MOHAN SINGH THAKUR v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH — 1997 DIGILAW 121 (HP)

JUDGMENT M. SRINIVASAN, C.J.—In C.W.P. No. 134 of 1997 the prayers are to quash the notifications dated 17-1-1997, 26-2-1997, and 27-2- 1997 issued by respondents 1 and 2. In C.W.P. No. 135 of 1997, the challenge is only against the notification dated 17-1-1997 in No. 7-16/69-lSG. Vol. IV. 2. The first of the notifications is dated 18.10.1996 issued by the government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 3 read with Section 417 of Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. The notification called for objections to the proposed inclusion of the area set out therein within, the Municipal Corporation, Shimla and such objections were to be in writing addressed to the Secretary (Urban Development) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh through the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, within 30 days from the date of the publication of the notification. In the schedule as many as 59 villages were mentioned. The objections were sent not only to the Deputy Commissioner and the Secretary but also to the Prime Minister of India and some other dignataries. It is not necessary at this stage to refer to those objections in detail. The Deputy commissioner fixed 26-12-1996 for hearing. On that date, he proposed to go to several places. He had mentioned the name of the places and the time at which he would be available for hearing the matter in those places. After the report of the Deputy Commissioner was received by the Government, a notification was issued on 17.1.1997, which reads, in so far as it is relevant, as follows : "Whereas a proposal for inclusion of 59 Villages/Part of Villages (including existing areas of Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli) within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Shimla, specified in Schedule TV of this Departments Notification of even number, dated 18.10.1996 was published in the Rajpatra, Himachal Pradesh (Extra Ordinary) dated 19.10.1996 for inviting objections from the affected persons through the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla within thirty days; And whereas the objections received from the various interested groups/parties have been heard by the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla. And whereas the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla has sent his recommendations to the State Government keeping in view the objections filed by various persons/parties; And whereas the objections received within the specified period alongwith the recommendations of the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla have been considered by the State Government; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub- section (3) of Section 3 of Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (Act No. 12 of 1994) and in consultation with the Municipal Corporation, Shimla, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to alter the limits of the Municipal area of Municipal Corporation, Shimla so as to include the areas specified in the schedule below within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Shimla, with immediate effect." 3. In the schedule the names of 30 villages were set out and in column 5 the various khasra numbers in the villages in which only certain lands were annexed to the municipal areas were mentioned. In all about 6245 Kitas were mentioned in column 5. By another notification dated 17.1.1997 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 3 of Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, the Governor excluded the villages mentioned in column 3 of the schedule from the Gram Sabhas mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule in order that they may be included in the municipal area of the Municipal Corporation, Shimla. The same 30 villages are mentioned and the same Kitas are set out in the said schedule. Another notification was issued on 26.2.1997 by which some more areas in six chaks were set out and they were also included in the area of the Municipal Corporation, Shimla. The total number of Kitas therein are 170. On the same day another notification was issued under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 excluding those areas from the Gram Sabhas mentioned therein. 4. A notification was issued on 27.2.1997, by which the municipal area of Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli, was merged with the Municipal Corporation, Shimla, and Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli was abolished thereby under the provisions of Section 9(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1994. 4. A notification was issued on 27.2.1997, by which the municipal area of Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli, was merged with the Municipal Corporation, Shimla, and Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli was abolished thereby under the provisions of Section 9(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1994. By the same notification the balance of the municipal fund and all other property at the time of issue of the notification, which stood vested in the nagar Panchayat, Dhalli, were directed to be vested in the State Government and the liabilities of the Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli, stood also transferred to the State Government. Another notification was issued on the same day, by which the Government was pleased to transfer all assets and liabilities of abolished Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli, which vested in the State Government to the Municipal Corporation, Shimla, with immediate effect. 