KAUSHALENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA v. U P PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
1997-10-01
D.K.SETH
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
D. K. SETH, J. An advertisement was made through U. P. Public Service Com mission in respect of several posts includ ing those of Principal in Government Col leges and post of Senior Lecturers in Dis trict Institute of Education and Training. The petitioner was qualified in the preliminary examination but he was refused permission to appear in the main examination on the ground that he is un derage. According to Clause 4 of the said advertisement, the age was prescribed as between 30 and 35 years for the post of Senior Lecturers in District Institute of Education and Training whereas the petitioner is below 30years. 2. Mr. Ashok Bhushan, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the age prescribed in the advertisement having been no basis and support in law could not be taken to be valid on the basis of the extent rules governing the subject. If there is any inconsistency in the advertisement and rules in that event according to him the rules will prevail. 3. Relying on Rule 10 of the U. P. Educational (General Education Cadre) Service Rules, 1992 (hereinafter called as the 1992 Rules), Mr. Ashok Bhushan con tends that except the post of Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys and Girls), age for other posts would be be tween 21 and 32years. Unless the rules are amended such prescription of age in the advertisement could not be included. Therefore, the ground on which the petitioner is being refused permission to appear in the main examination cannot be sustained. The second point advanced by Mr. Ashok Bhushan was that the petitioner had applied with all particulars and disclosed his age. Despite such dis closure, he was allowed to appear in the preliminary examination and was con sidered and ultimately qualified in the said preliminary examination, therefore, the petitioner can not be denied the oppor tunity on the principle that the respon dents are estopped from taking the said plea after having allowed the petitioner to appear in the preliminary examination which according to him should be deemed to have been done in view of the relevant rules applicable in the case. 4. Mr. V. M. Sahai, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that since rule having not been amended, therefore, the said rule cannot be applied in the case of the petitioner.
4. Mr. V. M. Sahai, learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that since rule having not been amended, therefore, the said rule cannot be applied in the case of the petitioner. Unless and until the post is included in the cadre and the rule is amended, by no stretch of imagination, the relevant rule referred to above by Mr. Ashok Bhushan cannot be attracted in the present case. The post having been created and sought to be filled up on the basis of the Govern ment Order, therefore, the advertisement issued pursuant to the Government decision is binding. He secondly contends that the petitioner having appeared in the examination knowing fully and being aware of the situation as is appearing on the basis of the advertisement, after having refused permission to appear in the main examination, he can not turn round and challenge the advertisement itself as being wrong. It is no more open to him to claim any benefit beyond the purview of the ad vertisement itself. 5. Both the learned Counsel had ar gued the case at length and had referred to various documents which are annexures to the pleadings as well as the rules in sup port of their respective contentions. 6. Mr. Ashok Bhushan, learned Counsel for the petitioner had also relied on the decision in the case of C. L. Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 437, in support of his case that administrative instruction can not compete with a statutory rule and if there be contrary provisions in the rule the ad ministrative instructions must give way and the rule shall prevail. 7. After having heard learned Coun sel for the parties, it appears that the facts are admitted. The post of Senior Lecturers in District Institute of Education and Training was not included in the Appendix I to the 1992 Rules. The said post was created by decision of the Government contained in an order dated 3-8- 1995 wherein District Institute of Education and Training has been established in 22 Districts and the posts created our the said institutes have been shown in the said order. SI. No. 3 is the post of Senior Lec turers.
The said post was created by decision of the Government contained in an order dated 3-8- 1995 wherein District Institute of Education and Training has been established in 22 Districts and the posts created our the said institutes have been shown in the said order. SI. No. 3 is the post of Senior Lec turers. In Clause (2) thereof it has been provided that the said post may be filled up either by deputation or by some other engagement on contract from outside but the recruitment in the said post would be made according to the instruction issued by the Government. By an order dated 19-8-1996 which is Annexure-CA-1, the procedure for recruitment was prescribed by the Government as contemplated in the order dated 3-8-1995 being Annexure SCA-1. In the said order dated 19-8-1996 (Annexure CA-1), it has been provided that the post of Senior Lecturers which have been created by the Government in the District Institute of Education and Training would be treated to be as Class II post as prescribed in the U. P. Educational (General Education Cadre) Service Rules, 1992 and that it has been so included in the said cadre. But the relevant rules are in the process of being amended for further ing the said inclusion of the post in the said cadre. The process for recruitment has been provided to be similar to those of Class II officers of other posts and the age and educational qualification would also be that of the Principal with the exception that candidate possessing M. Ed, is preferable. In paragraph 3 thereof it has been pointed out that the requisition of the said post should be included with the requisition of the post of Principal as has been requisitioned in April 1994 by the Government. In terms of the said Govern ment Order contained in Annexure CA-1 the advertisement was issued wherein Clause 4 it was specifically pointed out that the age for the post of Senior Lecturer would be between 30 and 35 years as on 1-7-1997. The said advertisement already prescribed the age limit between 21 and 32 for all other posts excepting the post of Principal Government Intermediate Col leges (for Boys or Girls) and the Senior Lecturers District Institute of Education and Training where the age limit is be tween 30 and 35 years.
