P. M. Gnanavelu v. R. V. Kothandan — 1997 DIGILAW 1247 (MAD)

Judgment : 1. The tenant is the petitioner in tins C.R.P. The landlord filed a petition for eviction on 3 grounds, i.e.10(2)(1)- default, 10(2)(7) - denial of title and 14(l)(b) -demolition and reconstruction. The Rent Controller went into the evidence in detail and found tint the condition of the building did not require demolition. He has found against the respondent with reference to the ether two grounds also. Hence the petition was rejected. The landlord filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority though confirmed that there was no default in payment of rent allowed the appeal on the other two grounds namely mat the landlord required the building bona fide for demolition and there was denial of title. Hence the tenant has filed the C.R.P. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended mat the findings of the appellate court mat there was a denial of title and the building requires immediate demolition are not correct. According to him the denial was raised only in the reply notice and the counter, but however he did not assert it in the evidence, He contended that the building did not require immediate demolition as the condition was not so bad as alleged. As against the aforesaid contention the learned counsel for the respondent Mr.Subbiah contented that the finding of the lower court with reference to denial of title and condition of building is correct. He has argued that the lower court ought to have found mat there was wilful default in payment of rent. 3. First of all with reference to the bona fide requirement of the building for demolition, the trial court has considered the evidence and has arrived at the finding mat the building did not require demolition. P.W.I has not stated anything about the condition. P.W.2 nor has spoken about the condition of the building. In his evidence a contradiction is found. In the chief examination he has stated that the floor was newly laid. But in the cross examination he has stated that he did not know that the flooring was newly laid. It is true that P.W.2 has stated that the condition of the building is very bad/According to him the building was constructed with bricks and cement. But R W 2 has stated that the walls are built with bricks and cement He has also stated teak wood has been used. It is true that P.W.2 has stated that the condition of the building is very bad/According to him the building was constructed with bricks and cement. But R W 2 has stated that the walls are built with bricks and cement He has also stated teak wood has been used. The wood and the walls are very strong. Since in one place the rafter is bent, the roof portion in that place has slanted. In assessing the evidence of the Petitioner and the respondent when we come to the evidence of P.W.2 mere is some discrepancy as mentioned above. Similarly when we come to the evidence of P.W.1 also his evidence is not reliable because he has produced Ex.P.16 stating that it is for the building, but in the cross-examination he has admitted that the said plan does not belong to the petitioner premises but for some other building. If that is so what is the necessity for production Ex.P.16 is not at all understandable. Further he has admitted as per Ex.P.16 he has constructed a new building in another place. There-fore whether he really intended to construct a new building in the petition premises is much doubtful because he has not obtained the plan for demolition and reconstruction as he himself has admitted in the cross-examination. Under these circumstances we have to rely upon the evidence of R.W.2 and hold that the condition of the building does not require any demolition. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted the following authorities and contended that mere was bona fide intention of the landlord that would suffice Mohammed Gani v. S.Rathinavel Mohammed Gani v. S.Rathinavel Mohammed Gani v. S.Rathinavel , (1994)2 L.W. 472 ; Sabura Begum and Sherwood Educational Society v. Abdul Normaria Sherwood Educational Society v. Abdul Normaria Sherwood Educational Society v. Abdul Normaria, (1997)1 L. W. 323 are the decisions submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent. In (1994)2 L.W. 472 the learned single Judge has stated that want of sanction plan itself cannot negative bona fide. But the learned Judge has taken a view mat the condition of the building warrant the same. In this case the bona fide is negative by the production of Ex.P.16 stating that it relates to the building and When questioned about it, it was admitted that the said Ex.P.16 did not relate to the building at all. But the learned Judge has taken a view mat the condition of the building warrant the same. In this case the bona fide is negative by the production of Ex.P.16 stating that it relates to the building and When questioned about it, it was admitted that the said Ex.P.16 did not relate to the building at all. in (1997)1 L. W. 418 the three conditions are set out by the learned Judge. Bona fide intention is also one of the requirements. At