the period in dispute, i.e., from the date of dismissal from service to the date of his reinstatement in service. There will be no order as to costs. The summoned record be handed over to Shri Virendra Lodha, learned counsel for the respondents for being transmitted back to the concerned department immediately.Writ Petition Allowed. *******