5. An ordinance was issued by the Governor by name Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj (Amendment) Ordinance, 1997 (H.P. Ordinance No. 3 of 1997) on 15.1.1997. By the said ordinance, the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 was omitted and sub-section (2-A) was introduced after sub-section (2). By the said sub-section (2-A) a provision was made that when on account of the reason that the Sabha area is increased or diminished during the term of the Gram Panchayat, such increase or diminution of the Sabha area shall not affect the term of the office bearers of the Gram Panchayat till the expiration of the duration of the Gram Panchayat specified in sub-section (1) of Section 120 of the Act or its dissolution under Section 140 of this Act. By the proviso, it was stated that where the whole of the Sabha area ceases to be a Sabha area, all the members including Pradhan and Up-pradhan shall cease to be the members and that they shall vacate their office from the date of the order made under sub-section (2) of that Section. Section 3-A was introduced after Section 3. By the proviso, it was stated that where the whole of the Sabha area ceases to be a Sabha area, all the members including Pradhan and Up-pradhan shall cease to be the members and that they shall vacate their office from the date of the order made under sub-section (2) of that Section. Section 3-A was introduced after Section 3. By that section, it was provided that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Act but subject to the provision of sub-section (2-A) of Section 3, when on account of the reason that the Sabha Area or the portion thereof is included in a municipality or a portion of the municipality excluded therefrom is included in a Sabha area during the term of office of the office bearers of a Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, such increase or diminution of the Sabha are, shall not affect the term of the office bearers of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, till the expiration of its duration specified in sub-section (1) of Section 120 of the Act or its dissolution under Section 140. The validity of the Ordinance is not challenged in these proceedings. 6. The petitioners in C.W.P. No. 134/97 claim to be the members of the Zila Parishad, members of the Gram Panchayat, member of Nagar Panchayat. Dhalli and a Samiti known as Krishak Sangarsh Samiti. Petitioners No. 5 to 9 are members of Gram Panchayats, petitioners No. 1 and 2 are members of the Zila Parishad while petitioners No. 3 and 4 are members of Block Development Committee. The 10th petitioner is a member of Nagar Panchayat Dhalli and the 11th petitioner is Krishak Sangarsh Samiti. The petitioners in C.W.P. No. 135/97 are residents of villages Khallini and Shogi 7. In C.W.P. No. 134 of 1997 several grounds have been raised in challenge of the notifications, referred to above. Some of them are on the footing that the notifications violate the provisions of Articles 14 and 21 of the constitution of India as well as Article 334 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary to set out those grounds in detail as in the course of arguments, learned counsel confined his submissions to two of the grounds only. The first objection of learned counsel is that the notifications are in violation of the provisions of Article 243-E and 243-li of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary to set out those grounds in detail as in the course of arguments, learned counsel confined his submissions to two of the grounds only. The first objection of learned counsel is that the notifications are in violation of the provisions of Article 243-E and 243-li of the Constitution of India. The second objection is that principles of natural justice have been violated and no reasonable opportunity has been given to he persons who would be affected by the inclusion of the area in the municipal Corporation before the notifications were issued. 8. With regard to Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli, a separate submission was made that even if the position relating to other villages may be considered to be different, in so far as Nagar Panchayat, Dhalli, is concerned, it is sought to be abolished and thereby it clearly violates the provisions of Article 243-E and 243-U of the Constitution. In ...... other writ petition, the only contention urged by learned counsel is that the basic principle underlining the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act have been thrown overboard and in order to circumvent the bar under the provisions of the Act, the Government has resorted to the present notifications and, therefore, they are invalid. 9. In elaboration of the first contention learned counsel invited our attention to Article 243-E of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows: “243-E. Duration of Panchayats etc.-(1) Every Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer (2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1). (3) An election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed - (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1); (b) before the expiry of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Panchayat. (4) A Panchayat constituted upon the dissolution of a Panchayat before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Panchayat would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved." 10. In particular, reliance is placed upon clauses (1) and (2) of the Article. According to learned counsel once a Panchayat is constituted and members are elected to be the members of the Panchayat then they shall have a full five year term as per the provisions of Article 243-E(1). There cannot be any curtailment of the term by adding some portions of the Panchayat areas to the Municipal Corporation. According to Seamed counsel the effect of including certain area of the Panchayat in the Municipal Corporation will only be to curtail not only the term of the office of the members of the Panchayat but also the constituencies which they represent. Article 243-U is similar with regard to the municipality. There is only one difference in that Article, namely, that there is a proviso to clause (1) to the effect that a Municipality shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before its dissolution. Such proviso is absent in Article 243-E (1) 11. We have already referred to the various notifications and also the fact that the villages named in the schedule to the notifications are not included in entirety in the Municipal Corporation area. With regard to each village only some portions are included in the Municipal area except with reference to a few villages in which the entire areas are being included in the Municipal Corporation. Thus it cannot be said that by virtue of the notification the Panchayats will cease to