JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner who was appointed as trainee in Jaipur Metals & Electrical Ltd. (for short the company') and whose services were terminated in the said capacity by the respondents, has challenged his termination by way of the instant writ petition on the grounds inter-alia as to whether it was open to the company to terminate his services once he had successfully completed his training? Whether it was not binding on the management of the company to regularise his service after completion of the training period? Whether it was open to the respondent company by virtue of sub-clause (5) of the contract of apprenticeship to have imposed the condition that the management shall have a right to terminate the service of apprentice during the training period or on completion thereof without assigning any reason and in case such trainee leaves the training before its completion, whether it was open to the management of the company to have deducted the stipend amount deposited by way of security? and whether the impugned action of the management will not tantamount to contravention of sub-sec. (3) of Section 4 of the Apprenticeship Act, 1961' hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1961 being inconsistent with Section 7 of the said Act which envisages the mode of termination of the contract of the trainee in view of the settled law that no terms can be imposed in violation of law and hence any terms imposed by the company which are contrary to clause (5) of the agreement executed between the parties is void and hence not enforceable? 2. The facts which are relevant for deciding the controversy between the parties as briefly stated are that the petitioner was appointed as trainee apprentice with the respondent company vide order, dated 1.1.1986 for a period of one year. The appointment of the petitioner was further extended by the company for a period of one year vide order, dated 18.11.1986; whereas as per clause No. 1 of the terms of appointment (Annexure 1) the training period could be extended for the maximum period of six months. According to the said clause the petitioner was entitled for the monthly consolidated stipend of Rs. According to the said clause the petitioner was entitled for the monthly consolidated stipend of Rs. 450.00 and as per clause 5 the management shall have a right to terminate the trainee apprentice during the period of training without assigning any reason whatsoever and in case the trainee decides to leave the training before its completion, the amount deducted from the stipend shall stand forfeited to the company and as per clause 7 after successful completion of the training, subject to their being any vacancy, the trainee shall be eligible for applying for the same when his case shall be considered on merits alongwith other candidates coming from open market, he shall have no preferential claim or right for being considered for absorption. 3. From the perusal of the office order, dated 18.11.1986 it is apparent that the petitioner was communicated by the management that the petitioner was given an option to complete the second year of his training on successful completion of the first year of training w.e.f. 18.11.1986 and as per the revised training scheme of the company he was to be given monthly stipend of Rs.600.00 w.e.f. 18.11.1986 while all other terms and conditions of appointment were to remain the same. Thereafter the petitioner vide office order, dated 17.12.1987 was informed that since he had successfully completed his second year of training he was allowed monthly stipend at the rate of Rs.850.00 w.e.f. 18.11.1987 for the third year of his apprenticeship training during which period he was again made to work as trainee apprentice instead of regularising his services contrary to the conditions as stipulated in the letter of appointment vide Annexure 1 dated 1.1.1986 according to which the maximum period for which the training could be extended, was six months in all with effect from 1.1.1986. Thereafter by an office order, dated 29.11.1988 vide Annexure 4 the services of the petitioner were terminated w.e.f. 30.11.1988 which the petitioner has assailed on the grounds inter-alia that the impugned order of termination was illegal being contrary to Regulations of the company. 4. Thereafter by an office order, dated 29.11.1988 vide Annexure 4 the services of the petitioner were terminated w.e.f. 30.11.1988 which the petitioner has assailed on the grounds inter-alia that the impugned order of termination was illegal being contrary to Regulations of the company. 4. The afore stated position is also borne out from the perusal of office order, dated 28.11.1988 by which the petitioner was conveyed that as per the terms of the contract of apprenticeship executed with the company dated 1.12.1987, since the period of apprenticeship was to get completed on 30.11.1988, hence the petitioner stood relieved immediately at the closure of 30th November, 1988, i.e., the last date of his training. It is under the aforesaid circumstances that the petitioner has moved to this court by way of the instant writ petition on the grounds inter-alia 1. that his termination is contrary to Section 7 of the Apprenticeship Act, 1961, 2. that the termination is contrary to Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 since the petitioner had successfully completed 240 days of continuous service prior to the date of his termination, 3. that the apprentice is workman within the ambit of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1947' and hence entitled to the protection of his service as against the respondent company and; 4. that his termination from service amounts to retrenchment under Section 2(00) of the Act of 1947 in view of the extension of the contractual period of appointment time and again and beyond the stipulated period of one year which is extend able by another six months as per clause 1 of the terms of appointment, dated 1.1.1986. 