Judgment :- Rajan, J. A common question arises in these Original Petitions as to whether the benefits of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ext. P-9 are available only to the parties to the above Writ Appeal or to the petitioners who are not parties to the above proceedings; The petitioners in these Original Petitions were granted advance increments on account of the fact that they possessed the experience and qualification and there was non-availability of Marine Officers for appointment in the Cochin Port Trust. Subsequently, the above benefit was withdrawn by the Port Trust basing on the report by the Agarwal Committee. The above withdrawal of the benefits was subject matter of certain Original Petitions filed before this Court. Initially a learned judge of this Court dismissed the Original Petitions. On appeal filed by the aggrieved persons this Court held that the appellants therein are entitled to the advance increments even after the clarification issued by the Central Government was enforced. The Port Trust was directed to fix pay in accordance with the above declaration. The reason for the above conclusion will be seen in paragraph 5 of the judgment which is as follows: "5. However, in reference to the second point, the Port Trust has not chosen to follow the said clarification and continued the fixation of higher than the minimum scale of reference to other officers referred in Paragraph 4 of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to the learned counsel, Mr. Neelambaran (joined on 2.4.1979), Mr. Sathe (joined on 19.1.1979) and Mr. T.P.A Pisharody (joined similarly) were fixed on a higher scale by taking the advance increments granted to them and if the recommendations contained in Exts. R3(b) and R3(c) that in all cases of appointments after 1.1.1974 minimum to be fixed, are followed no distinction can be drawn. Even then M/s. Sathe and T.P.A. Pisharodi would be ineligible if the rule is enforced. We do not find that any distinction can be validly be made between the officers. If these officers referred to in Para. 4 are eligible to continue in a higher scale than the minimum, the Port Trust cannot adopt a different standard for the appellants. This aspect of the matter has not been brought to the attention of the learned single judge. If these officers referred to in Para. 4 are eligible to continue in a higher scale than the minimum, the Port Trust cannot adopt a different standard for the appellants. This aspect of the matter has not been brought to the attention of the learned single judge. In that view of the matter, we hold that if the Port Trust is fixing higher scale of pay than the minimum to some of its officers, the same benefit should be extended to the appellants herein". Ext. P9 judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ext. P-10 judgment. 2. Thereafter, the petitioners filed representation to the Port Trust requesting to extend the benefits of Exts. P-9 and P-10 judgments to them also. All the petitioners except the petitioners in O.P. Nos. 18744 and 18171 of 1966 have retired from service. As far as the retired persons are concerned it is only a nominal increase in their pensionary benefits. The request of the petitioners were rejected by the Port Trust for the reason that the benefit of the judgment would be extended only to the petitioners/ appellants in the Writ Appeals. 3. The prayer in these Original Petitions is to quash the communications issued by the Port Trust declining the request of the petitioners and for a direction to the Port Trust to grant the petitioners all the benefits consequent to the payments of advance increments and relaxation of pay accordingly. 4. The only argument advanced on behalf of the Port Trust is that the petitioners who did not approach this Court earlier challenging the action of the Port Trust are not entitled to claim the benefits of the above judgments. There is a further case for the Port Trust that petitioners 1, 2 and 4 in O.P. No. 18744 of 1996 had earlier filed Original Petitions before this Court which were dismissed. They did not take up the matter in appeal before the Division Bench. I do not think the above argument of the learned counsel appearing for the Port Trust is legally sustainable. This Court declared that the denial of the benefits of advance increment is bad in law on the ground that the Port Trust is not empowered to discriminate among their officers in the matter of granting benefits of advance increments. The above judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court also. This Court declared that the denial of the benefits of advance increment is bad in law on the ground that the Port Trust is not empowered to discriminate among their officers in the matter of granting benefits of advance increments. The above judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court also. Under these circumstances, a statutory authority like the Port Trust is not entitled to put forward the plea that the benefit of the above declaration of law by this Court is available only to the petitioners therein. The Supreme Court as well as this Court have deplored the unsustainable stand of the Government, other public sector undertaking and statutory authority like the present respondents that the law declared by the courts can be applied only to those who approached this Court. The action of these authorities will lead to proliferation of litigation before Courts and also will drive all the officers to courts for redressal of their grievances. The above untenable attitude will lead to dissatisfaction, dissension and desperation among the officers. Ultimately, this will have an adverse impact on the morale of the service leading to lack of enthusiasm to work. Thus, public policy and public interest demand that the authorities should apply the law uniformly. The fruits of declaration of law on a point should not be denied to a section of the officers on the ground that they did not approach the court earlier for redressal of their grievances. The stand of the Port Trust that benefits of Exts. P9 and P10 are available only to the parties therein is unsustainable. Therefore, the Port Trust is directed to extend the benefits of the judgments evidenced by Exts. P9 and P10 to all the petitioners in these Original Petitions. The pensionary benefits of the petitioners who had already retired must be refixed taking into consideration the benefit of advance increments granted to them. The persons who are still in service are entitled to get their pay refixed in accordance with the declaration made by this Court in Ext. P9 judgment as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ext. P10 judgment. With the above observation and direction, the Original Petitions are disposed of.