exist or the members of the Panchayat will cease to hold office thereafter. The contention of learned counsel that the effect of the notifications will be to curtail not only the term of the office of the members of the Panchayat but also reduce the constituency will not be acceptable for the reason that the members of the Panchayat will continue to hold office till the expiration of the term of the Panchayat inspite of the notification. But the fact that some of the constituencies are reduced in area will not wipe out the constituencies themselves as the constituencies will continue to be in existence with some reduced areas. But the fact that some of the constituencies are reduced in area will not wipe out the constituencies themselves as the constituencies will continue to be in existence with some reduced areas. That will not offend Article 243-E in any manner. It it rightly pointed out by learned Advocate General that this is not a case of dissolution of Panchayat in order to offend the provisions of Article 243-E. This is a case of increasing the area of the Municipal Corporation and decreasing the area of the respective Panchayats. A provision is found in the respective Acts for such increase and diminution of the areas as and when it is found necessary by the Government. 12. In H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, Section 3 provides for declaration of the Municipal area as Corporation. Sub-section (3) provides that the Government from time to time after consultation with the Corporation by notification in the official Gazette, alter the limits of the Municipal area of the Corporation declared under sub-sections (1) and (2) so as to include therein or exclude therefrom such areas as may be specified in the notification. Sub-section (4) provides that when the limits of the municipal area are altered so as to include therein any area, except as the Government may otherwise by notification direct, all rules, regulations notifications etc. and all taxes imposed under this Act and in force in the municipal area, shall apply to such area. Sub-section (5) deals with the case of exclusion of the area from the Corporation. We are not concerned with the same in the present proceedings. Section 404 provides for dissolution of Corporation. It is not necessary in this case to deal with it at length. Section 417 contains certain special provisions as to rural areas. The said section reads as follows : "417. We are not concerned with the same in the present proceedings. Section 404 provides for dissolution of Corporation. It is not necessary in this case to deal with it at length. Section 417 contains certain special provisions as to rural areas. The said section reads as follows : "417. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions in this Act- (a) the Corporation with previous approval of the Government, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any portion of the rural areas shall cease to be included therein and upon the issue of such notification that portion shall be included in and form part of the urban areas; (b) the Corporation with previous approval of the Government, may, by notification in the Official Gazette, - (i) exempt the rural areas or any portion thereof from such of the provisions of this Act as it deems fit; and (ii) levy taxes, rates, fees and other charges in the rural areas or any portion thereof at rates lower than those at which such taxes, fees and other charges are levied in the urban areas or exempt such areas or portion from any such tax, rate, fee or other charge.” 13. In H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, Section 3 provides for declaration of Sabha area. The said section reads as follows : "3. (1) The Government may, by notification, declare any village or group of contiguous villages with a population of not less than one thousand and not more than five thousand to constitute one or more Sabha areas for the purposes of this Act and also specify its headquarter: Provided that in a Schedule area the Government may by order declare any village or group of contiguous villages with a population of less than one thousand to constitute a Sabha area Provided further that the Government may, after having due regard of the geographical location, lack of means of transport and communication and administrative convenience, declare an area comprising a village or group of contiguous villages having a population either less than one thousand or more than five thousand to constitute a Sabha area. (2) The Government may at the request of the Gram Sabha concerned or otherwise, and after previous publication of a proposal by a notification, at any time, - (a) increase any Sabha area by including within such Sabha area any village or group of villages; or (b) diminish any Sabha area by excluding from such Sabha area any village or group of villages; or (c) alter the headquarter of any Sabha area; or (d) alter the name of any Sabha area; or (e) declare that any are shall cease to be a Sabha area: Provided that the redelimitation of any Sabha area under this sub-section shall not have the effect till the expiration of the term of elected members of the existing Gram Panchayat. (3) If the whole of the Sabha area is included in a municipality, the Sabha area shall cease to exist and its assets and liabilities shall in the manner prescribed be disposed of.” 14. Sabha area has been defined under Section 2(16) of the Act which reads that Gram Sabha" or "Sabha" means a Gram Sabha established under Section 4 of this Act and Sabha area means an area declared to be a Sabha area under Section 3 of the Act. The second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 provides that after having due regard of the geographical location, lack of means of transport and communication and administrative convenience, the Government, may, declare an area comprising a village or group of contiguous villages having a population either less than one thousand or more than five thousand to constitute a Sabha area. Thus the second proviso to Section 3(1) itself gives sufficient powers to the Government to declare any particular area as a Sabha area even if the requirement of sub- section (1) are not fully satisfied. Similarly, under sub-section (2) the Government may