Honble YADAV, J.–The present misc. appeal arises out from an order dated 5.11.86 passed by learned District Judge, Churu, rejecting the application of the defendant-appellant dated 21.3.83 for setting aside ex parte decree dated 17.10.81. (2). The aforesaid application for setting aside ex parte decree was moved by defendant-appellant on the ground inter alia that there was no service of summons on him before passing the ex parte decree and he has no knowledge about the pendency of the suit before he was served with the notice of execution of ex parte decree. It is also averred in the application for setting aside ex parte decree that suit was instituted on 31.1.81 and summons were ordered to be issued. Next date was fixed 24.2.81 on which date it was recorded by the court that the defendant is not present let service of summons and registered AD be awaited. On 11.3.81 summons by ordinary process were not received however it transpired that the summons alleged to have been sent on the incorrect address of the defendant-appellant by registered post was returned back with the endorsement on the envelop as `refused. The refusal accepted to be sufficient service by the court upon the defendant-appellant. It is also alleged that the father of the plaintiff-respondent namely Shri Nath Malji was an employee of Electricity Board who has manipulated the report of refusal on the envelop from the postman without letting defendant- appellant to know about the pendency of the suit and fraudulently obtained ex-parte decree. (3). The plaintiff-respondent-decree-holder opposed the application for setting aside ex parte decree alleging that since the defendant-appellant has refused to accept the summons through registered post hence the ex parte decree was rightly passed by learned trial court. It is also alleged that since ex parte decree was passed on 17.10.1981 and the application for setting aside was moved on 21.3.81, therefore, it deserves to be rejected as barred by lapse of time. (4). In support of his application for setting aside ex parte decree, the defendant-appellant examined himself as PW1, his father-Madan Lal as PW2. Plaintiff- respondent-decree-holder examined Rajendra Kumar as DW1, Vishnu Kumar Tawari as DW 2 and Nath Malji as DW3. (5). The learned trial court on the basis of aforesaid evidence arrived at a conclusion that the registered envelop Ex.5 which bears the endorsement of refusal was sent on correct address. Plaintiff- respondent-decree-holder examined Rajendra Kumar as DW1, Vishnu Kumar Tawari as DW 2 and Nath Malji as DW3. (5). The learned trial court on the basis of aforesaid evidence arrived at a conclusion that the registered envelop Ex.5 which bears the endorsement of refusal was sent on correct address. It is further held that irrespective of that the defendant- appellant has denied on oath that no such registered envelop was tendered to him and the postman had not been examined yet declaration made by the court about sufficiency, of service is unassailable in view of newly inserted proviso of O.9, R. 13, CPC which provides that an ex parte decree shall not be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity in the service of summons. (6). I have heard learned counsel on both sides and perused the order under appeal. I have also critically examined the registered envelop Ex.5, bearing the endorsement of refusal. (7). It is contended by learned counsel for the defendant- appellant that it is a settled principle of law that presumption about endorsement of refusal on a regis- tered envelop is rebuttable provided it was sent on correct address of the addressee. It is further contended that such presumption stands rebutted by the statement on oath of the addressee, deposing denial of refusal by him on the registered envelop. According to Mr. Manish Sishodia, learned counsel for the appellant, once endorsement of refusal on a registered envelop is denied by addressee on oath, burden of proof shifts on the person claiming correctness of such endorsement of refusal on the envelop by examining the postman and giving an opportunity to the addressee to examine him to test correctness of such endorsement. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a Full Bench decision rendered by Allahabad High Court in Ganga Ram vs. Smt. Phul- wati (1), a decision rendered by the Apex Court in Puwada Venkateswara Rao vs. Chidamana Venkata Ramana (2) and another decision of Apex Court in Anil Kumar vs. Nanak Chandra Verma (3). (8). On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff- respondent-decree-holder refuted the aforesaid argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the defendant-appellant. (8). On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff- respondent-decree-holder refuted the aforesaid argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the defendant-appellant. While supporting the order impugned, he placed reliance on a decision rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court in Vasudeo vs. Mulk Raj Kumar (4) and a decision rendered by Supreme Court in Gujarat Electricity Board and another vs. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani (5). (9). I am of the view that in such cases where a summon sent by registered post is returned with endorsement as ``refused there can be two possibilities. Firstly, when a registered envelop returned back with the endorsement `refused there can be possibility that the sender may somehow got an endorsement of refusal marked on the envelop by the postman and secondly, that the addressee has actually refused receipt of the registered envelop tendered to him by the postman. In both these possibilities, it is always a question of fact whether there was sufficient evidence from the side of the addressee to discharge the initial burden of presumption envisaged under Sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act read with Sec. 114(f) of the Indian Evidence Act. (10). It is true that the argument advanced in the present case is most contentious based on interpretation of Sec.27 of the General Clauses Act read with Sec. 114(f) of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no consensus of opinion among the various High Courts on the point, therefore, I consider it proper to deal the question threadbare. (11). The High Courts of Calcutta, Lahore, Punjab and Madras have taken the view that a presumption of fact can be drawn even after such a registered notice is received back by the sender with an endorsement `refused. In the two Lahore cases of Sher Afzal vs. Mohan Lal (6) and Raunaq Ram vs. Prabhu Dayal (7), the view taken was that the presumption of service can be made even where the letter is received back by the sender with such endorsement. (12). It was held in the case of Nirmalabala Debi vs. Provat Kumar Basu (8) that in such cases, presumption of service of notice arises and the postman need not be examined to prove the endorsement. A similar view was taken in the case of Bapayya vs. Venkataratnam (9). (13). (12). It was held in the case of Nirmalabala Debi vs. Provat Kumar Basu (8) that in such cases, presumption of service of notice arises and the postman need not be examined to prove the endorsement. A similar view was taken in the case of Bapayya vs. Venkataratnam (9). (13). In case of Balbhadar Mal vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (10), the view taken was that where a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was received back by the sender with an endorsement `refused the presumption of service can be drawn both under Sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act and Sec. 114(f) of the Indian Evidence Act. The presumption was, however, ruled to be rebuttable. (14). The High Courts of Bombay, Madhya Bharat and Nagpur have expressed a view to the contrary. It was held in case of Vaman Vithal vs. Khanderao Ram Rao (11) that where an un-opened letter containing notice was received back by the sender it would not be considered to be good service of notice. The Nagpur HighCourt in case of Janki Ram Narhari vs. Damodhar Ram Chandra (12) and the Madhya Bharat High Court in case of Tek Chand Devi Das vs. Gulab Chand Chandan Mal (13), have taken the view that there can be no presumption that the endorsement of refusal was made by the postman and, therefore, unless the postman was examined such endorsement was inadmissible in evidence. (15). The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court on the aforesaid question in case of Ganga Ram (supra) formulated three questions for consideration, two of which are relevant for determining the disputed question which are reproduced below:– S.No. Questions Our Reply 1. xxx xxx xxxx xxxxxx xxx xxxx xxxxxx xxx xxxx xxx xxx xxx xxxx xxxxxx xxx xxxx xxxxxx xxx xxxx xxx 2. Whether it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by registered post by producing the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him? 2. The answer is in the negative. 3. Whether in the circumstances of the case, the Courts-below were right in raising the presumption under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act in favour of the Landlord? The answer is in affirmative. The presumption regarding service of such notice has also to be made under S.27 of the General Clauses Act. (16). 2. The answer is in the negative. 3. Whether in the circumstances of the case, the Courts-below were right in raising the presumption under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act in favour of the Landlord? The answer is in affirmative. The presumption regarding service of such notice has also to be made under S.27 of the General Clauses Act. (16). In case of Puwada Venkateswara Rao (supra), learned Honble Judges of the Supreme Court after taking the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Meghji Kanji Patel vs. Kundan Mal Chaman Lal (14) and conflicting opinion ex- pressed by Calcutta High Court in Nirmala Bala Debi vs. Provat Kumar Basu (15) ruled that these two decisions are conciliable. The Calcutta High Court applied a rebuttable presumption which had not been repelled by any evidence. In the Bombay case, the presumption had been held to have been rebutted by the evidence of the defendant on oath so that it meant that the plaintiff could not succeed without further evidence. It was further held in Puwada Venkateswara (supra) that it is not always necessary, in such cases, to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct. (17). On the aforesaid question, learned Single Judge of this Court in Vasudeo (supra), upon which, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has placed reliance, after taking into consideration catena of judgments of various High Courts and the Supreme Court cases arrived at a conclusion that if the evidence of the defendant on oath that he did not refuse to accept the postal article when the same was tendered to him by the Postman, inspires confidence, a presumption which generally arises under Sec.114 illustration (f) of the Law of Evidence and Sec.27 of the General Clauses Act generally will stand rebutted. But if there is other material on record, such as admission or conduct of the defendant which makes his statement unreliable, then, a bald statement of the defendant on oath will not rebut the presumption which is is no doubt a rebuttable presumption of fact. I respectfully concur with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Vasudeo (supra). (18). I respectfully concur with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Vasudeo (supra). (18). From the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion, that there can be no hard and fast rule about non-examination of postman in challenging the testimony of oath of an addressee, denying factum of refusal by him. It is true that in those cases, it will not be sufficient to rebut the presumption postulated under Sec.27 of the General Clauses Act read wth Sec. 114 illustration (f) of