Judgment : 1. THE instant petition has been filed for quashing the order, dated 19 July 1987, contained in Annexure 5, to the writ petition, passed by respondent 2 and order, dated 17 April, 1989, contained in annexure 6 to the writ petition, passed by respondent 1. 2. PETITIONER were appointed in 1977 and 1978 for a short period from time to time by respondent 2 which is evident from the orders, dated 16 April, 1987, 27 April 1987, 31 July 1987, 11 April 1988 and 19 July 1989, contained in annexures 2 to 4 to the writ petition. The petitioners were given work-charge employment and vide order, dated 19 July 1989, the services of the petitioners had been terminated as respondent 1 had allotted the work of Tendu Patta collection to respondent 3, vide order, dated April 17, 1989. The said order of termination has been challenged in the instant writ petition. The main contention raised by Sri ram Niwas Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, is that respondents 2 and 3 both are instrumentalities of the State and even if the contract to collect the tendu Pattas had been allotted to respondent 3 by respondent 1 in the year 1989. The petitioners' services could not be terminated. Sri V. K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, has vehementally opposed and argued that respondents 2 and 3 are separate legal entities governed by separate statutes and respondent 3 is not concerned with the liability by respondent 2. It is the exclusive prerogative of the State to allot the work to anybody as the agent of the state to collect Tendu Pattas under S. 4 of the Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyam)Adhiniyam, 1972, and respondent 2 had been given the said agency only for the year of 1987 and 1988. Respondent 2 during that period required the services of the work-charge employees to collect tendu Pattas, but in 1989 when the said work had been allotted to respondent 3, the services of the petitioners were no more required and terminated in accordance with the terms of their appointment. 3. Respondent 2 during that period required the services of the work-charge employees to collect tendu Pattas, but in 1989 when the said work had been allotted to respondent 3, the services of the petitioners were no more required and terminated in accordance with the terms of their appointment. 3. THE next contention raised by the respondents is that in 1989 when the services of the petitioners and other similarly situated persons were terminated, they filed Writ Petition No. 4998 of 1989 under the name and style of Uttar pradesh Tendu Patta Karamchari Sangh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, which was dismissed by the Lucknow Bench of this Court, vide its order, dated 8 May 1990. The petitioners were members of the aforesaid association and their writ petition having been dismissed earlier, it was the solemn duty of the petitioners to disclose the said fact before this Court. Moreover, the said writ petition is not maintainable as their earlier writ petition had been dismissed. 4. THE further contention of Sri V. K. Singh is that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands as being members of the association they must have been aware of this fact. However, the petitioners have denied of being the members of the aforesaid association in the rejoinder affidavit. Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, has referred to and relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in Ban nigam Karamchari Kalyan Sangh v. Divisional Logging Manager [1988 (3)S. L. R. 432], wherein the Hon'ble supreme Court has held that 149 workmen who were appointed by respondent 3 would be taken over by respondent 2 as there had been an agreement between the said two respondents. This case deals with a situation when the agency for collecting tendu Patta was given to respondent 2 in 1987. However, there is nothing on record to show that the said 149 workmen had also reverted back to respondent 3 when the agency had again been given to respondent 3 in 1989 and, thus, the judgment is of no help to the present petitioners. Sri R. N. Singh has vehemently argued that this would also apply vice versa and now as the contract has been given to respondent 3, the liability of the workmen appointed by respondent 2 should be taken over by respondent3. Sri R. N. Singh has vehemently argued that this would also apply vice versa and now as the contract has been given to respondent 3, the liability of the workmen appointed by respondent 2 should be taken over by respondent3. However, he has fairly conceded, as he has always been fair to the Court, that the petitioner said not fall within the said 149 workmen. Moreover, there is no material on record to show that there was any agreement between respondents 2 and 3 when the agency to collect the Tendu Patta was given to respondent 3 to take any liability to absorb the work-charge employees appointed by respondent 2. The appointment letters issued from time to time clearly contain a condition that the services of the petitioners were of temporary nature. It will come to an end on the expiry of the work of Tendu patta collection or on the instance when the services of the petitioners would not be required. 5. IN the case of State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar [1992 (1) L. L. N. 537], it has been held by the Apex Court that there is no reason as to why the services of the employees cannot be terminated by enforcing the terms and conditions of their appointment letter. The Apex court, in the case of jaswant Singh v. Union of India [1980 (1) L. L. N. 44], held that the petitioners had accepted the offer of appointment knowing very well the terms and conditions of their appointment. They had understood and accepted the conditions of service, thus, they cannot object when they are removed in accordance with the conditions subject to which they were appointed, thus, the employees can never raise any grievance if the action taken against them is primarily governed by the terms of their appointment. 6. THE concept of work-charge employee was explained by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is as under : "the work-charge employees are engaged on a temporary basis and their appointments are made for the execution of a specified work. From the very nature of the employment, their services automatically come to an end on the completion of the work for the sole purpose to which they are employed. From the very nature of the employment, their services automatically come to an end on the completion of the work for the sole purpose to which they are employed. They do not get any relief under the payment of Gratuity Act nor do they receive any retrenchment benefits or any benefits under the State Employees' insurance Scheme. " Similar view has also been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. S. K. Sinha v. State of Uttar pradesh [1995 Suppl. (1) S. C. C. 456]. In terms used in their appointment letter itself indicate that they were work-charge employees and, thus, they had no right to continue in service after the work for which they were appointed was no more available with the employer, i.e., respondent 2 in the instant case. 7. THE petitioners have filed an application for amendment to the effect that they may be permitted to amend the petition to the extent that if for any reason the petitioners cannot be given a job with respondent 2, they may be absorbed by respondent 3, who has now been allotted the work to collect the tenu Patta. Such a relief cannot be granted because there is nothing on record to show that by any agreement respondent 3 has taken over the liability of any type of employees employed by respondent 2. 8. IN view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the petition is devoid of any merit and hence it is dismissed.