ORDER 1. The Judgment-debtors, confronted with liability under the money decree, have filed this revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'Code') against the order dated 1.5.92, passed by the Executing Court (VI Addl. Judge to the Court of the District Judge, Indore) in Execution Case No. 71/84-A, thereby rejecting their objections under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code. Objections were preferred on the linchipin that Decree-holder Bank has already recovered the sum of Rs.3,50,000/-, substantial part of the decretal liability , from the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (for short 'Corporation') on the strength of premium paid from their (Judgment-debtors') accounts and it cannot be permitted to recover the aforesaid amount from them (Judgment-debtors) again and to indulge in undue enrichment. The Executing Court said monosyllabic "No" to the objections, on the ground of absence of 'Privity of Contract' between them and Corporation and absence of such a fetter in the decree. 2. I have heard Shri S.C. Bagadia, learned Senior Counsel with Shri Pankaj Bagadia for the applicants and Shri S.C. Consul, learned counsel for non-applicant No.1, none appeared for non-applicants No.2 and 4. 3. Shri Bagadia has submitted that the order is illegal and vitiated by material irregularity in that 'recovery' cannot be permitted to be duplicated despite the decree and that promisee, having accepted performance of the promise from the Corporation, i.e. a third person to the aforesaid extent, cannot be allowed to enforce it against the promisor via execution. He has also submitted that enforcement, designed to secure undue enrichment, would amount to practising fraud and to committing of abuse of the process of the Court. In further pursuit, he has placed reliance on Section 41 of the Indian Contract, 1872 and on AIR 1973 Calcutta 141 (Union of India v. Gangabishan). He has also stated that efforts for reasonable settlement with the Bank are in progress. 4. Shri Consul has, however, dubbed the oppugnation as non-meritorious and had contended that the Executing Court has passed the legal and valid order as there is indubitably 'no privity of contract' between the borrower and Corporation. He has submitted that Executing Court has no jurisdiction 'to go behind the decree' and imagine the state of affairs, not indicated or mandated by the decree which has attained finality. He has submitted that Executing Court has no jurisdiction 'to go behind the decree' and imagine the state of affairs, not indicated or mandated by the decree which has attained finality. He clarified that there is no question of duplication or undue enrichment and that payment by Corporation is adhoc arrangement on account of Insurance to save the Bank from becoming financially paralysed and that Bank has the liability to restitute the amount back to Corporation on recovery of debt-amount from the borrower i.e. Judgment-debtors. He has placed reliance on 1995 Important and Selected Judgments (IS1) Banking 222 (Shambhoo Lal Purohit vs. State Bank of India and others), AIR 1951 SC 189 (V. Ramaswami Aiyengar and others vs. T.N. V. Kailasa Thevar) and 1965 JLJ 147 = AIR 1965 MP 75 (FB) (Moolchand and others v. Manganlal). 5. On 12.10.92, the execution proceedings were directed to remain stayed. 6. Execution of decrees and orders is regulated by Order XXI of the Code which has as many as 106 Rules. This prodigious extent is not occupied by any other order of the Code. The attempt at misuse needs to be joined by law. The application was filed under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code. This provision envisages the consideration of "all questions" arising between the "parties to the suit". Indisputably, Corporation was not the party to the suit and as such, no question can arise for consideration vis-a-vis a party foreign to the suit. Hence, no application under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code could properly lie, on this point in execution case. 7. As regards merits of the matter, the Executing Court rejected the plea with uncontroverted position on observation as noted below.- 8. And such a provision is not contained in the decree as well. That being so, it is impermissible in law to go behind the decree and entertain the plea, for whatever worth, unsupportable by the decree. 9. The law as enacted in Section 41 of the Contract Act, as noted above, has been adopted from Roman Law and is a departure from the early English Law on the point. Indian Rule is presumably based on the observations in 32 LJCP 121 (Cook v. Lister). What is required by this Section is actual performance and not a substituted promise. Indian Rule is presumably based on the observations in 32 LJCP 121 (Cook v. Lister). What is required by this Section is actual performance and not a substituted promise. It is stated that there is no actual performance, but adhoc payment, as substituted one, to become incinerated as being liable to be returned on recovery from the borrower. It is thus, contended that it is neither a performance nor an acceptance from a third person like Corporation. Section 41 is thus, not shown to be attracted in the peculiar facts in this execution case. The decision pressed into service, is inapplicable and thus, unhelpful. 10. It is, thus, luculent that the submissions are inutile and futile atleast so far as the execution proceedings are concerned. There is no material to infer 'fraud' or 'abuse'. The Full Bench decision, cited above, has ruled that Executing Court has no jurisdiction to refuse to execute the decree. It is trite position of law that Executing Court cannot spin a new decree for the parties even under the guise of interpretation. Objections are not entertainable even by doctrine of implication. 11. Apart from debility and infecundity, the Judgment-debtors have stated nothing substantial to tear up the tenebrosity as to why the alleged position, untriable in such proceedings was not provised? The course is thus, not relaxant. The order is not fit to be evicted. 12. The decree remains executable as it is and the exercise can be seen to suffer no speed-breaker. There is no question for retrogradation or riddance. 13. The order is, thus, found to be on firm foundation. The Court below is not shown to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The order also does not seem to fall under (a) or (b) of the proviso to Section 115 of the Code. The scope of interference under this Section, as held in AIR 1973 SC 76 (The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad), is even otherwise little and limited. No ground is made out to warrant interference. 14. In the result, I dismiss this revision petition, but with direction/observation as noted below:- (a) This order shall not impair the right of the applicants, if any, to file appropriate proceedings, if not forbidden by law. No ground is made out to warrant interference. 14. In the result, I dismiss this revision petition, but with direction/observation as noted below:- (a) This order shall not impair the right of the applicants, if any, to file appropriate proceedings, if not forbidden by law. (b) The interim order dated 12.10.92 shall remain operative on the fulcrum of contention about efforts at settlement till 31.1.1997 so as to enable the parties to compromise in the mean-time, if they so desire. (c) Further, proceeding in the execution case, in the event of absence of written-compromise, shall be resumed after 31.1.1997, in accordance with law without unnecessary delay. 15. In view of nature of objection, I make no order as to costs. Counsel fee for each side is, however, fixed at Rs.500/-, if certified.