Judgment M. Y. Eqbal, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the demand raised by respondent No.4 Accounts Officer, transmission Circle, Dehri-on-sone calling upon the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.5,01,17,264.00 by way of additional. security payable in 12 installment with regard to electric connection of the petitioner. A further prayer has been made for a declaration that the demand of additional security under 1993 tariff for payment of entire amount in cash is wholly illegal, arbitrary and without any basis. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of this writ application are as follows: the petitioner is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and is running the Industry at Garhwa road, Palamu. The petitioner entered into an agreement with the respondent Board for supply of electric energy of 132 KVA, high tension service for a contract demand of 23,000 KVA under High tension Agreement. Under clause 7 of the said agreement, the petitioner was required to make a deposit of security money of Rs.60,00,000/- out of which 30,00,000/- was required to be deposited in cash and Rs.30,00,000/- in the form of bank Guarantee which was duly paid by the petitioner. According to the petitioner, there has been no enhancement in the contract demand whatsoever and the same contract demand is still continuing. A copy of the agreement entered into between the petitioner and the respondent board is Annexura-1 to the writ application. As per tariff notification, which is prevalent since the beginning with regard to high tension consumers, clause 15.3 (d) provided that upto rupees one lakh, the amount is required to be deposited in cash and beyond rupees one lakh, 50% of the security money will be deposited in cash and 50% in the shape of Bank guarantee. This provision of security money has been made from 1979 tariff and till 1991 the Board was asking for deposit of security money in the said form. The respondent Board made a tariff notification in the year 1993 under which clause 15.3 provided for deposit of entire security money in cash. This provision of security money has been made from 1979 tariff and till 1991 the Board was asking for deposit of security money in the said form. The respondent Board made a tariff notification in the year 1993 under which clause 15.3 provided for deposit of entire security money in cash. According to the petitioner, the tariff notification of 1993 postulates only for fresh security money to be taken with regard to new connection and with regard to old connection, they can only ask for additional security money to the extent of enhancement of consumption charges and not on the total amount of security, which has already been deposited by the consumer. In utter surprise of the petitioner, a demand notice dated 18th January 1995 was issued by the Accounts Officer, Transmission Circle, dehri-on-sone of the respondent Board stating that the petitioner is required to deposit the additional security money amounting to Rs.5,01,17,264 so that the entire amount is paid by 31st December 1995. The petitioner had protested with regard to the said demand made against him by stating that as per Boards Circular with regard to High Tension Consumer, the amount should be paid through letter of credit but the same was not accepted. However the petitioner is said to have deposited two installments under threat of disconnection. According to the petitioner, the demand on the face of it is illegal and without any basis and there is no justification for demanding the said amount from the petitioner inasmuch as there has been no change en the expiry of 1991 tariff. The petitioner also stated that the demand of additional security money by the respondent Board under clause 15.3 (C) of 1993 tariff is contrary to the judgment of the supreme Court in the cases of Ferro Alloy corporation V/s. A. P. State Electricity Board and another. ( AIR 1993 SC 2005 ) 3. A counter affidavit has been field on behalf of respondent Board stating inter alia that Clause 1.5.3 (c) and (f) relating to security deposit and of tariff notification dated 21st June 1993 superseded the earlier tariff notification dated 26th August 1991 which provided for furnishing 50% security in cash and 50% by way of Bank Guarantee. A counter affidavit has been field on behalf of respondent Board stating inter alia that Clause 1.5.3 (c) and (f) relating to security deposit and of tariff notification dated 21st June 1993 superseded the earlier tariff notification dated 26th August 1991 which provided for furnishing 50% security in cash and 50% by way of Bank Guarantee. It is stated that under tariff notification of 1993, a new provision has been made for security deposit in cash only and, therefore, the Board is entitled to demand from the writ petitioner for additional security even in relation to the period during which the tariff notification of 1991 was enforce. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that the new tariff is applicable to all categories of consumer from 1st July 1993 and the Board is empowered to demand for enhancement of additional security deposit as per provisions of Clause 15.3 (c) of the said tariff notification. The amount of additional security deposit is liable to be enhanced or reviewed from time to time. This review was to take place twice every year. The respondent Board further stated that against the impugned demand (Annexure-4), the petitioner deposited two installments and thereafter filed a writ application being 1993 of 95 (R) and this Court passed an order that the electric line of the petitioner shall not be disconnected provided the petitioner pays 75% of the total amount of the bill within six months from that day. The petitioner accordingly deposited six more intalments, thus, making a total of 75% of the total bill served to the petitioner. The petitioner again deposited an amount equivalent to three more instalments after negotiation at Boards level by the Director of accounts which was treated as ad hoc payment and has been adjusted from their running outstanding bill. During the pendency of the writ application, the petitioner filed an application and challenged another demand notice/bill dated 1st August 1996 whereby the board has demanded an additional money and delayed payment sur-chargc to the extent of Rs.22,25,271/-. It is stated that in the instant writ application, this court by order dated 20th April 1995, admitted the writ application and directed the petitioner to deposit 75% of the total demand of the bill within six months. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner deposited 75% of the total amount of Rs.3,75,87,948/- and only a sum of Rs.1,25,29,316 remained due. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner deposited 75% of the total amount of Rs.3,75,87,948/- and only a sum of Rs.1,25,29,316 remained due. It is further stated that the petitioner however on pcrsuution made by the Board, deposited the balance amount of Rs.1,25,29,316/- being the balance amount of additional security money, as per discussion held with the chairman of the board, the petitioner requested that the amount of interest up to 31st March 1996 may be released. The respondent board on deposit of the said amount issued a receipt showing that the amount deposited by the petitioner was against the security deposit. A copy of the said receipt has been annexed as Annexure-7 to the said application. The petitioner accordingly on 13th July 1996 gave a letter to the Chairman of the Board with a copy to different authorities stating therein that as per the discussion, the amount which was retained by the petitioner has been deposited and the petitioner has requested for payment of interest on account of security deposit. The petitioner in utter surprise received a letter from the Accounts Officer dated 16th August 1996 in which it was stated that the amount deposited by the petitioner has been adjusted against the monthly bill of July, 1996 on ad hoc basis. The petitioner immediately protested against the said illegal action of the respondent Board and requested for making necessary rectification but in instead of correcting the mistake, the petitioner again received a demand of additional security money of Rs.1,25,29,316 which had duly been paid by the petitioner earlier and in the said bill-delayed payment surcharge had also been charged to the extent of Rs.22,25,277. A copy of the said bill is annexure-11 to the writ application which has also been challenged by the petitioner. 4. Mr. Pawan Kumar Rajgarhia learned Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner firstly submitted that under the old tariff all high tension consumers were required to deposit 50% security money, both in cash and 50% in the form of bank guarantee, and after the coming into force of 1993 tariff from 1st july 1993, the consumer are required to deposit the entire amount of security money in cash. The Learned Counsel submitted that in view of the law laid down by this Court that the tariff cannot be enforced retrospectively, the respondent board was not justified in demanding the entire security money in cash. The Learned Counsel submitted that in view of the law laid down by this Court that the tariff cannot be enforced retrospectively, the respondent board was not justified in demanding the entire security money in cash. The Learned Counsel vehemently assailed the action of the respondent board in diverting the running amount of security money towards the so called arrear bill and making illegal demand of delayed payment vide Annexure-11. 