Honble SINGH, J.–Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. (2). This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is directed against the order dated 11th June, 97 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate No.3, Jodhpur, whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate rejected the applica- tion dated 7th April, 97 submitted by the accused petitioner praying that further investigation started by the police in C.R. No. 190/92 be stopped. (3). The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the First Information Report No. 190/92 was registered at Police Station, Udai Mandir, Jodhpuron 9th May, 92. The offences alleged in the First Information Report were punishable under Sections 420, 379, 440 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and after investigation a final report was submitted on 2nd July, 92. Further investigation was conducted by a Special Branch of the office of Superintendent of Police and a final report was submitted in which it was mentioned that the case was of a civil nature. The final report No. 94/92 was accepted by the learned Judicial Magistrate on 28th August, 94. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that after the acceptance of the final report by the learned Judicial Magistrate on 28th October, 94, the police has started further investigation in the case without any legal authority and justification. Therefore, the petitioner moved an application before the learned Judicial Magistrate praying that the investigation may be stopped. But, the application moved by the petitioner was rejected by the learned Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 11th June, 97. (4). The learned Public Prosecutor has not disputed this fact that police has started further investigation. The submission made by the learned Public Prosecutor is that the officer incharge of the Police Station is empowered under sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code to conduct further investigation in the case. It has also submitted by him that further investigation is being conducted since 16th January, 96 and the application dated 7th April, 97 was moved by the petitioner before the learned Judicial Magistrate after considerable delay. The learned Public Prosecutor has supported the order dated 11th June, 97 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate No.3, Jodhpur. (5). It has also submitted by him that further investigation is being conducted since 16th January, 96 and the application dated 7th April, 97 was moved by the petitioner before the learned Judicial Magistrate after considerable delay. The learned Public Prosecutor has supported the order dated 11th June, 97 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate No.3, Jodhpur. (5). The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the authority of the Police Officer to conduct further investigation in this case on the following grounds:– 1. That after the acceptance of the final report, vide order dated 18th October,94 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, no further investigation could be started by the police without permission of the Magistrate and since no prior permission of the Magistrate was obtained in the case, further investigation by the police is without legal authority. 2. That the order dated 18th October, 94 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate No.3, Jodhpur whereby he accepted the final report was a judicial order and so long that order is not set aside, further investigation by the police could not have been started as such investigation would be derogatory to the judicial order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate on the final report. 3. That in the instant case the matter is of a civil nature and no cognizable offence can be said to have been made out, and therefore, further investigation by the police under sub-section (8) of Section 176 Cr.P.C. is not warranted and therefore, it amounts to abuse of the process under the Code. (6). I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. (7). Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the police to conduct further investigation in the case. (6). I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. (7). Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the police to conduct further investigation in the case. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 reads : ``Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investi- gation, the officer incharge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-section (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they supply in relation to a report or forwarded under sub-section (2). (8). The provisions of sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code were considered by the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal Narang vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1). After considering the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898, the report of the Law Commission, the provisions of Criminal Pro- cedure Code, 1973 and the judgments of the High Courts, the Honble Supreme Court held that under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 as well as under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the police have a right to further investigate the case after the submission of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The view taken by this Court in Hanuman vs. State (2) was over ruled by the Honble Supreme Court. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal Narangs case, it must be said that even after the submission of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. the police have a statutory right to conduct further investigation in the case. A bare reading of sub-section (8) of Section 173 shows that for the purpose of exercising the powers of conducting further investigation, no formality is required to be performed as a condition precedent for the exercise of power to investigate, and therefore, further investigation is started by the police after the submission of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. before the competent court, it cannot be said that further investigation started by the police is illegal. (9).The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the obser- vations of the Honble Apex Court:- ``We should not, however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a Court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the Court of any offence. We think that in the interest of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the Court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light. (10). On the basis