JUDGMENT 1. - This Civil Revision Petition has been filed against the appellate order dated 29-8-97 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 3. Udaipur in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 230/96 thereby dismissing the appeal filed against the order of dismissal of application of the plaintiff-petitioner under O.39, Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151, C.P.C. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the petition are as follows : 3. The petitioner, as plaintiff, filed a suit for permanent injunction against the non petitioner, who is defendant in the trial Court with the averments that the suit premises which is a plot measuring 25 x 14 fit situated in Udaipur, which was of the ownership of the non-petitioner, was under the use and occupation of the petitioner under a licence granted for the period starting from 1-4-80 to 31-3-81 and that he had deposited the licence-fee prescribed therefor with the non-petitioner up to 31-3-86. However, the non-petitioner served notice dated 14-1-87 thereby calling upon the petitioner to vacate possession of the suit premises and failing which it was further threatened that he would be otherwise forcibly evicted from the suit premises. Along with the suit itself, an application for grant of temporary injunction was also filed before the trial Court. 4. The trial Court, after giving an opportunity to both the parties, vide its order dated 8-2-90, while holding that the plaintiff-petitioner failed to prove necessary three facts, (1) existence of a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff, (b) balance of convenience and (3) in absence of temporary injunction, irreparable loss accruing to the petitioner and, accordingly, the application was dismissed resulting in appeal before the District Court, who in turn, transferred the same to the Addl. District Judge No. 3, Udaipur, who has dismissed the appeal thereby affirming the aforesaid order passed by the trial Court and hence this Revision Petition. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the impugned order dated 8-2-90 as well as the appellate order passed by the lower Court and have considered the same carefully. 6. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the impugned order dated 8-2-90 as well as the appellate order passed by the lower Court and have considered the same carefully. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the same contentions as were raised before the trial Court and so also before the appellate Court, maintained that, as is borne out of the impugned appellate order, the non-petitioner granted licence in respect of the suit premises in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner has already deposited licence-fee up to 31-3-86 and, thereafter, abruptly notice dated 14-1-87 was served on the petitioner and, thereafter, no licence-fee is being deposited by the non-petitioner. However, as per the terms of the licence and the bye-laws framed by the Municipal Council. Udaipur and gazetted on 9-12-71, did not serve one months notice while terminating the licence of the petitioner and, accordingly, without having a recourse to the legal provisions, the non petitioner cannot be allowed to illegally and unauthorisedly oust the possession of the petitioner and, in view of these circumstances, specially when Dharam Das is alleged to have taken forcible possession of the disputed plot from the petitioner and, subsequently, on the complaint of the petitioner himself, non petitioner dispossessed Dharam Das from the suit premises and so, as is the case of the petitioner, he again came into possession of the suit premises pursuant to the licence originally so granted to the petitioner by the non-petitioner and accordingly both the lower courts did not appreciate these circumstances in their right perspective and, instead, taking a superfluous view of the circumstances, illegally refused to grant temporary injunction and thus both the lower Courts have committed material irregularity in exercise of their jurisdiction thereby refusing to grant temporarily injunction in favour of the petitioner which has resulted in irreparable injury to the petitioner. 7. 7. On the contrary, the learned Counsel for the non-petitioner has maintained that the petitioner was granted licence enuring from 31-3-80 to 1-4-81 only and, thereafter, the licence so granted to the petitioner was never renewed though, subsequently, he had deposited rent up to 31-3-86 without prior permission or seeking renewal of the licence originally granted to the petitioner and he was required, as per the terms of the licence itself, to have deposited advance yearly licence-fee before 31st of March of every year but he failed to comply with this term. Besides, he had further transferred his possession illegally and without knowledge and authority of the non-petitioner Municipal Council to one Dharam Das who was dispossessed of the premises on 20-11-86 by the non-petitioner and, no fresh licence was granted in favour of the petitioner nor was he allowed to re-take possession of the suit premises by the non-petitioner and, therefore, there was no right or authority vesting in the petitioner to either re-take possession of the suit premises and, therefore there did not arise any question of either dispossessing or threatening to dispossess him from the suit premises since he had already abandoned his possession while allowing Dharam Das to illegally occupy the suit premises in flagrant contravention of the terms of the licence and, therefore, even if it is assumed that, some how, after ejectment of Dharam Das by the non petitioner, the petitioner has illegally occupied suit premises, his status is that of a simpliciter trespasser who cannot claim any relief by way of seeking decree for permanent injunction against the Municipal Council itself and, therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances, when both the lower courts have concluded that the petitioner was not possessed of the suit premises as a licencee of the non petitioner and that the necessary factors for issuance of temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner were found to be absent and, in view of these circumstances, when grant of temporary injunction being an equitable relief was within the discretion of the lower courts, and they have not committed any illegality or any material irregularity while refusing to grant such a relief and hence no interference in the orders of the lower courts is called for. 8. It is indisputable that the petitioner was granted licence for the suit premises under the provisions of the Municipal Council. 