Honble CHAUHAN, J.–In the instant case, petitioner has challenged the vires of the provisions of Clause (3) of Regulation 13 of the Bhilwara - Ajmer Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1985, hereinafter called as `the Regulations framed by the respondent Bank in exercise of powers conferred upon it bythe provisions of S.30 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, which indirectly/implie- dly links up the seniority of an employee with the date of confirmation. (2). Petitioner was appointed as the Officer of the respondent Bank vide appointment letter dated 2.2.1985 on probation for a period of two years. The probation was extended for six months vide order dt. 11.2.1987. Under Regulation 8 of the said Regulations, two years probation period can be extended for a further period of one year. However, he stood confirmed vide order dated 16.1.1988, which provided for confirmation with retrospective effect i.e. with effect from 16.8.87. The grievance of the petitioner is that while determining inter-se seniority of the officers appointed in the same batch, his seniority has been determined according to the provisions of clause (3) of Regulation 13 of the Regulations. (3). Regulation 13 reads as under: ``1(a) Seniority of an officer or employee of the Bank in a grade or scale shall be reckoned with reference to the date of his appointment in that grade or scale. (b) ..................... (c) ..................... (2) The inter-se seniority of officers or employees directly recruited in a batch to any grade or scale shall be reckoned with reference to the rank allotted to them at the time of such recruitment. (3) In the case of an officer or employee whose probation has been extended, his seniority shall be reckoned just below all the officers or employees, if any, recruited or promoted in the same batch alongwith him. (4). The grievance of the petitioner is that as respondents No.2 to 20, who had been appointed alongwith him, had been confirmed prior to him, by application of clause (3) of Regulation 13, all of them, though they were lower in merit of the selection list, had become senior to the petitioner. (5). Heard Shri R.S. Saluja learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri M.S. Singhvi and Shri Manoj Bhandari for the respondent No.1. (6). (5). Heard Shri R.S. Saluja learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri M.S. Singhvi and Shri Manoj Bhandari for the respondent No.1. (6). Shri Saluja has vehemently contended that the seniority cannot be linked up with the date of confirmation and it has to be determined according to the continuous service rendered by an employee and, thus, clause (3) of Regulation 13 is arbitrary and not in consonance with the constitutional scheme. All persons who had been benefitted by this rule and had allotted seniority over and above the petitioner, have been impleaded as respondent Nos. 2 to 20 and have been served, though they have chosen not to contest the case. (7). Shri Manoj Bhandari contends that the petitioner had joined the service under the said Regulations, 1985 knowing the effect of the Regulations, 1985 and as his probation period has been extended in accordance with the same, the petitioner cannot have any grievance whatsoever. He vehemently contended that clause (3) did not link up the seniority with the event of confirmation as the term `confirmation had not even been mentioned in the said proviso at all. (8). I have considered the rival submission made at Bar. (9). The regulation in issue makes a person junior/lower in seniority, if his probation period is extended. The plain arithmetic of this formula is that employees, whose probation period is not extended, would be senior to those, whose probation period has been extended. Thus, it links up the issue of seniority with confirmation though it does not make any reference to the event of confirmation. It is settled law that what cannot be done ``per directum is not permissible to be done per obliquum. Meaning thereby whatever is prohibited by law to be done directly cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance and it can be explained by quoting the legal maxim ``quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibeturet omne per quod devenitur ad illud. Therefore, the only issue to be exami- ned in this case is whether seniority should be reckoned from the date of confirmation of an employee or from the date of his initial appointment. (10). `Probation means trial, testing or testing proof. An action or process of testing or putting to proof. Probation has been described in Whaston Law Lexicon. Therefore, the only issue to be exami- ned in this case is whether seniority should be reckoned from the date of confirmation of an employee or from the date of his initial appointment. (10). `Probation means trial, testing or testing proof. An action or process of testing or putting to proof. Probation has been described in Whaston Law Lexicon. 13th Edition as ``suspension of final appointment to an office; has by his conduct proved himself to be fit to fill the permanent appointment. (11). In Dr. T.C.M. Pillai vs. The Indian Institute of Technology, Guindy, Madras (1), the Apex Court has observed as under: ``Suitability does not depend merely on the excellence or proficiency in work. There are many factors which enter into consideration for confirming a person who is on probation. A particular attitude or tendency displayed by an employee can well influence the decision of the confirming authority while judging his suitability or fitness for confirmation. (12). In the aforesaid case, petitioner was not confirmed on the ground that during the course of his employment with the respondents, petitioner had executed a bond of service with some other institution. