Honble YADAV, J. – The present appeal is listed today for admission. The question regarding payment of court-fees has already been determined by me on 25.9.97. (2). The learned counsel for the appellants Mr. A.L. Chopra, at the very out-set before arguing the appeal for admission stated that in identical facts and circumstances, in S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 75 of 1995 on 29th May, 1997 in which he was appearing as a counsel for the appellants, the learned Single Judge of this Court upon his arguments held that the appellants are liable to pay court-fees ad valorem in terms of Sec. 15 read with Sec. 40 (a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and SuitsValuation Act, 1961 whereas Yesterday, I ruled that the court-fees of Rs. 300/- already paid by the appellants was sufficient as envisaged under residuary Sec. 45 of the said Act. I am of the view that once a judgment was dictated, pronounced in open Court on 25.9.97 in presence of the learned counsel for the appellants and was signed on 25.9.97, it cannot be recalled and reviewed as a matter of course todaymerely because the decision regarding payment of court-fees rendered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 15.5.97 could not be brought to my notice by the counsel. (3). Be that as it may, it is held that once a judgment is pronounced by the learned Judge or Judges of the High Court in ignorance of a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of the same High Court, it is not a ground for review within the meaning of O. 47 R.1, CPC although it is true that if such judgment is pronounced in ignorance of a Supreme Court decision then review is maintainable. (4). For the better and deeper understanding of the controversy involved in the present case, I consider it just and proper to reproduce in verbatim the judgment dictated, pronounced in presence of the learned counsel for the appellants in open court and signed on 25.9.97 herein below :– ``Honble Shri R.R.Yadav, J. Mr. A.L. Chopra, for Appellants. The present appeal was posted on 31.3.97. When the case was called on for hearing, learned counsel for the appellants was absent. In absence of counsel, it was directed to remove the defect pointed out by the office by paying requisite court-fees of Rs. 1,88,765/- after deducting Rs. A.L. Chopra, for Appellants. The present appeal was posted on 31.3.97. When the case was called on for hearing, learned counsel for the appellants was absent. In absence of counsel, it was directed to remove the defect pointed out by the office by paying requisite court-fees of Rs. 1,88,765/- after deducting Rs. 300/- of court-fees already paid within one month from the date of order. 2. The appellants then thereafter moved two applications, one on 19.4.97 and other on 24.7.97. In the first application it is clearly mentioned mentioned that if the court comes to the conclusion that the court fee paid by the appellants is insufficiently paid then the appellants may be given reasonable time to make the deficiency of court-fees good. The second application was moved to recall my order dated 31.3.97. Today, the learned counsel for the appellants made his submissions only on his second application. 3. Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 4. Perused the judgment and decree under appeal. 5. The core question about payment of court-fees in the present appeal depends upon the determination as to whether the plaintiff-appellants can file an appeal within the meaning of Sec. 96 CPC where their suit has been decreed in toto in view of the admission made by the defendant-respondents. 6. I am of the view that for filing and making an appeal legally entertainable under Sec. 96, CPC., the following three conditions precedent are required to co-exist;:– (A) Firstly, the subject-matter of the appeal must be a decree as defined under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 2, CPC conclusively determining the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit either by passing a preliminary decree or a final decree. (B) Secondly, the person appealing against such a decree must demonstrate that he has been ``adversely affected by such determination. The meaning of words ``adversely affected may vary according to the context of the reliefs sought in the suit. For example, in a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment, there may be a possibility that the trial court on the basis of evidence on record or on admission of the defendant may decree the suit of the plaintiff in toto granting both the reliefs or it may decree the suit partly by granting one relief and refusing the other relief. In former situation, where suit is decreed in toto the plaintiff is not entitled to file an appeal, as he cannot claim to be ``adversely affected by the decree, simply because some adverse observations or findings have been recorded by the trial court while decreeing the suit in toto. In such cases where the suit is decreed in toto adverse observations or findings do not operate as res judicata as the plaintiff is not entitled to file an appeal. In fact, an appeal can be filed under Sec. 96 CPC against a decree not against adverse observations or findings. In latter situation, where suit has been decreed partly giving one relief and refusing other relief plaintiff is entitled to file an appeal under Sec. 96 CPC against the relief refused by the Court and on appeal, court-fee is payable only on the relief refused under the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961. (C) Thirdly, the expression ``Matters in the controversy in the suit used under sub-sec. (2) of Sec, 2., CPC includes only those matters which from the pleadings of the parties, appear to be in dispute andnot a controversy on which parties are not at variance in their pleading. 