Judgment :- JAGADEESAN, J. 1. The respondent in all the Second Appeals are the same. The appellants are different persons. Since the issues involved are common in these appeals, we have decided to dispose of the appeals by way of common judgement. 2. The defendants in O.S. No. 710 to 712/86 on the file of the Prl. District Munsif, Chidambaram are the appellants herein respectively in the Second Appeals. The respondents herein filed the said suits for recovery of possession and mesne profits. It is the case of the respondent/plaintiffs that the suit property has been granted to the Ramzanshaw in order to maintain the Thaikkal and Chavadi and the said grant was confirmed under T.D. 1107 of Udayarkudi Village by the Inam Commissioner on 8th October 1861. The Thaikkal came to be known as Ramzanshaw Thaikkal. Ramzanshaw and his descendants were in possesion and enjoyment of the suit properties only and their capacity as muthuvallies and for maintaining the said Thaikkal and Chavadi. The alienation in favour of the defendants in the suits are void and the defendants in the suits cannot have any valid title or interest over the suit property. The first plaintiff being the muthuvalli and the second plaintiff the Wakf Board have filed the suit for recovery of possession, as they are the owners of the suit properties. 3. The defendants in the suit disputed the claim of the plaintiffs contending that the first plaintiff is the muthuvalli in respect of the Masjid Namazga situated in a portion of the Ramansha Thaikkal. The claim for the patta in respect of the suit property and the enquiry thereon is pending before the Settlement authorities under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 30 of 1963) and as such the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and decide the rights of the parties. It is the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities to decide the entitlement of the patta. In any event, the defendants had purchased the properties under registered sale deeds from those who claimed to be the owners of the properties and as such the defendants have prescribed their title by adverse possession. Further, the suit is barred by limitation as well as on the principle of res judicata. 4. In any event, the defendants had purchased the properties under registered sale deeds from those who claimed to be the owners of the properties and as such the defendants have prescribed their title by adverse possession. Further, the suit is barred by limitation as well as on the principle of res judicata. 4. The trial court, after elaborately considering the evidence both oral and documents available on record, had decreed the suit by the judgement and decree dated 13th October 1988. As against these judgements and decrees of the trial court, the appellants/defendants in the respective suits have filed appeals on the file of the Sub Court, Chidambaram in A.S. Nos. 1 to 3 of 1989 respectively. The lower Appellate Court also concurred with the finding of the trial court and dismissed the appeals by Judgement and decrees dated 6th August 1992. As against these judgements of the Subordinate Judge, Chidambaram, the appellants have preferred the present Second Appeals. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the original grant was in favour of one Ramzanshaw with an obligation to maintain the Thaikkal and Chavadi situated in Udayarkudi village and hence the grant is a personal grant to Ramzansha. It cannot be considered to be a grant in favour of the institution. It was further contended by the counsel for the appellants that during the pendency of the civil suit, the revenue authorities have granted patta in favour of the defendants in the suit and hence without seeking for the relief of declaration of the title, the suits filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession alone are not maintainable. As the defendants had purchased the property under registered sale deeds and in the absence of any evidence to show that the plaintiffs have been in possession of the property at any point of time the defendants have perfected their title by adverse possession. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the defendants have virtually admitted that the suit properties have been granted only for the purpose of mamtaining the thaikka and chavadi. When the grant is for the maintenance of thaikkal and chavadi, the grant is only in favour of the institution and not in favour of any individual. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the defendants have virtually admitted that the suit properties have been granted only for the purpose of mamtaining the thaikka and chavadi. When the grant is for the maintenance of thaikkal and chavadi, the grant is only in favour of the institution and not in favour of any individual. Moreover, the properties had been notified as wakf property in the year 1959 and the predecessor of the defendants did not raise any objection in respect of the said Notification within the prescribed period and as such the Notification has become final declaring that the property is wakf property. The issue of patta in favour of the defendants during the pendency of the proceedings before the civil court will not in any way affect the decision of the civil court. 7. We carefully considered the contention of both the counsel. In column 12 of the Inam B Register Ex. A1. It is mentioned as (Tamil) Under the column description 67 properties, it has been mentioned as follows: “For the support of a thaikkal at the village with a small thatched chavadi attached for the accommodation of the musalman travellers thaikkal maintained.” Under the column “remarks” it is stated as follows: “to be continued as long as the thaikka and chavadi are maintained”. From the above recitals under Ex. A1 it is clear that the grant was made only to support the thaikkal with the small thatched chavadi. Equally under Ex. A2 the gazette Notification dated 6th May 1959, the suit properties have been notified as Wakf property in accordance with S. 5(2) of the Wakf Act 1959. In the said Notification, the name of the Wakf has been mentioned as Odayarkudi mosque and thaikkal in the village of Odayarkudi. The name and object of the wakf has been notified as follows: “Pious, religions and charitable : For the support and maintenance of the Mosque and for the performance of fathihas.” “Pious, religious and charitable. For the support and maintenance of the Taikkal”. “Pious, religious and charitable : For the support of Taikkal and Chavadi and for the accommodation of the Musalman travellers in chavadi.” 