5. The first question which arises for consideration is with regard to the validity of demand of additional security money and also the payment of interest on the said security. This question has no longer res Integra and the controversy has been set at rest by the Supreme court in Ferro Alloys Corpn. Ltd. V/s. A. P. State Electricity Board AIR 1993 SC 2005 wherein it has been held by the apex Court that the object of the conditions of security deposit by the consumer is to ensure proper payment of bills and the demand of deposit of security money and the additional security money is neither illegal nor unreasonable. Their Lordship of the Apex Court, with regard to the payment of int erest on security money, has held as under: para-122: We should also observe that the rate of interest of security deposit cannot be equated with the rate of interest on the fixed deposit. First of all, if the consumption charges are to be appropriated, the moneys accrued by way of deposits cannot be held in fixed deposit. Nor all deposits need carry interest in every transaction. Secondly, the nature and character of the security deposit is essentially different from fixed deposit. It is worthwhile, in this connection, to refer to Companies (Acceptance of Deposits (Rules 1975. In rule 2, it is stated: 2. Definition, - In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires.- (a ). . . . . (b) deposit means any deposit of money with and includes any amount borrowed by, a company but does not include - (i) to (iv ). . . . . . In rule 2, it is stated: 2. Definition, - In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires.- (a ). . . . . (b) deposit means any deposit of money with and includes any amount borrowed by, a company but does not include - (i) to (iv ). . . . . . (v) any amount received from an employee of the company by way of security deposit; (vi) Any amount received by way of security or as an advance from any purchase agent, selling agent, or other agents in the course of or for the purpose of the business of the company or any advance received against the orders for the supply of goods or properties or rendering of any service. . . . . . . . " in Bihar Chamber of Commerce and another V/s. Bihar State Electricity board and another 1993 (1) PLJR 36, the provisions of revised tariff notification dated 26th August 1991 were challenged and the Division Bench of this court while deciding various issues raised in the writ application held that the provisions of the tariff cannot be given retrospective effect and it shall be effective from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. The said view was reiterated in a subsequent decision of this Court in Council for Protection of public rights and Welfare V/s. State of Bihar and others 1994 (1) PLJR 853 wherein this Court held as under : "para-27.- The Board also being the state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is required to act in a fair and reasonable manner. The board in terms of is power under Section 49 and 59 of the 1948 Act is certainly entitled to adjust its tariff in such a manner so as to ensure that total revenue in any year ensures surplus of not less than 3%. The board in terms of is power under Section 49 and 59 of the 1948 Act is certainly entitled to adjust its tariff in such a manner so as to ensure that total revenue in any year ensures surplus of not less than 3%. The Board is not only required to frame a tariff keeping in view a coordinate supply of and distribution of electricity in most efficient and economical manner with particular reference to development of such area which is undeveloped but is also required to take steps for extension of supply of electricity to sparsely developed area, it is also permissible for the Board to frame tariff so as to enable it to supply electricity at lower rate in relation to a section of consumer, it is also entitled to give concession, to a section of consumer like agriculturist or inhabitants of sparsely developed area. Fixation of such different tariffs cannot be held to be discriminatory as the consumers may belong to the different classes. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that 1991 tariff per se is ultra-vires the provisions of 1948 Act or Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Para 59: Re:question No. V. The submission of Sri Navaniti prasad Singh to the effect that Board cannot give retrospective effect to its notification dt.3rd July 1992 has also substance. In Bihar Chambers of Commerce V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1993 (1) PLJR 36, a Division Bench of this court has clearly held that the Board has no jurisdiction to give retrospective effect to any tariff. The submission of Mr. Shiv Kirti singh to the effect that the Board had given retrospective effect to its aforementioned notification, as it had withdrawn the fixed charges levied on the domestic consumers, cannot be construed to have any restorospective effect only because it confers some benefit to the consumers of electrical energy thereby. The question as to whether any fixed charges can be levied on a domestic consumer or not was also the subject matter of these writ applications. The Board itself has purported to withdraw the fixed charges so far as the same related to the domestic consumers. It, therefore, in our opinion, had no jurisdiction to issue any notification whereby and whereunder a higher rate of tariff can be fixed upon the consumers with retrospective effect and retrospective operation. The Board itself has purported to withdraw the fixed charges so far as the same related to the domestic consumers. It, therefore, in our opinion, had no jurisdiction to issue any notification whereby and whereunder a higher rate of tariff can be fixed upon