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid case that the confirmation of a probationer may be refused even if he is at par excellence in his official duty. (13). In Hari Singh Mann vs. State of Punjab and Others (2), the Apex Court has again observed that purpose of probation is to find out whether the employee is fit person to be retained in service. Probation does not relate to penalties or punishment i.e. moral turpitude/misconduct etc. and if does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The same view had been taken by a constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Ranendra Chandra Banerjee vs. The Union of India and Another (3). (14). In S.B. Patwardhan vs. State of Maharashtra (4), the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under: ``Confirmation is one of the inglorious uncertainties of Govt. service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor on the availability of substantive vacancies. A glaring instance widely known in a part of our country is of a distinguished member of the judiciary who was confirmed as a District Judge years after he was confirmed as a Judge of the High Court. service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor on the availability of substantive vacancies. A glaring instance widely known in a part of our country is of a distinguished member of the judiciary who was confirmed as a District Judge years after he was confirmed as a Judge of the High Court. It is on the record of these writ petitions that officiating Deputy Engineers were not confirmed even though substantive vacancies were available in which they could have been confirmed. It shows that confirmation does not have to conform to any set rules and whether an employee should be confirmed or not depends upon the sweet will and pleasure of the government. (15). It was held in S.B. Patwardhans case (supra) that the seniority cannot be linked up with the confirmation. (16). A constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association vs. State of Maharashtra and Others (5) has laid down the following propositions regarding the seniority: ``(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post unin- terruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. (17). Thus, it is settled law that seniority is to be reckoned from the date of initial appointment in case the appointment has been made in accordance with the recruitment rules. (18). Similarly in A.N. Sehgal & Ors. vs. Raja Ram Sheoram & Ors. (6), the Apex Court has held that ``confirmation and appointment to a substantive vacancy is always an inglorious uncertainty and would take unduly long time. Therefore, the confirmation or appointment to a substantive capacity would not normally be a condition precedent to reckon the continuous length of service for the purpose of seniority. (19). In O.P. Garg vs. State of U.P. (7), Honble Supreme Court considered an identical issue, where proviso to Rule 26 of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975, provided to reckon the seniority from the date of confirmation. (19). In O.P. Garg vs. State of U.P. (7), Honble Supreme Court considered an identical issue, where proviso to Rule 26 of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975, provided to reckon the seniority from the date of confirmation. The Honble Supreme Court placed reliance on its earlier judgments particularly in the cases of S.B. Patwardhan and Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association (supra) and struck down the said proviso to Rule 26 after holding it arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the mandate of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. (20). In the instant case, similar situation exists and this case is squarely covered by the said judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in O. P. Gargs case (supra). Sub clause 3 of Regulation 13 clearly links up the seniority with the date of confirmation and runs as an exception to sub-clause (2) which provides for determining inter-se seniority according to the merit rank in the select list. According to clause (3), if probation period of an officer/employee is extended, he would become junior to all other persons appointed in the same grade or scale. Thus, sub clause (3) impliedly provides for reckoning the seniority from the date of confirmation, which is violative of mandatory provisions contained in Art. 16 of the Constitution, arbitrary and, thus, liable to be declared ultravires, as minimal and bare requirement of the rule of law is that every action of the State should be free from arbitrariness and Article 14 of the Constitution of India strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and reasonableness. (Vide Maneka Sanjay Gandhi vs. Union of India (8); Rammana Duttatreya Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India and Ors. (9); Srilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (10); and E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu (11). Clause (3) of Regulation 13 links up the seniority with the date of confirmation, which may depend upon various factors and it may also include factors not related to the official duty of an employee. If probation of an officer has been extended on