JUDGMENT 1. - The controversy which has arisen for consideration of this court between the parties to this writ petition, briefly stated, is that the petitioner was appointed as Head Mistress (Second Grade) vide order, dated 22nd September, 1973 (Annexure 1) in Bal Niketan Vybasthapak Samiti, Bundi (non-petitioner No. 3). 2. Bal Niketan Vysthapak Samiti Respondent No. 3 (hereinafter referred to as the Society') is a registered body under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1960 and has framed its own constitution containing Rules for its governance, day-to-day functioning and administration. This is an aided institution having received grant-in-aid for the Government of Rajasthan under the Grant-in-aid to Educational & Cultural Institutions Rules, 1963 (for short the Rules of 1963'). In the year 1973 the post of Head Mistress (Second Grade) was advertised in daily newspaper and the petitioner applied for the same on 13th June, 1973. She was selected and appointed as Head Mistress of the School on the basis of interview conducted by the said society vide order, dated 22nd September, 1973 (Annexure 1) and the term of appointment was upto 15th May, 1974. 3. The post of Head Mistress was sanctioned only for Montessory Trained teachers pursuant to the order of Director of Primary and Secondary Education, Bikaner and consequently the petitioner was allowed to work as Head Mistress Third Grade vide order, dated 2nd August, 1974 (Annexure 2) contrary to her order of appointment as aforesaid by which she was appointed as Head Mistress Second Grade. Consequently vide order, dated 13th December, 1978 the petitioner was confirmed as Head Mistress Third Grade w.e.f. 1.11.1978 vide Annexure 3. Since there was no other candidate available with the respondent society who had qualification and requisite training as a montessory trained teacher, the management of the society referred the matter to the Inspector of Schools (Women Education) for relaxation of the said requirement vide communication dated 7.3.1979 (Annexure 4). Ultimately the matter was examined at higher administrative level and by an order, dated 14.1.1981 the Director, Primary and Secondary Education, Bikaner sanctioned the post of teacher Second Grade in favour of the petitioner for the academic Session 1980-81 and thereafter an order, dated 14th Jan., 1981 was passed by the society by which the services of the petitioner were terminated w.e.f. 1.5.1981 vide Annexure 6. Subsequently the managing committee of the society in its meeting convened on 30th April, 1981 examined the whole matter afresh and decided to re-call the earlier order, dated 28.3.1981 by which the services of the petitioner were terminated and the petitioner was accordingly reinstated in service in the same capacity. 4. Subsequent to her reinstatement the petitioner was not allowed to work as Head Mistress and one Abdul Gafoor Gauri M.A. M.Ed. was appointed as Head Master (Second Grade) on the same post on which the petitioner was earlier performing her duties and the petitioner was compelled to join the lower post of Assistant Teacher which infact amounted to her reversion. After joining as Asstt. Teacher, the petitioner was served with charge-sheet on 6.7.1982 under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short `the CCA Rules'). The petitioner challenged the validity of the charge-sheet by filing a suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the Munsiff, Bundi vide civil suit No. 198/1982. The trial court temporarily restrained the management of the respondent society in terms of its interim order dated 10th September, 1982. 5. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended at the bar that the management of the respondent society was very much prejudiced against the petitioner and hence Inimical towards her and, therefore, she was served with a letter, dated 6.10.1982 stating inter-alia that the service agreement forms filled in by the petitioner were not available and consequently she was asked to execute a fresh agreement with the society w.e.f. 1.4.1981 vide Annexure 8 to which she had submitted her reply on 7.10.1982 stating therein that she was not under any obligation to execute a fresh agreement with the respondent society in view of her earlier agreement which was executed with the management in the year 1973 and hence she could not be compelled to execute a fresh agreement with the respondent society. Thereafter a long correspondence was exchanged between the parties and ultimately she yielded to the request of the respondent society by executing a fresh agreement vide Annexure 10 by which she consented to resume her duties as officiating Head Mistress Third Grade w.e.f. the date of her appointment vide Annexure 10 dated 30.10.1982. 6. Thereafter a long correspondence was exchanged between the parties and ultimately she yielded to the request of the respondent society by executing a fresh agreement vide Annexure 10 by which she consented to resume her duties as officiating Head Mistress Third Grade w.e.f. the date of her appointment vide Annexure 10 dated 30.10.1982. 6. The petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid arbitrary action of the respondent society for having compelled the petitioner for executing fresh agreement to function as officiating Head Mistress Third Grade vide Annexure 10, as referred to above has challenged the same as arbitrary, grossly illegal, unjust and in violation of principles of natural justice on the grounds inter-alia that without giving any opportunity or show cause notice impugned order dated 9.11.1982 was passed by which the services of the petitioner were terminated with immediate effect vide Annexure 11 which is couched in a language which shows it to be a termination simplicitor whereas it tantamounts to termination by way of punishment. 7. It has been further contended by the petitioner that the impugned order is also not sustainable in law for the reason that when the society had been restrained from proceeding with the charge-sheet by an interim order of the trial court passed in the civil suit as aforesaid, thereafter the order of termination had been passed purposely to circumvent those proceedings which had been initiated by the petitioner by way of a civil suit for permanent injunction and with a view to make the same infructuous. 8. Failing to get any relief against the society, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the managing committee of the society under Rule 4 (g) of the Rules of 1963 vide Annexure 12. The said appeal was accepted on 25.8.1983 by the appellate authority and the petitioner was reinstated in service with all consequential benefits vide Annexure 13. Thereafter the society preferred an appeal before respondent No. 2, i.e., the Deputy Director, Women Education Department, Kota challenging the order, dated 25.8.1983. The matter was referred by the management of the society to the Director, Primary and Secondary Education, Bikaner. Thereafter when nothing was heard from the said Director, the petitioner served a notice under Section 80 CPC requesting the appellate authority to decide the appeal after hearing the petitioner. 