5. In the relief clause the petitioner has sought the issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction from this court to the effect that the impugned order, dated 28.11.1988 which his services were terminated by the respondent company be quashed and set-aside and the petitioner be reinstated in service as confirmed employee with continuity of service and full back wages besides other consequential benefits. 6. The respondents on being noticed by this court have contended inter-alia that respondent No. 1 is a company registered under the Companies' Act, 1956 and is not a State within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. 6. The respondents on being noticed by this court have contended inter-alia that respondent No. 1 is a company registered under the Companies' Act, 1956 and is not a State within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. It has further been contended that the management of the company is being carried on by the Board of Directors elected in accordance with the provisions of the Companies' Act, 1956 and that the Board of Directors of the Company act independently without any' interference of the Central Government or the State Government in the matters of policy decisions, general administration and capital structure. Neither the Central Government nor the State Government has any control whatsoever with regard to the policies or affairs of the company and the company is being audited by the auditors appointed by the said company. In short none of the factors as specified by the Apex Court for treating the company as an instrumentality or agency of the State are present in this case and hence in view of this matter the writ petition is not maintainable. 7. By way of an alternative argument it has been further contended by the respondents that since the petitioner was engaged as an apprentice under the provisions of the Act of 1961 for a fixed period of one year w.e.f. 1.12.1987 to 30.11.1988 in terms of the apprenticeship contract, dated 1.12.1987, on completion of the said period he was relieved on the last date of the apprenticeship training and thus he has no locus-standi or cause of action to file the instant writ petition. It has been further contended by the respondents that since the petitioner had an alternative adequate remedy available to him under the Act of 1961 by representing his case before the management as well as under the Act of 1947 by way of raising an industrial dispute and which the petitioner did not avail before filing the instant writ petition, for this reason as well the petition deserves dismissal. As regards the contention of the petitioner that respondent is a relief undertaking declared by the Government by virtue of powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1961 and. As regards the contention of the petitioner that respondent is a relief undertaking declared by the Government by virtue of powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1961 and. therefore, the legal proceedings cannot be initiated against the said company in view of the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, it has been contended that the respondent company has ceased to be a relief undertaking with effect from 16.12.1987 and as such the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. As a matter of fact the petitioner had entered into an apprenticeship contract by virtue of the Act of 1961 with the company for a period of one year only, the terms of which were duly accepted by the petitioner and the Joint Director, Technical Education, Rajasthan issued a certificate of registration in favour of the company and hence as per the provisions of the Act, 1961 the petitioner has absolutely no cause of action to file the instant writ petition which is not maintainable. It has further been contended that since the petitioner was not performing his duties as against any vacant permanent post but was working as an apprentice for receiving his training as a clerk and joined for a fixed period of one year under the Act of 1961 and his appointment being contractual for a fixed duration, the respondent company cannot be held liable to give employment to the petitioner as a matter of right after the expiry of the contractual period of appointment. The petitioner had accepted the appointment with full knowledge and awareness of the terms and conditions of the contractual employment and it was open to the petitioner to have accepted or to have declined to continue as a trainee apprentice, and there was no binding obligation on the petitioner to have continued beyond the contractual period and hence the respondent company cannot be held liable for any action nor can be held accountable for the same. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions as well as the legal position at issue. 9. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions as well as the legal position at issue. 9. In support of his contentions advanced at the bar, Shri M.K. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the following decisions-Oswald S. Joseph and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others : 1996 (2) L.L.N. 645 , D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. 1993 (3) SCC 259 , Dr. Bajranglal Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. 1994 (2) WLC (Raj.) 1 , Ravindra Kumar Sabu v. State of Raj. & Ors. AIR 1994 Raj. 36 , Deepak Kumar Khivsara v. Oil India Ltd. & Ors. 1996 (3) WLC (Raj.) 22 & Mahendra Kumar Sharma v. U.O.I. & Ors. 1994 WLR 705. 