the same time die age and the condition of the building are also the factors to be taken note of in addition to the means of the landlord. What me learned Judge has staled is that the building need not be in a deteriorated condition for demolition and reconstruction. In this case whether the respondent really intended to construct die building is itself in doubt because of his producing Ex.P.16. If he has been genuine to demolish and reconstruct he could have applied for a sanctioned plan. But without doing so he attempted to use die plan of some other building. Therefore his intention is only to evict me tenant and not for construction. The other decision (1997)1 L.W. 323 is also not helpful to me respondent. In the said case it is stated that mere is no necessity to produce liquid cash for the purpose of showing means. However it is also stated that the bona fide has to be presumed from the surrounding circumstances. In tins case we find that the condition of the building did not require demolition. Further the landlords attempt is also not a bona fide one. Therefore the said decision is not helpful to the respondent. As regards the means also there is some doubt. Exs. P 17 to 19 show that he is a partner in some firms and his contribution is only Rs.1,000. Even though it is stated that number of properties are in the name of his wife it has been admitted the house is mentioned in Ex.P.23, only order. From Ex. P.16 we find that recently the respondent has constructed a new building in some other place. If that is so whether he would be in a position to construct a new building is doubtful. The respondent has not produced the evidence to disprove the said suspicion. 4. From Ex. P.16 we find that recently the respondent has constructed a new building in some other place. If that is so whether he would be in a position to construct a new building is doubtful. The respondent has not produced the evidence to disprove the said suspicion. 4. The other ground on which the eviction has been ordered is denial of title. The tenant in his reply has stated that he spent a lot of money and recently renovated the superstructure. He has claimed that he is the owner of the superstructure, but however he has given up that stand in the evidence and he has admitted the same. He has also stated in the evidence that he has not denied the title of the landlord. It is to be noticed mat in the notice sent to the tenant by the respondents the grounds made out were only default and demolition. Only in the petition the ground of denial of title has been added in view of the reply, but inasmuch as the petitioner has given up the plea any categorically admitted that the respondent is the owner of the building and the land the eviction cannot be based on the said ground of denial of title. The learned counsel for the respondent cited M/s.Hussain Lorry Booking Service and others v. A.Sirajuddin M/s.Hussain Lorry Booking Service and others v. A.Sirajuddin M/s.Hussain Lorry Booking Service and others v. A.Sirajuddin , A.I.R. 1991 Mad. 367 and contended that even if the denial of title is during the course of evidence it can be taken note of and relied upon for the purpose of eviction. In Ammal Pillai and others v. M/s. Varadarajulu Complex Partnership Firm, (1997)1 MLJ. 626 also it is stated that mere was a binding order against the tenants with reference to the superstructure, based on an admission of title on his part with reference to it, in spite of the said admission in the order they have once again denied the title of the landlord in the subsequent eviction petition. Therefore the learned Judge has held mat mere was justification for eviction on the ground of denial of title. 5. As far as the ground of denial of title is concerned the attitude of the tenant should be taken note of. Therefore the learned Judge has held mat mere was justification for eviction on the ground of denial of title. 5. As far as the ground of denial of title is concerned the attitude of the tenant should be taken note of. If it is a casual denial and with reference to the superstructure alone especially when a tenant has spent considerable amount for the purpose of renovation of the same, such a casual denial should not be taken as a ground for eviction. It must be persistent and mala fide. In this case the courts have found that shortly before the purchase of the premises by the respondent, the tenant has spent his amounts and renovated the building. Therefore the denial of title with reference to superstructure alone cannot be termed as a mala fide one. The denial must be not only mala fide but must be a continuous one. In mis case as we have already found even though there is denial of title with reference to the superstructure in the reply and the counter, the same has been given up by the tenant in the evidence. Therefore in my view the denial of title in this case is not a mala fide one. For the abovementioned reasons I am of the view that the C.R.P. should be allowed. Accordingly the same is allowed. No order as to costs. The C.M.P. No.13488 of 1997 is disposed off accordingly.