9. The matter was referred by the management of the society to the Director, Primary and Secondary Education, Bikaner. Thereafter when nothing was heard from the said Director, the petitioner served a notice under Section 80 CPC requesting the appellate authority to decide the appeal after hearing the petitioner. 9. Inspite of the above the petitioner was not conveyed any date of hearing by the society and when no intimation was received, she personally contacted the Dy. Director Education on 7/8.10.1984 and it is only thereafter that she came to know that an appeal had already been decided by respondent No. 2 way back on 26th September, 1984. 10. In reply to show cause notice the society (respondent No. 3) has contended inter-alia that since the petitioner did not possess the montessory trained teacher's qualification which was a pre-requisite condition for appointment on the post of Head Mistress of a montessory school, the respondents were under no obligation to continue to retain the services of the petitioner and hence the services of the petitioner which were of temporary nature were rightly terminated by the respondent society. It has further been contended that from the appointment order (Annexure R.1) which the respondents have placed on the record of this court along with their reply, dated 20.9.1973 it is clearly apparent that the appointment of the petitioner was purely temporary and was subject to approval by the Inspectoress of the girls school at Kota and was again subject to the work having been found satisfactory by the managing committee. The petitioner has thus deliberately manipulated and has filed forged documents alongwith the writ petition with a view to obtain favourable order from this court. The respondents have further contended that the conduct of the petitioner therefore, disentitles her to obtain any relief from this court in view of suppression of material documents Annexure R.1 from the notice of this court. 11. The respondents have further contended that the conduct of the petitioner therefore, disentitles her to obtain any relief from this court in view of suppression of material documents Annexure R.1 from the notice of this court. 11. As regards the execution of the fresh agreement it has been contended that the appointment of the petitioner was made in Third Grade as Head Mistress and the nature of said appointment was provisional for a period of six months only and from the perusal of Annexure 3 it would be apparent to this court that she was not confirmed as Head Mistress Second Grade and was confirmed only as an ordinary teacher and, therefore, she had no right or lien over the post of Head Mistress Third Grade or to claim permanent right of appointment and continuity over the same. It has further been contended that the petitioner had voluntarily accepted the decision of the managing committee of the society and had started performing her duties as Asstt. Teacher consequent to her reversion to the said post and thereafter she cannot claim any right of continuity for her appointment to the post of Head Mistress Second Grade. 12. With regard to the civil suit, it has been contended that though temporary injunction was granted by the civil court on 10.9.1982 but since the managing committee had immediately preferred an appeal before the appellate court of District Judge, Bundi and during the pendency of the appeal the petitioner had withdrawn the civil suit from the civil court and, therefore, the order of temporary injunction ceased to have any effect. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions as well as the legal position on the subject. 14. Prima-facie I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner has no case to invoke extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this court her work not being found satisfactory by the management of the society and hence no legal right is conferred in favour of the petitioner because the appointment itself being of a temporary nature could not vest the right of continuity or permanent lien on the said post in favour of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner had voluntarily and gladly accepted the said appointment without any protest or demur and thereafter since the managing committee had not given its approval to her appointment on the said post, consequently she was reverted to the post of Head Mistress Third Grade w.e.f. the year 1974 vide Annexure R.1O and thereafter she was directed to execute a fresh agreement which she also executed by filling in the fresh agreement form and was appointed as teacher grade III in the primary school of the society which obviously means that it was a fresh appointment and hence it cannot be deemed as in continuation of her earlier appointment. 15. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are wholly devoid of merit since the impugned order of termination of the services of the petitioner was termination simplicitor and from the perusal of which it is apparent that she had deliberately refused to fill up the agreement form which is the very basis and foundation to claim continuity in service as provided in the Grants- in-aid Rules, 1963 and unless and until a candidate is prepared to execute the said agreement form, no grant-in-aid would be payable for his/her salary and as such it cannot be deemed to be a continuity in service from which no legal right would flow in favour of the petitioner. Moreover, the appointment being contractual and for a fixed duration its terms were obviously binding on the petitioner and the petitioner cannot claim any permanent legal right of continuity on the said post consequent upon termination of her services vide the impugned order as referred to above. 16. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the following decisions Kaluram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : 1993 (1) WLC (Raj.) 447 , D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. : 1993 (3) SCC 259 and Dr. Bajrang Lal Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. : 1994 (2) WLC 1. 17. I have examined the ratio of the aforesaid decisions and the same are not applicable to this case for the reason that the question of having resort to the principles of natural justice would arise only when there is definite legal right in favour of a party only violation of the said right would give rise to the enforcement of a legal remedy. But in absence of any such legal right, no right to claim continuity in service can be claimed by an employee and when the terms of appointment is itself temporary and when the conditions of the agreement executed between the parties are itself not fulfilled by the aggrieved party, the said party cannot claim any permanency or continuity in service particularly when consequent upon the termination from service of an employee, the said employee has executed a fresh agreement and accepted a fresh appointment on new terms. 18. As a result of the above discussion I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******