of the above observations the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that without obtaining a permission from the Magistrate, the police cannot start further investigation in a case in which they have already submitted a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. (11). I have carefully considered the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. A bare reading of the observations of the Honble Apex Court shows that these observations have been made in relation to those cases in which cognizance has been taken by the Court on the report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and during the pendency of judicial proceedings initiated and taking cognizance under Section 173 Cr.P.C. the police officer wants to conduct further investigation. These observations, therefore, have no application to the case in which no judicial proceedings are pending on the date when further investigation is sought to be started by the police officer. There is a material distinction between the cases in which judicial proceedings are pending in the Court on the date when further investigation is started and the cases in which no judicial proceedings are pending on the date when the further investigation is started. The difference between the two cases is that in the former cases in which the judicial proceedings have been initiated is actually conducting a judicial inquiry or trial and has to consider the question of granting adjournments under Section 309 Cr.P.C. or of re- fusing to grant an adjournment. The difference between the two cases is that in the former cases in which the judicial proceedings have been initiated is actually conducting a judicial inquiry or trial and has to consider the question of granting adjournments under Section 309 Cr.P.C. or of re- fusing to grant an adjournment. In this connection, it would be useful to draw attention to Explanation 1 given below sub-section (2) of Section 309 Cr.P.C. The explanation (1) reads :- Explanation 1.–If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. (12). In view of the Explanation 1 given below sub-sec. (2) of Section 309 Cr.P.C., it is obvious that if a judicial inquiry or trial is pending before a court which is taking cognizance on the basis of a report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the hearing of the case may be adjourned and the accused if in custody may be remanded to further custody, if there is likelihood of obtaining further evidence by a remand. In cases following in this category if the police officer wants to conduct further investigation, it is expected from him that he will inform the Court under Section 309 Cr.P.C. that he intends to conduct further investigation in the case and that there is a likelihood of collection of further evidence and he may also apply for the adjournment of the inquiry or trial and remand to further custody of the accused, who may be in custody. On the other hand, the cases in which no judicial inquiry or trial is pending before the Court, would be the cases in which there would be no necessity to exercise the powers under Section 309 Cr.P.C. and therefore, there would be no necessity of informing the Court that a further investigation is intended, nor there would be any necessity of moving any appelication for adjournment and remand under Section 309 I.P.C. The observations made by the Honble Apex Court in para no. 21 of the judgment at page 1357 of the report and quoted above do not apply to the cases in which no inquiry or trial is pending on the date when further investigation is conducted. 21 of the judgment at page 1357 of the report and quoted above do not apply to the cases in which no inquiry or trial is pending on the date when further investigation is conducted. I, therefore, do not find any force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that without the permission granted by the Magistrate, the investigation could not have been started. (13). It may be pointed out that in the case of Ram Lal Narang (supra), the police officer did not obtain any formal permission from Ambala Magistrate for second investigation. The Honble Supreme Court observed:- ``Though the investigating agency would have done better if it had informed the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal permission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that the investigating agency did not act out of any malice. We are also satisfied that there has been no illegality. (14). In view of the observations of the Honble Supreme Court, it may be said without any hesitation that even in those cases in which it is necessary for the police to inform the Court about their intention of conducting further investigation and to seek a formal permission out of regard and respect for the Court, the failure on the part of the police officer conducting investigation and to seek a formal permission from the Court to conduct further investigation does not amount to any illegality, though such omission may be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding the question whether the police officer acted in bona fide manner or acted with malice by starting further investigation in the case. (15). The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the judgments given in Namasivayam vs. State (3), S. Rampadandian vs. State (4), Kennady vs. The State (5) and Amar Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Rajasthan (6). The last case reported in Amar Singh & Ors. State of Rajasthan (supra) was decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Single Judge held that if charge-sheet is filed against some accused conclusion that no prima facie involvement was made out against other accused and that finding is accepted by the Magistrate, then the Police cannot re-investigate the matter unless the order of Magistrate is challenged or permission is sought from the said Magistrate. The learned Single Judge held that if charge-sheet is filed against some accused conclusion that no prima facie involvement was made out against other accused and that finding is accepted by the Magistrate, then the Police cannot re-investigate the matter unless the order of Magistrate is challenged or permission is sought from the said Magistrate. The learned Judge observed at page 462 of the report:– ``The learned Magistrate has passed a judicial order on May 28, 1990 by which he refused to take cognizance against the petitioners on the basis of the evidences which was recorded upto that time. There is no dispute that after the said order, no fresh material has been collec- ted and no evidence has been recorded by the police; and on the basis of the same evidences, the police wants