the Indian Evidence Act about service of refusal if denial of refusal by addressee itself is inherently unreliable. To my mind, this would always be a question of fact in each case where there is sufficient reliable evidence from the addressee to discharge initial burden and it is proved that envelop was sent on correct address of the addressee then the sender is required to examine the postman giving an opportunity to addressee to cross-examine the postman to rebut the presumption otherwise not. (19). With the aforesaid introspection, I am of the opinion that in the present case, there can be two possibilities either the registered envelop Ex.5 was returned back with the endorsement `refused although it was not tendered to the defendant-appellant in connivance of the father of the plaintiff-respondent-decree- holder with the postman or it has been actually refused by him. In such a situation, this Court is called upon to decide which of the two possibilities might be probable provided it is established that registered envelop Ex.5 was sent by the plaintiff-res- pondent-decree-holder on the correct address. (20). It is pertinent to observe that there is no dispute between the parties that the permanent address of the defendant-appellant is ``Khemko Ka Mohalla whereas at the time of filing of the suit, he was working in the office of the Executive Engineer, Research Training and Manual, Old Power House, near Ram Mandir, Jaipur. It is further admitted by DW 2 Vishnu Kumar Tawri that registered envelop was also sent at the permanent address of the defendant- appellant but its where-abouts is not known. It is further admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that the envelop Ex.5 was not sent on the aforesaid correct address where the defendant-appellant was working but it was sent on the address of Assistant Engineer, Research and Training, R.S.E.B. Jaipur. (21). It is further admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that the envelop Ex.5 was not sent on the aforesaid correct address where the defendant-appellant was working but it was sent on the address of Assistant Engineer, Research and Training, R.S.E.B. Jaipur. (21). The plaintiff-respondent-decree-holder examined DW 1 Rajendra Kumar, who is an independent witness to establish that there was possibility that registered envelop sent on incorrect address of defendant-appellant can be served on him at the office of Executive Engineer, Research, Training and Manual, Old Power House, near Ram Mandir, Jaipur which is situated at a distance of 100 yards to the office of Assistant Engineer, Researach and Training, R.S.E.B. Jaipur. (22). The learned District Judge has committed an error of law in raising presumption about service of refusal on the basis of Ex. 5, on which correct address of the defendant-appellant was not written. In fact, the question of raising presumption under Sec.27 of the General Clauses Act read with Sec.114 illustration (f) of the Indian Evidence Act arises only when correct address of addressee is written on the envelop. (23). From the aforesaid discussion, it is held that on the basis of registered envelop Ex.5, upon which correct address of defendant-appellant is not written, therefore, the question of presumption under Sec.27 of the General Clauses Act read with Sec.114 of the Indian Evidence Act does not arise and a finding contrary to it recorded by the learned trial court is not sustainable. (24). The learned trial court has also rejected the application for setting aside ex-parte decree on the basis of second proviso of O.9 R.13, CPC which provides that no court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons if it is satisfied that the defendant-appellant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim. (25). The learned trial court has not correctly understood the true import of second proviso of O.9 R.13, CPC. The finding that decree cannot be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity in service of summons upon the defendant-appellant is not sustainable in the eye of law. (25). The learned trial court has not correctly understood the true import of second proviso of O.9 R.13, CPC. The finding that decree cannot be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity in service of summons upon the defendant-appellant is not sustainable in the eye of law. The finding of learned trial court to the effect that the defendant-appellant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim is not based on any definable objective evidence but it is based on his own imaginary assumption and presumption which deserves to be set aside. (26). Learned trial court has further committed serious error in computing limitation for moving an application under O.9, R. 13, CPC within 30 days from the date of decree. It is true that limitation for moving an application under O.9 R. 13, CPC is 30 days from the date of decree but where it is found that summons were not duly served then the limitation begins to run from the date of knowledge of decree. Keeping in view this fact, in the present case, limitation would begins to run from the date of knowledge of ex parte decree passed against the defendant- appellant because service of summons was not affected on him. He has no knowledge about the date of hearing. When the limitation is computed from the date of knowledge of the ex parte decree then the application for setting aside the ex parte decree is found to be within limitation. (27). Resultantly, the present appeal is allowed. The order of refusing to set aside ex parte decree dated 5.11.86 together with the order to proceed ex parte dated 17.10.81 are set aside. The application for setting aside ex parte decree moved by the defendant-appellant is allowed with a direction to the learned trial court to re-admit the suit under its original number in the register of Civil Suits and proceed to determine the suit on merits after giving opportunity to both the parties to adduce their evidence.