increase or diminish the area of Sabha area by including any village or group of villages within that Sabha area or excluding any village therefrom. Section 120 of the Act provides for duration of Panchayats. Under sub-section (1), every Panchayat shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer unless sooner dissolved under the Act. Section 140 empowers the State Government to dissolve Panchayats for default, abuse of power etc. 15. Section 120 of the Act provides for duration of Panchayats. Under sub-section (1), every Panchayat shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer unless sooner dissolved under the Act. Section 140 empowers the State Government to dissolve Panchayats for default, abuse of power etc. 15. A reading of the provisions of the two Acts, referred to above, will show clearly that what is now sought to be done by the present impugned notifications is not dissolution of the Panchayats. it is only a case of increasing the area of the -Municipal Corporation and excluding some portions of the areas covered by the HP. Panchayati Raj Act. What is contemplated under Article 243-E is a case of dissolution. Once a Panchayat is constituted pursuant to the provisions of the statute. Article 243-E provides for its continuance normally for a period of 5 years but even under clause (1) a Panchayat can be dissolved before the expiry of 5 years. Clause (1) contemplates such a dissolution in accordance with the provisions of the law. What exactly is meant by clause (1) is that the period shall not exceed five years in any case. The emphasis is on th6 last part of the clause (1), which uses expression no longer. Thus, when a statute provides for constitution of Panchayats its duration shall be five years and no longer. Thus the Article does not lay stress on the earlier dissolution of the Panchayat but it takes care to fix the maximum period of duration for a Panchayat. Under clause (2), no amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level. This clause is very much relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners. According to learned counsel, the notification would amount to amendment of law for the time being in force and that will have the effect of causing dissolution of the Panchayat and, therefore, it will be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. We are unable to accept this contention for two reasons. According to learned counsel, the notification would amount to amendment of law for the time being in force and that will have the effect of causing dissolution of the Panchayat and, therefore, it will be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. We are unable to accept this contention for two reasons. One, we have already pointed out that it is not a case of dissolution It is only a case of increasing the area in the Municipal Corporation, Secondly, we should point out that the statute which has created this Panchayat or brought into existence this Panchayat contains a provision in itself for variation of the area of the said Panchayat it contains also a different provision for dissolution It is not as if there is any amendment of the law. When there is a provision in that statute, which contemplates dissolution under particular circumstance and if that provision is invoked, it can be considered to be dissolution. When another provision is there, by which the area comprised in the Panchayat is being altered that cannot be considered to be a case of dissolution or amendment of the saw. Hence the contention has no force. 16. We find no force in the contention that the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act are sought to be circumvented by the notification. There is no question of any circumvention here. There is a specific provision in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act which is invoked in this case and some of the Panchayats which fall within the Sabha area are being excluded from the same and included in the Municipal Corporation Hence that contention is rejected. 17. The argument regarding Dhalli that the effect of abolition of the nagar Panchayat is dissolution within the meaning of Article 243-E is not acceptable as it is not a case of dissolution, as pointed out already. 18. There is no substance in the argument that the elected members of the Panchayat are entitled to continue in office for full term of five years and represent during the said period the entire constituencies from which they were elected Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to Section 27 of the States Reorganisation Act. 18. There is no substance in the argument that the elected members of the Panchayat are entitled to continue in office for full term of five years and represent during the said period the entire constituencies from which they were elected Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to Section 27 of the States Reorganisation Act. 1956 By that Section the reorganisation of the States under Part-II of the said enactment was declared not to affect the constitution or duration of the then existing House of the People or the extent of the constituency of any sitting member of that House. Learned counsel argued that the same principle would apply to the members of the Panchayat in view of the provisions of Article 243-E of the Constitution. We are unable to agree. Section 27 of the States Reorganisation Act contains an express provision to that effect and the reason is not far to seek. The Parliament intended that by reorganisation of some of the States the Constitution or duration of the House of the People which pertains to the entire country should not be affected. No inference can be drawn from that provision that Article 243-E of the Constitution of India contains a similar provision when areas of the Panchayat are diminished or increased. It should be noted that Sections 28 and 30 of the same Act contain different kind of provision and contemplate changes in the composition and allocation of sitting members as well as duration of Legislative Assemblies when whole of the area of the Assembly constituency in an existing State is transferred to any other existing State or becomes part of a new State other than Kerala. Hence the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act will not