to submit a charge-sheet against the petitioners and for that purpose they are taking steps to get them arrested. If the investigating agency is allowed to make further investigation or submit a charge-sheet against the petitioner, it would be against the above judicial order of the Magistrate, which is not permissible unless permission of further investigation is sought from the Magistrate after satisfying him. Once the entire case was examined by the Magistrate, on the same evidences, the prosecution cannot be permitted to file a charge-sheet simply because the Supdt. of Police, C.I.D. (C.B.) directed the local police to file a charge-sheet against the petitioners while the same Supdt. of Police, in his letter dt. July 28, 1990 to Supdt. of Police, Sikar, had agreed that no compliance was need to his previous letter dated July 2, 1990 as a charge-sheet was already filed against the two co-accused persons, namely, Ramlal and Khurdaram. (16). A perusal of the judgment shows that the facts of the case were different from the facts of this case. The observations made by the learned Single Judge in the case of Amar Singh (supra) should therefore, be considered in view of the peculiar circumstances of that case. It may be pointed out that the judgment given by the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal Narang (supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge, nor the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in that case was discussed. It may be pointed out that the judgment given by the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal Narang (supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge, nor the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in that case was discussed. If the observations of the learned Single Judge read as a whole, it apears that the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that a further investigation in the case was not impermissible and in view of the fact that no evidence had been collected, it was impermissible for the police to file a charge- sheet against the persons against whom no prima facie case was found by the Magistrate, who had taken cognizance of the offence on the basis of the first charge-sheet. In other words what the learned Single Judge has laid down in the case of Amar Singh is this that if on the basis of the evidence collected by the police, the Magistrate has applied its judicial mind and form the judicial opinion that no prima-facie case against one or more accused persons is made out, then it would be impermissible for the police to form a contrary opinion unless additional evidence showing a prima-facie case was collected. (17). I respectfully agree with the above conclusions of the learned Single Judge. (18). It will not be out of place to point out that Section 173 Cr.P.C. does not make any distinction between a final report and a charge-sheet. After every investigation conducted under the Criminal Procedure Code, the police is duty bound to submit a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The opinion formed by the police officer about the guilt or innocence of the persons complained against is completely irrelevant for the purpose of formation of judicial opinion by the Magistrate before whom the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is submitted. The Magistrate has to judicially consider and form an opinion whether the facts mentioned in the re- port submitted before him by the police under Section 173 constitute one or more offences of which he can take cognizance and if so, whether he should take cognizance and thereafter proceed against any person under Section 204 Cr.P.C. The opinion formed by the Station House Officer about the guilt or innocence of the accused is completely irrelevant so far as the functions of the Magistrate under Section 190 and 204 Cr.P.C. are concerned. (19). If the Magistrate has judicially considered the evidence produced before him and arrived at a conclusion that there is no ground to proceed against any accused, he is entitled to decline the issue of process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. and in such a case, the order which he may pass would be an order analogous to an order passed under Section 203 Cr.P.C. It is well established that unless additional evidence is collected, the Magistrate, who has judicially passed an order to the effect that no prima facie case is made out, is not entitled to take a contrary view, because doing so would amount to revising his order and he has no power under the Criminal Procedure Code to revise his own order. On the other hand if additional evidence be available to coming to the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out, the Magistrate would be within his powers to proceed against an accused and his act of proceeding against the accused in such a case would not amount to revising his earlier order, because he would be acting not on the same evidence as was available to him when the earlier order was passed, but on addi- tional evidence which was collected after the passing of the earlier order. (20). So far as the relevance of the opinion formed by the police as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is concerned, such opinion has no relevance to the exercise of judicial functions by the Magistrate under Section 190 and 204 Cr.P.C. Just as the Courts should not interfere with the functions of the police, the police is also not empowered to interfere with the judicial functions of any Court. It is undoubtedly within the powers of the police officer to form such opinion as he deems fit for the purpose of exercising one or more of the powers conferred on him under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The freedom to form such opinion as he deems fit carries with the responsibility for the results that may occur if he acts upon the opinion formed by him. It is also true that he is required to submit such report as the law requires to submit before a Magistrate and so far as the State is concerned, the State has a right to make such applications before a Court as may be permitted by law. But, nothing contained in the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the police officer to insist that the opinions formed by him should be taken as binding on the Courts when they performed their judicial functions under the Code. (21). The observations made by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmed Vs. Emperor (7), lay down the law that neither the Court can interfere with the functions of the police, nor the police can interfere with the functions of the Court. (22). The opinion formed by the police about the guilt or otherwise of the