The said advertisement already prescribed the age limit between 21 and 32 for all other posts excepting the post of Principal Government Intermediate Col leges (for Boys or Girls) and the Senior Lecturers District Institute of Education and Training where the age limit is be tween 30 and 35 years. The petitioner has been qualified in the preliminary examina tion on merit against the post of Senior Lecturer but he is being denied of the opportunity to appear in the main ex amination on the ground that he is less than 30 years of age and he does not fulfil the condition contained in the said advertisement. 8. Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner can claim any right on the basis of the contention as raised by Shri Ashok Bhushan or the petitioner is disentitled to appear in the main examina tion by reason of the justification put forth by Mr. Sahai. 9. The advertisement thus clearly specifies the age for the post of Senior Lecturer. If it is held that U. P. Educational (General Education Cadre) Service Rules, 1992 is not applicable, in that event, the advertisement would prevail. If it is found that the said rule applicable and attracted, in that event, the advertisement prescrib ing the age has to give way to the rules as has been held in the case of C. L. Verma (supra ). In paragraph 6 of the said judg ment, the Apex Court has held that:- "6. The question which arose for con sideration in the writ petition before the High Court at the instance of the appellant was whether in the face of the mandate in Rule 29 the administrative order could operate. It is not the stand of the State Government that the order dated May 15, 1981, is one under the proviso to Rule 29. In fact, the tenor of the proviso clearly indicates that it is intended to cover specific cases and individual employees. An administrative instruction cannot compete with a statutory rule and if there be contrary provisions in the rule the administrative instruc tions must give way and the rule shall prevail. We are therefore of the view that the appellant, in terms of Rule 29, ceased to be a Government employee on his attaining the age of 58 years, two days prior to the order of dismissal.
We are therefore of the view that the appellant, in terms of Rule 29, ceased to be a Government employee on his attaining the age of 58 years, two days prior to the order of dismissal. In view of the fact that he had already superannuated, Government had no right to deal with him in its disciplinary jurisdiction available in regard to employees. The ratio of the decision in R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India in Council supports the position. " 10. If it is found that the rule is ap plicable in that event, the contention of Mr. Sahai that having his eyes open to the condition laid down in Clause 4 of the advertisement it is no more open to the petitioner to challenge the same, cannot be sustained. Inasmuch as if the age prescribed on is contrary to the rule, in that event, it is the rule which would prevail because of the person applying is also aware of the rules which stare on the face on the respondents which case is to be applicable. 11. In order to decide the question, it is necessary to refer to the relevant orders by which the said post of Senior Lecturer was created. In the order contained in An-nexure-SCA-1 the age for the post was not prescribed or decided. On the other hand, it was specified that the recruitment pro cedure shall be according to the decision/direction of the Government. Therefore, we are to fall back on such instruction to which the Government had prescribed the procedure for selection. Such procedure has been sought to be prescribed by means of Annexure CA-1. While prescribing the recruitment proce dure, it has been pointed out in the said order that the post had already been in cluded in the cadre under the said 1992 Rules and that because of such inclusion of the post in the said cadre, the rules were in the process of being amended, therefore, for all practical purposes the post was in cluded in the cadre and was to be treated as within the rules for which the process for amendment is undergoing. Even if it is accepted that Mr.
