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1997 DIGILAW 1196 (ALL)

SHAMBHOO NATH RAI v. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY VARANASI

1997-09-24

D.K.SETH

body1997
D. K. SETH, J. List is revised. Mr. Dinesh Kakkar, Counsel for the respon dent, is not present. 2. The matter is taken up. 3. Mr. Neeraj Tripathi holding brief of Mr. K. N. Tripathi, submits that the order contained in Annexure-6 which is dated 21/22-12-1988 cannot be sustained in as much as when the petitioner was acquitted of the criminal case in con sideration whereof he was placed under suspension, there was no scope for deduct ing any amount from the petitioners salary in respect of the period he remained under suspension. In order to substantiate his case, Mr. Tripathi has briefly referred to the facts of the case as follows: 4. The petitioner having been ap pointed as linguist in Hindi Publication Board in Banaras Hindu University, had developed enmity with his landlord and consequently the petitioner was falsely im plicated in a criminal case, on account of which he was detained in police custody on 24-7-1984. On account of petitioners being detained in the custody, he was placed under suspension by order dated 27-7-1984. During the period of suspen sion, the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance. All representations made by the petitioner for revocation of the suspension were futile. Ultimately, by an order dated 8-11-1988 the criminal case was decided in favour of the petitioner. He was acquitted of the charges. The petitioner thereafter applied for reinstate ment with full consequential benefits on 16-11- 1988. The petitioner was duly reinstated by order dated 21-12-88 being Annexure-6 to the writ petition, but he was informed that he would be entitled for 90% of his salary during the period he remained under suspension. It is sub mitted that only communication of the said order was given to the petitioner and original order was not supplied to him. The petitioner, thereafter, made repre sentation before the Registrar on 16-1-1989 for giving him full salary. The said representation was rejected on 9-2-1989 vide Annexure-S. A.-l to the supplemen tary affidavit. Ultimately, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Executive Council on 12-9-1990 after his repre sentation dated 8-11-1989 was rejected by the Vice- Chancellor, the communication whereof was received by him on 24-2-1990. By the communication dated 12-11-1990 the petitioner was informed about rejec tion of his appeal. 5. Mr. Ultimately, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Executive Council on 12-9-1990 after his repre sentation dated 8-11-1989 was rejected by the Vice- Chancellor, the communication whereof was received by him on 24-2-1990. By the communication dated 12-11-1990 the petitioner was informed about rejec tion of his appeal. 5. Mr. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that in view of the petitioners acquittal from the criminal case, there was no scope for deducting 10% of his salary from his pay in the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. After having heard Mr. Tripathi, it appears that the petitioner was involved in a dispute with his landlord, which is wholly unconnected with his employment. Then again it appears that it was a dispute be tween the petitioner and his landlord, who had implicated the petitioner in a criminal case which ended in acquittal. The petitioner having been suspended only on account of his being taken into custody and he having not been subjected to any disciplinary proceedings by the employer, he is entitled to be reinstated with full salary. There being nothing to allege against the petitioner to have committed any misconduct, it was not open to the respondents to deduct any amount from the petitioners salary. The deduction of 10% of his salary visits the petitioner with penal consequences and the same amounts to penalty. Since the respondents did not hold any disciplinary proceedings, it was not open to the respondents to in flict any punishment on the petitioner. No misconduct is alleged to have been com mitted by the petitioner. It is not the case of the respondent that said amount is being deducted on account of commission of any misconduct by the petitioner. The original order is not before the Court. However, its communication which is An-nexure-6 to the writ petition, proceeds on the basis: "therefore, based on the findings of the judgment of the Honble Court, the Vice- Chan cellor has been pleased to pass the orders dated 19-12-1988 to the following effects: (1) The suspension of Shri Shambhu Nath Rai is revoked with immediate effect. (2) In view of the nature of the case and the nature of the acquittal, Sri Shambhu Nath Rai would receive 90% of the salary for the period during which he was under suspension. " 7. (2) In view of the nature of the case and the nature of the acquittal, Sri Shambhu Nath Rai would receive 90% of the salary for the period during which he was under suspension. " 7. Thus, it appears that 10% of his salary was deducted on the basis of the nature of the case and the nature of acquit tal. It is not open to the respondents to go into this question as to what was the na ture of case and what was the nature of acquittal. It was open for the respondents to hold enquiry if the petitioner had com mitted any misconduct under the rules ap plicable to his service. Without holding any enquiry and without inflicting any punishment, deduction of 10%- of his salary cannot be justified. In that view of the matter, the order impugned contained in Annexure-6 to the writ petition cannot be sustained and the same is accordingly quashed. In view of quashing of Annexure-6, other orders relating to rejection of rep resentation and rejection of appeal, also fall through and stand quashed. Let a writ of certiorari do issue accordingly. 8. The petitioner should be paid balance amount since not paid as early as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. In the facts and circumstances, the respondents shall also pay 18% interest from the date of re-in-statement viz. 21/22- 12-1988, till the date of actual payment. 9. The petition stands allowed. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. .