the consumers with retrospective effect and retrospective operation. The Board, in our opinion, has no jurisdiction to issue any notification with retrospective effect as it has no power to do so under the provisions of the Act and the question of this Courts holding that the notification has a retrospective effect only because some benefit, if any, is said to have been conferred upon the consumer, cannot be accepted. " 6. The validity of 1993 tariff has also been challenged by various persons before this Court in a series of writ applications which have been disposed of by a common judgment of this Court in bihar 440 Vold Vidyut Upbhokta Sangh V/s. Chairman, BSEB 1994 (2) PLJR 103. In that case the validity of 1993 tariff was questioned on various grounds and particularly attach has been made in relation to Clauses 15.2, 15.2. (b), 15.2. (c), 15.3 (b), 15.3 (c), 16.10 and 16.44 of the said tariff. This Court held as under: "para 87: Sec.59 of the 1948 Act not only provides that the price charged for electricity should be sufficient to recover from consumers the real value of the resources used up each year in serving them after taking credit, for any subventions from the State Government except in a very specific situation, as for example where a plant is under construction but also to leave a surplus of 3%. Sec.59 of the 1948 Act leaves no justification to the Board to impair the capital structure of a scheme by defraying normal revenue expenditure out of capital. Reference in this connection may be made to M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. V/s. Chairman Bihar State Electricity Board reported in AIR 1984 SC 657 and Kerala state Electricity Board/s case (supra ). Para 88: We, however, cannot accept the submissions of Mr. Basudev Prasad that only because the Board would continue to make losses, the tariff should be struck down as violative of Sec.59 of the 1948 Act. Para 88: We, however, cannot accept the submissions of Mr. Basudev Prasad that only because the Board would continue to make losses, the tariff should be struck down as violative of Sec.59 of the 1948 Act. It is true that the Board should adjust its accounts in such a manner that the same generates a surplus of 3% but the same does not mean that board will have to put so much burden on the consumers which they cannot bear. In fact the said submission are absolutely contrary to and inconsistent with the other submissions made by the Learned Counsel. The power of the Board, however to frame a tariff can neither be arbitrary nor unreasonable. Sec.189 (a) clearly lays down a mandatory duty on the Board to act in the most efficient and economical manner with particular reference to those area which are not for the time being supplied or adequately supplied with the electricity. Sec.26 of the 1948 Act postulates that except some provisions enumerated therein the Board has some power and obligations of licensees under indian Electricity Act, 1910. Para 89: There cannot be any doubt that the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of india would not normatly go into the details of the provisions of any rate fixed or tariff made by an expert committee. " 7. In the light of the ratio decided by this Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove, the only question left for consideration in the instant writ application is whether the respondent board is entitled to demand security amount in cash in respect of previous period where under the old tariff, the said amount was deposited by way of bank guarantee. The answer will be in negative. The respondent Board is entitled to demand the additional security money under the 1993 tariff in cash, but cannot demand the amount covered by the Bank guarantee in cash. However, in the instant case, the petitioner deposited 75% of the total amount demanded by the respondent Board in cash pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 20th April 1995 and as a good guesture, the petitioner also deposited the remaining 25% i. e. Rs.1,25,29,316/- which is evident from the application dated 13th November 1996 filed by the petitioner. From Annexure 7 to the said application it appears that the said amount of Rs.1,256,29,316/-was received by the respondent Board as payment against security deposit. In that view of the matter the action of the respondent Board in adjusting the said amount against the running bill was illegal and arbitrary. Consequently, the demand/bill dated 1st August 1996 demanding additional security of Rs.1,25,29,316, as contained in Annexure-11 to the writ application is probably illegal and mala fide and is liable to be quashed. 8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner deposited the entire additional security amount in cash, no order need be passed in this case. But the demand/bill raised by the respondent board, vide Annexure-11 demanding 25% additional security amount is quashed. 9. In the result, this writ application is allowed in part and the impugned bill/demand dated 1st August 1996, so far it relates to demand of additional security, is hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.