Even if it is accepted that Mr. Sahai is fight in his con tention that unless and until the rule is amended it can not be treated to be in cluded in the cadre and the rules would be applicable on the basis of the Government instruction. Since Government instruc tion can not be a part of the rules even then by reason of the prescription of recruit ment process in the order contained in Annexure CA-1 the process is to be similar to that of the said rules. By expressed in struction it has been pointed out that the procedure for recruitment for the post of Senior Lecturer would be similar to that of the Class II post in the said rules and the age and educational qualification would be similar to those of the Principals under the said rules except that the candidature having M. Ed would be preferable. It is stated in paragraph 3 that the requisition was also directed to be a kin to that of the Principal. 12. Thus it appears that even if the rules are not applicable but by administra tive instruction, the principle followed for recruitment in the post of Principal is to be followed. Then again Rule 4 of the 1992 Rules which provides as follows:- "4. Cadre of service.- (i) The strength of the service and of each category of posts therein shall be such as may be determined by the Government from time to time. (2) The strength of the service and of each category of posts therein including the posts of Mens Branch and Womens Branch shall, until orders varying the same are passed under sub-rule (i) be as given in Appendix I: Provided that- (1) the appointing authority may leave un filled or the Governor may hold in abeyance any vacant post, with thereby entitling any person to compensation; or (2) the Governor may create such addi tional, permanent or temporary posts as may be considered proper. " 13. It appears from the said Rule 4 that Government may from time to time determine category of post. Until varied, the posts included in the Appendix I is to be treated as the strength of the service of the relevant categories. Admittedly, in the orders contained in Annexure SCA-I and Annexure CA-I, the Government had decided to include those posts in the cadre.
Until varied, the posts included in the Appendix I is to be treated as the strength of the service of the relevant categories. Admittedly, in the orders contained in Annexure SCA-I and Annexure CA-I, the Government had decided to include those posts in the cadre. Annexure CA-I specifically indicated that those posts have been already included in the cadre. Therefore, if it is included in the cadre, in that event, the rules would very much applicable even without the amend ment. Inasmuch as by reason of inclusion of such post in the cadre no amendment in the rules is being made. On the other hand in terms of Rule 4, Clause (1) the Govern ment had determined the strength by in cluding those categories as indicated in Annexure SCA-1 which finds support in Annexure CA-1 that those posts have been included in the cadre itself. In order to include in the cadre beyond the scheme of" recruitment prescribed in the Rule, it ap pears that any amendment is necessary. On the other hand, the Government is free to determine the strength through execu tive actions as has been sought to be done. The question of amendment of the rules would be with regard to the difference in the question of age or qualification etc. as is appears from Annexure CA-1. Unless such amendment is incorporated, the rule as it stands would be applicable because of the specific instruction issued that recruit ment should be in the same process through which the post of Principals are being filled by direct recruitment under the said Rules. 14. Rule 10 o 1992 Rules provides as follows:- "10.
as is appears from Annexure CA-1. Unless such amendment is incorporated, the rule as it stands would be applicable because of the specific instruction issued that recruit ment should be in the same process through which the post of Principals are being filled by direct recruitment under the said Rules. 14. Rule 10 o 1992 Rules provides as follows:- "10. Age.-A candidate for direct recruit ment must have attained the age of twenty-one years and must not have attained the age of more than thirty-two years on the first day of July of the calendar year in which vacancies for direct recruitment are advertised by the Com mission : Provided that for the post of Principal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls) a candidate must have attained the age of thirty years and must not have attained the of more than thirty-five years on the first day of July of the calendar year in which vacancies for such posts are advertised by the Commission: Provided further that the upper age limit in the case of candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other categories as may be notified by the Govern ment from time to time shall be greater by such number of years as may be specified. " 15. It appears that excepting the post of Principal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls) the age was provided as between 21 and 32 years for all other posts in the cadre. By reason of proviso to Rule 10, the age of the Principal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls) has been provided between 30 and 35 years. In the order contained in Annexure CA-1 only Principal has been mentioned. It has not been mentioned that the qualification of those of the Principal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls) is to be followed. A plain reading of the rules having regard to Ap pendix 1 indicates that a distinction has been created in between post of Principal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls) and the Principal of other institutes or colleges which is apparent from SI. Nos. 16,20, 26,41,42, 43,57,63, 72, 75, 76 and 77. Each of these posts are the post of Principal in different institutes and colleges. Then again Professors and Senior Research Psychologist mentioned in SI. Nos. 35,36,37,38,39,54, 55,65,67 and 73 respectively have also been in cluded in Rule 10.