8. Though it was contended by the counsel for the defendants that the name of “Ramzanshaw” has not been mentioned in Exs. A1 and A2, it is not their case that the properties referred under Ex. “Pious, religious and charitable : For the support of Taikkal and Chavadi and for the accommodation of the Musalman travellers in chavadi.” 8. Though it was contended by the counsel for the defendants that the name of “Ramzanshaw” has not been mentioned in Exs. A1 and A2, it is not their case that the properties referred under Ex. A1 and A2 are some other property and it does not relate to the suit property. Hence both the courts below have correctly appreciated the evidence on record and found that Ex. A1 and A2 relate to the suit property alone. 9. From the recitals in Ex. A1 and A2 it is very clear that the grant is in favour of the thaikkal and chavadi i.e. in favour of the institution. When the grant is in favour of the religious institution, the person in charge of that institution cannot claim the property as that of his own or the grant is his personal one. There are catena of judgements, both of this Court as well as the Apex Court. We do not think it is necessary to refer all those Judgements. It would suffice to refer one to the well laid principle by the Apex Court. In a recent judgement reported in Sri Vedaranyaswami Devasthanam v. A.C. Dharma Devi (1996) S.C.C. 467 = 1997-2-L.W. 323 the Apex Court has held as follows: “It is true that this Court in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu (1991 Supp(2) S.C.C. 228) held that the entries in the Inam Fair Register are great acts of the State and coupled with the entries in the Survey and Settlement record furnish unimpeachable evidence. Construction of the relevant entries in the IFR is a question of law. On considering the entries, the Court can come to a conclusion whether the grant made was to the institution or to the individuals or for the maintenance of the institution as mentioned in the relevant entries in the IFR. In that case, on construction of the relevant entries, it was found that the grant was for the preservation and maintenance of the tank and tax free inam land was granted for that purpose of maintaining the tank. In that case, on construction of the relevant entries, it was found that the grant was for the preservation and maintenance of the tank and tax free inam land was granted for that purpose of maintaining the tank. Accordingly, it was held that the named individuals have no individual right except as trustees on behalf of the villagers for the proper maintenance of the tank.” However, when dealing with the rights of the individual who is claiming title to the property, the Apex Court has held that the presumption is in favour of the religious institution and such presumption can be rebutted by the individual by contra evidence that he has been granted certain rights either by the grantor or otherwise by the land holder. To extract the same, is as follows: “S. 44, though refers to presumption that when it relates to the Inam granted for the benefit of the religious, educational or charitable institution or granted to any individual for rendering service to religious, educational or charitable institution or for the purpose of rendering any other service, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the inam consists not merely of a grant of the melvaram in the land but also the kudivaram therein. It is only a rebuttable presumption that when the grant was in favour of the religious institution or the individual rendering service to the religious institution, the appellant institution and the individual have both the melvaram and kudivaram interest therein.” 10. Coming to the question as to whether the defendants had rebutted such presumption in favour of the religious institution, it is necessary to refer to the conduct of the defendants. Exs. A7 to All are the receipts issued by the second plaintiff for the contribution made by the first plaintiff. They are of the year 1982 to 1984. Unless the first plaintiff is wakf property, there is no need for the first plaintiff to make any contribution to the second plaintiff. Moreover, it is clear that the first plaintiff is managed by the muthuvalli. There are several other documents also evidencing payment of kist by the first plaintiff. Unless the first plaintiff is the owner of the property, there is no need for the first plaintiff to pay the land revenue. Moreover, it is clear that the first plaintiff is managed by the muthuvalli. There are several other documents also evidencing payment of kist by the first plaintiff. Unless the first plaintiff is the owner of the property, there is no need for the first plaintiff to pay the land revenue. The defendant has not produced any parent document in favour of their vendors or concrete material to show or substantiate the title of their vendors. In all the cases, the defendants had produced only the sale deeds in their favour. Further the defendants did not examine any third person to establish the nature of their possession or source of title of the predecessor in interest. The defendants even in the oral evidence did not furnish any details with regard to the right of either their vendors or their predecessors in title. Further it is not the case of the defendants that they have purchased the property from the person who had been authorised in law to represent the religious institution or any one concerned with the institution. When it is found that the grant is in favour of the religious institution, unless the transfer is made either by the person concerned with the institution or any other person authorised in law to represent such institution, the transfer is to be held void and the transferee thereon will not derive any title to the properties purported to have been conveyed. When the defendants have not pleaded that they have purchased the property from any one concerned with or having authority to represent the institution, the sale deeds relied upon by them are void and cannot clothe them with any rights or title and as such they have no title to the suit properties. On this short ground, the suit is to be decreed and in our view had been rightly decreed. 