7. In abundant caution, I think it just and proper to observe that aforesaid three conditions precedent are required to co-exist in a legally entertainable appeal according to the law made by the Parliament under Sec. 96, CPC. There is one other mode of filing an appeal evolved by the Supreme Court in case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha vs. M/s. Golcha Properties Private Limited (In Liquidation) (1), wherein, the Supreme Court ruled that a person who was not a party in the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment under appeal. 8. The law declared by the Supreme Court in case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha (supra) is to be taken to be binding on all courts within the territory of India as postulated under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 8. The law declared by the Supreme Court in case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha (supra) is to be taken to be binding on all courts within the territory of India as postulated under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The law pronounced by the Supreme Court in case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha (supra) is to be taken into account by all authorities, civil and judicial and they are under legal obligation to act in aid of the Supreme Court pronouncement as enshrined under Article 144 of the Constitution of India. 9. In my humble opinion, there is distinction between these two classes of appeals mentioned above. As regards filing of an appeal under Sec. 96, CPC is concerned, the appellant is not required to obtain leave of the appellate court for making the appeal entertainable before it whereas according to the law propounded by Supreme Court in case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha (supra) an appellant whowas not a party in the suit can file an appeal but it becomes entertainable only after leave of the appellate court is granted to him not otherwise. Former classes of appeals can be said to be statutory appeals entertainable on the basis of law made by Parliament whereas other classes of appeals can be called non-statutory appeals based on Judge made law evolved by the Supreme Court to meet the principles of natural justice and fair play in administration of justice. 10. It is to be imbibed that filing of an appeal is not synonymical to its entertainability. The expression ``Entertain is explained by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court as denoting the point of time at which an application to set aside the sale is heard by the Court. The expression ``Entertain does not mean same thing as filing of the application. The aforesaid view was expressed by the Allahabad High Court in case of Kundan Lal vs. Jagannath Sharma, (2). A similar view was again taken in Dhoom Chand Jain vs. Chaman Lal Gupta and another (3), in which the learned Chief Justice Mr. Desai and Mr. Justice Dwivedi gave the same meaning to the expression ``Entertain. 11. The aforesaid view was expressed by the Allahabad High Court in case of Kundan Lal vs. Jagannath Sharma, (2). A similar view was again taken in Dhoom Chand Jain vs. Chaman Lal Gupta and another (3), in which the learned Chief Justice Mr. Desai and Mr. Justice Dwivedi gave the same meaning to the expression ``Entertain. 11. The expression ``Entertain used under Sec.173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came up for interpretation before me in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Smt. Santosh and others (4), wherein, it was held that the appeal will not be entertainable by the High Court unless the appellant has deposited a sum of Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount awarded against the appellant, which ever is less. It was also held that mere filing of an appeal and stay application by an appellant under Sec.173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 will not be entertained by the court unless the mandatory provisions contemplated in the aforesaid Section is complied with by him by depositing Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount awarded against him whichever is less in pursuance of the direction of the High Court prescribing the manner of deposit. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered opinion, for entertaining the present appeal and before giving judicial pronouncement on the points raised by the appellants they are required to pay court-fee under the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act of 1961). The Act of 1961 provides detail procedure for payment of court-fees in those statutory appeals which are legally entertainable under Sec.96, CPC but no specific provision for non-statutory appeals or those appeals which are legally not entertainable is provided in the Act of 1961, therefore, in the present case the appellants are required to pay court-fees under Sec.45 of the Act of 1961 which is a residuary Section and provides that in a suit not otherwise provided for payment of court-fee shall be payable at the rates enumerated thereunder. The appellants have paid maximum court-fees of Rs. 300/- as envisaged under Sec. 45 of the Act of 1961, therefore, it is held to be sufficient payment of court-fees. Accordingly, the application for recalling my order dated 31.3.97 is allowed. The court-fees of Rs.300/- already paid by the appellants is held to be sufficient payment of court-fees. The appellants have paid maximum court-fees of Rs. 300/- as envisaged under Sec. 45 of the Act of 1961, therefore, it is held to be sufficient payment of court-fees. Accordingly, the application for recalling my order dated 31.3.97 is allowed. The court-fees of Rs.300/- already paid by the appellants is held to be sufficient payment of court-fees. The office objection contrary to it is hereby over-ruled. Office is directed to list this appeal for admission along with S.B. Civil First Appeal No.75/96 tomorrow after giving it regular appeal number. (R.R. Ydav, J.) (5). At the first instance, learned counsel for the appellants Mr.A.L. Chopra contended that even if the present appeal is not maintainable strictly within the meaning of Sec.96 CPC but it is entertainable as ruled by the Supreme Court in case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha (supra). (6). It is to be noticed in this regard that the plaintiff-appellants filed civil suit for specific performance making averments in the plaint that they are ready andwilling to perform their part of agreement dated 7.10.94. The defendant-respondents appeared and admitted the claim putforth in the plaint by the plaintiff-appellants in toto, therefore, the learned trial court has no alternative except to decree the suit in toto. Such decree in toto could be passed even in absence of the plaintiff-appellants as envisaged under O.9, R.8, CPC which provides that where the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when suit is called on for hearing, the court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed unless the defendant admits the claim or part of the claim thereof in which case the court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission and where part only of the claim has been admitted shall dismiss the suit so far as it relates to the remainder. (7). Thus although argument of learned counsel for the appellants is attractive but fallacious. (7). Thus although argument of learned counsel for the appellants is attractive but fallacious. It is not acceptable for the reason that in case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha (supra), it was ruled by the Apex Court that with the leave of the appellate court a person who was not a party; in the suit can file a non-statutory appeal whereas in the present case, the plaintiff-appellants were parties in the suit and their suit for specific performance is decreed in toto by the trial court in view of the admission of the defendant-respondents yet they have filed this appeal against the some of the observations made by the trial court which does not amount to decree, therefore, granting of leave to file the present appeal does not arise. the facts and circumstances of the case of Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. (8). It is well to remember that an appeal lies under Sec.96 CPC only from a decree. Unless therefore, an adverse decree is passed against the plaintiff-appellants, they are not entitled to file the present appeal merely on some imaginary adverse observations or findings which neither amounts a decree nor operate as res judicata against them. In fact, remedy of appeal under Sec. 96 CPC is provided with an avowed object for getting the decree of lower court set aside on a complaint by a person adversely affected with such a decree to higher court. To my mind, the present appeal at the instance of plaintiff-appellants whose suit has been decreed in toto by the trial court is not maintainable and as such deserves to be dismissed at admission stage. (9). In my considered opinion, the plaintiff-appellants miserably failed to establish in the present appeal three conditions precedent enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment which are required to co-exist for legally entertainable appeal within the meaning of Sec.96, CPC read with sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. I further decline to grant leave to the plaintiff- appellants to file the present appeal as their suit for specific performance has been decreed in toto by the learned trial court in view of admission made by the defendant- respondents and they were plaintiffs before the learned trial court. Resultantly, the present appeal is dismissed as not maintainable at admission stage.