Nos. 16,20, 26,41,42, 43,57,63, 72, 75, 76 and 77. Each of these posts are the post of Principal in different institutes and colleges. Then again Professors and Senior Research Psychologist mentioned in SI. Nos. 35,36,37,38,39,54, 55,65,67 and 73 respectively have also been in cluded in Rule 10. Only in respect of Prin cipal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls) in SI. No. 46 has been treated differently. In the order contained in Annexure CA-1 instead of using the expression "principal Government Inter mediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls)" only "principal" having been used. The same can notes that it is the "principal" other than "principal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls)". Admittedly, Rule 10 provides age between 21 to 32 years for all candidates for direct recruit ment with the exception provided in the proviso only for the post of Principal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls ). Therefore, even on the face of the expression used in Annexure CA-1, the contention of Mr. Sahai does not ap pear to be of any substance. If it was in tended that the qualification would be that of Principal Government Intermediate Colleges (for Boys or Girls) in that event it would have used the said expression in stead of leaving the same only as "prin cipal" without any other qualifying clause. An expression is to be given true meaning on the basis in which it has been so ex pressed. The Court can not add or substract from the expression used when the meaning is complete and unambiguous. There appears no ambiguity in the expres sion used. The language used is very clear and simple and does not conceive of any doubtful or two meanings. Only one meaning can be made out of the said ex pression used. There is no question of con fusion with regard to the expression so used. 16. As has been observed, the adver tisement appears to be clearly in violation of the instruction contained in Annexure CA-1 which requires the same qualifica tion of Principal for the post of Senior Lecturers which means the Principals referred to in SI. Nos. in Appendix 1 men tioned hereinbefore and not the Principal mentioned in SI. No. 46 of the said Appen dix. 17. Therefore, I have been unable to pursuade myself 10 agree with the conten tion of Mr.
Nos. in Appendix 1 men tioned hereinbefore and not the Principal mentioned in SI. No. 46 of the said Appen dix. 17. Therefore, I have been unable to pursuade myself 10 agree with the conten tion of Mr. Sahai though argued with dealt and extreme craftfulness. 18. In the result, the petition suc ceeds and is allowed. The respondents shall permit the, petitioner to appear in the main examination. 19. After the above order is passed Mr. Sahai further contends that since the advertisement with regard to the Senior Lecturer was published wrongly as has been held in the above order, the adver tisement should be cancelled and fresh selection should be held with regard to the post of Senior Lecturers so that all other eligible candidates will obtain the oppor tunity of the said advertisement. 20. Mr. Ashok Bhushan opposes the said prayer on the ground that about 800 candidates have declared under age. 21. Argument continue for some time and no time is left today. The matter may be put up at 2. 00 p. m. for orders tomorrow. 22. Hearing is resumed. After hear ing the learned Counsel for the parties, following order is passed: "mr. Ashok Bhushan relies on the decision in the case of Uma Shanker Singh and others v. Chairman, Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh and another, 1994 (2) UPLBEC 1412, a decision rendered by the Full Bench to contends that declaration of result on the basis of post is not permitted at this stage which is a preliminary screening as has been held in the said decision. " 23. Mr. Sahai contends that since there is a difference of age in respective post, therefore, the result was declared separately in respect of different post. In the present case aid of Service Commis sion was requisitioned for Selection of candidates under the said 1992 Rules which stands on a little different footing from the selection which was involved in the Full Bench decision in the case of Uma Shanker Singh (supra ). He also contends that the petitioner was considered under age for the post of Senior Lecturer on the ground that according to the merit list, the petitioner has not qualified for being per mitted to appear in the main examination for all other posts excepting the post of Senior Lecturer for which he had qualified in the preliminary examination.
He also contends that the petitioner was considered under age for the post of Senior Lecturer on the ground that according to the merit list, the petitioner has not qualified for being per mitted to appear in the main examination for all other posts excepting the post of Senior Lecturer for which he had qualified in the preliminary examination. There fore, the ratio decided the said Full Bench is wholly distinguishable and can not be attracted in the present case. 24. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the said question shall remain open to be decided at a later stage by the Commission but at the same time the petitioner may be allowed to appear in the examination pursuant to this judgment alongwith all other candidates selected permitted by the Commission for the post of Senior Lecturers. 25. The writ petition is thus disposed of. 26. A photocopy of the judgment be supplied to Shri V. M. Sahai, learned Counsel for the respondents on payment of usual charges in course of today. Order accordingly. .