8. It is indisputable that the petitioner was granted licence for the suit premises under the provisions of the Municipal Council. Udaipur (Tahbazari and Shed bye-laws), 1971 (to be called the bye-laws hereinafter) in exercise of powers vested under clause 3 of the Bye-laws and clause 8(3) of the same prescribed that as and when the Council desires to terminate the licence granted to licensee, one month's advance notice shall be served on licensee for vacation of the premises and in case the licensee failed to comply with it within the stipulated period, he shall be deemed to be a trespasser on the land and, as a result, the Council shall be authorised to proceed against the licensee under Section 203 of the Municipalities Act. Besides, sub-clause (3) of clause (5) of the Bye-laws clearly says that the licence shall be for a maximum period of one year ending on 31st March of every year and the maximum period for which the licence could be granted shall not exceed seven years. It further says that the licence-holder shall be under an obligation for presentation of the licence for its renewal every year along with prescribed licence fee. 9. Therefore, the petitioner was under obligation to get the licence renewed every year and to have paid licence-fee in advance before end of 31st March of every year but, admittedly, the petitioner did not get his licence renewed beyond 31-3-81 and he also did not deposit advance licence-fee. Thus, the petitioner, at the time of filing of suit and so also application for issue of temporary injunction, was not a holder of a valid licence being authorised to occupy and use the suit premises and, accordingly, his status was that of a trespasser. Admittedly, he did not deposit any licence-fee after 31-3-86 and prior to it also, he never deposited licence-fee in compliance of the terms of the licence and the aforesaid provisions of the Bye-laws framed by the non-petitioner Municipal Council. 10. Besides, the petitioner could not dispute the position that Dharam Das had taken possession of the suit premises implying thereby that he stood dispossessed from the suit premises. Be it that he was illegally and forcibly dispossessed by Dharam Das, the fact remains that he became out of possession of the suit property. 10. Besides, the petitioner could not dispute the position that Dharam Das had taken possession of the suit premises implying thereby that he stood dispossessed from the suit premises. Be it that he was illegally and forcibly dispossessed by Dharam Das, the fact remains that he became out of possession of the suit property. In case he was illegally and forcibly dispossessed from the suit premises by Dharam Das, the only course left for him was to have immediately filed a suit for restoration of the possession as provided under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act but he did not. 11. On the other hand, the non-petitioner's case is that since the petitioner abandoned his possession and in flagrant disregard of the terms and conditions of the licence so granted to the petitioner, he transferred possession of the suit property illegally and unauthorisedly to Dharam Das who had to be evicted by the non-petitioner on 25-11-86 and the memo of proceedings prepared by the non-petitioner does not support the contention made from the side of the petitioner that it was at his instance that the non-petitioner came to His rescue to oust the unauthorised and illegal possession of Dharam Das and instead, the non-petitioner has, right from beginning, consistently maintained that the petitioner, while abandoning his own possession, illegally transferred the possession to Dharam Das and, hence, the non-petitioner was forced to have evicted Dharam Das therefrom and to have, thereafter, raised a 'kutcha' construction to convert it into a room. A lock was placed by the non-petitioner on the same and the petitioner was never given any permission or issued any fresh licence or the licence so initially granted to him was renewed to authorise the petitioner to re-occupy or re-take possession of the suit property and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to re-claim possession of the suit property by way of temporary injunction. 12. 12. This conclusion has been concurrently arrived at by both the lower courts and factually there is no error or infirmity in the impugned orders and, consequently, presently, in absence of renewal of licence and payment and acceptance up to date licence-fee for renewal and continuance of the licence in favour of the petitioner, as already concluded hereinbefore, the petitioner lost his right to be continued in possession of the suit property and to restrain the non-petitioner, who is a licensor, for either taking possession of the suit property or to continue with the same. 13. In an application under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2, C.P.C. temporary injunction can be granted if the case of the petitioner is covered by the three principles, namely, (1) on making out a prima facie case (2) on showing balance of convenience in petitioner's favour and the refusal of the injunction would cause greater inconvenience to him and (3) whether on refusal of the injunction, he would suffer irreparable loss. Granting of an injunction is a matter of discretion and, therefore, the petitioner has to satisfy the court that the petitioner has a triable case. Resultantly, before temporary injunction, as prayed for is granted, the petitioner is further required to show that he has a legal right and there was an invasion of his right, as was held in the Chandu Lal v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1978 Delhi 174 (Full Bench) 14. As concluded hereinbefore, the position of the petitioner, presently, does not appear to be different from a trespasser and a trespasser is not entitled to any permanent injunction as against owner of the property nor the owner is required to resort to legal proceedings to establish his rights of ownership over the suit property. So the principle that the relief of injunction is a discretionary relief is now well settled and a party, before it can ask a Court to exercise jurisdiction in its favour, must show that it has some equities in its favour which would impel a court to exercise discretion in its favour ( State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Ghulam Rasool, AIR 1979 J and K 53) . 15. 15. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, when there is absolutely no evidence that after dispossession of Dharam Das by the non petitioner, the petitioner was granted any fresh licence or that the original licence was ever renewed after 31-3-81 and he was again permitted to occupy the suit premises, even if he has illegally re-entered the suit premises, he can be termed to be a rank trespasser and he cannot maintain this action against the defendant non-petitioner and so even if any notice dated 14-1-87 was served on the petitioner to remove his illegal and unauthorised possession from the suit premises, that does not have any material adverse bearing on the conclusion so arrived at hereinbefore. 16. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, the impugned order passed by the lower court and so also affirmed by the appellate Court, being impugned in this revision petition, do not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity and so no interference with the same is called for in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 17. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, from which ever angle this petition is viewed, the same is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. However, all these observations have been made for the sole purpose of disposal of this petition and, accordingly, it is clarified that these observations shall not have any adverse effect on the merit of the case itself which is as yet pending before the trial Court. However, delayed disposal of the original suit cannot be appreciated. 18. Accordingly, this revision petition along with stay petition is dismissed and the impugned orders are hereby affirmed. In the circumstances, no order as to costs.Revision dismissed. *******