11. So far as the question of adverse possession is concerned, though the defendants have stated in the written statement that they have perfected their title by adverse possession, the plaint is bereft of any details as to from which date the possession of the defendant became adverse to that of the plaintiffs. Ex. A3 dated 6th May 1959 is the gazette Notification which was published in accordance with S. 5(2) of the Wakf Act, declaring that the suit properties are the wakf properties. Ex. A3 dated 6th May 1959 is the gazette Notification which was published in accordance with S. 5(2) of the Wakf Act, declaring that the suit properties are the wakf properties. There is absolutely no evidence on the part of the defendants that the vendors of the defendants or the predecessors, alleged to have some interest in the property, had objected to the said Notification. As per S. 6 of the Wakf Act, if no dispute is raised within one year from the date of publication of the list of wakfs before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, then the list published under S. 5(2) of the said Act becomes final in accordance with S. 27(2) of the said Act, and therefore the same cannot be challenged. As per Ex. A3, the properties belong to the wakf. When once the property has been declared as wakf property, as per S. 66-G, the Wakf Board can file a suit for recovery of possession within 30 years. S. 66-G of the Wakf Act reads as follows: “66-G - Period of limitation for recovery of wakf properties to be thirty years: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for any suit for the possession of immovable property comprised in any wakf or possession of any interest in such property shall be period of thirty years and such period shall begin to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.” It is clear that this provision enables the Wakf Board to file the suit within thirty years notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963. Since this is a special enactment, the period of limitation for the Wakf Board to file the suit for recovery of the property is thirty years and that too the period shall begin to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In this case, as already observed, there is absolutely no evidence except the sale deeds in favour of the defendants that either the defendants or their predecessors had acted openly adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs and even if it is so the plaint do not disclose any detail as to from what date the defendants title became adverse to that of the interest of the plaintiff, and as such this plea of the appellants fails. 12. 12. It is admitted that in the suo-moto enquiry conducted by the Thanjavur Settlement Officer under the Act 30 of 1963 originally the patta was granted in favour of the Udayarkudi mosque. Challenging the said order the appellants and others preferred appeals in I.A.T. Nos. 36/80 and 13 to 20 of 1981. In those appeals, the respondents herein filed applications to implead themselves as parties. The Inam Abolition Tribunal/Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore by his order dated 8th August 1983 had dismissed all the applications filed by these respondents to implead themselves in the appeals. Thereafter the Tribunal by its order dated 26th August 1983 allowed the appeals and remanded the matters for fresh disposal to the Settlement Tahsildar. After the remand, the Asst. Settlement Officer, Tiruvannamalai, who became the competent Revenue authority to enquire into the matter held enquiry. After enquiry, by his order dated 29th August 1985, the A.S.O. Thiruvannamalai directed the issue of patta in favour of the individuals, who claimed patta. Even during the pendency of the enquiry, the respondents herein filed objections with regard to the claim made by the appellants herein and others for the issue of patta. Those objections have been rejected by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thirunvannamalai on the ground that the applications filed by the respondents to implead them as parties to the proceedings have been dismissed by the Inam Abolition Tribunal and as such their objections cannot be considered. As against this, the first respondent herein filed an appeal in I.A.T. 6/85 on the file of the Inam Abolition Tribunal/Sub Court, Cuddalore. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals by its judgment dated 17th October 1989 on the ground that the applications filed by them to implead themselves as party/respondents in the earlier round of appeals had been dismissed and the same was not challenged by the respondents. The order of dismissal has become final and hence it cannot be considered that the respondents were having any interest or right in the subject matter of the proceedings. As against this, the first respondent has preferred an appeal under S. 30(1) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 30 of 1963). The order of dismissal has become final and hence it cannot be considered that the respondents were having any interest or right in the subject matter of the proceedings. As against this, the first respondent has preferred an appeal under S. 30(1) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 30 of 1963). Now it is contended by the counsel for the appellants in the Second Appeals that since the applications filed by the respondents before the Inam Abolition Tribunal in the appeals under T.N. Act 30/63 filed by the appellants herein had been dismissed and the same having not been challenged by the respondents herein, the said order has become final