help the petitioners in the present case. 19. The next contention is that there is failure of natural justice. We have already referred to the fact that the notification dated 18.10.1996 called for objections from the people interested, Such objections were really forwarded to the concerned authorities. The 11th petitioner has also forwarded objections to the Deputy Commissioner, a copy of which has been placed before us. A perusal of the objections shows that they are of general nature and no specific particulars have been given in any of the objections as to how the proposal to increase the area of Municipal Corporation will affect the people concerned. A perusal of the objections shows that they are of general nature and no specific particulars have been given in any of the objections as to how the proposal to increase the area of Municipal Corporation will affect the people concerned. But it is not necessary for us to consider the merits of the objections. The only question is, whether there was an opportunity given to the people concerned to raise their objections and whether those objections were taken note of by the concerned authorities. After such written objections were sent to the authorities, a date was fixed by the Deputy Commissioner for hearing the persons concerned. Annexure P-VII shows that on 26.12.1996 the Deputy Commissioner was to visit 8 places at different times from 10.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. to hear the objections. The contention of learned counsel is that it is not humanly possible for any authority to travel such a long distance during the course of about one day or to be exact, within a period of about seven hours and hear all the people concerned satisfactorily. At the out set, we must point out that there is no specific allegation in the writ petition that the Deputy Commissioner did not visit those places at the specified time or that people were ready to be heard by the Deputy Commissioner and they were waiting for him, but the did not hear them patiently or that he refused to hear them. No such allegation has been made in the writ petition. In the absence of such a specific allegation, it is not open to the counsel to raise an inferential argument or invite this Court to draw an inference just from the programme found in Ann. P-VII that the Deputy Commissioner could not have heard the objections satisfactorily or to the satisfaction of the persons concerned. Nothing has been said as to whether anybody was really present to put forward his objections orally before the Deputy Commissioner. It has to be noted that even a month before the date fixed for the personal hearing, written objections had been sent to the authorities. Those written objections have been sent from different quarters and to different authorities. When those objections were available, it was not necessary at all to give a lengthy hearing in person to the people concerned. It has to be noted that even a month before the date fixed for the personal hearing, written objections had been sent to the authorities. Those written objections have been sent from different quarters and to different authorities. When those objections were available, it was not necessary at all to give a lengthy hearing in person to the people concerned. It is not the case of the petitioners that some more objections would have been raised or were available and they could have been raised before the Deputy Commissioner in person. When there is no dispute that all the relevant objections have already been raised in the written objections forwarded to the authorities, there is no merit in saying that personal hearing was not given to the persons concerned. Admittedly, there is no provision in the law for such personal hearing. 20. Learned counsel draws our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Baldev Singh and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1987 S.C. 1239. That case arose under the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act (19 of 1968). An area was declared notified area’ under Section 256 of the said Act. One of the contentions put forward before the Supreme Court was that no opportunity was given to the persons concerned to place their objections and thus the principles of natural justice were violated. The Supreme Court accepted that contention and held that the declaration of the area as a notified area would certainly have civil consequences and it was necessary that people who would be affected by the said notification should have been given an opportunity of being heard The Supreme Court said as follows : "It is a fact that the Orissa Act provides in clear terms a right of hearing whereas Section 256 of the Himachal Act makes no such provision but the settled position in law is that where exercise of a power results in civil consequences to citizens, unless the statute specifically rules out the application of natural justice, the rules of natural justice would apply. We accept the submission on behalf of the appellants that before the notified area was constituted in terms of Section 256 of the Act, the people of the locality should have been afforded an opportunity of being heard and the administrative decision by the State Government should have been taken after considering the views of the residents. Denial of such opportunity is not in consonance with the scheme of the Rule of Law governing our society. We must clarify that the hearing contemplated is not required to be oral and can be by inviting objections and disposing them of in a fair way." 21. The last sentence in the above passage is very significant. The Court has taken pains to clarify that the hearing contemplated is not required to be oral and it may be by inviting objections and disposing of them in a fair way. Once the parties have been given the opportunity to place their objections in writing and those objections have been taken into account by the authorities, there is no merit in saying that there should be further oral hearing in detail. 