persons alleged to be involved is relevant for the purpose of making arrest, proceeding under Sections 169 of 170 Cr.P.C. and for moving applications under various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. So far as the powers of the police in the matter of arrest of persons accused of offence is concerned, the Honble Supreme Court has pointed out in Jogendra Kumar vs. State of U.P. (8) that mere power to make arrest does not justify the arrest of any person. There must be not only the power to arrest, but the justification for making the arrest of any person and if an arrest is made without justification, then the responsibility would be of the police officer making the arrest. A serious question arises when a person against whom the Magistrate after application of the judicial mind finds no sufficient ground to proceed under Section 204 Cr.P.C. but the police officer wants to arrest that person in the so called exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. In the case of Amar Singh (supra), such a question arose before the learned Single Judge. The police had submitted a charge-sheet against some persons. The Magistrate after judicial consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that prima facie case was made out against some accused persons, but no prima facie case was made out against the others. The police officer, however wanted to arrest those persons against whom the learned Judicial Magis- trate did not find any prima facie case and it is noteworthy that the police intended to exercise the powers of arrest without collecting any additional evidence. It is obvious that there was no justification for the police to make arrest of the same persons about whom the learned Judicial Magistrate had observed that there was no prima facie case to proceed against them. I am in respectful agreement with the opinion of the learned Single Judge that in a case of above kind, the police cannot justify the arrest so long the order of Magistrate is not set aside. If the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Jogendra Kumar vs. State of U.P. (supra) is followed in letter and spirit, there would not arise any occasion for the criticism that the police is abusing its powers of further investigation under sub-sec. (8) of Section 173 for the purpose of arresting any person otherwise than in accordance with law. (23). For the reasons mentioned above, the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the case of Amar Singh (supra) have no application to this case. (24). In M/s. Jayant Vitamins Ltd. vs. Chaitanya Kumar and Anr. (9) the Honble Supreme Court observed:– ``Needless to emphasise that the further investigation in the offence is legally permissible as contemplated by Sec. 173(8) of Criminal Procedure Code. The learned counsel appearing for the State when asked represents that the investigation is not yet complete and the State would come to a definite conclusion as to the culpability of the appellant only on the completion of the investigation. As repeatedly pointed out by various decisions of this Court that the investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the police and the superintendence thereof is vested in the State Government and the Court is not justified without any compelling and justifiable reason to interfere with the investigation. (25). As repeatedly pointed out by various decisions of this Court that the investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the police and the superintendence thereof is vested in the State Government and the Court is not justified without any compelling and justifiable reason to interfere with the investigation. (25). In light of the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal Narangs case (supra) and M/s. Jayant Vitamins Ltd. (supra), it must be said that the police have statutory power to conduct further investigation even after the sub- mission of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The orders passed by the Magistrate on the report submitted by the police under Section 173 Cr.P.C., do not in any manner deprive the police of their power to conduct further investigation. In other words, if the Magistrate has declined to take cognizance on the basis of the police report submitted before him under Section 173, no proceedings are instituted in the court of Magistrate. Such an order, though judicial order, does not prevent the police from exercising their power to conduct further investigation under sub-section (8) of Section 173. In other words, if the Magistrate has declined to take cognizance on the basis of the police report submitted before him under Section 173, no proceedings are instituted in the court of Magistrate. Such an order, though judicial order, does not prevent the police from exercising their power to conduct further investigation under sub-section (8) of Section 173. On the other hand if the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence on the basis of the report submitted before him under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the order taking cognizance of the offence results in initiation of judicial proceedings before him in respect of which he has to pass appropriate orders under Section 309 Cr.P.C. Such an order does not deprive the police of their power to conduct further investigation under sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C., but it is expected that since a judicial inquiry is initiated in the Court of the Magistrate, the police would inform the Magistrate about their intention to conduct further investigation and would also move an application for adjournment under Section 309 Cr.P.C. If the inquiry has proceeded to the state of issuing process against one or more persons and if one or more accused being in custody the question of remanding them in further custody would arise, and therefore, the police officer would be expected to move an application for adjournment of the inquiry or trial showing the necessity of further investigation and the prospect of collecting further evidence within the meaning of explanation 1 given below sub-section (2) of Section 309 Cr.P.C. Aforesaid steps are not related to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to grant remand under Section 309 Cr.P.C. or to pass order under Section 309, nor they have any relevance to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to conduct further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. Above steps, in view of the observations of the Honble Apex Court are relevant for the purpose of co-ordinating the steps taken by the police officer and the steps which are required to be taken by the Court for proper conduct and