and in view of the dismissal of the applications, now it is not open to the respondents to claim any right over the property in order to seek recovery of possession. It is further contended that when once the applications for impleading has been dismissed, the respondents ought to have sought the relief of declaration of their tide. 13. It is true that originally the patta has been granted in favour of the Pallivasal, against which the appellants herein preferred the appeal before the Inam Abolition Tribunal along with others. In those proceedings, the respondents have filed applications to implead themselves as parties. A perusal of the order of the Inam Abolition Tribunal/Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore dated 8th August 1983 clearly reveals that the applications filed by the respondents had been dismissed on the ground that the patta has been granted in favour of the mosque of Udayarkudi and as such if the respondents are aggrieved by the said order, they ought to have agitated the same by way of separate appeal and it is not open to the respondents herein to get themselves impleaded in the appeal to put forth their claim especially when they did not participate in the enquiry held by the Settlement Tahsildar. From this, it is clear that the applications filed by the respondents were dismissed not on merits considering the claim of the respondents herein. Those applications have been dismissed merely on the ground that the respondents cannot seek themselves to implead in the appeals filed by the individuals and it is open to the respondents to file separate appeal. From this, it is clear that the applications filed by the respondents were dismissed not on merits considering the claim of the respondents herein. Those applications have been dismissed merely on the ground that the respondents cannot seek themselves to implead in the appeals filed by the individuals and it is open to the respondents to file separate appeal. It may be pertinent to note that the respondents have filed the suit for recovery of possession instead of agitating their right before the revenue authorities. 14. In the Judgment reported in Ramanujam Kavirayar v. Srila Sri Sivaprakasa Pandora Sannathi Avargal (1988 2 L.W. 513) it has been held as follows: “I have already referred to the fact that the distinction sought to be made by Varadarajan, J. in Chinnappa Gounder v. S. Seshadri (AIR 1981 Madras 8) was impliedly disapproved by the Division Bench in Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmigu Thirumaleswara Swamy Deity (97 L.W. 243) when they proceeded on the footing that the Abolition Act and the Minon Inams Act were analogous to each other. Hence, the ratio of the Division Bench in Udaiyappan and Others v. Karuppan and Others (1982 TLNJ 490) will apply to cases arising under Minor Inams Act. It has to be held that the finality conferred by S. 46 of the Minor Inams Act on the orders passed by the authorities constituted under the Act will not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide questions of title. S. 46 of the Minor Inams Act which deals with res judicata corresponds to S. 64-A of the Abolition Act. S. 3(d) of the Minor Inams Act contains the same language as S. 3(d) of the Abolition Act. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalingam Swamigal Madam ( AIR 1986 S.C. 794 ) will apply to cases arising under Minor Inams Act.” 15. When there are rival claims for the issue of patta, it is always open to the patties to indicate their claim before the Civil Court and the decision of the Civil Court will be binding on them. Hence by the mere dismissal of the applications for impleading, it cannot be said that the respondents have lost their right to vindicate their claim over the suit property; especially when their claim has not been considered on merits. Hence by the mere dismissal of the applications for impleading, it cannot be said that the respondents have lost their right to vindicate their claim over the suit property; especially when their claim has not been considered on merits. Hence we are of the opinion that the dismissal of the applications filed by the respondents to implead themselves before the Inam Abolition Tribunal will not affect the right or interest of the respondents in any manner. Equally those orders will not affect the Notification issued under S. 5(2) of the Wakf Act, declaring the properties as Wakf properties. As Ex. A3 has become final in view of S. 27(2) of the Wakf Act, we are of the opinion that there is no necessity for the respondents to seek for the relief of any declaration, since already the properties have been declared as belonging to the first respondent and the same is under the control of the second respondent. 16. In view of the above reasonings, there is no merit in the Second Appeals and they are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the same are dismissed. 17. The appellant in the S.T.A. has filed STA. 10/89 under S. 30(1) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 30 of 1963) against the order of the Inam Abolition Tribunal, Cuddalore in I.A.T. 6785. The Tribunal has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the appellant has not chosen to challenge the dismissal of the application filed by them before the Inam Abolition Tribunal on the earlier round and as such now it is not open to the appellant to put forth any claim of their own. In fact the Tribunal has confirmed the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai who also held that the appellants objections cannot be considered in view of the dismissal of their applications to implead themselves as parties in the earlier proceedings by the Inam Abolition Tribunal. 18. Since the entire facts have been elaborately discussed in the S.A. No. 1466 to 1468 of 1992 and held that the appellant herein is the owner of the property and entitled to recover possession and for other reliefs and the Civil Court judgment and decree is final and binding, the S.T.A. 10/89 has to be allowed. Accordingly the same is allowed. Accordingly the same is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.