22. However, learned counsel lays stress on the last two words in the above passage in fair way. According to learned counsel, in this case the objections have not been considered in a fair way because the authorities thought fit to give an oral hearing and the Deputy Commissioner had fixed only one day for such hearing, that is, on 26-12-1996. When he had fixed a date for such hearing he ought to have heard in detail the objections from various persons concerned on that date and he should have given sufficient time for each Panchayat. There is no merit in this contention in view of the fact that there is no factual allegation in the petition. We have already dealt with that aspect of the matter in detail. 23. Further, the fact that the authorities though fit to give a personal hearing on a particular date will not mean that the persons concerned are entitled to a personal hearing. Once it Is laid down by the Supreme court that it is not necessary to give oral hearing and an opportunity for raising objections will be sufficient, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that they should be given a detailed personal hearing. Once it Is laid down by the Supreme court that it is not necessary to give oral hearing and an opportunity for raising objections will be sufficient, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that they should be given a detailed personal hearing. At any rate, there is no question of any violation of the principles of natural justice in this case. It is also contended that no reasons have been given in the notifications for rejecting the objections put forward by the persons concerned. There is no requirement in law for giving such reasons in the notification. The Supreme Court has pointed out in the above case that it is purely an administrative act. If that administrative act is performed after satisfying the principles of natural justice that is enough and the notification need not itself contain the reasons as it is not a judicial order. 24. It is also seen that the first notification containing the proposal referred to 59 villages but after the objections were received and the report of the Deputy Commissioner was forwarded, the Government has chosen to notify 30 villages only and thus it is evident that the Government has applied its mind before passing the impugned notifications. Obviously, the Government has considered the objections. It has taken care to mention only specific Khasra numbers in several villages which are going to be included in the municipal area. To a question put by the Court, learned counsel was fair enough to answer that the area increased would be about 4 kilometres in radius. Such an increase of area will not amount to any great disturbance of the Panchayats or the constituencies. 25. Learned counsel has also invited our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indru Ramchand Bharvani and others v. Union of India and others, (1988) 4 S.C.C. 1. He places reliance on the following passage in the judgment: "There is, however, one aspect of the matter which was emphasised before us, i.e., that the conclusions of the fact finding body or statutory authority must be arrived at after living a fair opportunity to the party to be affected by the order to be passed. As has been reiterated by a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bal Kissen Keijriwai v. Collector of Customs, a fair hearing has two justiciable elements. As has been reiterated by a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bal Kissen Keijriwai v. Collector of Customs, a fair hearing has two justiciable elements. The first is that the opportunity must be given and the second is that the opportunity must be reasonable. Whether a person has a fair hearing, can be gone into by the court and the courts conscience must be satisfied that an Administrative Tribunal charged with the duty of deciding a dispute has conformed to the principles of natural justice. In that decision the Calcutta High Court was dealing in respect of a proceeding under the Sea Customs Act, 1878. Counsel for the appellant sought to urge before us that a fair hearing had not been given. He have set out the facts hereinbefore. The High Court had also examined this aspect and rejected this challenge. In our opinion, judge by the aforesaid two aspects a reasonable and fair hearing was afforded to the petitioners. Hence, it cannot be accepted that there was legitimate cause of grievance." 26. Learned counsel submits that the opportunity given to the party must be reasonable and in this case the opportunity given to to the parties concerned was not reasonable. We are unable to accept this contention. It is seen that the first notification was issued on 18.10.1996 and a period of 30 days was given to the parties to send their objections in writing. Such objections were sent in November, 1996 by various parties. Thereafter, a date for personal hearing was fixed as 26.12.1996. After the Deputy Commissioner sent his report, the impugned notification was issued only on 17.1.1997. Thus, the Government had given ample time for objections and it is only after considering the objections, the impugned notifications have been issued. One of the apprehensions expressed by learned counsel is that once the area is included in the Municipal Corporation, people concerned will have to pay higher taxes and will have to face great hardship. It is only in order to avoid such hardship, the notification itself contains a provision that for a period of three years from the date of issue of notification the lands and buildings in the area now sought to be included in the Municipal Corporation are exempted from payment of general taxes. It is only in order to avoid such hardship, the notification itself contains a provision that for a period of three years from the date of issue of notification the lands and buildings in the area now sought to be included in the Municipal Corporation are exempted from payment of general taxes. Thus the notifications themselves contain enough inherent evidence to show that the Government has applied its mind to various aspects of the matter before issuing the notifications. 27. Thus none of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners has any merit and they are hereby rejected. In the result, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. CMP No. 336/97 in CWP No. 134/97 and CMP No. 341/97 in CWP No. 135/97 In view of the dismissal of the writ petitions, both these applications are also dismissed. Petition dismissed.