judicial inquiry or trial. Thus, whether the Magistrate deco- lines to take cognizance under Section 190 or he takes cognizance under Section 190 and initiates a trial or inquiry before him, the jurisdiction of the police to conduct further investigation under sub-sec. Thus, whether the Magistrate deco- lines to take cognizance under Section 190 or he takes cognizance under Section 190 and initiates a trial or inquiry before him, the jurisdiction of the police to conduct further investigation under sub-sec. (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. is not affected by the orders passed by the Magistrate. (26). So far as the question of abuse of their powers by the police officer are concerned, every power can be used for legitimate purposes and it can also be abused. Whenever any power is conferred upon any person, there is an inherent probability that such power may be abused. To prevent the abuse of the powers and to ensure that they are used for legitimate purposes only, proper channelisation of the powers is essential, and therefore, it is often pointed out that the powers are not in the nature of absolute rights rather they are in the nature of pious duties to be discharged in accordance with the well established principles along which they must be exercised. It is the concept of a `public duty which is more appropriate for the powers conferred on public authorities, in the context of the object for which they are conferred and the necessity of preventing their abuse. If this be a correct approach, the powers conferred upon the police officer under the Criminal Procedure Code should be regarded as public duties, which are to be discharged in accordance with the well established principles. Neither the police officer is entitled to act arbitrarily, nor he is entitled to act otherwise than in accordance with the directions which he is bound to obey while exercising the powers conferred upon him. Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Courts have ample power to pass such orders as may be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts can issue an appropriate writ and order for enforcing the fundamental rights or other legal rights. In view of these provisions, if a police officer threatens the life or personal liberty or the property of any person by abusing the powers conferred upon him under the Code, the Courts have ample powers to prevent the abuse of the powers by the police officer. In view of these provisions, if a police officer threatens the life or personal liberty or the property of any person by abusing the powers conferred upon him under the Code, the Courts have ample powers to prevent the abuse of the powers by the police officer. It is necessary that just as good surgeon performs the minimum but sufficient operation of the living organism so that the twin purposes of curing the body and keeping it alive may be served, the Courts have to identify and properly locate the malady and pass appropriate orders for the same. The maximum possibility of abuse of powers by the police arises in the matter of search and arrest. The Honble Apex Court has therefore, deemed it necessary to issue directions in the case of Jogendra Kumar vs. State of U.P. (supra) and if those directions are religiously followed, the occasion for criticising the arrest on the ground that powers to arrest have been abused would not arise. What is important to be pointed out is that even if there is a likelihood that police officer may abuse his powers to make arrest, the proper course would be not to quash the further investigation started by him under sub-section (8) of Section 173 but to give necessary directions for the purpose of preventing the abuse of powers by the police officer conducting the investigation. (27). The cases of the Madras High Court on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not assist the petitioner in establishing the point urged by him. (28). In my humble opinion, it is well establishd by the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal Narangs case (supra) and M/s. Jayant Vitamins Limiteds case (supra) that further investigation by the police under sub- section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. is permissible and that if formal permission from the Magistrate has not been obtained, it does not amount to an illegality. It is, therefore, not necessary to discuss in detail the judgments delivered by the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. The questions No. 1 and 2 are decided accordingly. (29). It is, therefore, not necessary to discuss in detail the judgments delivered by the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. The questions No. 1 and 2 are decided accordingly. (29). The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the facts stated in the F.I.R. No. 190/92 P.S. Udai Mandir, Jodhpur do not constitute an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code and at best the matter is of a civil nature. In the case of M/s. Jayant Vitamins Ltd. offences under Sections 420, 408 read with 34 and criminal conspiracy were alleged by the complainant. After investigation, the investigating officer arrived at a conclusion that the allegations were found to be an internal dispute of the company. On 23rd September, 1989 that investigating officer was transferred and another Sub Inspector was posted. The Superintendent of Police directed for investigation. The High Court quashed the investigation in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Honble Supreme Court did not approve of the quashing of the investigation and set aside the order passed by the High Court. (30). After hearing the High Court for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor and taking into consideration the facts of the case, it does not appear to be just and proper to quash further investigation. It is further necessary to point out that this Court expects the police officer conducting investigation has to exercise the powers conferred upon him under the Criminal Procedure Code in accordance with law. The police officer would be free to conduct the further investigation in such manner as he deems fit according to law. So far as the powers of arrest are concerned, it is expected that the investigating officer shall strictly abide by the law declared and the directions given by the Honble Supreme Court in Jogendra Kumar vs. State of U.P. (supra) and Shri D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal (10). (31). The prayer for quashing the further investigation started by the police u/s. 173(8) Criminal Procedure Code deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. The petition is therefore dismissed.