some allegation/complaint, and after investigation/inquiry, the complaint is found to be false, and the employee is confirmed at a later stage, clause (3) of Regulation 13 becomes arbitrary as it empowers the employer/competent authority to change the event of allotment of seniority on unreasonable and baseless grounds. If probation of an officer has been extended on some allegation/complaint, and after investigation/inquiry, the complaint is found to be false, and the employee is confirmed at a later stage, clause (3) of Regulation 13 becomes arbitrary as it empowers the employer/competent authority to change the event of allotment of seniority on unreasonable and baseless grounds. Of course, if any employee is not found fit to be retained in service during his probation period, his services are liable to be terminated and such termination cannot be termed as punitive nor would it be based on some delinquency or misconduct nor would it attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution in case of Govt. employees and other relevant rules applicable in other cases for initiating disciplinary proceedings, but in case he is retained in service and confirmed, he must be entitled to get his seniority reckoned from the date of his appointment and not from the date of his confirmation. Thus, under the law, it is not permissible to disturb someones seniority, which he is otherwise entitled in law, on some whimsical ground or some baseless complaint. Clause (3) of Regulation 13 of the Regulations, has empowered the competent authority with unfettered and unchannelised powers to deprive an employee of the seniority, which he is otherwise entitled, to hold under clause (2) of Regulation 13. Thus, the provisions of clause (3) of Regulation 13 smacks of arbitrariness and liable to be declared ultravires. (21). Sri M.S. Singhvi has submitted that under the Regulations governing the service conditions of the petitioner, there is no scope of misuse of power to extend the probation period. His main thrust of argument on this point is that Regulation 9 of the said Regulations provides complete channelisation and control for extending the probation period. There is no substance in this contention also. Regulation 9 reads as under: ``9. Confirmation: An officer or employee shall be confirmed in the service of the Bank, if in the opinion of the appointing authority, the officer or employee has completed his probation. (22). It is evident from the plain, simple and unambiguous language of this regulation that once an employee completes the initial or extended probation period, he would be entitled to be confirmed automatically. This view is fortified by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh (12). (22). It is evident from the plain, simple and unambiguous language of this regulation that once an employee completes the initial or extended probation period, he would be entitled to be confirmed automatically. This view is fortified by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh (12). Same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Dhoonji Bhai Ramji Bhai vs. State of Gujarat (13); Omprakash Maurya vs. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Fed & Ors. (14); and M.K. Agarwal vs. Gurgaon Gramin Bank and Ors. (15). (23). Thus, in view of the above, the inescapable conclusion one has to reach is that Regulation 9 provides for a maximum period of probation and after completing the probation period, an employee shall be deemed to be automatically confirmed. However, by no stretch of imagination, one can argue that the said regulation provides for a control/safeguard from misuse of power to extend the probation period, which would ultimately deprive an employee of the seniority, to be fixed in terms of clause (2) of Regulation 13. (24). The Apex Court in Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Association vs. Union of India and Ors. (16) has held that an employee has no vested right to seniority but he has an interest to seniority acquired by working out the rules. It could be taken away only by operation of valid law. This view has been approved and followed by the Honble Apex Court in Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karmchari Sangh vs. Union of India & Ors. (17). The natural corollary of this law laid down by the Apex Court is that the law which has the tendency to take away the seniority, must also meet the test of reasonableness and if it is found to be arbitrary, then it will fall within the ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution and is liable to be declared ultra- vires. Thus, the contention of Sri Singhvi is untenable. (25). In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that clause (3) of Regulation 13 is inconsistent with the philosophy and public policy enshrined in Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the same is declared ultravires. (26). In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. (25). In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that clause (3) of Regulation 13 is inconsistent with the philosophy and public policy enshrined in Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the same is declared ultravires. (26). In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to reckon the seniority of the petitioner in terms of clause (1)(a) of the Regulation 13 i.e. from the date of his initial appointment and give him all consequential benefits for which he is entitled. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.