10. In the matter of Oswald S. Joseph v. R.S.R.T.C. & Ors. (supra) an appeal was directed against the judgment and order dated 30.6.1986 of the learned Single Judge passed in S.B. C.W.P. No. 161/1985 wherein the petitioner-appellant had challenged the impugned order of removal from service passed by the management of the respondent corporation. The disciplinary authority relying upon the report of the enquiry office terminated the services of the petitioner which he had earlier challenged before the learned Single Judge and subsequently in appeal before learned division Bench of this court. It was held by this Court that since there was not a proper application of mind by the disciplinary authority as regards the imposition of penalty which was shocking to the conscience, it was a fit case where the punishment was liable to be struck down on the ground that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was highly disproportionate considering the nature of delinquency on the basis of the charge framed against the petitioner. Keeping in view the peculiar circumstances of the case this court held that instead of remitting the matter back to the disciplinary authority, reinstatement of the petitioner was directed with immediate effect. 11. Keeping in view the peculiar circumstances of the case this court held that instead of remitting the matter back to the disciplinary authority, reinstatement of the petitioner was directed with immediate effect. 11. In the matter of D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (supra) the apex court while deciding an appeal preferred before it against an Award of the Labour Court, Haryana at Faridabad which had upheld the termination of the appellant's service as legal and valid, since it was in violation of the standing orders and the relevant provisions of the Act, 1947, it was held by the apex court that there could be no distinction between quasi-judicial function and in administrative functions for the purpose of applicability of principles of natural justice. It was further held that since the management did not conduct any domestic enquiry nor it gave the appellant any opportunity to put forth his case, 50% of the back wages was held as admissible to the appellant in the ends of justice. 12. Likewise in the matter of Kaluram v. State of Rajasthan (supra) in view of violation of principles of natural justice and the standing orders the termination of the services of the petitioner on the ground of misconduct of voluntary absence from duty for 29 days, was held illegal by the learned Single Judge of this court and the impugned order of termination being penal in nature was held violative of the principles of natural justice and was quashed with the direction to reinstate the petitioner in service. 13. I have examined the ratio of the aforesaid decisions and in my view they are distinguishable on facts and law for the reason that the appointment of the petitioner in of the appointment order, dated 1.1.1986 (Annexure 1), was purely contractual view and in view of clauses 5 and 7 of the letter of appointment which govern the terms and conditions of appointment, the management reserved the exclusive right to terminate the services of the petitioner as a trainee apprentice without assigning any reason and even after the completion of successful training, he was to be absorbed only against existence of a vacancy for which he was held eligible to apply and his case was to be considered on merits alongwith open market candidates with no preferential right or claim for permanent absorption. I am further of the view that since the petitioner had voluntarily accepted his appointment as a trainee apprentice and had given his consent without any coercion, undue influence and had gladly accepted his appointment, there was no binding obligation on the respondent company to have continued his appointment beyond the contractual period of appointment and since the management of the respondent reserved its option to terminate his service either before or even after completing his training period and the services of the petitioner have been terminated in accordance with Annexure 4, dated 28.11.1988 w.e.f. 30.11.1988 viz. the last date of completion of his training, I am of the considered view that no legal rights had got vested with the petitioner to claim continuity in service beyond the contractual period of appointment and consequently in absence of legal right, the question of any legal injury for vindication of the said right by way of this instant writ petition, would not arise. I am further of the view that since the petitioner had failed to avail the alternative remedy of vindicating his rights by approaching appropriate forum constituted under the Act of 1947, even otherwise the writ petition is not maintainable before this court without exhausting such alternative remedy which admittedly the petitioner has failed to avail of. I am further of the view that the writ petition is also not maintainable in view of the fact that the respondent company is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and the Board of Directors of the company is functioning without any financial aid or assistance from the Central or the State Government and hence it cannot be held an instrumentality or agency of the State and the writ petition is also not maintainable in view of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India since no violation of fundamental right can be claimed against private bodies and institutions which are neither controlled nor financially aided by the State/Central Government. 14. As a result of the above discussions I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed. 14. As a result of the above discussions I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed. However, in case the petitioner is desirous of approaching the appropriate Forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for vindication of his rights against the respondents, he may do so in accordance with law and in case he presents any such claim or petition within a period of 90 days from today, the delay or latches will not come in his way for presenting such claim or petition.Writ petition dismissed. *******